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MODERN GERMANY

Her Political and Economic Problems,
Her Foreign and Domestic Policy,
Her Ambitions, and the Causes
of her Successes and of her
Failures

Fifth and very greatly enlarged Edition, completely revised and brought up to January 1915

BY

J. ELLIS BARKER

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PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

THE fifth edition of *Modern Germany* is practically a new book. The last four chapters, containing about a hundred pages, have been added. They deal with the War, its causes and probable consequences, and I venture to think they should be of particular interest at the present moment. In Chapter XXXII, "The Ultimate Ruin of Germany," a pessimistic forecast of that country's future is given, while Chapter XXXIII, "How the Military Rules Germany," sheds a great deal of light upon the hidden causes of the War. I would draw special attention to Chapter XXXIV, "The German Customs of War," and Chapter XXXV, "Rules of the Hague Convention." Their perusal will enable every reader to ascertain for himself whether Germany has observed the international laws of war and her own war regulations or whether she has violated either.

The present volume contains nearly 300,000 words, or about three times as much reading matter as the average six-shilling novel. While the present edition runs to 852 pages, the first edition, published in 1905, comprised only 346 pages. Notwithstanding its very great increase in size the price of the book has now been reduced from 10*s.* 6*d.* to 7*s.* 6*d.* in order to make

it as widely accessible as possible. Unfortunately the cost of producing so large a book precluded its being sold more cheaply.

Modern Germany in its present form is, I believe, the most exhaustive book on the subject in the English language, and it has the honour of being generally considered a standard work which has even penetrated to Japan, for it has been translated into the Japanese language. My critics have very kindly declared it to be "an encyclopædia of German affairs," "a storehouse of information which cannot be found elsewhere," "an indispensable compendium, invaluable as a book of reference to statesmen, lecturers, and publicists," &c.

Ever since 1900, when I first entered the literary field, I have pointed out in numerous articles, especially in the *Nineteenth Century and After* and in the *Fortnightly Review*, that, owing to the mistaken policy of her rulers, Germany was creating enemies for herself throughout the world and endangering her future. From year to year these warnings became more emphatic. The Preface of the fourth edition of *Modern Germany*, published in autumn, 1912, contains the following passage:

"During the last few years Germany's failures, to which I had drawn attention in previous editions, have become more salient and more frequent. During twenty years the German Foreign Office has serenely marched from failure to failure. The Morocco fiasco is merely the last of a large number of mistaken and unsuccessful enterprises.

"By her policy towards Great Britain, Germany has brought into being the Triple Entente and that isolation about which she has so frequently complained, and she is accelerating the unification of the British

Empire, which she wishes to prevent and has tried to prevent. The failure of her domestic policy is proclaimed by the constant increase of the Social Democratic Party, which polled more than 4,250,000 votes at the election of 1912. Germany's prosperity is admittedly phenomenal. Still, a careful observer cannot help noticing that her economic progress is slackening. Germany's future seems no longer as bright as it used to appear, and deep pessimism prevails in leading German circles."

I foresaw and frequently foretold the present War, and warned not only British statesmen and the British public of the coming catastrophe, but also the leading German statesmen, as may be seen in Chapter XXXII. Unfortunately these warnings, addressed to the most eminent official German personages, produced no effect.

Most of the chapters of this book have appeared in the form of articles in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, the *Fortnightly Review*, the *National Review*, and the *Contemporary Review*, and I herewith cordially thank their editors for their permission to reprint these.

In conclusion, I would draw attention to the Analytical Index at the end of this book, which should greatly increase its practical utility.

J. Ellis Barker.

London,
January 25, 1915.

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MODERN GERMANY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION—THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE IN ENGLAND AND IN GERMANY

SINCE her creation in 1871, Modern Germany (Prusso-Germany) has become a factor of constantly increasing importance in the world's politics, industry, and commerce. Formerly Germany was a humble admirer and modest imitator of everything English. In political and economic methods she was England's follower. Now, Germany has become a formidable competitor to this country, and her importance and strength are constantly and rapidly increasing from year to year.

Two or three decades ago, Great Britain's political position in the world was unchallenged, and seemed to be unchallengeable, by Germany. England possessed almost the world's monopoly in the manufacturing industries, in engineering, in commerce, in banking, and in the shipping trade. Now, our formerly undisputed, and then apparently indisputable, paramountcy in manufacturing and in the various branches of trade has disappeared, owing to the stress and success of Germany's competition. The Germans, although they are a nation and a race of landsmen, and although they possess practically no harbours

and no maritime and colonial experience, even try to wrest from this country its patrimony, its paramount position on the ocean and the rule of the sea, which seems to be the peculiar gift of Nature to these islands. Germany appears to threaten even our position as a colonial and as a world power, and has tried to oppose the unification of the British Empire. Will Germany be as successful against this country in matters political as she has been in trade and industry?

The fact that Great Britain has, politically and economically, lost much ground to Germany cannot be denied, and Germany's success in nearly all fields where she has chosen to compete with this country seems all the more astonishing if we bear in mind that her natural resources in men and matter are much inferior to those possessed by this country.

Germany's geographical position and physical configuration and structure, her climate, her agricultural soil, and her mineral wealth are greatly inferior to those possessed by Great Britain. Germany is naturally a poor country, and her natural poverty has been accentuated by numerous wars and invasions which have frequently devastated her territories. Until lately, she had but little accumulated wealth, and she was almost exclusively an agricultural State. She has only inferior coal, she does not possess any colonies worthy of the name, and until a few years ago she had hardly any experience in manufacturing, commerce, shipping, and finance.

The aristocratic form of her government and the survival of feudal institutions, feudal privileges, and of many mediæval prejudices oppose and stifle, to some extent, even at the present day, personal ambition and individual effort in Germany.

Germany is pre-eminently a military nation. She is greatly hampered by universal and compulsory military service, and the military spirit prevails to such an extent that, until a few years ago, trade and every form of making money was looked down upon with undisguised contempt by her upper classes. Bankers and merchants used to be the pariahs of society, and they are even now not treated as the equals of military officers, university professors, and professional men.

Evidently Germany is very heavily handicapped by nature and by her history, by traditions and by her customs; yet, notwithstanding all these natural and artificial disadvantages and obstacles, which greatly hamper her in the race for success, and especially in the race for economic success, Germany, who but three decades ago was a poor and backward country, has become Great Britain's greatest and most dangerous rival on sea and land the world over. Will she eventually succeed in driving Great Britain to the wall by force of will and by the force of arms, or by patient application, industry, and study?

Many thoughtful and patriotic Englishmen view with uneasiness, if not with alarm, Germany's rapid progress and her equally rapid and sometimes threatening encroachments upon what had been, until lately, considered to be Great Britain's political and economic preserves. Will Germany eventually supplant Great Britain, and take our place in the world? What is Germany's policy towards this country, towards the United States, Holland, Austria-Hungary, France, and Russia? What are Germany's aims, what are her ambitions, and, above all, what are the causes of her marvellous success?

These are questions which are frequently heard,

and they are, perhaps, the most urgent questions of the time. These are questions which should occupy all those who have the welfare, the greatness, the happiness, the traditions, and the prosperity of this country truly at heart, and the following pages have been written with the object of supplying an answer to these most important questions.

If we look for the ultimate causes of Germany's marvellous success, it will become clear that Germany is no longer a more or less mechanical imitator of this country. On the contrary, German policy, even where it imitates this country in matter, differs completely from it in manner, for German policy is guided by principles of government which are diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of British state-craft.

The conception of the position of the State and of its duties towards the citizens is totally different in the two countries. Hence it comes that the authority of the State and the functions of the State in Germany and in Great Britain are quite dissimilar, and Germany's different conception of the functions of the State seems to be one of the chief causes, if not the principal cause, of her success.

The watchword of all British Governments has been Individualism, Non-interference, and Free Trade —that is to say, free exchange. The governmental policy of Great Britain has been the policy of *laissez-faire*. Our policy of *laissez-faire* is based on custom, and it has been recommended as the best policy by the most distinguished British statesmen, philosophers, and political economists of modern times. That policy has been considered the natural and the only possible policy for this country, for Englishmen are constitutionally impatient of, one might almost say hostile

to, governmental interference, and even to the justified assertion of governmental authority. Bagehot truly remarked: "We look on State action not as our own action, but as alien action, as an imposed tyranny from without, not as the consummated result of our own organised wishes. . . . The natural impulse of the English people is to resist authority."

In Great Britain, both the State and the local authorities are meant to be, and are made to be, subservient to society. State and local communities are, on the whole, deliberately subordinated to the will of the individual, whose rights and privileges are jealously guarded against every form of official interference and coercion; and if private rights and national rights happen to come into collision, private rights are apt to prove the stronger. In Great Britain the nation has to give way before the individual, and the individual can tyrannise the nation if he is strong and rich enough and cares to do so, as may be seen by the action of our shipping rings, railway companies, &c., whilst the nation cannot treat the individual unjustly. Private rights are well defined, national and public rights are not so defined.

In Germany, on the other hand, the will of the individual is deliberately subordinated to the will of the State and to that of the local authorities, which exercise a somewhat absolutistic rule. The nation is disciplined and taught obedience as its first duty, and it is considered the first duty of the State and of the local authorities to maintain order. Conscientious resistance, active resistance, passive resistance, open resistance, and resistance by evasion, by subterfuge, or by the skilful abuse of the law, are practically unknown in Germany. In Germany, State and nation and State and society are practically one.

Therefore, the State and the nation act in matters political and economical like one man. The individual has to give way to the State, which represents all individuals, and, in the absence of organised and powerful opposition and obstruction, progress in Germany is comparatively easily and rapidly achieved.

In Great Britain, national and local authorities rule and legislate with a show of power, but in reality they rule and legislate merely on the sufferance of society. National and local authorities have to obey the will, and even the whim, of a majority of voters or supporters, and in consequence of that permanent dependence on that volatile factor, Public Opinion, they do not lead, but are led by society, as represented or misrepresented by public opinion. This is the reason that our national and local authorities possess no initiative, that they always wait to be pushed, that they originate little, and that they are satisfied to exist to maintain order, to administer in accordance with precedent, to perpetuate, to preserve.

As a result of the predominance of society over the State in this country, the strongest conservative influence in Great Britain, and the strongest opposition to progress unfortunately also, lies in our administration, which is hostile to all change, and therefore to all progress. Owing to their lack of authority, national and local "authorities" in this country administer mechanically, soullessly, impersonally, but do not lead—they reign, but do not govern. After having destroyed the power of the Crown, we have crippled the power of the national executive and administration as well; and we have substituted party government, caucus government, mass government, carried on by endless unbeautiful disputes for power, miscalled discussion, for truly national govern-

ment. Great Britain has many heads but no head, many wills but no will, many minds but no mind. Great Britain is a nation divided against itself. Great Britain is a kingdom in name, but it is in reality a republic presided over and directed by the vague and uncertain moods and fancies of ill-informed masses, personified under the name of "The Man in the Street." Even republics proper, which are composed of individual and very independent States, such as the United States and Switzerland, possess a more national government, a more national administration and a more national organisation, than does Great Britain.

In Germany, national and local authorities consider it their duty to lead, to initiate, to sow, to plant, to foster, to support, to regulate, to instruct. The governing individuals of Germany are not distinguished and irresponsible amateurs, without administrative training, supported merely by a section of the nation, a party; but they are, as a rule, distinguished and fully responsible experts in administration, who, owing to their qualifications for the office which they occupy, are supported by the whole nation. Therefore, they can speak and act in the name of the nation, and their every action is not condemned on principle by "His Majesty's Opposition," as anti-national, unconstitutional, dangerous, foolish, &c.

The German nation and the German communities look to their national and local governors and administrators for guidance, for enlightenment, for initiative, for encouragement, and for protection. Evidently the State has a totally different position and totally different functions in the body politic of Germany than it has in that of Great Britain, and

the conception of the duties of the State towards the citizens, and of the local authorities towards the citizens, is quite another one in Germany than it is in this country.

In Great Britain, nearly all progress and nearly all great reforms have been initiated by far-sighted but irresponsible amateurs, who have had to fight against the inertia, the indifference, the ill-will, and the opposition of the governing individuals, official and unofficial. In Germany, nearly all progress and nearly all great reforms are due to the initiative of distinguished and enlightened officials, who only too often had to fight against the inertia, the indifference, the ill-will, and the opposition of almost the whole nation. If Germany had followed the policy of *laissez-faire*, if the German Government had been subordinated to "the will of the people," and if it had always waited for the lead of "The Man in the Street," the German nation would still be a medley of peasants, university professors, philosophers, and soldiers. Germany would not have become a nation, but she would still be divided against herself in hundreds of petty principalities, and Voltaire's word, "England rules the sea, France the land, Germany the clouds," would now be as true as it was when it was coined.

Unintelligent Government interference by incapable or selfish administrators, who abused or ill-used their position, to which they were not entitled, and for which they were not qualified, proved so disastrous to this country at the time when Great Britain was cursed with class rule, that nearly all governmental interference is now opposed and condemned in advance as certain to prove a costly failure. On the other hand, a higher conception of

the duties and scope of the State and intelligent governmentalism, governmental initiative, State-organised national effort and State-organised national co-operation, which sprang from that higher conception of the functions of the State, have made Germany united, powerful, wealthy, and successful, and have rapidly converted a backward and conservative military peasant State into a progressive modern industrial nation.

Individualism is the strength, but it is at the same time the weakness, of this country. Individualism is an excellent medicine, but it is no panacea, and it must be taken only in moderate doses. Exaggerated individualism is harmful. Too much liberty and too much individualism have destroyed the greatness of the Netherlands, and have completely destroyed the ancient republic of Poland. Individual isolated effort has made this country great and prosperous in the past, but individualism may not prove equally effective in the future. Individualism has made Great Britain wonderfully successful at a time when other countries were greatly inferior to Great Britain in organisation, and when, besides, they were politically disunited. When other States had not yet become nations, and were constantly at war, British individualism had an immense chance and an immense scope, for then intelligent and enterprising British individuals were pitted against less intelligent foreign individuals, but not against foreign States.

At the present time, when other nations are no longer divided against themselves, as was Germany of old, but have become homogeneous, unified, nations in fact and nations in organisation, and when the most progressive nations have become gigantic institu-

tions for self-improvement and gigantic business concerns on co-operative principles, the spasmodic individual efforts of patriotic and energetic Englishmen and their unorganised individual action prove less effective for the good of their country than they were formerly. The most determined and even the most heroic individual efforts of the ablest and strongest individual Englishmen are altogether futile, if they are directed against the serried ranks of highly-organised foreign nations, even if these are composed of men who, individually, are in every respect greatly inferior to Englishmen.

Class government has proved a failure in England, and party government, as at present carried on, is proving a failure, because the enormous forces of opposition and of obstruction act as an effective check to rapid and even to adequate political and economic progress. Chiefly owing to indiscriminate, determined, and somewhat unscrupulous party opposition, progress in Great Britain is so slow that this country is every year falling farther behind in the race. At a snail's pace we try to catch up a horse. Hence, it seems that both class government and party government, as at present constituted, have had their day, and that the time has come for national government, national organisation, national co-operation, and for the management of national and local affairs not by irresponsible amateurs and party men, who represent the vague instincts of the likewise irresponsible "Man in the Street," but by practical, experienced, and distinguished business men, who are willing to lead, to direct, and to govern in a manner worthy of this country.

Governmentalism and individualism may be combined, and that nation which succeeds best in com-

bining these two enormous forces will prove the most successful in the race. Japan's marvellous success in peace and in war is chiefly, if not entirely, due to the successful blending of a highly-organised governmentalism and of an equally highly developed individualism; and if this country is able to link those mighty forces together, Great Britain at the head of the British Empire will again obtain the leading position in the world, which, by her geographical position, her latent resources, and her opportunities, is her due.

Germany has been successful, but she is not so successful as she might have been because individualism is repressed. The individual German is not given enough scope. Besides, Germany is in some respects not well governed, and the ill result of partial misgovernment and of the rash repression of individualism may be seen in the phenomenon of the Social Democratic Party and in Germany's failure as a colonising power. *Est modus in rebus.*

CHAPTER II

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY

We cannot fully understand the foreign policy of Germany unless we previously cast a glance into Germany's past, and examine the genesis and the development of the State and the rise of its policy and of its political traditions. Germany, as known to the older generation, was a country peopled with philosophers, poets, composers, slow and sleepy officials, and backward peasants; it was an æsthetical, sentimental, day-dreaming land. Modern Germany is matter-of-fact, hard-headed, calculating, cunning, business-like, totally devoid of sentimentality, and sometimes even of sentiment, and very up-to-date. But modern Germany and old Germany are two different countries. New Germany is an enlarged Prussia. Old Germany continues to vegetate and to dream dreams under the name and under the banner of Austria; and it should not be forgotten that those Germans who used to be considered typical representatives of Germany, such as Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Wieland, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Uhland, Lenau, Hegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart, Haydn, belonged to old Germany and were non-Prussians.

Six hundred years ago the country where the foundation of Prussia was laid was a wilderness, which was considered to lie outside the then German Empire, and it was inhabited by heathen savages. These were

ruthlessly massacred and extirpated by the knights of the Teutonic Order, who were sent to Prussia to conquer and to colonise that country, and of the ancient Prussians nothing has remained excepting the name. The Teutonic knights won the country to Christianity, and replaced the massacred population with emigrants from all parts of Germany, but they created at the same time an intolerable feudal anarchy in the country. The land became divided among powerful robber-knights, such as the Quitzows, the Putlitzes, the Rochows, &c., and as these denied obedience to the Empire, Prince Frederick of Hohenzollern, a reduced but warlike Suabian nobleman, who had some inconsiderable possessions in the south of Germany, was sent by the Emperor in 1415 to Prussia with the mission to create order in that savage and rebellious country, the government of which was vested in him and in his heirs for ever. With fire and sword the Hohenzollerns reduced the rebellious knights and the independent cities of Prussia to obedience, and created an absolutely centralised State ruled by the sword, which remained military in character partly because the population was composed of lawless and reckless adventurers and criminals from everywhere, partly because the State was ever threatened by hordes of the neighbouring Slavs and by the armies of then powerful Poland. Thus, up to a comparatively recent time, savagery and arbitrary rule prevailed in Prussia, and Prussia occupied a position in Europe not unlike that held by the Balkan States at the present day. In 1650 London had 500,000 inhabitants, Paris had 400,000 inhabitants, Amsterdam had 300,000 inhabitants, whilst Berlin was a village of 10,000 inhabitants. Up to a very recent time Prussia was a semi-barbarous State.

Prussia, like Rome, was founded by a band of needy and warlike adventurers. Both States were artificial creations, both could maintain themselves only by force of arms and extend their frontiers only by wars of aggression, and the character of both States may be read in the records of their early history. By the force of events and by the will of her masterful rulers Prussia grew up, and ever since has been, a nation in arms, as may be seen at a glance from the following figures, which more clearly illustrate the history of Prussia than would a lengthy account.

	Square Kilometres of Prussia.	Inhabitants of Prussia.	Number of Soldiers in Standing Army during Peace Time.	Percentage of Soldiers to Population.
1688 . . .	113,000	1,500,000	38,000	2.5
1740 . . .	121,000	2,250,000	80,000	3.6
1786 . . .	199,000	5,500,000	195,000	3.6
1865 . . .	275,500	18,800,000	210,000	1.1
1867 . . .	347,500	23,600,000	260,000	1.1
1912 (Germany)	541,000	66,000,000	626,732	1.0

During the last two hundred and twenty years the population of Great Britain has grown fivefold. During the same period the territory ruled by the Hohenzollerns has grown fivefold in size and the population of their dominions has increased no less than forty-fold. In 1688 Great Britain had five times more inhabitants than had Prussia, but at present Germany has 50 per cent. more inhabitants than has this country. These few figures prove how successful has been the policy of the Hohenzollerns, and in view of their success it is only natural that modern Germany closely follows Prussia's political methods and traditions. The foregoing table shows also that the marvellous rapidity with which Prusso-Germany has grown was due to the strength of her army. *Machtpolitik*, the policy of force, the policy of the mailed fist, has

always been Prussia's favoured policy; it has hitherto been exceedingly effective, and it has, therefore, not unnaturally, become Prusso-Germany's policy as well.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the little State of Prussia used to maintain a much larger army than Austria, France, and other great, densely populated, and wealthy States. Her army was, as a rule, exceedingly well drilled and absolutely ready for war, and by her army and by her not over-scrupulous diplomacy Prussia succeeded in aggrandising herself at the cost of her neighbours.

Up to the death of Frederick William I. Prussia's diplomacy was simple, crude, artless, and clumsy, though energetic. Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, opened a new era in Prussia's foreign policy, for that monarch gave to the diplomacy of his country a new character. The main principle of Frederick the Great's foreign policy was to act with startling rapidity against an unprepared and unsuspecting opponent. In his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien, des Principes sur lesquels il roule, avec quelques Réflexions Politiques*, which was written either in 1775 or 1776, he advises his successor as follows: "Constant attention must be paid to hiding, as far as possible, one's plans and ambitions. . . . Secrecy is an indispensable virtue in politics as well as in the art of war."

During the year before he came to the throne, Frederick the Great wrote his celebrated book, the *Anti-Machiavel*, in order to confute Machiavelli's *Prince*, a book which, according to Frederick's preface, was one of the most monstrous and most poisonous compositions which had ever been penned. According to the concluding words of his book, Frederick dedicated the *Anti-Machiavel* to his brother sovereigns; at the end of chapter vi. Frederick emphatically pro-

claims, "Let Cæsar Borgia be the ideal of Machiavel's admirers, my ideal is Marcus Aurelius."

The *Anti-Machiavel*, which was published in 1740, the year in which Frederick ascended the throne, seemed to be a political pronunciamento of the highest importance and the political programme of the King, and very likely it was meant to appear as such in the eyes of the world and to impress foreign rulers with Frederick's love of peace. However, in December of the very year during which the *Anti-Machiavel* had appeared and had proclaimed that Frederick meant to be a prince of peace, the King, under the shallowest of pretexts and without a declaration of war, invaded Silesia and wrested it from Austria, "because," as he frankly confesses in his *Memoirs*, "that act brought prestige, and added strength, to Prussia."

Marcus Aurelius was Frederick's ideal only in his *Anti-Machiavel*. In his military testament Frederick the Great shows himself an admirer and disciple of Machiavel, for we read in that document: "A war is a good war when it is undertaken for increasing the prestige of the State, for maintaining its security, for assisting one's allies, or for frustrating the ambitious plans of a monarch who is bent on conquests which may be harmful to one's interests." In other words, every advantageous war is a good war.

In 1741 Sweden declared war against Russia. Frederick assured Russia on his word of honour that he had not instigated that war, but his assurances were unavailing, and Brakel, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, warned his Government "not to believe the King, who was consumed with ambitious projects and who would not keep the peace as long as he was alive." It should be noted that it was Frederick's settled policy to foment wars among his powerful neighbours. This

policy was formulated in the following words by Frederick the Great in his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien*, which was written for the guidance of his successors : "If possible the Powers of Europe should be made envious against one another in order to give occasion for a *coup* when opportunity offers."

Frederick the Great's attitude towards Russia furnishes us with the key to Germany's historic and traditional policy towards her Eastern neighbour. In Frederick the Great's *Histoire de mon Temps* we read : "Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should cultivate the friendship of those barbarians, because they are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense number of their mounted troops, whilst one cannot repay them for the damage which they may do because of the poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia and through which one has to pass in order to get into the Ukraine." Russia was dangerous to Prussia, and she possessed nothing worth the taking. A war with Russia, even if it should be victorious, was therefore bound to be very unprofitable to Prussia. Hence it was in Prussia's interest to make Russia harmless either by peaceful means or by involving her in wars with other countries.

The easiest way to neutralise a powerful country and a possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance with that very State. Therefore we read in his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien* :—

"One of the first political principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free as long as the alliance lasts."

In another part of his writings Frederick advises his successors: "Before engaging in a war to the south or west of the kingdom every Prussian prince should secure at any cost the neutrality of Russia if he be unable to obtain her active support."

According to Frederick's advice, alliances were to be formed by Prussia, not so much for the defence of Prussia's possessions as for their extension. Alliances were to be considered as engagements which were to serve rather for Prussia's benefit than for the mutual advantage of the allies, and were to be instruments which were to serve more for aggrandisement than for preservation and for defence.

Frederick's views as to the sanctity of a ruler's obligations under a treaty of alliance are exceedingly interesting. As the views of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck with regard to a nation's duties under a treaty of alliance coincide, and as these views considerably differ from the English conception as to the sanctity of treaty bonds, it is worth while quoting Frederick's views as to the binding force of treaties which he expressed in his *Memoirs* as follows:—

"If the ruler is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice engagements, the continuation of which would be harmful to his country. Examples of broken treaties are frequent. . . .

"It is clear to me that a private person must scrupulously keep his word even if he has given it rashly. If he fails to do so, the law will be set into motion, and after all only an individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another ruler breaks his engagements? The word of a private man involves but an individual; that of a sovereign involves, and may mean misery for, whole nations. Therefore the problem may be summed up thus: Is it better that a nation should perish or that a sovereign should break his treaty? Who would be so imbecile as to hesitate how to decide?"

The foregoing explanation reminds of Bismarck's cynical remark recorded by Busch: "What are alliances? Alliances are when one has to."

On December 6th, 1772, Frederick the Great wrote to Voltaire, "The world is governed only by skill and trickery," and one is amazed at the skill and trickery with which, during many years of laborious, most intricate and unceasing diplomatic negotiations, Frederick the Second endeavoured to involve Russia and Austria, his strongest neighbours, in war with one another. Sometimes Poland was the object which was to serve Frederick's policy, sometimes Turkey, and Frederick in countless letters never tired pointing out that Russia's advance meant a frightful danger to Austria. On September 3rd, 1770, Frederick met Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Prime Minister, at Neustadt, and impressed upon him that "Austria can on no account allow Russia to cross the Danube. . . . I am aware that, if the Russians cross the Danube, you would be unable passively to look on. . . . Could you not persuade France to make a declaration to you that, if you were to break with Russia and to make war against her if the Russians should cross the Danube, France would send 100,000 men to help you? You would confide the news to me and I would make use of it."

In these attempts to commit Austria against Russia we have the model which served Bismarck in 1866. At the time of the Austro-Prussian war Napoleon the Third endeavoured as an offset to Prussia's conquests to obtain some territorial compensation for France on the left border of the Rhine. Bismarck, unwilling to let it come to a rupture between Prussia and France at that awkward moment when hostilities had not yet ceased, proposed to Napoleon that he should take

Belgium, as he, Bismarck, had frequently advised the Emperor in former years. Napoleon fell into Bismarck's trap, and Benedetti handed at Bismarck's request a draft agreement to Bismarck which was to be placed before the King of Prussia. As soon as Benedetti had given to Bismarck that compromising document, it was sent to Russia to be shown to the Tsar, and Bismarck explained to Benedetti that the delay in deciding upon it was caused by the hesitation of the King of Prussia. By this trick Bismarck succeeded in convincing the Tsar that France was a disturber of the peace, and in securing Russia's support in the subsequent war against France.

Frederick's skill and trickery was not confined to his unceasing attempts to create war among his neighbours. The division of Poland was Frederick's work, but he knew how to put the odium of that transaction on the shoulders of Russia, who apparently took the initiative. Austria had intended to keep aloof from the partition of Poland, and a short-sighted Prussian statesman would have endeavoured to take advantage of Austria's disinclination to participate in that shameful transaction in order to secure a larger portion of Polish territory for Prussia. However, Frederick looked farther ahead, and therefore he wished to induce Austria to assist in the spoliation of Poland. On February 16th, 1772, Frederick wrote to Solms: "If Austria gets no part of Poland all the hatred of the Poles will be turned against us. They would then regard the Austrians as their sole protectors, and the latter would gain so much prestige and influence with them that they would have thousands of opportunities for intrigues of all kinds in that country." In these words we find the reasons which caused Frederick to work upon Austria for years until he at last succeeded

in persuading her against her will that it would be in her own interest if she took part in the division of Poland. By giving Austria a part of Poland Frederick made his own share of the plunder smaller but more secure. At the same time he weakened Austria by furnishing her with a disaffected province and a cause of friction with Russia, for those parts of Poland which fell to Austria were coveted by the Russians. The partition of Poland bound the three confederates in that crime to one another, and thus Frederick succeeded in creating a situation which allowed Prussia to aggrandise herself easily at the cost of the minor German States and of France. Bismarck's political successes were founded on, and made possible by, the partition of Poland which had made Russia Prussia's traditional friend and ally. He imitated Frederick's policy when, in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, he estranged Italy and France by securing for France Tunis, upon which Italy had the strongest claim, and when he estranged Russia and Austria-Hungary by giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, while Russia returned from the Congress empty-handed. Owing to this arrangement, Austria and Russia and France and Italy were set against one another. For their own safety Austria and Italy had to seek Germany's support, and thus the Triple Alliance was made a necessity.

Frederick the Great had said in his *Exposé*: "All far-off acquisitions are a burden to the State. A village on the frontier is worth more than a principality two hundred and fifty miles away." Bearing in mind the wisdom of Frederick's maxim, Bismarck refused to embark in risky but dazzling adventures which appealed to the imagination, and which were suggested to him by the representatives of old Germany, South German professors, and cosmopolitan philanthropists

who, fifty years ago, agitated in favour of making Germany a sea Power. Not heeding their recommendations, Bismarck kept in mind "the village on the frontier." Believing that he ought first to settle the business nearest at hand, he intended, before embarking on the sea, to make Prussia the strongest Power on the Continent of Europe. Nor was Bismarck willing to follow the policy recommended to him by the German Liberals, who, guided by the declamation and the rhetoric fireworks of Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright, and other distinguished Englishmen, preached disarmament, the weakening of the executive of government, the establishment of a universal brotherhood among nations in a universal commonwealth of commerce and the universal freedom of trade. Believing that the Millennium was not yet at hand, Bismarck refused to be guided by the somewhat hazy sentiments of unpractical, though large-hearted, enthusiasts, and resolved to rely in his policy on the old Prussian political traditions and methods, which he summed up in the two words "Blood and iron." Therefore he meant to raise Prussia to further greatness not by a sentimental policy of drift, but by vigorous action and by the sword.

Immediately on coming into power Bismarck doubled the Prussian army, and, bearing in mind Frederick's advice to ally Prussia with her most dangerous neighbour, her future antagonist, he induced Austria in 1864 to enter, in alliance with Prussia, upon a common campaign against Denmark, who was deprived of Schleswig-Holstein with the harbour of Kiel, and of more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. Thus Bismarck brought Prussia back to her traditional policy of conquest, and after fifty years of peace reopened the war-era in Europe. Two years later, after having secured Napoleon the Third's benevolent

neutrality in return for vague promises that France should have Belgium, Bismarck attacked Austria, Prussia's ally in the Danish campaign of 1864, being determined to humble Austria and thus to secure for Prussia the leading place among the German States.

Having secured Russia's support against France largely by the means which have previously been described in this chapter, Bismarck turned against France, who, by her benevolent attitude towards Prussia during the Austro-Prussian war, had assisted materially in Prussia's aggrandisement exactly as Austria had done in 1864. Through Bismarck's skilful management of the Spanish question,—the alteration in the text of the Ems telegram was a minor incident,—war broke out between France and Prussia in 1870, and, after a victorious campaign, in which the South German States joined, the German Empire was erected on the ruins of France, and the South German States became amalgamated with Prussia. Thus Prussia became almost synonymous with the German Empire. The King of Prussia became Emperor of Germany, which, as William the First somewhat contemptuously, though very truly, said, was merely "an enlarged Prussia."

Having raised Prussia to greatness, Bismarck, like Frederick the Great, endeavoured to weaken his most powerful neighbour, Russia, who, at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, had announced that she would assist Germany if another Power should assist France. Thus Russia had kept Austria, Italy, and Denmark at bay, who were willing to help France, and had enabled Prussia to defeat France and to raise herself to further greatness. Encouraged, incited, and almost pushed by Bismarck, Russia made war upon Turkey in 1877. This war utterly crippled her

strength and, thanks to Bismarck's manipulation at the Congress of Berlin, she was deprived of the fruits of her victory, which she had expected Germany would, in gratitude for her past services, assist in securing for her.

When Bismarck had established Germany's greatness and had secured her paramountcy on the Continent of Europe by weakening all her neighbours by creating discord between all European great Powers, he thought that now the time had come for Germany to seek further expansion in other continents, and he, not William the Second, originated Germany's world policy. Already in 1876 Bismarck had contemplated acquiring a large part of South Africa with the help of the Boers. According to the very reliable Poschinger, Santa Lucia Bay was to be acquired by Germany, and German merchants were found ready to build a railway from that harbour to Pretoria, and to run a line of ships to Santa Lucia Bay, whereto, by specially cheap fares, a great stream of German emigrants was to be directed. Thus a German South Africa was to be founded. The sum of marks 100,000,000 (£5,000,000) was thought to be sufficient for financing that enterprise, and German business men were willing to find that sum, provided 5 per cent. interest on that sum was given to them by the State during ten years. At that time Germany was financially exhausted through a violent Stock Exchange crisis and through the consequences of Free Trade, which had crippled her manufacturing industries. Therefore this project had temporarily to be abandoned for lack of funds. In 1884 Bismarck made another and more determined attempt at acquiring Santa Lucia Bay, but this second attempt miscarried through the incapacity of his son, to whom the negotiations had been entrusted.

Since the time when Prussia and Germany were

given Parliaments, Prusso-German policy is no longer exclusively shaped by the ruler and his trusted minister, but it is influenced to some considerable extent by the will and by the wishes of the people. Consequently, if we wish to understand the foreign policy of Germany, we must not only consider the attitude of the actual political leaders of the nation and weigh the influence of those political traditions of the country which have become the leading political axioms of State, but we must also consider the views of the very influential German professors.

The German university professors play a very important part in the foreign policy of Germany. There are twenty-three universities in Germany, in which more than three thousand professors teach more than sixty thousand students. These three thousand university professors not only form the minds of the professional men and of the future high and low officials, and thus influence cultured public opinion in the making, but they also write much for the newspapers. The views of the German professors carry very great weight with the newspapers, and thus they profoundly influence not only the cultured circles but the whole nation.

None of the German university professors has exercised a greater influence upon the shaping and the development of Germany's foreign policy than Professor von Treitschke, the great historian, who, during about thirty years, enjoyed the greatest authority in the lecture room and with the Press in matters political. No German professor of his time had a greater weight and a more lasting influence with the German patriots. Therefore we must take note of his leading views and of the political doctrines which he inculcated.

Treitschke gazed ahead towards the time when his dream of a Greater Germany, a Germany whose

dominions would extend beyond the seas, would be realised; when Germany would be able to enter upon a world-embracing policy, and when, after having acquired the harbours of Holland and built an enormous fleet, she would be able to measure her strength with that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. The claim of the Pan-Germans to the possession of the whole Rhine is not of recent origin. It is based on Treitschke's claim which he formulated in his book, *Politik*, as follows:—

"Germany, whom Nature has treated in a stepmotherly manner, will be happy when she has received her due and possesses the Rhine in its entirety. . . . It is a resource of the utmost value. By our fault its most valuable part has come into the hands of strangers, and it is an indispensable task for German policy to regain the mouths of that river. A purely political union with Holland is unnecessary, because the Dutch have grown into an independent nation, but an economical union with them is indispensable. We are too modest if we fear to state that the entrance of Holland into our customs system is as necessary for us as is our daily bread, but apparently we are afraid to pronounce the most natural demands which a nation can formulate."

In view of Germany's dearth of harbours the acquisition of the Netherlands was considered the first step towards entering upon a world-embracing policy, and acquiring a predominant position not only in Europe but in the world across the ocean. It was clear to Treitschke that Germany could acquire such a position only after England had been crushed and after the rule of the sea had been wrested from her. Then, and then only, would Germany find a free field for her energy in every quarter of the world. This was his view, and he explained the nature of the future relations between Germany and this country with his usual candour at every occasion. The policy which he recommended towards this country, and his opinion

of this country, may be seen from the following characteristic extract from his paper, entitled *Die Türkei und die Grossmächte*, which was published on June 20th, 1876 :—

"Whatever one may think of British liberty, England of to-day is no doubt a Power for action in the society of nations, but her power is clearly an anachronism. It was created in the olden time when the world's wars were decided by naval battles and by hired mercenaries, and when it was considered good policy to rob well-situated fortresses and naval ports without any regard to their ownership and history. In this century of national States and of armed nations a cosmopolitan trading Power such as England can no longer maintain itself for any length of time. The day will come and must come when Gibraltar will belong to the Spaniards, Malta to the Italians, Heligoland to the Germans, and the Mediterranean to the nations who live on the Mediterranean. . . . England is to-day the shameless representative of barbarism in International Law. Hers is the blame, if naval wars still bear the character of privileged piracy."

Treitschke detested this country, wished to see it crushed, and hoped to see a huge German World Empire arise on the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom. Decades would have to pass by until Germany would be strong enough to crush the Anglo-Saxons. Meanwhile the most pressing need of Germany seemed to Treitschke the acquisition of large colonies situated in a temperate zone whereto a stream of German emigrants might be directed. In *Deutsche Kämpfe* we read :—

"In the South of Africa circumstances are decidedly favouring us. English colonial policy, which has been successful everywhere else, has not had a lucky hand at the Cape of Good Hope. The civilisation which exists there is Teutonic, is Dutch. The policy of England in South Africa, which vacillates between weakness and brutality, has created a deadly and unextinguishable hatred against her among the Dutch Boers. . . . If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our

interests and those of England is unavoidable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power of Central Europe had to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, and with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult one."

Having taken note of the world-embracing political measures which Treitschke advocated, let us now consider the leading maxims of his political philosophy. Treitschke lectured not only on history but on policy as well, and the political theories which he taught have been of very great importance in developing the political mind, and in creating the political conscience, of Germany. It would lead too far to describe here Treitschke's system of policy. It must suffice to say that his system is but an elaboration of the political teaching of Machiavelli and the glorification of the political methods which have been adopted with such marvellous success by Frederick the Great and by Bismarck. Therefore we read in the beginning of his book *Politik* :—

"It will always redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has placed the State on a solid foundation, and that he has freed the State and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the Church, but especially because he has been the first to teach : 'The State is Power.' "

Starting from his fundamental conception that "The State is Power," that it is not a moral agent, but merely power, Treitschke logically arrives at the following conclusion regarding the sacredness of treaties : "Every State reserves to itself the right of judging as to the extent of its treaty obligations."

If we bear in mind Treitschke's teaching, can we wonder that Treitschke's pupils gave such a peculiar interpretation to that Anglo-German Treaty regarding

the integrity of China which was explained away by German diplomacy immediately after it had been signed, which since has become known as the Yangtse Agreement, and which our Foreign Office might safely have put into the fire? Seeing in the State not a moral representative of the nation, but merely power personified, Treitschke was the most determined opponent to international arbitration, for we read in his book *Politik*: "The institution of international and permanent courts of arbitration is incompatible with the very nature of the State. Only in a question of secondary or tertiary importance would it be possible to obey the ruling of such a court. For vital questions there exists no impartial foreign power, and to the end of history arms will give the final decision. Herein lies the sacredness of war." Taking note of Treitschke's political philosophy, we cannot wonder that modern Germany is the strongest opponent to International Arbitration, and that she was the most reluctant participant of the first International Peace Conference at the Hague.

Treitschke died in 1896, but his work has survived him. The seed which he had sown broadcast in countless lectures, books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles has borne fruit. Thus Treitschke has helped in opening an era of universal political unscrupulousness in Germany, and he has created a mighty popular movement towards expansion over sea, with the object of destroying the power of Anglo-Saxondom. Germany's determination to diminish the greatness of this country is largely due to Treitschke's influence, and Germany's resolve to possess herself of a fleet of overwhelming strength, regardless of cost, is perhaps as much ascribable to the activity of Treitschke and of his followers, as to the activity of William II. and his Navy League.

It must not be thought that the professors have

created the world policy of Germany, for that policy was begun by Bismarck who, looking further ahead than Treitschke and his friends, saw rather in the United States than in England Germany's most formidable opponent. Great Britain was to him "a country which had seen better days." Many years ago Bismarck significantly said to Bucher :—

"Up to the year 1866 we pursued a Prusso-German policy. From 1866 to 1870 we pursued a German-European policy. Since then we have pursued a world policy. In discounting future events we must also take note of the United States, who will become in matters economic, and perhaps in matters political as well, a much greater danger than most people imagine. The war of the future will be the economic war, the struggle for existence on the largest scale. May my successor always bear this in mind and always take care that Germany will be prepared when this battle has to be fought."

Bismarck left the preparation for that battle between Germany and the United States and England not merely to posterity, but he prepared his country for that struggle, and especially for the economic part of that struggle, by his economic policy. His protective tariff of 1879 was directed against Great Britain and the United States, though principally against Great Britain, and we see the outcome of his policy in the fact that Bismarck's policy has succeeded in crippling our industries and in transferring industrial success and industrial prosperity from Great Britain to Germany, as will appear in the course of this book.

Bismarck's successors have continued Bismarck's policy, and have improved upon it. Not only has Germany more, and ever more, severely penalised our manufactures by protective tariffs, and impoverished and thrown out of work the masses employed in our factories, but she has besides in every way

favoured and promoted the formation of gigantic trusts (Syndikate, Kartelle), which were chiefly designed to destroy our industries by persistently underselling us in foreign markets, and especially in our home market. Furthermore, Germany has, by the conclusion of commercial treaties with many Powers, secured for the German industries an immense outlet, almost the monopoly, in many countries on the Continent of Europe to the disadvantage of our own industries, and she is now assiduously working for a Central European Customs Union of States to which union she means to be the most favoured, and almost the sole, purveyor of manufactured articles. Thus Germany is striving to recreate in time of peace Napoleon's Continental system against this country whereby English goods were excluded from all Continental countries under his sway. Through Germany's action our markets on the Continent of Europe have been completely spoiled, and before long they may be almost closed against British manufactures unless Great Britain meets force with force and violence with violence instead of meeting it with polite and perfectly useless remonstrations.

Though Bismarck ostensibly was Russia's friend, he strengthened Turkey against Russia by providing her with arms, with money, with railways, and with officers. Bismarck's successors have continued that policy and have extended it towards this country as well. In Egypt and in China Germany's agents have intrigued against Great Britain, and even during the Tibet settlement we had to overcome Germany's opposition at Pekin. Last, but not least, the South African war would perhaps never have broken out had Germany not deluded the Boers into the belief that, as the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared

to us in writing, "the independence of the Transvaal Republic is a German interest," and had she not lavishly supplied the Boers with arms and ammunition.

Some years ago the German Emperor painted a symbolical picture of the "Yellow Peril," which he sent to the Tsar, and since then official and semi-official Germany has persistently urged Russia that it was her mission to civilise the Far East and to rule Asia. Germany hoped that Russia in civilising, which means conquering, Asia would come into collision with this country, but Providence willed it otherwise. Blindly advancing at Germany's bidding, the Russians rushed upon Japan's bayonets, and Russia was crippled for many years. Only the lesser aim of Germany's foreign policy had been achieved. Russia was weakened, but Great Britain's force is unimpaired.

It should here be remarked that it is an axiom of German policy that the interest of Great Britain and Russia in Asia are, and will remain, irreconcilable, the wish being probably father to the thought. Therefore, in her attitude towards Great Britain and Russia, it is Germany's constant aim in every quarter of the world, and at every opportunity, to accentuate and to increase the differences between Russia and this country. Many examples of Germany's endeavours in this direction could be quoted.

Starting from the premise that the differences between Great Britain and Russia in Asia are, and will remain, or at least may be made to be, irreconcilable, German diplomacy has logically arrived at the following fundamental rule of conduct from which German foreign policy has determined not to swerve. This rule is that Germany never can, and never will, be the friend or the enemy of both Great Britain and Russia at the same time, because Great Britain and Russia must be

made to act constantly as a counterpoise against one another and to quarrel with one another to Germany's benefit.

If we now abandon for a moment diplomatic theory, and look at Germany's fundamental rule of political conduct towards Russia and this country from the point of view of political and military practice, it will be seen that Germany's policy is an exceedingly wise one. If Germany has to fight Russia, Great Britain can effect a powerful diversion in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, especially if, as until lately was the case, the Russian fleet is numerically stronger than the German Navy. On the other hand, if Germany should be engaged in a war with Great Britain, Russia's help would be invaluable to Germany, for Germany would endeavour to attack Great Britain in India over land, hand-in-hand with Russia. The happiest result of Germany's policy towards Russia and Great Britain would, of course, be if Russia and Great Britain could be made to fight one another to exhaustion. By such an exhaustive Anglo-Russian war Germany would be freed of all restraint, and would, with her strong fleet and immense army, be able to act on land and sea according to her pleasure.

From the foregoing it follows that it is easy for British diplomats to understand Germany's real attitude towards this country. If Germany is actively friendly to Russia, she is actually, though probably secretly, hostile to Great Britain; if she is on terms approaching hostility with Russia, Germany is friendly to this country. Furthermore, it is clear that all attempts on the part of Russia and Great Britain to settle their differences and to arrive at an understanding are viewed with the most serious alarm by Germany, for in a war with Great Britain Germany

could harm this country easiest if Russia would enable her to attack India. For these reasons the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian understanding is considered to be one of the greatest calamities by Germany, and it is hoped that it will not last.

During the last twenty years Germany has felt confident that she need not fear a Russian attack. Consequently she has constantly supported Russia against this country.

Germany has always tried to create an effective counterpoise against Great Britain. Bismarck set France and England against one another over Egypt, and encouraged France in her anti-British attitude, and his successors continued Bismarck's policy. Therefore Germany tried in 1905 and in 1911 to frighten France away from Great Britain by raising the Morocco question.

Germany's Venezuela policy also aimed at creating a counterpoise, if not an enemy, against this country. When the United States took umbrage at the Anglo-German Venezuela expedition, Great Britain wished to withdraw, but Germany insisted that the Venezuela business should be carried through, arguing that some show of energy on the part of the strongest naval and of the strongest military Power would cause the United States to withdraw, and would teach them to be modest for at least thirty years. Happily our diplomacy did not stumble into the trap, and saw the point of the argument, which was similar to that of Frederick the Great when he told the Austrians that they could not allow the Russians to cross the Danube, and that they should oppose their crossing in alliance with France.

A few years ago the vague and groping movement towards the unification of the British Empire began to take a more tangible shape. Canada offered pre-

ferential fiscal treatment to the Mother Country, other colonies were inclined to follow, and Mr. Chamberlain cordially responded to the advances made by the Colonies, and began to work for a British Imperial Fiscal Union. Treitschke and his followers had frequently declared that the British Empire was an empire only in name, that it would gradually fall to pieces; that the United States would have a similar fate, and that united Germany would eventually profit from these fatal and suicidal disintegrating tendencies among the Anglo-Saxon nations. Therefore Germany resolved, if possible, to kill the movement towards Imperial Unification, and declared commercial war against Canada. As the penalising of Canada's exports failed to have the desired effect, further measures to prevent the unification of the Empire were contemplated and threatened by Germany, and on June 29th, 1903, Lord Lansdowne made the following extraordinary statement in the House of Lords :—

"The position between Germany and Canada with which we were threatened is not one which His Majesty's Government could regard as other than a serious position. It is not merely that we found that Canada was liable to be made to suffer in consequence of the preferential treatment which the Canadian Government had accorded to us, but it was actually adumbrated in an official document that if other colonies acted in the same manner as Canada, the result might be that we, the mother country, would find ourselves deprived of most-favoured-nation treatment."

Not satisfied with crippling our industries and our trade, and with hampering our commercial expansion, Germany tried to oppose the political unification of the Empire by threats. Germany's action was all the more astounding as she could not seriously expect to be consulted in the arrangement of a purely internal affair between the component parts of the British

Empire, for it is clear that the giving of fiscal preference between Motherland and Colonies is a purely domestic affair, and a right which, by the law of nature and of nations, all nations exercise, and which no third nation is entitled to question.

We have now taken note of the three main factors of German policy by having surveyed Germany's genesis and political history; by having acquainted ourselves with her political traditions and methods, and with those political principles of hers which have become the leading maxims of German statesmanship; and we have taken account of the political aspirations of the masses of the people. These three factors form the triple foundation of Germany's foreign policy, which is directed by the Emperor.

The father of William the Second, Frederick the Third, was a peaceful, liberal-minded man, who, through his English wife, had received many English ideas and many English ideals. With him the State was not merely "Power," but a power for good. With him generosity and humanity were not merely empty words and part of the diplomat's stock-in-trade of political counters. It was not his idea that "Might is Right." He was imbued with the sense of political morality, a feeling which, it is true, Machiavelli treated almost with contempt. The views of the Emperor and the Empress Frederick were diametrically opposed to those of Prince Bismarck, who proved victorious in the lengthy struggle which he waged against what he called "English influences" and "petticoat influences." In these struggles Bismarck was energetically supported by the present Emperor, then Prince William, whom old Prince Bismarck used in many ways to liken to Frederick the Great. The Emperor William II., indeed, resembles in many ways his great ancestor. He has

the same self-consciousness, the same many-sidedness, the same passionate desire to aggrandise his country, the same political methods, and the same love of a powerful army. How will the Emperor make use of his military forces and of his opportunities ?

The present position of Germany is most favourable. She has defeated France and Austria. Russia lies exhausted. Germany has her elbows free. On the Continent of Europe she is not only the strongest, but by far the strongest, Power. Now or never is her opportunity. Will she make use of it ? Will she try to take Holland, or will she interfere in Austria-Hungary and try to save the dissolving German element in that country by incorporating with Germany, in some form or other, the western half of that monarchy ? Or will she endeavour to take another slice of France and the French colonies ? Or will Germany at present abstain from action, notwithstanding her opportunities, and continue in feverish haste to increase her enormous navy " for the protection of commerce " until an occasion for using it against a great naval and colonial Power arises ?

CHAPTER III

THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY AND THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY [1]

DURING the last few decades, the population of Germany has been increasing with marvellous and unprecedented rapidity. From 1870 to the year 1912 it has grown from 40,818,000 people to more than 66,000,000 people, and has therefore increased by exactly 65 per cent. During the same period, our own population has increased from 31,817,000 people to 45,500,000 people, or by but 43 per cent. No nation in the world, excepting those oversea, which yearly receive a huge number of immigrants from abroad, multiplies more rapidly than does the German nation, as may be seen from the following figures :—

AVERAGE YEARLY INCREASE OF POPULATION BETWEEN THE LAST AND THE PREVIOUS CENSUSES

Germany . .	+13,600	inhabitants	per million	of inhabitants
Europ. Russia	+11,100	,,	,,	,,
Holland . .	+13,700	,,	,,	,,
Switzerland .	+12,400	,,	,,	,,
Belgium . .	+ 9,800	,,	,,	,,
Great Britain .	+ 9,000	,,	,,	,,
Austria . . .	+ 8,800	,,	,,	,,
Hungary . .	+ 7,900	,,	,,	,,
Spain . . .	+ 4,700	,,	,,	,,
Italy . . .	+ 6,900	,,	,,	,,
France . . .	+ 1,500	,,	,,	,,

From the foregoing table, it appears that not only the population of Germany, but that of all the chiefly

[1] In this chapter the figures for 1900 are frequently given, as the Census figures of 1910 were not yet available.

Germanic nations increases very much faster than that of other nations, Russia excepted. However, Russia cannot fairly be compared with Germany, partly because her population statistics are not reliable, partly because the conditions prevailing in large parts of Russia are peculiar.

Whilst the increase of the population per million of inhabitants among many other nations is rapidly becoming smaller and smaller, a fact which is so well known that it need hardly be substantiated by statistics, the population of Germany has, during the last few decades, been growing with constantly increasing rapidity. Only lately this increase has become less rapid. Between 1816 and 1855, the average yearly increase of the population of Germany was only 9,600 per million of inhabitants; but the average increase amounted to 10,700 per million per annum between 1885 and 1890, to 11,200 per million per annum between 1890 and 1895, to 15,200 per million per annum between 1900 and 1905, and to 13,600 per annum between 1905 and 1910. At present, when other nations are comparatively but slowly expanding, the 66,000,000 in Germany are adding yearly approximately 900,000 to their numbers, whilst Great Britain adds less than 400,000 to her population. As, at the same time, the 30,000,000 Germans who live outside of Germany are increasing with similar rapidity, the 96,000,000 Germans appear to be multiplying even faster than the 90,000,000 inhabitants of the United States, notwithstanding the fact that these receive, on an average, more than 800,000 emigrants per annum.

The proud boast of the militant Pan-Germans, that it is the destiny of the Germans in Germany and in Greater Germany to rule the world, would

appear to be justified, were it not for a singular phenomenon which, so far, has remained almost unobserved. Whilst the 66,000,000 Germans in Germany are increasing with astonishing rapidity, the 30,000,000 Germans who live in Austria-Hungary and in other countries are so rapidly losing all German characteristics and even the German language, that it seems possible that forty or fifty years hence the Germans outside Germany proper will be a negligible factor. The rapid disappearance of the 30,000,000 Germans in Greater Germany is so extraordinary a process, and it is so important a factor in Germany's foreign policy, that it is worth while to look somewhat closely into the position of the Germans in all countries outside Germany.

Since the time when Tacitus wrote, the Germans have always been one of the most prolific races, if not the most prolific race, in Europe, and they would, no doubt, have obtained the dominion of the world by sheer weight of numbers had it not been for two racial peculiarities. In the first place, the German tribes and nations have never been unified, but have always been fighting and exterminating one another from prehistoric times through the Middle Ages and the Thirty Years' War up to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. In the second place, the Germans who have settled among foreign nations have, even if they came as conquerors, easily given up their national characteristics and their language, and have allowed themselves to be submerged and assimilated by other races. The Franks, who went to Northern France, became French; the Longobardi, who conquered Italy and who ruled the North of Italy for centuries, became Italian, and only a few names, such as Lombardy, remind one of the ancient rule of the dreaded "Long-

beards." The Goths in France and in Spain, and the Varagi and Goths in Russia have similarly disappeared, and only a few names here and there remind one of the hosts of German conquerors who were swallowed up by those countries as the Pharaoh's hosts were swallowed up by the Red Sea.

It seems to be a law of Nature, and may be considered an axiom, that the Germans increase only in countries where none but Germans live. If Germans have to live side by side with men of another nationality, they are easily absorbed and soon lose their language unless a vigorous German Government upholds Germanism by force and counteracts the natural tendency of Germans to sink their nationality by forcibly Germanising those who, otherwise, would denationalise the Germans.

The 90,000,000 Germans who live in Germany and in Greater Germany are distributed as follows, over the globe :—

Germany	66,000,000
Austria-Hungary	11,550,000
Switzerland	2,320,000
Russia	2,000,000
Various European countries	1,130,000
Total in Europe	83,000,000
United States and Canada	11,500,000
Central and South America	600,000
Asia, Africa, Australia	400,000
Grand Total	95,500,000

In Austria-Hungary the Germans not only rapidly increased in numbers, but they increased proportionately more rapidly than did the other nations which dwell in that country as long as they were politically

predominant, and were able to Germanise the other races with which they share the land. However, since a few years, the Germans have lost their proud position in the Dual Monarchy. Czechs, Poles, and Magyars have begun to assert their national claims. They have rebelled against being treated as an inferior race by the Germans, and since then the Germans have been losing ground in Austria-Hungary with startling rapidity.

In the Austrian half of the monarchy, where four-fifths of the Austrian-Germans are found, there lived 8,461,580 Germans, according to the census of 1890. At the census of 1900, 9,170,939 Germans were counted in that country. At first sight, the increase in the German population of 8,380 per million per annum, which compares with 15,000 per million per annum in Germany, may appear not unsatisfactory; but when we look more closely into the population statistics of Austria we find that that increase is insufficient, for the Austrians of non-German nationality have increased much faster than have the Germans. Between 1870 and 1900 the Austrian Poles increased by 14,520 per million, the Austrian Ruthenians by 10,450 per million, the Austrian Czechs by 8,820 per million, whilst the Austrian Germans increased only by 8,380 per million, or slowest of all. Therefore it comes that, in 1880, 36.75 per cent. of the Austrians were Germans, that in 1890 the proportion of Germans had shrunk to 36.04 per cent. of the total population, whilst in 1900 the proportion of Germans had further fallen to 35.78 per cent. This decrease is perhaps not very great, but it is only the beginning of an enormous shrinkage which has commenced to set in, as will readily be seen if we examine the position of the 6,000,000 Germans who live in

those parts of Austria where they come into contact with other nationalities.

In the Middle Ages, Bohemia was colonised by Germans, and it was Germanised by force; but when the Hussites rose in rebellion, more from political and national than from religious motives, the progress of Germanisation was interrupted, but in course of time it was resumed. At present, Bohemia possesses a prominently German and a prominently Czech sphere. About 37.27 per cent. of the whole population are Germans, and about 62.67 per cent. are Slav. The Germans live chiefly in the north of Bohemia, and form a fringe along the Austro-German frontier. The Czechs sit in the middle and in the east of Bohemia.

Prague, the capital of Bohemia, which is situated in the central part of the country and in the Czech sphere, used to be a German town, and its celebrated university was, until 1882, a purely German institution. But since then, and especially during the last ten or fifteen years, Prague has become almost completely Czech. In 1890 there were still 16 per cent. of German-speaking people in Prague. In 1900 only 10 per cent. of German-speaking people were left in that town, and the celebrated German university has been swamped by the Czechs. Although the number of Czech and German professors and lecturers is equally great, there are about 3000 Czech students as compared with only about 1000 German students, and the number of the Germans remains stagnant, whilst that of the Czech students is rapidly increasing.

The Czechs, who have seen their nationality and their language suppressed for centuries, and who for centuries have been treated as an inferior race

by the Germans, and have been treated with injustice, work with passionate energy and with the zeal of revenge to reconquer Bohemia from the Germans, and to make it again an independent nation, free from German control. The Germans offer only a feeble, passive, and futile resistance to the determined onslaught of their opponents. The Czechs in the towns of mixed nationality not only refuse to learn German, but disdain to speak it even if they know the language. In fact, it is dangerous for a German to enter a Czech restaurant and to speak German in it, for he will expose himself to suffering bodily violence at the hands of the fanatic and easily infuriated Czechs, to whom the sight of a German and the sound of the German language appears as an insult.

Whilst the Czechs are determined to remain Czechs, and refuse to learn and to speak German, the Germans in Bohemia are sending their children in rapidly increasing numbers into the Czech schools, and have thus capitulated to the Czechs. Therefore it comes that, although 37.3 per cent. of the total population of Bohemia are Germans, only 33.8 per cent. of the school children are described as German-speaking; consequently, it seems that, at present, at least one-tenth of the German children throughout Bohemia are being converted into Czechs. In the German school district of Bohemia 332,118 children were described as speaking only German, 30,320 children, or as much as one-ninth, as speaking Czech and German, and 14,203, or one twenty-fourth, as speaking only Czech. On the other hand, in the Czech school districts, 597,149 children were described as speaking only Czech, 10,743, or but one-fiftieth, as speaking Czech and German, and 2603, or only

one in two hundred and twenty-nine, as speaking only German. In other words, of the children in the German schools about one out of eight speak Czech, whilst of the children in the Czech schools, hardly one in forty-five children speaks German.

In Prague the migration of the German children to the Czech camp is still more pronounced than it is for the whole of Bohemia. In the German school district in Prague there were, according to the last statistics, but 1432 German-speaking children, whilst the vast majority, namely 3480 children, spoke both languages, and 323 children spoke Czech only. But in the Czech school district of the capital the German language is almost unknown, for there 16,644 children speak Czech, 163, or less than one child in a hundred, speak both languages, and one solitary child is described as speaking German only. Here we have an astonishing contrast between the Czech and the German attitude. Almost three-quarters of the children in the German school districts speak Czech, whilst not one hundred of the children in the Czech school district speak German. The German language, after having been the medium for centuries, is rapidly and completely disappearing in Bohemia, and is being replaced by Czech.

From the foregoing it appears that the Germans in Bohemia, and especially in Prague, lead their children by the thousand into the camp of the Czechs. In a few years Prague will have become completely Czech, and by the time when the children who at present go to school have grown up, German will probably be as little spoken in Bohemia as it is now spoken in Hungary. In 1900 there were 2,337,013 Germans in Bohemia, and their number has increased

by 8420 per million per annum since 1890, largely owing to the industrial expansion in that country. But if the political power of the Czechs should be strengthened—and all indications point in that direction—the German parts of Bohemia would as rapidly lose their German character and the German language as Prague has lost its German character and language.

In Moravia, where 27.1 per cent. of the population are Germans, and 71.36 per cent. of the people are Slavs, chiefly Czech, similar conditions prevail. In Brünn, the largest town of Moravia, the proportion of Germans has shrunk from 69 per cent. in 1890 to 64 per cent. in 1900; but although the Germans are still in a great majority in that town, only 4880 children are described as speaking German, whilst no less than 8807 children, or almost two-thirds of the total, are stated to be speaking Czech, or Czech and German. How retrogressive the German element is in Moravia may be seen from the fact that the German population of that country comprised 29.4 per cent. of the population in 1890, but only 27.9 per cent. in 1900. When the thousands of German children who now learn Czech at the schools have become men and women, Moravia will probably contain only traces of the German population.

In Austrian Silesia the Germans have to share the land with both Czechs and Poles, and numerically the Germans are by far the strongest element. Nevertheless, they have rapidly lost ground during the last decade. In 1890, 47.8 per cent. of the inhabitants of Austrian Silesia were Germans, 30.2 per cent. were Poles, and 22 per cent. were Czechs. In 1900 only 44.7 per cent. of the population were Germans, 33.3

per cent. were Poles, and 22 per cent. were Czechs. The ground which the Germans lost in Silesia was gained by the Poles, and here, as in Bohemia and Moravia, the German children are sent to schools where they learn Czech or Polish. Therefore we find that, although 44.7 per cent. of the total population of Austrian Silesia were Germans, only 38 per cent. of the children were described as speaking German. Apparently one-sixth of the German children are going to Czech and Polish schools, where they are rapidly being converted into Czechs and Poles.

In Galicia 200,000 Germans live among 4,000,000 Poles and 3,000,000 Ruthenians, and the Germans are rapidly disappearing. The German population of Galicia has declined from 227,600 in 1890 to 211,752 in 1900, and the proportion of Germans to non-Germans in the country has, during the same time, fallen from 3.46 per cent. to but 2.91 per cent.

In Tyrol there are 460,840 Germans and 304,578 Italians, and in that country the proportion of Germans to non-Germans has, between 1890 and 1900, slightly increased. However, notwithstanding the fact that the number of Germans is more than 50 per cent. larger than is that of the Italians, we find that 60,403 children were described as speaking German, 57,418 as speaking Italian, and 3061 as speaking both German and Italian. According to the numbers of Italians and Germans, there should be 80,000 German-speaking children and 40,000 Italian-speaking children. Consequently, it appears that in Tyrol about 22,000 German children are being Italianised, and it seems likely that the Italian element will, eventually, be as victorious over the German element in the south of the monarchy as

are the Czechs and the Poles in the north of Austria.

The foregoing facts and figures clearly prove that in those parts of Austria where Germans live side by side with other nationalities, the former are rapidly being absorbed by the latter. The Germans who live in Austria-Hungary are likely to increase only in those districts where exclusively, or nearly exclusively, Germans are living. These districts are Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, and Carinthia.

In 1890, 2,107,577 Germans lived in Hungary. Ten years later, 2,114,423 Germans were counted in that country. Therefore it appears that, whereas the German population in Germany has grown by 131,000 per million between 1890 and 1900, the German population in Hungary has grown by but 3000 per million during the same time, or at about one-fortieth the rate of speed. The German population of Hungary has remained practically stationary during the last decade, although the whole population of Hungary has considerably increased. Consequently the German element, although it is unchanged in numbers, has greatly decreased in proportion to the total population. In 1890, 12.1 per cent. of the population of Hungary were Germans. In 1900 only 11 per cent. of the inhabitants of the country were Germans. The decrease of the German population has been particularly striking in Hungary proper, where the proportion of German inhabitants has shrunk from 13.7 per cent. in 1890 to only 12 per cent. ten years later. In other words, in 1890 one German was to be found for every six Hungarians in Hungary, whilst in 1900 there was only one German to every eight Hungarians. In the Hungarian towns

the Germans have lost ground at a surprisingly rapid rate, as the following figures show :—

PROPORTION OF GERMANS IN IMPORTANT HUNGARIAN TOWNS

	1890 per cent.	1900 per cent.
Buda-Pesth	24	14
Pressburg	60	50
Oedenburg	64	54
Temesvar	56	51
Hermannstadt	61	55
Arad	53	10
Kaschan	13	9
Grosswardein	3	3
Raab	5	4
Klausenburg	4	4
Agram	9	7
Fiume	5	5

A glance at the foregoing table shows that the Germans have diminished in all the big towns in Hungary, and most rapidly in those towns which, only ten years ago, were strongholds of Germanism; but the German element has little diminished, or has even remained stationary in those towns where it was insignificant.

Buda-Pesth was founded by Germans in 1241, and it was pre-eminently a German town until very recently. Fifty years ago more than half of the inhabitants of the Hungarian capital were Germans; in 1888, 33 per cent. of the population were Germans; in 1890, the German population had fallen to 24 per cent.; in 1900 it amounted only to 14 per cent. At the present date, only about one-tenth of the population of Buda-Pesth consists of Germans, and it is quite impossible to make oneself understood only with a knowledge of German in the Hungarian capital.

Whilst in Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, Galicia, and Tyrol the German element has chiefly voluntarily merged itself in the Czech, Polish, and Italian element, it has in Hungary, to some extent, been denationalised owing to the application of external pressure. Hungary, like Germany, follows an active, and to some extent coercive, national policy, whilst Austria now follows the policy of *laissez-faire* with regard to the different nationalities which dwell in the country. However, the Germans in Hungary do not seem to object to being Magyarised. On the contrary, they like to be taken for pure-blooded Magyars. They speak Hungarian among themselves, and affect not to know German when addressed by a stranger in their mother-tongue. Under these circumstances, it seems likely that, in a few decades, hardly a trace will be left of the 2,000,000 Germans who now live in Hungary.

In 1900 Austria-Hungary had a total population of 45,405,266 people, of whom 11,385,362, or about one quarter, were Germans. Of these Germans exactly 6,000,000, or somewhat more than one half, lived in a precarious position in Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, Tyrol, Galicia, and Hungary, districts where their position is threatened by Czechs, Poles, Italians, and Magyars. Consequently the outlook for the future is far from hopeful for the Germans who live under the Double Eagle.

Hungary absorbs the Germans with incredible rapidity, but the Government of Austria has hitherto been able to protect the German element, and to rule the various races in a way favourable to the preservation of the German nationality and of the German language. But the Czechs are anxious to follow Hungary's example, and to pursue a vigorous

national policy, which would necessarily be anti-German, for the Germans have suppressed the Czechs in the past, and are therefore considered by them as strangers and intruders. If the Czechs should succeed in getting a free hand in Bohemia, the 3,000,000 Germans who live in that country would rapidly be absorbed by the Czechs, and the German population of Austria-Hungary might in twenty years be restricted to about seven million people, who would find themselves in a hopeless minority against fifty million non-Germans living with them in the monarchy.

In Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia the Germans form a fringe along the Austro-German frontier, but they are cut off from the German Hinterland of Austria. In Hungary the Germans occur in patches, here and there, and cannot stand together in mutual defence. If these dispersed great German colonies in Austria and in Hungary should disappear —and their isolation makes such an event appear possible—the Germans in Austria-Hungary would be confined to the great German enclave in South-west Austria, which is composed of Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, &c., where about six million Germans live, who form nine-tenths of the population. This German island in the midst of a surging and roaring sea of Slavonic nations would, no doubt, be able to resist the more or less forcible encroachments of Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians for some considerable time; but the German element, with its hopeless minority, would hardly be able to act any longer as the governing element in Austria, as it has done hitherto. Vienna, which is situated almost on the eastern border of the German enclave, and dangerously near Bohemia, is already being invaded by immense numbers of Czechs, and if the

Czech element should once succeed in capturing the Austrian capital, it would soon, through the capital, dominate the whole of Austria.

The German element in Austria is not only threatened from without, but also from within. It has often been remarked that illegitimacy is nowhere in Europe more frequent than in Austria, where, according to recent official statistics, 13.7 per cent. of the children were illegitimate, as compared with only 9 per cent. in France, 9 per cent. in Germany, 8.5 per cent. in Hungary, 7.4 per cent. in Scotland, 4.2 per cent. in England and Wales, &c. The high proportion of illegitimate births in Austria becomes particularly startling if we investigate the statistics of births in the different parts of Austria, for then we are brought face to face with the following most extraordinary phenomenon. In those parts of Austria where Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, and Italians prevail, such as Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia, Tyrol, Carniola, Bukovina, Dalmatia, only about 7 per cent. of the births were illegitimate. On the other hand, in those districts where the Germans form about nine-tenths of the population, from 20 per cent. to 40 per cent. of the children were illegitimate. In Styria 24 per cent., in Lower Austria 25.1 per cent., in Salzburg 26.9 per cent., in Vienna 32 per cent., and in Carinthia even 42.6 per cent. of the children were born out of wedlock. In the chiefly German parts of Austria 130,000 children, or about one quarter of all the children born, were illegitimate. This startling and almost incredible difference in the percentage of illegitimate births in the German and the non-German parts of Austria, and the frightful number of fatherless children in that country, bodes ill for the future of the Austrian Germans, for such figures are a

sure indication of moral and physical decay, and they explain why the Germans in Austria are everywhere losing ground to Czechs, Poles, Italians, and Magyars.

In Austria lived in 1900, in round numbers, 9,200,000 Germans, 6,000,000 Czechs, 4,300,000 Poles, and 6,000,000 people belonging to six other nationalities. Consequently, if the German element should lose its supremacy in Austria, the Czechs, or the Czechs and the Poles combined, might claim, and probably would obtain, the supremacy in and the rule over the Austrian part of the monarchy. That they would use their power for their own ends, and retaliate on the Germans for the centuries of persecution which they have suffered, by gradually extinguishing the German element in Austria and transforming the country into a Slavonic State, can hardly be doubted.

The Slavonic element is evidently in the ascendant in Austria, where 60.2 per cent. of the population are Slavs, and it may soon be triumphant. Consequently, it seems very likely that Austria may, in course of time, be turned from a nominally German State into a purely Slavonic State, supposing, of course, that events are allowed to develop peacefully in that direction in which they are developing at present. Whether Germany, Austria's neighbour, will allow such a change to take place is, of course, another question. That Germany will placidly look on whilst ten million Austrian Germans are being absorbed by those Slavs whom Germans and Austrians have colonised, Germanised, suppressed, and oppressed in the past, and who therefore detest Germany and Germanism, may well be doubted. Therefore Austria-Hungary may, in course of time, become to Germany and Russia, or to Germany, Russia, and Italy, a second Poland.

Switzerland is partly German, partly French, and partly Italian. In 1900 there were 2,319,105 German-speaking people, 733,220 French-speaking people, and 222,247 Italian-speaking people in Switzerland. These three nationalities occupy separate parts of the country. The Italians live in the south, the French in the west, and the Germans in the north and east of the country. In view of the fact that more than two-thirds of the Swiss are Germans, and that the French and Italians in Switzerland do not endeavour to Italianise or to Gallicise their German neighbours, it might be thought that the Germans would, owing to their great fruitfulness, increase more rapidly than do the Italian Swiss and the French Swiss. But this is not the case. Between 1888 and 1900, the French-speaking population of Switzerland increased by 15.5 per cent., the Italian population, largely through immigration, increased by 43.3 per cent., whilst the German-speaking population increased by only 11.4 per cent. As the French population is almost completely stationary in neighbouring France, it cannot be doubted that the great increase in the French-speaking population of Switzerland is largely due to the fact that the French-speaking Swiss are absorbing the Germans. The merging of the German element in the French population is particularly noticeable in the canton Berne, where about one-sixth of the people are French, but this sixth is growing fast at the expense of the German five-sixths.

If the present movement of nationalities in Switzerland should continue for a few decades, the Germans will find themselves in a minority, and will then, in all probability, rapidly become Gallicised, especially as the German Swiss are republicans to a man. They are passionately opposed to monarchical government,

and therefore naturally incline rather towards France than towards Germany.

It is estimated that two million Germans live in Russia, but no exact figures exist as to their numbers. About 300,000 Germans live in the Baltic provinces, principally in Riga, Mitau, Dorpat, and Reval. In Poland 500,000 Germans are supposed to live. They are chiefly occupied in factories, and in Lodz alone more than 100,000 Germans are counted. Spread through South Russia and along the Volga, approximately a million Germans are supposed to reside. They are the descendants of the German peasant colonies which were founded by Catherine II., Alexander I., and other monarchs, who wished to develop their thinly populated country by attracting many thousands of Germans.

For a long time the Germans in Russia preserved their national characteristics and their language; they had in their colonies their own laws, their own administration, their own colleges, schools, &c.; but during the last twenty-five years they have been Russianised with so much energy and so much success that the German language is rapidly becoming extinct in Russia. The Poles in Russia have apparently preserved their nationality and their language much better, notwithstanding a longer and more energetic persecution on the part of Russia. Recently there were but two small German schools in Russia, one in Riga and one in Helsingfors.

In Belgium and Holland about 150,000 Germans are living, and in both countries they are rapidly being converted into Belgians and Dutch. In France there are at least 100,000 Germans, who are mostly in comfortable circumstances, and of these about 15,000 live in Paris. But their cohesion and their

sense of nationality is so small that, notwithstanding the old enmity between French and Germans, they are rapidly becoming French. The only German paper in France is the *Pariser Zeitung*, which appears weekly, and which has to work hard to make both ends meet. There are only two German elementary schools in the whole of France, one in Paris and one in Marseilles. The former was attended by 113 German children and the latter by but seven German children.

In this country there are at least 100,000 Germans permanently domiciled, who are, on the whole, in very good circumstances, and of whom the great majority live in London. There are some German churches in London, Liverpool, and other provincial towns. Two German weeklies and a German bi-weekly paper appear in London, but their circulation is quite insignificant, and there are four or five German schools in the whole of Great Britain. The sons and daughters of German parents living in this country in many cases know no German, and it is very exceptional that the children of German parents are sent to school in Germany.

In Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria, and Turkey, about 100,000 Germans reside, of whom about 30,000 live in Bucharest alone. They are found chiefly in the towns, and have not lost their nationality. Hence, they possess, in those countries, a considerable number of schools, which are largely patronised by native children.

In the United States there were in 1900 about 11,200,000 German-speaking people, but of these only 2,666,990 were born in Germany. The remaining 8,533,010 were the children of German immigrants; but of these many, and probably the majority, grow up with hardly any knowledge of the German lan-

guage. Throughout the United States there are numerous nominally German schools, but these have gradually become Americanised, and have, in most cases, lost their German character altogether. The huge number of flourishing German private schools which used to exist in North America has almost completely disappeared, and in many of the so-called German schools German is only taught as a foreign language, side by side with French. The German element remains German for a longer time only in those parts of the United States where the Germans are crowded together in considerable numbers—for instance, in New York, where 322,343 Germans were counted in 1900, in Chicago with 170,738 Germans, in Philadelphia with 71,319 Germans, in St. Louis with 58,781 Germans, &c.

Canada is estimated to have about 340,000 Germans among her population, but these have become Canadians.

No less than 600,000 Germans live in South America. Brazil has about 400,000 German citizens, of whom 300,000 are found in the two southern districts of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, where they form about one quarter of the population. Here the Germans have founded substantial towns and villages, and they have preserved their characteristics and their language, which is tinged with numerous Portuguese, Spanish, and native words; and in those parts where Germans prevail native Brazilians and negroes may be heard using the broadest German dialects. The Germans in Brazil possess a large number of German schools, there being six hundred in Rio Grande do Sul alone, and there are numerous German churches, clubs, newspapers, &c. Many of the German schools in Brazil are subsidised by

the German Government. The Germans in South Brazil feel themselves a nation, and in the small morning hours after festivities they may be heard discussing, with patriotic enthusiasm, the possibility of again forming a part of the old Fatherland. The Germans in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, &c., are dispersed all over these countries, and do not form compact colonies, as they do in the south of Brazil.

In Australia about 100,000 Germans are counted, who have completely lost their nationality and language. In Asia there are a few thousand Germans, who chiefly live in British colonies and in the harbour towns of China. Many of these have become Anglicised; they are members of English clubs, they take in the English papers, and they speak English even among themselves. In Africa there is a considerable number of Germans, most of whom are found in the Cape Colony and in the Transvaal Colony. In the former, as well as in the latter, they have lost their nationality completely. In the German colonies in Africa so few Germans are living that they are not worth mentioning.

Whilst the 66,000,000 Germans in Germany are increasing in number at a surprising rate, the 30,000,000 Germans outside Germany are rapidly being converted into Czechs, Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Frenchmen, Russians, Dutchmen, Belgians, Englishmen, Americans, Canadians, Boers, &c. This spectacle fills many thoughtful Germans with regret and sadness, especially as the Germans who become incorporated in foreign nations are, in many cases, men of promise and ability, whose services would have been invaluable to the mother country. Not a few of the most prominent statesmen, generals,

scientists, and business men in many countries, Great Britain included, are Germans by birth or by descent. Germany incurs therefore enormous losses not only in material, but also in intellectual power, by the migratory tendency of her sons, and by their peculiarity of easily allowing themselves to be assimilated by Germanic, Latin, or Slavonic nations.

Men of other nations are not so easily denationalised as are the Germans. Wherever the Englishman goes, he takes with him his church, his Bible, his clubs, his newspaper, his sports, his household gods, his national virtues, and his national failings. Frenchmen also who live abroad will remain Frenchmen in thought and language, even if they have been separated from France for centuries, as may be seen by the *habitants* of Eastern Canada. Dutchmen, likewise, preserve their language and their national peculiarities during centuries of separation from their country, as can be seen in the case of the Boers, who are Dutch to the marrow. It seems that, among European nations, the Germans alone are truly cosmopolitan, for they make the world their country.

Fifty years ago, when cosmopolitanism was the fashion, this peculiar adaptability of the Germans was considered by them as a virtue; but since the time of Friedrich List and Prince Bismarck, when the Germans began to call Political Economy "National" Economy and to discard their policy of sentiment for a purely national and deliberately selfish policy of interest, the cosmopolitanism of the Germans has come to be considered as a vice, and it is now loudly condemned as such by all university professors and other professional moralists. Therefore the Germans are striving hard to overcome the vice of cosmo-

politanism, to become more national and to preserve the German element abroad.

With this object in view, many Societies for the Defence of Germanism have been founded both in Germany and in Austria during the last two or three decades. In 1880 the Vienna School Society was founded for the purpose of preserving the German language in those parts of Austria where it is threatened by other nationalities. That society has, since its creation, spent £400,000 and has opened forty-nine schools, but of these only fifteen are at present in existence. The enthusiasm for the society which prevailed in Austria for a few years has disappeared, and, from the details given in the beginning of this article, it seems that its activity has not been able to stem the Slavonic tide.

In 1881 the Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums im Ausland (the German School Society for the Preservation of Germanism Abroad) was founded in Berlin on the model of its Vienna prototype. In 1903 it had 33,000 members, and a yearly income of £6000. It has confidential agents in all countries, and has altogether spent about £100,000 since its inception. It has the proud motto, "To serve Germanism is to serve mankind." The moderate figures of money spent by that society seem to show that its practical utility can hardly be very great, and it is not apparent that it has, during its twenty-five years' activity, done much to counteract the process of denationalisation among the Germans living abroad. The German Government sympathises with the policy of the Schulverein, and it grants since 1900 a subsidy of £15,000 to German schools in foreign countries without claiming the right of control or supervision. The figures given in this chapter were furnished by the Schulverein.

From pre-Christian times up to the present, its migratory instinct has been one of the leading characteristics of the German race. The Germans have had practically no settled country, excepting the narrow district between Rhine and Elbe, which has always been German. That district, which contains approximately 40,000,000 Germans, is almost purely Germanic, and it is still the stronghold of the race. The remaining parts of present Germany are colonial land.

In the course of centuries the Germans have spasmodically streamed north and south and east and west in enormous numbers, but those Germans who were left behind on foreign soil were, after a short period of supremacy, swallowed up by the original inhabitants of the countries in which they had settled. Copenhagen in the north, and Novgorod, near St. Petersburg, far away in the east, were at one time German towns, and German used to be the language of culture and the language of commerce in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Holland and Switzerland were at one time loyal German States; but, having been left to fight their own battles single-handed, they cut themselves adrift from the German nation and formed independent States. In this way Germany has been deprived not only of several millions of people but also of Switzerland and Holland, two of the most valuable strategical positions in Europe, the possession of which would allow Germany to rule the Continent of Europe.

Whilst Germanism has lost much of the ground which it had conquered in past centuries, it has prevailed in other not originally German parts. In East Prussia, for instance, the native heathen inhabitants, the Prussians, of whom nothing but the

name has been preserved, were exterminated in the thirteenth century by the Teutonic Order; and, from all parts of Germany, peasants and townsmen were settled in that devastated country, which thus became thoroughly German.

Since the time when the foundation of present Germany was laid in the wilderness of Prussia up to the present day, the policy of vigorous, and, if needs be, brutal, colonisation has always been a guiding principle of Prussian policy, and thus Prussia has Germanised her conquered lands. In the sixteenth century, the Prussian Electors attracted to their territories the Protestants and Dissenters who were expelled from other German States. The great Elector and the first Prussian Kings, Frederick I. and Frederick William I., pursued the same policy of colonisation in the Slavonic east of Germany, and they attracted also numerous foreigners, who brought with them their methods of agriculture, of canalisation, and of irrigation, their sciences and their manufacturing industries.

Frederick the Great was the greatest, the most thorough, and the most systematic of all Germanising rulers of Prussia, although he spoke only French. He created along the Polish frontier in Silesia a chain of villages, after he had conquered that province from Austria, and he planted a large German population among the Slavs in the east of his kingdom. He converted his old soldiers into peasants, found them wives, cattle, and furniture, and he attracted from the south and the west of Germany about 43,000 families, or, approximately, about 300,000 people. By these means he increased the slender population of his kingdom by ten per cent., and firmly established German supremacy throughout the country.

At the end of his reign, about one-third of the population of Prussia consisted of immigrant colonists and their descendants.

The Empress Maria Theresa and the Emperor Joseph imitated the policy of Frederick the Great in Austria-Hungary. They founded, for instance, a great German colony in the south of Hungary, where 25,000 colonists were settled, and where at present about 400,000 Germans are found. However, their labour has been lost, for the isolated German peasant colonies in the north and the south of Hungary will soon succumb to the victorious Magyars, who are rapidly Magyarising the whole of Hungary.

Through the deliberate, forceful, and thorough Germanising policy of Prussia, Germany, in its present form, is no longer a conglomerate of individualistic and mutually hostile States, but a firmly knit, united, and thoroughly national nation, whilst the Germans in other countries, and even in nominally German Austria, are not unlike wandering tribes of nomads which have temporarily settled in a foreign land, and which are ready to abandon their own nationality. Through the energetic policy of the Hohenzollerns the historic character of Germany has been radically altered; the Germans in Germany have with fire and iron been welded into a nation, and will remain a nation as long as they are held together by a strong iron band. Whether the Germans would remain a nation if they are left to themselves and if the firm band of national discipline be loosened, may well be doubted. Not by national inclination and by natural growth, but by force, have they received the sense of nationality, and by force they have Germanised non-German elements in the country.

The traditional policy of Germanisation is still

pursued by the Government in the Eastern Provinces of Prussia, where, at the census of 1900, 3,328,751 Poles were counted, whom Prussia has so far been unable to assimilate and to Germanise. In order to convert these Poles into Germans, the use of the Polish language has been forbidden to the Poles, in public and private education, and even in religious instruction. Letters addressed in Polish are not forwarded by the German Post-Office ; Polish theatres, clubs, societies, &c., are not allowed to exist. Besides, the Prussian Government tries to Germanise the districts where Poles prevail by its traditional policy of settling German peasants among them. This policy was initiated by Bismarck in 1886, and for this purpose a settlements fund of £5,000,000 was created, which was increased to £10,000,000 in 1898, to £22,500,000 in 1902, and to £35,000,000 in 1908. With this fund land belonging to Polish landed proprietors and Polish peasants is bought, and the Poles are replaced by German proprietors and German peasants. This measure has proved a godsend to those Polish landed proprietors whose estates were heavily encumbered, for they were enabled to sell them on very favourable terms.

So far, about fourteen thousand families, or about seventy thousand people, have thus been settled by the State among the Poles, but in spite of all Government measures, the Poles have not only held their ground in the east of Germany, but they have apparently even gained ground, partly because their national instinct is strongly developed and because they cling to their language, partly because the Poles are even more prolific than are the Germans. Consequently we find that, in the province of Posen, where about 1,000,000 Poles and about 900,000

Germans are living side by side, the Germans have increased by only 3¾ per cent. between 1890 and 1900, whilst the Poles have increased by about 10½ per cent. during the same time.

If we take a comprehensive view of Germany and of Greater Germany, we find the curious spectacle that Germany proper is not a natural but an artificial nation, which has been created by energetic rulers, who deliberately set themselves the task to counteract the natural self-destructive tendencies which are the historical characteristic of the German race.

Modern Germany was founded about five hundred years ago by conquerors and colonists, and the energetic spirit of the pioneers who founded present Germany among the heathen Prussians has prevailed in the traditional policy of the Hohenzollerns up to the present date. Present Germany is but a magnified Prussia, and the national character of present Germany is no longer the same as that of ancient Germany, but it is the energetic conquering and fighting character of the Teutonic Order, who laid the foundation of the present Empire.

It is clear that the artificially created Germany of to-day has, as regards national character, little in common with the natural but gradually dissolving German States which lie outside the German frontiers. Notwithstanding their unity of race and their unity of language, the Germans inside and outside of Germany are politically totally different beings. Aristotle taught, twenty-three centuries ago, that men are, after all, pre-eminently political animals, and therefore it comes that the Germans inside Germany and those outside Germany are practically two different races.

To those Germans whose ambition is a German

world-empire, the thought that 30,000,000 of their countrymen in Greater Germany are disappearing fast is almost unbearable. Hence, it is the wish of many Germans to save the Germans in Greater Germany by drawing them into the iron circle which surrounds, compresses, and at the same time upholds and elevates the German Empire. Only if they are united with the German Empire will the outlying German tribes become German indeed, and will be made to Germanise other nations.

Whether the dream of a German Empire from Hamburg to Trieste which would include the German part and some of the Slavonic parts of Austria, and which might include Holland and Switzerland as well, will remain a dream, or whether it will materialise, should soon be decided, for the German element in Austria seems likely to disappear almost completely within a few decades. The problem of the Austrian Germans may therefore become soon of greater interest to German diplomacy than the future of Asia Minor and of Shantung.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS

GERMANY'S relations with the various great Powers have carefully been scanned, watched, and studied by most statesmen and political writers, but Germany's relations with Holland and Germany's policy towards Holland have hitherto escaped attention, although Holland may, and probably will, some day play a most important part with regard to the political and economic development of Germany. Holland is a small and weak neutral state, and it is usually considered to be politically as uninteresting a country as is Luxemburg or the Republic of San Marino. Yet it may become a factor of the very greatest importance in any readjustment of international relations in which Germany is concerned. In fact, Holland may, and very likely will, again become the storm-centre of European politics, as it was in the times of Philip the Second and of Henry the Fourth, of Cromwell and of Louis the Fourteenth, of Marlborough and of Napoleon the First, for history is apt to run in circles. During four centuries the Netherlands have been the centre of gravity to the European great Powers. The sceptre of Europe lies buried not on the banks of the Bosphorus, but at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt. Therefore the Netherlands have during four centuries been the battlefield on which the struggle for the

mastery of Europe and of the world has been decided. In the Netherlands the mighty armies with which Philip the Second, Louis the Fourteenth, Louis the Fifteenth, and Napoleon the First strove to subdue Europe and to conquer the world were broken to pieces, and in the Netherlands Germany may find either her Gemblours, her Breda, or her Waterloo.

If we wish clearly to understand the nature of the political relations between Holland and Germany, in order to be able to gauge the probable development of these relations in the future, we must first of all consider the peculiar and most important position which Holland occupies with regard to Germany's manufacturing industries and with regard to Germany's commerce.

The kingdom of Holland lies right across the greatest trade route of Germany, and to some extent blocks that trade route. By far the most important coal and iron mines, and by far the larger part of the more important manufacturing industries of Germany, lies on or near the Rhine, and its tributaries, the Ruhr, the Mosel, the Saar, and the Main. At the great industrial exhibition which was held in 1902 in Düsseldorf, it was triumphantly announced that Rhenish Prussia and Westphalia, the two Prussian provinces on the Rhine, which possess only 15 per cent. of the territory of the country, consume no less than 71 per cent. of the coal raised and produce no less than 81 per cent. of the iron and 86 per cent. of the steel made in Prussia, and that these two provinces keep no less than 83 per cent. of the country's spindles running. Although these figures show that the Rhine valley possesses the predominance as regards manufacturing, they do not tell the whole tale of its industrial pre-eminence, for not only the principal

industrial towns of Prussia but also those of Baden, Alsace-Lorraine, Hessia, and Bavaria, lie on or near the Rhine. In fact, if we allow for the industrial centres in and around Saxony, we may say that practically the whole of the German manufacturing industry is concentrated on or near the Rhine.

As the German manufacturing industries are chiefly carried on in the valley of the Rhine, that mighty river has not unnaturally become the main artery of Germany's trade, and it is the outlet for the productions of Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Ruhrort, Barmen, Elberfeld, Essen, Bochum, Remscheid, Solingen, Gladbach, Duisburg, Krefeld, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Frankfort, Offenburg, Reutlingen, Kaiserslautern, Saarbrücken, Mannheim, Würzburg, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, Strasburg, Mülhausen, Gebweiler, Dornach, Colmar, &c. All these industrial towns and many more send their manufactures along the valley of the Rhine, and they receive in return their foreign raw materials, food stuffs, &c., also largely by way of the Rhine.

While the English coalfields and the English industrial centres enjoy the precious advantage of being situated either on the seashore itself or in its immediate proximity, the German coalfields and all the industrial centres on and near the Rhine lie in a straight line from 150 to 350 miles away from the sea. The great Dortmund coal and iron centre, for instance, is separated by 150 miles of land, the Saarbrücken coal and iron centre by 220 miles of land, and the Mülhausen spinning and weaving centre by 350 miles of land from the nearest point of the sea border. These figures make it absolutely clear that the German manufacturing industries labour under the very greatest difficulties in competing in foreign markets with other countries, and especially with a

country which is as happily situated as is England, which manufactures on the sea border. Indeed, Germany would be quite incapable of industrially competing with this country did not the Rhine and the canals built in connection with the Rhine afford to the German industries very cheap carriage by water. It cannot be doubted that under equal conditions the competition of German manufactured goods with British manufactured goods should be impossible everywhere outside of Germany, owing to the unfavourable geographical position of the German coal-fields and industrial centres.

Germany's export trade is principally over-sea trade. In 1898 the Reichs Marine Amt, the Navy Board of Germany, published a lengthy memoir on the maritime interests of Germany, in which it was estimated that "certainly three-fifths, but probably two-thirds or more of Germany's foreign trade is over-sea trade." Since 1898 Germany's foreign trade has increased by more than 100 per cent., and at present about three-quarters of Germany's foreign trade, perhaps more, should be over-sea trade. The preservation of her over-sea trade is therefore of vital importance to Germany, and cheap water carriage is an essential condition for its maintenance and further extension.

Germany's principal industrial centres lie in the Rhine Valley, and Germany's enormous export trade flows along the shores of the Rhine, through Holland and Belgium towards foreign countries over-sea, whilst she receives on the same route her most valuable and her most necessary imports. Hence Antwerp and Rotterdam are rightly considered by far the most important German harbours, and compared with these Hamburg appears almost insignificant, especially as Antwerp and Rotterdam are constantly increasing

the lead which they have obtained over Hamburg. Formerly Hamburg was Germany's most important harbour, but Hamburg is steadily losing ground through the marvellous development of Antwerp and Rotterdam. At present the shipping trade of Antwerp and Rotterdam combined is almost twice as large as that of Hamburg, and the time seems to be near at hand when Hamburg will sink from the first to the third and perhaps even the fourth place among Continental harbours. Antwerp, which fifty years ago handled about 300,000 tons, and twenty years ago about 2,000,000 tons of shipping, now handles 12,000,000 tons of shipping every year. Rotterdam has during the same period increased its shipping from a few hundred thousand tons to about 10,000,000 tons at the present time.

The enormous increase in the trade of Antwerp and of Rotterdam, and especially of Rotterdam—for Antwerp is the principal port not only to Belgium but also to the industrial north-east of France—is due to the marvellous prosperity of the German manufacturing industries, and to the surprising expansion of traffic along the Rhine and across the Dutch-German frontier which is still growing with undiminished rapidity, as may be seen from the following figures :

GOODS EXCLUSIVE OF TIMBER IN RAFTS CARRIED BY WATER PASSING THE GERMAN-DUTCH FRONTIER ON THE RHINE AT EMMERICH

	Going up river.	Going down river.
1894	4,765,600 tons	3,142,000 tons
1909	14,881,299 „	9,964,662 „

The Hamburg trade is largely Austrian trade.

From these figures, which show that the freight carried on the Rhine across the German-Dutch frontier has considerably more than trebled in the short

space of fifteen years, and from other figures supplied by the Statistical Department of Germany, it appears that by far the greatest and the most valuable part of Germany's over-sea trade is not carried on *via* Hamburg and Bremen as is usually believed, but *via* Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Antwerp, and that the foreign trade carried on across the Dutch frontier grows proportionately far more quickly than the general foreign trade of Germany. Thus Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and to a minor extent Antwerp, have become the principal harbours of industrial Germany, and industrial Germany is in the same position in which Lancashire would be if Liverpool and the Manchester Ship Canal were possessed by a foreign country.

Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and to a lesser degree Antwerp, have become wealthy through the immense stream of German exports and imports which continually flows through these harbours, and it cannot be doubted that the great prosperity of Holland is to a very large extent derived from the German through traffic. The Dutch, the Germans exclaim, have become wealthy at the cost of the German manufacturers and traders. It is true that the trade of Rotterdam and Antwerp is chiefly carried on by German merchants living in those towns, for the merchant always follows his wares; but these German merchants enrich Holland and Belgium, and they employ Dutch and Belgian labour to whom they distribute the largest part of their profits in the shape of wages. The more industrial Germany works, the richer will Antwerp, Amsterdam, and especially Rotterdam, become, for these towns possess, so to say, a first charge on the profits made by the foreign trade of Germany. In fact, the trade of Germany is in perpetuity mortgaged

to the towns of the Netherlands, and these will levy their toll in good and in bad times.

This fact is exceedingly galling to Germany, and we cannot wonder that Professor Treitschke, the *enfant terrible* of German diplomacy, proclaimed in his book *Politik*, with his usual lack of reticence and discretion:

"The Rhine is the king of rivers. It is an infinitely precious natural resource to Germany, and, owing to our own fault, the very part of the Rhine which is materially most valuable to us has fallen into the hands of foreigners. It is an indispensable duty of German policy to regain the mouths of that river. A purely political connection with Holland is perhaps not necessary; but an economic union of Holland and Germany is absolutely required; and we are far too modest if we are afraid to say that Holland's entrance into the German Customs Union is as necessary to us as is our daily bread."

During the last few decades the people in Germany have talked much about a purely economic and about an economic and political union with Holland. That agitation received for a long time no official countenance whatever from the German Government, which refused by any official action to bring pressure to bear upon the Dutch. However, during the reign of the Emperor William II. the policy of Germany towards Holland has been altered, and a constantly increasing economic pressure been exercised upon the Netherlands. An attempt was to be made to divert the current of German trade from Holland towards the German coast, and with this object in view the building of the Dortmund-Ems Canal was begun by Germany in 1892. This canal, which was completed in 1899 and opened in 1901, connects the greatest coal and iron centre of Germany with Emden, a little German coast town which almost touches the German-Dutch frontier line. The importance of the Dortmund district in respect of

the Rhine trade may be gauged from the fact that its coal production increased from 12,219,432 tons in 1870 to 94,658,769 tons in 1907, that it produces about three-fifths of the hard coal raised in Germany, and that the traffic of Hochfeld-Duisburg-Ruhrort, the Rhine harbour serving the Dortmund coal and iron centre, increased from 2,900,000 tons in 1875 to no less than 17,000,000 tons in 1909. The port of Hochfeld-Duisburg-Ruhrort is as regards extent and traffic by far the greatest inland harbour in the world, and Germany threatens to transfer the bulk of the immense traffic of the Dortmund centre, and eventually the bulk of the whole Rhine traffic as well, from the Netherlands to Emden by means of the Dortmund-Ems Canal.

The Dortmund-Ems Canal is the grandest and the most generously constructed inland waterway of Germany. It is a Government undertaking, and about £4,000,000, or no less than £25,000 per mile, have been spent on its construction. It has a uniform depth of 8¼ feet, a depth which is equal to that of the Rhine at Cologne, and it can be used by ships carrying 600 tons and more. How large such ships are for inland navigation may be seen from the fact that on our English canals boats carrying only from 30 to 50 tons, which are exceedingly uneconomical, may daily be met with. The Dortmund-Ems Canal has as far as possible been made uniform with the Rhine, so that a large, perhaps the larger, part of the 50,000 ships which now yearly cross the German-Dutch frontier should in future travel to Emden. There are twenty-one locks in the canal, and a number of these are almost 600 feet long, in order to enable whole trains of boats to get through the locks with the minimum of delay. At Dortmund almost 400 acres of land, an area larger than the water expanse of the port of Hamburg, have

been reserved for harbour accommodation, and Emden, at the other end of the canal, has at a cost of £400,000 been fitted out with the most modern and the most expensive appliances, in order to convert that sleepy little coast town into a well-equipped port.

Although the Dortmund-Ems Canal has been in existence only during a few years, and although many serious imperfections, which were discovered after the completion of the canal, have caused delays and have impeded the rapid development of traffic on the canal, the progress shown by that undertaking is certainly remarkable, as may be seen from the following figures:

TRAFFIC ON THE DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, NEAR EMDEN

	1899.	1908.
Iron ore	512 tons	534,480 tons
Iron ware	6,372 „	24,265 „
Grain, &c.	28,522 „	142,535 „
Coal and coke . .	20,254 „	481,307 „

It should be noted that the bulk of the German-Dutch Rhine trade consists of the imports of grain and of Swedish iron ore, and of the exports, of German coal and of German manufactured goods, chiefly iron ware.

During the nine years from 1899 to 1908 the traffic on the Dortmund-Ems Canal in the most important articles carried had increased twelvefold, the tonnage of sea-shipping entering the port of Emden has increased fivefold, from 108,157 tons in 1899 to 584,642 tons in 1908, and the Emden harbour is already proving too small for the traffic.

This promising beginning has caused the Government to develop the new inland waterway and the new sea harbour with redoubled energy. A million pounds is being spent on the enlargement of the port

of Emden, so that Emden should become a serious competitor to Rotterdam and Antwerp. A shallow of 750 acres is being enclosed by high dykes and gradually, according to requirements, to be converted into a harbour, which in size should emulate and perhaps exceed not only the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, but even the foremost British harbours.

The canal itself will also be greatly improved and be extended further. The town of Dortmund, where the Dortmund-Ems Canal at present ends, lies thirty-five English miles to the east of the Rhine, and in due course a canal connection between Dortmund and the Rhine will be effected, which will require seven locks and which will cost about £2,500,000. When these works are accomplished, and they can be executed probably in two or three years, Germany will be able to draw not only the traffic furnished by the Dortmund centre, but the bulk of the whole Rhine traffic, which is furnished by her manufacturing industries, away from the Netherlands towards Emden.

It is true that the canal route to Emden compares unfavourably with the route along the Rhine to Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Antwerp. Whilst the Rhine follows a natural course, twenty-one locks and the narrowness of the artificial channel of the canal make rapid navigation on the latter impossible. Hence goods travel along the Dortmund-Ems Canal in five days, whilst they travel in two and a half to three and a half days along the Rhine. This disadvantage would be crippling in a country where Government interference with the natural development of industry is considered almost a crime, but it can easily be rectified, or at least be compensated for, in a country which deliberately and systematically fosters its home trade. By low tariffs, which will

favourably compare with the minimum costs of sending freight *via* the Dutch frontier to the Dutch and Belgian harbours, Germany will divert her exports and imports from the mouths of the Rhine to Emden, and Germany regulates her transport charges to and from Emden with that object in view. Since the 1st of April 1905, for instance, the charges for the export of coal and coke *via* Emden have been considerably reduced by the Government, partly in order to enable the coal of the Dortmund district to be sold in the Mediterranean (Port Said) and in South America, and partly in order to oust English coal from the north of Germany, where it has hitherto found a very large market.

It is clear at first sight that a narrow, artificial and expensive canal, which eventually will possess twenty-eight locks, which follows a circuitous route, and which takes the German exports to a seaport which is about 200 miles further distant from England and from other Western countries whereto these exports are sent, than are Rotterdam and Antwerp, cannot possibly compete as regards rapidity and economy of transport with a broad natural river which carries German goods to Rotterdam and Antwerp. Nevertheless, Germany may, by offering sufficient inducement to shippers, succeed in diverting the whole of her over-sea trade from Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Antwerp to Emden, but she may have to work the Dortmund-Ems Canal for many years, perhaps permanently, at a loss, in order to achieve her aim. However, it seems to the German Government a matter of very minor consideration whether the Dortmund-Ems Canal, with its eventual extension to the Rhine, will be a profitable or an unprofitable enterprise to the State, for that canal is not a necessity

to the German industries, and it is certainly not a purely economic enterprise on the part of the State, as might be thought. It is an economic undertaking serving a political purpose, or rather it is a political enterprise with an economic label.

When the canal was completed the *Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen*, an important semi-official publication, wrote :

"In our time our dependence on foreign countries has frequently been felt by the circumstance that the mouth of the Rhine is in the hands of a foreign country, and that that country in consequence draws away from us the chief profit of our export industry. This state of dependence will be ended by the Dortmund-Ems Canal, which gives to the Rhine, at least for the province of Westphalia, a German outlet in Emden."

In July and August 1901, the year when the new canal was opened, a series of anonymous articles entitled "Holland and Germany," appeared in *Die Grenzboten*, a German weekly which is frequently officially inspired, and the style of those articles bears a curious resemblance to the picturesque diction of Prince Bülow, the then Chancellor. The gist of that important series of articles was :

"Holland's wealth is chiefly derived from the German transit trade. That trade can be diverted by the new Dortmund-Ems Canal, which will give to the Rhine an outlet at Emden. That port, which lies on the Dutch frontier, has so far been neglected, but it is being equipped in order to make it an efficient competitor of Rotterdam. If she chooses, Germany can cripple Dutch commerce and bring Holland on her knees by diverting the Dutch transit trade and by imposing hostile tariffs. Consequently Holland is economically dependent upon Germany, and Holland's economic incorporation with Germany in some form or other is for Holland an unavoidable necessity.

"Politically, Holland is threatened by other nations. Her

guaranteed neutrality is no more than a shred of paper, which would prove worthless in war. Spain has been brutally crushed by the United States; Portugal hangs like a fly in the spider's net of England, a prey to her monopolistic mercantile system. The Dutch will not share the fate of the Boers, but, if they are not careful, they may be caught in British snares. From all these dangers incorporation with Germany is the only salvation. The movement of naval expansion in Germany will not end until a German navy floats on the sea that can compete with the fleet of Great Britain. Equally strong on sea and on land, the world may choose our friendship or our enmity. The strong may make their choice, but Holland will do well to stand by us in friendship, not so much for our sake as for her own existence."

The foregoing lines were written during the Boer War, "the fifth Anglo-Dutch War," as it was called with bitterness by many Dutch patriots, who remembered that Cromwell and Charles the Second had destroyed the greatness of their country. At that time the exasperation of Holland against Great Britain was indescribable, and, taking advantage of the prevailing spirit among the Dutch, the semi-official Press of Germany ventured directly and vigorously to recommend the incorporation of Holland into the German Empire.

At first sight, the idea of Holland becoming a part of the German Empire seems fantastic and absurd, but it is much less extravagant than it appears at first sight. Germany is after all not a single State, but a voluntary union of a number of independent States, and the German Emperor is not the monarch of Germany, but merely the hereditary President of the German union of States. He is only the *primus inter pares* among the German rulers. Such is the position of affairs—at least on paper, according to the German constitution—although it might be a serious matter for one of the smaller States of Germany

if it should venture to insist too loudly on its paper independence. The kingdoms of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony, and all the other political units of Germany, large and small, are independent States, which hitherto have got on very well with their mighty President, and Holland would no doubt receive the greatest consideration and the amplest guarantees of independence at the hands of Germany if she should be inclined to join the union of German States. It is conceivable that under a special treaty Holland would be given special privileges by Germany. For instance, Dutch citizens might be free from compulsory military service in the German army; the Dutch army, like the Bavarian army, might form a separate contingent; Germany might guarantee the integrity of Dutch territory without requiring more than a passive assistance on the part of the Dutch in case of a foreign war, and the contributions of the Netherlands to the imperial German exchequer might be fixed at a very low rate. In short, it might be made worth Holland's while to join the German union of States.

A political amalgamation of Holland and Germany is no doubt the *beau ideal* which German diplomacy keeps in view, and with this ultimate aim in view, Germany's policy towards Holland is shaped. It may be summed up in the words, "Peaceful penetration and gradually increasing economic pressure from without." German merchants following their wares steadily filter into the Netherlands. On the exchanges of Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam, perhaps more German than Dutch and French is heard; the principal banks, shipping companies, mercantile houses, factories, &c., in the Dutch and Belgian Netherlands are in German hands; and as the commercial classes

exercise a great influence in the democratic Low Countries, German political influence both in Holland and in Belgium is rapidly growing, although it is little noticed abroad. Holland and Belgium are rapidly becoming Germanised. Commercial men in Belgium, and especially in Holland, begin to feel greatly hampered by having their operations restricted to the narrow territory of their country, and to cast longing eyes towards the German customs walls, which so effectively restrict the extension of their operations. Many Dutch and Belgian business men are of opinion that their business would wonderfully benefit if by joining the German Customs Union they would receive 66,000,000 new customers, and they view with serious apprehension Germany's determined exertions to divert her enormous over-sea trade from Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Amsterdam to Emden.

It should not be forgotten that wealthy Holland is by nature one of the poorest countries in the world. Practically no coal, no iron, no timber, and no stone exists in the country, which is merely a mud-flat, and very little corn can be grown in it. Nevertheless, Holland is more densely populated than is Great Britain. Holland is more dependent on foreign food and raw material than is this country, and the Dutch produce for export chiefly vegetables, flower bulbs, butter, cheese, margarine, &c. Manufacturing has apparently no great future through the absence of coal, and notwithstanding all these hampering circumstances, the Dutch population increases much faster than does the population of this country. In view of the lack of natural resources, it is quite clear that the Dutch owe their prosperity chiefly to the German transit trade, and the Netherlands would become utterly impoverished if they were deprived of that

trade, for, rightly considered, the Dutch harbours are the greatest natural resources of the Dutch people. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that Dutchmen think with the greatest alarm of the possibility that Germany might succeed in diverting her trade from the Dutch harbours to Emden, and they will do all in their power to keep the precious German transit trade in the Netherlands.

It is worth much to German diplomacy to have created that feeling of alarm and consternation in the minds of the Dutch, and Germany is probably prepared to spend ten or twenty million pounds *à fonds perdu* on the Emden Canal, not so much in order to make Emden a first-class harbour, to ruin Rotterdam, and to impoverish the Netherlands, but in order to force Holland into a political union with Germany, towards which a Customs Union might be the first important step. If Germany should succeed in this policy, the money which she may lose on the Emden Canal would be exceedingly well spent. The possession of Holland is worth to Germany ten or twenty million pounds, and considerably more.

In former years, when the Prussian State wished to buy cheaply a prosperous private railway, it regularly commenced operations by building a well-planned competition line, which deeply cut into the profits of the railway which the Government wished to acquire. After some years of severe competition, in which the private enterprise was, of course, the loser, it could, as a rule, be acquired at a reasonable figure, and the railway was glad and anxious to be bought up by the State. Germany seems to follow a similar policy with regard to Holland in building the canal connection between the Rhine and Emden, and that policy may have a similar success.

The mouths of the Rhine, together with the mouths of the Meuse and the Scheldt, would be exceedingly precious to Germany, not only for economic purposes, but for naval and military purposes as well. Germany is determined to have a very powerful fleet, and she is building a very powerful fleet, but she has practically no harbours which are suitable for her mighty navy. Germany has two war harbours, Wilhelmshafen on the North Sea, and Kiel on the Baltic. Wilhelmshafen is well situated for striking westward, but it is an artificially dug out, small, and utterly insufficient port. Kiel, on the other hand, is a splendid natural harbour which is roomy enough to contain all the ships of the German navy, present and to come. But its geographical position is as unfavourable as is that of the German coalfields. Kiel lies on the wrong shore, the eastern shore, of the Danish peninsula, and it is suitable only for observing the Danish Sound, and for striking at Russia. It is connected with the western shore of the Danish peninsula by a canal, the Baltic–North Sea Canal, and thus a junction of the German naval forces can, at least in theory, quickly be effected in the North Sea in case of war. However, a canal sixty miles long is not an ideal route to follow for a fleet in time of war. At the critical moment, when minutes may decide the fate of the German navy, a mishap, blocking the Kiel Canal for several days, might occur either by chance or by the boldness or bribery of Germany's opponent, and the German fleet in the Baltic would be forced to follow the dangerous and narrow route round the north of Denmark. We can realise the difficulty of Germany's naval position with the principal base at Kiel, only by comparing her situation with that of Great Britain. In doing so, we discover that Germany will find it

as difficult to defend her foreign trade off the Dutch coast with Kiel as principal base, as Great Britain would find it to defend her Channel traffic against a superior enemy, if her only important naval base was situated in the Hebrides or the Orkney Islands, for the distances and difficulties in both cases are almost identical. It should not be forgotten that the Baltic-North Sea Canal, which, at present, is not deep enough for the new warships which Germany is constructing, is being deepened and widened. The new canal will be completed about 1915, and will greatly alter Germany's naval strategical position, as is shown in another chapter. As Russia will hardly become a dangerous naval opponent to Germany for many decades to come, the German fleet is meant to strike at some power to the west of Germany. Yet Germany may be unable to act in the way she may wish to act, notwithstanding her strong fleet, unless she possesses an adequate naval base within easy reach of her probable field of naval operations. If the German fleet should be defeated off her principal trade route at the mouth of the Rhine, it would probably not be able to reach either Wilhelmshafen or Kiel for refitting. Therefore, a naval defeat might mean annihilation to the German fleet. Germany, as at present situated, has to stake her all on the first naval battle.

If Germany possessed the mouths of the Rhine, she would be able to create there a number of excellent naval bases which, through the Dutch islands lying in front of them, would be safe from foreign attack, and these bases would by their advantageous position not only be ideal points for protecting Germany's trade, but also be particularly valuable for an attack against both France and England. Besides, the amalgamation of Holland and Germany would give

to the latter Power a number of excellent naval bases and coaling stations in both hemispheres.

A glance at the map will show the fact, which is ignored by many, that Holland possesses the mouths of the Scheldt and the islands lying in front of Antwerp and commanding that port. Therefore, if Germany had possessed herself of Holland, she could control Antwerp, and through Antwerp the industries of North-Eastern France, which ship their raw materials and their productions through Antwerp. The temptation to join the possession of Antwerp to that of Rotterdam would probably prove too great to be resisted, for by its position in the rear of the Dutch shore Antwerp seems destined to be a part of Holland.

From the military point of view also Holland would be extremely valuable to Germany. The provinces of North and South Holland, with part of Utrecht, form a natural fortress of the greatest strength. Within twenty-four hours a broad belt of country stretching from Naarden on the Zuyder Zee, *viâ* Utrecht, Culenborg, and Gorinchen to Geertruidenberg, on the mouth of the Meuse, can be inundated, and the places where a passage might be forced across the water are defended by strong fortifications. Amsterdam itself is a huge fortress within the provincial fortress described, which is defended by similar inundations and by a huge circle of forts. In the possession of Holland, Germany would, in time of war, have a huge impregnable island fortress on the flank of France and of England, a fortress which could hardly be starved into surrender, and which could hardly be attacked if vigorously defended, and this fortress would furnish the most convenient sally-port for a naval and military attack on either country. As long as Holland is neutral, the defence of the

open French frontier facing Germany is comparatively easy. If Holland should fall into German hands, both the Belgian and the French defences could be turned from Holland. France would be at the mercy of Germany, and she would soon occupy as unimportant a political position in the world as is that held by Belgium at the present day. If Germany should take Holland, France would become a third-rate Power. The possession of Holland would not only enable Germany to become a naval Power of the first rank, and compel England to keep practically her whole fleet permanently tied up in the Channel, but it would at the same time make the military superiority of Germany on the Continent of Europe absolutely overwhelming. Holland has evidently a more important strategical position than Constantinople. Therefore I said in the beginning of this chapter that the sceptre of Europe lies buried not on the banks of the Bosphorus, but at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt.

Some German writers have argued that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland would be of inestimable advantage to Germany in case of a war with a superior naval Power such as Great Britain, inasmuch as the over-sea trade of Germany would continue to flow during such a war without hindrance through the neutral ports of the Netherlands, whilst the enemy would blockade Hamburg and some minor German ports. Germany could stand a blockade of Hamburg, but she could not stand the cutting off of her huge over-sea trade *viâ* Rotterdam and Antwerp. Of course, it is possible that a superior naval Power at war with Germany will, at the bidding of some professors of international law, leave Germany's trade *viâ* Holland and Belgium unmolested. But that seems hardly likely. No sane German statesman will

be influenced in his policy towards Holland by the argument that a superior sea Power will leave Germany's trade through the Netherlands undisturbed. Germany trusts for her security in war to her right arm, not to a piece of paper or to the dicta of her professors.

If we look at the German-Dutch relations from the German point of view, it is clear that the acquisition of Holland in some form or other—the form is very immaterial—would be of inestimable advantage to Germany. Germany, like every young and vigorous Power, and every young and vigorous individual, wishes to acquire and to increase, and not merely to preserve and to maintain. Only old nations are contented to contemplate and to philosophise, leaving the race for national success to the younger and the more sturdy nations around them. Old men and old nations live in the past, and political Germany is young, very young. The Germans argue: Holland has become rich by shipping our goods, Holland is a stumbling-block in Germany's road to economic success and prevents her becoming a world-Power. Holland has excellent harbours, Holland is weak, Holland is dependent upon our trade for her very existence. Therefore, we have Holland in our power. Let us make Holland feel our power, let us make Holland feel that she is dependent on Germany's goodwill, let us drain Holland of her wealth by diverting our trade for a time from Holland, and she will ask us to come to terms with her. When she is in the required mood of humility, let us propose to her, "Give us the free use of your harbours, and we will not only restore to you your former prosperity by leading back our foreign trade to its former route *viâ* Holland, but we will besides give you freedom of trade throughout

Germany. We will respect your independence and all your peculiarities, and we will not trouble you with militarism. Do what you like, provided you give to us the free use of your harbours."

If Germany should succeed by means of the Emden Canal, and perhaps by the additional pressure of hostile tariffs, in impoverishing Holland, Holland may feel compelled to throw herself into Germany's arms in order to escape national bankruptcy; but if Germany should not succeed in drawing her trade away from Holland through the insufficient capacity of the Emden Canal or some other reason, Germany may feel tempted to create some dispute with her Dutch neighbours, in order to acquire Holland in a more direct manner. It is true that in twenty-four hours the north-west corner of Holland with Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, may be converted into an impregnable island fortress, but the Dutch may not be given the time necessary for flooding their country. Only fifty miles separate Muiden, where the most important sluices for putting the country round Utrecht under water are situated, from the German frontier, and German military motor cars travel at an astonishing speed. Besides, it seems not at all certain that Holland would vigorously resist an energetic German attack. In 1787, a small Prussian force overran Holland, and took Amsterdam almost without bloodshed. In that year the dykes were pierced, and Amsterdam seemed to be impregnable, but a weak spot in the water defences enabled the Prussians to get through. After all, the intensity of resistance depends not so much upon the defences than upon the defenders, and the little Dutch army is an unknown factor. Therefore, a German general of daring might feel tempted to recommend to his sovereign to take Holland by a rush, and in view

of the preparedness of the German army such a rush would very likely prove successful.

Germany's acquisition of Holland, in whatever form, would directly threaten all those European Powers which do not desire to see Germany become all-powerful on the Continent. Looked at from the British point of view, Holland, which separates Germany and Great Britain, occupies the identical position which Corea occupied in relation to Japan and Russia before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, and an occupation of Holland on the part of Germany might, to that country, have consequences similar to those which the attempted occupation of Corea had to Russia. The absorption of Holland by Germany would permanently threaten the safety of England. Therefore, Germany will hardly be able to acquire Holland forcibly without a great struggle, unless some vast international commotion such as a great European war in which Germany is neutral may give to her an opportunity of acquiring Holland by a coup. Unless such an opportunity should occur, Germany will probably endeavour gradually to strengthen her hold upon Holland and to swallow that country by degrees. An economic arrangement between Germany and Holland may lead to a customs union, to a railway union, to the introduction of a uniform coinage in the two countries, &c., and Holland may become German almost unnoticed. This seems to be the policy which is at present being pursued by Germany.

In view of Germany's record, it seems natural to conclude that she will continue her triumphant progress, and many influential Dutchmen believe that the absorption of their country by Germany is inevitable, that this consummation is merely a question of time. However, a few years may altogether change

the aspect of international politics, and the prospects of Germany. Germany's military and naval strength is based on her wealth. During the last twenty-five years the progress of her industries and of her economic power has been even more marvellous than has been the progress of her political power. However, Germany's prosperity hangs by a slender thread. Germany is greatly hampered by her lack of harbours and by the long distances which separate her coalfields and her industrial centres from the sea-coast. On the other hand, Germany has, during the time of her marvellous growth, been greatly benefited by the fact that Great Britain, her most dangerous competitor, if natural conditions are duly considered, has, at the bidding of unpractical doctrinaires, neglected her matchless resources and opportunities, and has foolishly opened to Germany her world-wide markets as a reward for seeing her manufactured goods excluded from Germany. The introduction of Protection in Great Britain and of preferential tariffs throughout the British Empire may therefore bring about the economic and the political decline of Germany, and it seems not impossible that Germany is building her fleet with such feverish haste in order to oppose if possible the conclusion of a Pan-Britannic Zollverein. Although Holland may be considered the mother of Free Trade—two centuries before Adam Smith was born the Dutch already championed that policy—Holland may owe the preservation of an independent national existence to the introduction of Protection in Great Britain. Owing to their natural burdens and hindrances, which have been touched upon in the foregoing, the German industries are working with a slender margin of profit, and if Free Trade throughout the British Empire, which is the basis on which the vast

over-sea trade of Germany has been erected, should cease for Germany, Germany's industries may decline, her economic prosperity may be replaced by economic decay, and the costly canal route to Emden may become abandoned by German shipping because the German Government may no longer be able to subsidise that undertaking. The introduction of Protection in Great Britain may conceivably save the world from a very great war; it may save Holland from political extinction and the Continent of Europe from German domination.

CHAPTER V

THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY AND THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM

THOSE who have watched Germany's activity in Samoa, the Philippines, South-West and East Africa, China, Asia Minor, Polynesia, and Venezuela believe that it is Germany's aim to acquire colonies and coaling stations wherever they can be obtained. Those who have followed her policy towards Belgium, Holland, and Denmark think that Germany strives to aggrandise herself at the cost of her weak neighbour States, which possess excellent harbours, and which, besides, occupy perhaps the most valuable strategical positions in Europe. Those who have been struck by the menacing attitude towards France which Germany took up in connection with Morocco in 1905 and 1911 conclude that she wishes to obtain by a victorious war another slice of Eastern France, and perhaps some of the French colonies as well. Lastly, those who have observed Germany's policy towards Great Britain, the rapid growth of the German navy and its concentration near the British shores, and who remember the German Emperor's declaration, "Germany's future lies upon the water," and the statement, "Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would threaten the supremacy of that Power," which was contained in the official memorandum introductory to the great German Navy Bill of 1900, believe

that Germany wishes to use her vast naval armaments for the overthrow of Great Britain and the dismemberment of the British Empire. Germany is credited with warlike designs against nearly all civilised and uncivilised countries of the world, except Russia. Yet thinly-populated and semi-barbarous Russia, with her immense territory and her unlimited, varied, and scarcely-touched natural resources, would be an ideal field of action for German private enterprise, and for the genius for organisation and administration possessed by the German officials.

It is true that the German Emperor's declaration, "Germany's future lies upon the water," and the preamble of the German Navy Bill referred to, have furnished a text for countless speeches, newspaper articles, and books unfriendly to Great Britain. It is true that the German Navy Bill was promoted by a national campaign of passionate vituperation and denunciation of Great Britain, a campaign which was rather encouraged than merely tolerated by the German Government. It is also true that since the time of the Kruger telegram German diplomacy has raised difficulties for Great Britain in various parts of the world, and that the cry, *Britanniam esse delendam,* is periodically raised by the German press. Still, appearances are often deceptive. Diplomatic action which at first sight seems shallow and unintelligent is sometimes deep. Germany's greatest interests are rather continental than trans-oceanic and maritime. In its anti-British campaign German diplomacy either made a great mistake or was very profound. If the German diplomats were really bent upon acquiring a colonial empire at the risk of a collision with Great Britain, and perhaps with the United States as well, if they had really been pre-

paring themselves for war with "the mightiest naval Power"—as the German Navy Bill puts it—their recklessness in endangering Germany's most important interests was only equalled by their folly in proclaiming their intentions from the house-tops. But if we assume that the German diplomats understand their business—and secrecy is the soul of statesmanship—then we may, perhaps, conclude that the German fleet is neither for the spoliation of Great Britain nor for the humiliation of the United States, but for some other purpose.

Germany's restlessness springs, in the first place, from her need of expansion, and, in the second place, from a vague sense of future danger. Both sentiments are justified. Germany's population increases by about 900,000 a year. The country is rapidly becoming too small for its inhabitants. Per square mile Germany's population is already more than 60 per cent. greater than that of France, and is almost as great as that of the United Kingdom. Germany wishes neither to suffer from a congestion of population destructive to the national physique similar to that which exists in the British manufacturing districts and in the West of Ireland, nor does she wish her surplus population to migrate to foreign countries and to strengthen her national competitors to Germany's hurt. Germany's greatest need is sufficient territory; she requires urgently more elbow-room.

Germany's territory comprises 208,740 square miles. Russia in Europe has 2,052,490 square miles, and the whole of Russia extends to no less than 8,379,044 square miles. All Russia is forty times, and European Russia alone is ten times, as large as Germany. In the imagination of many, Russia is a gigantic ice-bound country inhabited by shivering

moujiks clothed in furs. The climate of Russia is not so bad; it has extremes of heat and cold similar to Canada. It is not generally known that Moscow and Riga in the north of Russia lie in the same latitude as Glasgow and Copenhagen, that Kieff and Kharkoff in Russia's centre are no farther north than Frankfort-on-the-Main and the Isle of Wight, that Odessa and Rostoff lie as far south as Venice and Milan, and that Tiflis and Khiva have the latitude and the climate of Naples and Constantinople. The greater part of European Russia lies no farther to the north than Germany; and in the south of both European and Asiatic Russia peaches, grapes, tobacco, cotton, and many other tropical and sub-tropical productions are raised in abundance under a climate which resembles that of Southern Italy and of Southern California. Per square mile European Russia has 65 inhabitants, and Asiatic Russia has only 3.7 inhabitants. Whilst all Russia has but 20 inhabitants per square mile, Germany has no less than 310 inhabitants per square mile. European and Asiatic Russia possess the largest cultivable plains in the world, and as the soil is very rich, Russia should, and undoubtedly will, become the greatest granary and ranch in the world. Besides, Russia is in parts very highly mineralised, and she possesses magnificent forests and inland waterways. Through the possession of all these resources Russia has room for a very large population. If we now assume that only one-half of Russia is susceptible to dense settlement, and that the favoured half of Russia can support only half as many people per square mile as Germany, it follows that all Russia should be able to maintain a population of 670,000,000 people.

Russia's population is rapidly increasing. At

present she has more than 160,000,000 inhabitants, and if the present rate of progress should be maintained, Russia will have 300,000,000 inhabitants in about thirty years, whilst Germany will scarcely be able to nourish more than 90,000,000 or 100,000,000 people on her present territory. A military state of 300,000,000 people, able to raise an army of 10,000,000 or 20,000,000 men, would be a very dangerous neighbour to Germany. Germany's future lies not upon the water, but upon the land, because her future is most seriously threatened on the land, and she can hope to remain a great nation only by acquiring sufficient land for her rapidly-increasing population.

Owing to the great prolificness of the race, the Russian population increases very rapidly. The yearly birth-rate in Russia is 48.0 per thousand, compared with only 31.0 per thousand in Germany. Furthermore, the German birth-rate is rapidly declining, whilst that of Russia remains stationary. The death-rate in Russia is high; yet the excess of births over deaths is 18.5 per thousand in Russia as compared with only 13.8 per thousand in Germany. The natural increase of the population is, therefore, almost 50 per cent. greater in Russia than it is in Germany. Since the Russian census of 1897, the population of Russia and of Germany has increased as follows :—

	Population of Russia.	Population of Germany.
1897 . .	129,209,000	53,569,000
1909 . .	160,095,000	63,695,000
Increase	30,886,000	10,126,000

During the twelve years under review the population of Russia has increased a little more than three times as fast as that of Germany. Germany is rapidly

falling behind. To Germany, a military State with 160,000,000 inhabitants, which promises to have 300,000,000 inhabitants in thirty years, is a great danger. The foregoing makes it clear that Germany suffers from over-population and from the danger of being overwhelmed by Russia. Her greatest needs are elbow-room and territorial security, and Germany can simultaneously obtain both by a successful war with Russia.

Up to the Russo-Japanese War Russia was almost everywhere, and, especially by the Russians themselves, considered invincible in war. On paper she had by far the largest and the most powerful army in the world. The Russian soldiers had a reputation of fearless, stubborn stolidity, and of an absolute contempt of death, which had given them victory in countless battles, and which had made good the defects in her leadership and in her administration. It was assumed that Russia could not be conquered, because people believed that an army rash enough to invade the country would perish as miserably in the snow-fields as Napoleon's army in 1812. Even before the Russo-Japanese War the Germans had no exaggerated ideas of Russia's military strength. The German officers had learned from Clausewitz, their classical writer on strategy, that Napoleon was defeated in Russia not by the Russian armies, and by "general" winter and "general" hunger, but by his own mistakes, by starting too late on his campaign, and then exhausting and decimating his troops by marching too rapidly to make up for lost time. Besides, they knew that with the advent of railways Russia was no longer an inhospitable, roadless desert. German military men stated freely that Russia was a thing of lath and plaster painted to look like iron. The German

general staff had prepared plans for an advance upon Moscow and St. Petersburg in case of war. No German soldier had any doubt about the issue of a Russo-German campaign. Still, German diplomats followed the example wisely set by Bismarck and William I., and made to the Russians flattering remarks about the irresistible might of their army whenever an opportunity offered.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia, as the previous one of Charles XII. of Sweden, failed through an ill-considered plan and through transport difficulties. Both had to feed their armies with supplies carried on carts and wagons through the heart of the wild, poor, and practically roadless country. Conditions have changed since 1812. The country separating the two Russian capitals from the German frontier has become densely settled, and has been provided with excellent roads and railways. Besides, an invading German army need not necessarily follow the footsteps of Napoleon the First and advance upon Moscow. St. Petersburg is now by far the more important of the two capitals, and it lies on the sea. The battle of Tsushima has wiped out the Russian fleet, and an enormous German navy has been built up. In a few days the German battle-fleet could appear before St. Petersburg, and a German army could march upon St. Petersburg *via* Riga, Dorpat, and Narva, skirting the Baltic Sea, drawing the necessary supplies either over the railways following that route or from the Baltic Sea. It is undesirable to rely on a railway for the supply of an army. Tunnels and bridges can be blown up, and a large military force is always needed for the defence of the line of communication. If Germany dominates the Baltic, her invading armies need not rely on the somewhat precarious connection by road

and railroad with their own country and its arsenals. She might make the sea her base of supply, and she could draw all the food, war material, and reinforcements needed through the excellent harbours of Libau, Windau, Riga, Pernau, Reval, which form easy and convenient stages on the road from Königsberg and Dantzig to St. Petersburg. Having a very powerful fleet, Germany need not fear molestation from Russian warships.

Interruption of the sea communication with Germany might be fatal to her army if it relied entirely on the sea. But such interruption could only come from a third Power strong at sea. To guard against intervention of a strong naval Power, Germany might seize the narrow passages through the Danish Isles which connect the Baltic with the North Sea. Preparations for such a step have probably been made. The narrow Little Belt could be closed to foreign warships by German guns placed on the coast of Schleswig; and the remaining two passages, the Great Belt and the Sound, might be closed by Germany's occupation of two or three points on the Danish Islands. They might conceivably be closed by the Danes themselves in the interests of neutrality. As soon as Germany dominates the Baltic with her fleet, no transport difficulties and no serious climatic difficulties would hamper a German advance upon St. Petersburg. The distance which separates St. Petersburg from the German frontier is only a little more than half as long as the distance which separates Moscow from the German frontier. The German route to Russia's capital would, therefore, be only a little more than half as long as that taken by Napoleon in 1812, and it would be far more secure and convenient. Had Great Britain been friendly or neutral,

Napoleon might in 1812 have marched upon St. Petersburg, skirting the sea and receiving provisions and ammunition from the French fleet, and the Franco-Russian war might have had a different ending.

The occupation of St. Petersburg—by far the more important of the two capitals—a town which, once captured, could be held indefinitely by a Power possessing the command of the Baltic Sea, would very likely end the war. However, an excellent railway line connects Moscow both with St. Petersburg and with the German frontier. If the occupation of St. Petersburg and the very important Baltic harbours should not suffice to bring Russia to her knees, Germany would have the choice of several fairly commodious routes for an advance upon the older capital. Russia is no longer invulnerable.

A nation does not enter upon a great war solely with the object of defeating a great neighbour State, the continued growth of which might become dangerous. Wars of precaution were possible when States relied upon hired armies. With the advent of national armies and of armed nations wars must be popular even in non-democratic countries. They must be waged not only for a practical aim, but for a great national ideal. They must powerfully appeal to patriotism and the national imagination. Wars of precaution and prevention are never popular.

Official Germany has in the past not only frequently spoken of Russia's irresistible might, but has equally frequently stated that a war between the two countries was senseless, because neither country has anything which the other country desires. The latter assertion is as incorrect as is the former. A glance at the map shows that Russian Poland enters like a solid wedge between Germany and Austria-Hungary. From

a purely theoretical point of view a rounding off of the German frontier by detaching Russian Poland from Russia might seem desirable. In practice such a step would not recommend itself. Germany has enough difficulties with her Polish subjects, who number more than 3,000,000. By adding several millions to these, she would rather weaken than strengthen herself, and she would not weaken Russia very much. She could also not weaken Russia by creating an independent Poland as a buffer State between Germany and Russia, for the 3,000,000 German Poles, who wish Poland to become again an independent State, would involve Germany in serious difficulties by conspiring with the independent Polish State across the border. Germany will scarcely try to find in Russian Poland compensation for a war with Russia. Besides, the acquisition of Russian Poland would not be an object with which a Russo-German war might be justified and the patriotism of the German nation be aroused.

To the north of Russian Poland and along the shore of the Baltic lie the three Baltic provinces, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia. These three provinces are German colonies of great antiquity. In the eleventh century the enterprising merchants of Lubeck traded with the natives on the shores of the Russian Baltic. They settled in 1160 at the mouth of the Duna River, where now Riga stands, and in 1185 the monk Meinhard of Segenberg built a church and castle at Uxkull, twenty miles up the river. The Archbishop of Bremen made the monk Bishop of Livonia. Christianity and German civilisation were introduced in the lands on the Baltic. In those days Church and State went hand in hand. The princes of the Church wielded sword and sceptre; they were

statesmen and soldiers. In 1202 the bishop created the Order of the Knights of Christ, called the Brethren of the Sword, a military German order for the conquest and defence of the Baltic provinces. In 1207 Philipp, King of Germany, declared Livonia to be part of the German Empire. The power of the Brethren of the Sword was increased, and their civilising activity and that of the Church Militant was supported by the powerful Hanseatic League. Trade became very active, and Riga, Dorpat, and Reval became prosperous German towns. The story of the Baltic provinces is a story of self-sacrifice and of heroism on the part of a handful of German pioneers, who struggled successfully against the overwhelming numbers of uncivilised tribes surrounding them. They defeated the Russians in many battles.

The German Reformation spread to the Baltic provinces. The great religious wars broke out and devastated the Continent of Europe. Germany was rent by internecine wars, and was no longer able to succour her sons in the outlying provinces. Profiting by her weakness, Alsace and Lorraine in the west were seized by France, and the Baltic provinces, having to rely on their own unaided force, were attacked by their neighbours. Russia, Sweden, and Poland fought for their possession. To obtain peace Livonia joined Russia in 1710; and in 1721, at the Peace of Neustadt, Peter the Great solemnly bound himself to maintain for all time the autonomy and the German local government of Livonia, the German law and law-courts established in it, the German schools, the German churches, and the German Protestant religion. The successors of Peter the Great solemnly confirmed the Treaty of Neustadt, but in the forties of last century the Russian Government

induced many peasants to join the Russian Church. In the seventies the Pan-Slavonic movement arose, and in 1881 the Baltic provinces were deprived of their ancient privileges. The German schools and the German university were ruthlessly Russianised, and were degraded in the process. Russian was made the official language. In the law-courts the use of the German language was forbidden. German officials and teachers were replaced by Russians. The Protestant clergy were persecuted, and many were imprisoned or sent into exile. Even the names of German towns were Russianised. Dorpat was re-christened Yuriev. A cry of sorrow and of rage arose all over Germany. The Baltic provinces were rather German than Russian, and many patriotic Germans had hoped that some day the Balts and the Germans, being united by a common language, a common civilisation, and a common religion, might again be politically united.

Names are the oldest monuments of history. A glance at the map will show that the three Baltic provinces are essentially German. The province of Courland is divided into the "Circles" of Bauske, Friedrichstadt, Goldingen, Grobin, Hasenpoth, Illuxt, Mitau, Talsen, Tuckum, Windau.

The province of Livonia is divided into the "Circles" of Dorpat, Fellin, Oesel, Pernau, Riga, Walk, Wenden, Werro, Wolmar. The province of Esthonia is divided into the "Circles" of Harrien, Jerwen, Wiek, Wierland. Among the larger towns in the Baltic provinces are Frauenburg, Prinzenhof, Neuhausen, Jacobstadt, Marienburg, Seswegen, Lemburg, Mühlgraben, Sennen, Kürbis, Weissenstein, Wasenberg, Grossenhof, Gogenkreitz, St. Annen, Pungern, &c., names which are as German as Berlin, Hamburg,

Wiesbaden, and Frankfurt. Sentimentally the Baltic provinces now occupy a position in the German mind similar to that which Alsace and Lorraine occupied before the Franco-German War. They are old German provinces which were torn away from Germany at the day of her humiliation. They contain still a considerable proportion of German-speaking people, and they remind the Germans in Germany of the ancient glorious times of strife and triumph by the German names of the towns. From the German point of view the acquisition of the Baltic provinces would be a cause worth fighting for. It would be a cause for which the enthusiasm of the German nation might easily be aroused. A war for the conquest of the Baltic provinces might be as popular as was the war for the defence of the Rhine and for the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine.

According to the *Handbuch des Deutschtums im Ausland*, the population of the Baltic provinces is composed as follows :-

	Livonia.	Esthonia.	Courland.
Germans . . .	113,373= 9.74%	21,856= 5.81%	49,953= 8.68%
Russians . . .	53,872= 4.63%	17,465= 4.64%	10,900= 1.89%
Esthonians, Letts and Jews . .	996,239= 85.63%	337,016= 89.55%	514,634= 89.43%
Total	1,163,484=100.00%	376,337=100.00%	575,487=100.00%

According to the same source, the population of the principal towns in the Baltic provinces is as follows :—

	Number of Germans.	Percentage of Total Population.
Riga . . .	110,000	35%
Mitau . .	16,000	50%
Pernau . .	3,500	25%
Dorpat . .	15,000	35%
Reval . .	13,000	25%

It will be noticed that the Germans in the Baltic provinces form only a minority of the population. Still, they are far more numerous than are the Russians. The great majority of the inhabitants are Letts, Esthonians, and Jews. In the large towns the proportion of the Germans is very considerable, being from 25 to 50 per cent. The Germans are, as they were in the Middle Ages, the aristocracy of the Baltic provinces. Practically all the large estate owners, bankers, merchants, lawyers, doctors, teachers, clergymen, &c., are Germans. In Riga alone are published twenty German newspapers and periodicals. The German element represents wealth and culture in the upper and middle classes, whilst the Russians, Esthonians, and Letts represent manual labour. The Russians are largely town labourers, and many of them are dissenters who have fled from the persecution of the Russian Church into the Baltic provinces. The Letts and Esthonians are peasants and agricultural labourers, and the Jews are petty traders. Among primitive people religion is a stronger bond than racial identity. Most of the Letts and Esthonians belong to the German Protestant Church, and only about 10 per cent. of the Balts belong to the Russian Church. In their common religion there is a strong bond of union between the German estate owners, merchants, and professional men in the Baltic provinces and the non-German peasants and agricultural labourers on the one hand, and between the Baltic Protestants and the Protestants of Germany on the other hand. The German Protestant Churches could easily undertake a campaign in favour of freeing the Baltic Protestants from the yoke of Russian Orthodoxy, Russian intolerance, and Russian persecution.

Among the landless agriculturists in the Baltic

provinces there is much dissatisfaction. A few years ago they attacked the landed proprietors and burnt and plundered their houses. If Germany should acquire the Baltic provinces, she would no doubt introduce the traditional German land policy, and convert the landless cultivators into small landowners with the assistance of the State, buying out many of the large proprietors. Such a step would make the Letts and Esthonians happy and contented, and reconcile them with their change of rulers, especially as there is not much love lost between Letts and Russians, Esthonians and Russians, and Jews and Russians.

Owing to the absence of small freeholds and the insufficient development of agriculture on the large estates, the Baltic provinces are far more thinly populated than the adjoining provinces of Germany. This is apparent from the following figures :—

	Square miles.	Population.	Population per square mile.
Courland	10,435	727,300	70
Livonia	17,574	1,431,900	80
Esthonia	7,605	459,700	60
East Prussia . .	14,786	2,030,176	137.3
West Prussia . .	9,861	1,641,746	166.5
Pomerania . . .	11,631	1,684,326	144.8
Posen	11,190	1,986,637	177.5
Germany	208,780	67,000,000	320.00

Whilst the population in the Baltic provinces is from 60 to 80 people per square mile, the population in the adjoining German provinces of East Prussia, West Prussia, Pomerania, and Posen, which also suffer from the evil of large estates, is from 137.3 to 177.5 per square mile, and the population of all Germany comes to 320 people per square mile. As the soil and climate of the Baltic provinces are similar

to the soil and climate of the adjoining German provinces, it is clear that the Baltic provinces, which at present have only about 2,600,000 inhabitants, should be able to maintain 150 people per square mile, or about 6,000,000 inhabitants. There is, therefore, a good chance of settling a very considerable part of the German surplus population among the Baltic Letts and Esthonians, who would welcome a German Government, especially if it should enable them to acquire on easy and equitable terms farms of their own. They could be quickly Germanised by planting Protestant German peasants among them. If sufficient inducements were offered to them, German peasant boys would migrate to Baltic farms instead of to German factories. The German Government has successfully followed a similar policy of settlement in the districts inhabited by the German Poles.

A glance at the map shows that the Baltic provinces touch Eastern Germany only with a small and pointed corner. In order to create an organic connection, Germany would have to acquire part, or the whole, of the Russian province of Kovno, which extends to 15,518 miles, and which has 1,720,500 inhabitants. The acquisition of the three Baltic provinces alone would give to Germany additional territory equal in size to that of Bavaria and Wurtemberg combined. The acquisition of Kovno would give to Germany additional territory equal in size to that of Baden, Saxony, and Hesse combined. The incorporation of the Baltic provinces would increase Germany's territory by one-sixth, and the incorporation of the Baltic provinces and of Kovno would increase it by one-quarter. The Baltic provinces would give Germany some elbow-room.

The possession of the Baltic provinces would give,

at the same time, Germany some security from a Russian attack. At present the distance separating St. Petersburg from the German frontier is 450 miles. The acquisition of the Baltic provinces would reduce that distance to 80 miles, or four days' march. The Baltic provinces form a kind of natural fortress. They contain an immense number of small lakes, which make the use of large bodies of troops very difficult, and extensive swamps and forests provide an additional protection to them against a Russian attack. The natural protection of the Baltic provinces is particularly strong in that portion which is nearest to St. Petersburg, for there Lake Peipus and Lake Pskoff form a barrier 90 miles wide against Russia. A strong German garrison in Northern Esthonia could cover the 80 miles separating it from St. Petersburg in a few days, and German cruisers stationed at Reval could steam to St. Petersburg in from eight to ten hours. St. Petersburg would be within easy striking distance of Berlin. Russia would have her capital close to the German frontier. She would be one of the most vulnerable States in the world.

St. Petersburg lies at the extreme end of the Gulf of Finland, an arm of the Baltic which is 250 miles long and from 30 to 50 miles wide. Finland forms the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, and of the southern shore 170 miles belong to Esthonia. The shipping of St. Petersburg would have to pass 170 miles of German coast. St. Petersburg would be approximately in the same position in which London would find itself if Germany had a strong military and naval base at Sheerness, or in which New York would be if a first-class Power were in possession of Long Island. St. Petersburg would be a hostage for Russia's good behaviour in Germany's hands.

Finland has 3,000,000 inhabitants, of whom 400,000 are Swedes and only 6000 are Russians. Of the Finnish population 98.14 per cent. are Lutherans. The remaining 1.86 per cent. belong to the Russian and Roman Catholic Churches. Racially, religiously, intellectually, and socially Russians and Finns have scarcely anything in common. Finland is nominally an independent Grand Duchy, the Czar of Russia being at the same time Grand Duke of Finland, but Russia has taken away from Finland her solemnly guaranteed rights and her ancient constitution. Russia has treated Finland like a conquered country, and the Finns resent it, but they are too weak for active opposition. If Germany should defeat Russia, she might conceivably restitute to Finland her freedom and guarantee her continued independence. By such a step Finland would become virtually a German Protectorate. As St. Petersburg lies only ten miles from the Finnish-Russian frontier, the Russian capital would become a Finnish frontier town, and the Finnish harbours in sight of St. Petersburg could become at any moment a base of the German torpedo-boat flotillas. Russia's military men have become keenly aware of this danger. General Borodkin wrote:—

"The Baltic Sea is undoubtedly the scene of any future conflicts with our foes; it is here that they will endeavour to inflict injury upon Russia by attacking her fleet and towns, blocading the sea border and making attempts to land forces. Of all the territories washed by the Baltic, Finland, thanks to its proximity to the capital, will always attract the attention of the enemy. From the moment when Peter the Great 'planted a firm foot beside the sea' an enemy will constantly have Finland for a very serious objective for operations of war."

Germany's occupation of the Baltic provinces would greatly reduce Russia's naval and military

power. It would give the keys to Russia's citadel into Germany's hands. It would, besides, greatly reduce Russia's economic power to Germany's benefit. Fully one-third of Russia's maritime trade is carried on by the ports in the Baltic provinces. Riga holds the same position in the North of Russia which Odessa occupies in the south. Riga is the Russian Hamburg. The trade handled by the ports in the Baltic provinces — Riga, Reval, Libau, Windau, Pernau — amounted in 1909 to £53,500,000, and that of Riga alone came to £29,000,000. Russia's Baltic trade is rapidly growing, and is becoming more and more necessary to the empire. At present Riga has 350,000 inhabitants, and is the sixth largest town in the Russian Empire. In 1867 Riga had only 77,468 inhabitants. Reval and Libau also have been growing at a very rapid rate.

Russia's manufacturing industries are centred about Lodz in Russian Poland. A glance at the map shows that the harbours of the Baltic provinces are nearest to Poland. The prosperity of the Polish manufacturing industries depends largely on the unimpeded flow of trade through the Baltic ports. Hence the Baltic harbours are very important to Russia not only for the exportation of timber and woodwork and of Russian agricultural produce, especially wheat, oats, eggs and butter, flax, skins and hides, &c., but also for the importation of coal, cotton, wool, indiarubber, copper, tin, lead, machinery, &c., used in manufacturing. Through their excellent ports the Baltic provinces necessarily control a large part of Russia's export and import trade, and as alternative outlets cannot easily be provided, it is evident that a foreign Power possessing Riga, Reval, Libau, Windau, and Pernau can levy tribute on Russia's trade. It

can bring strong pressure to bear upon Russia's industries, and it can compel the manufacturers at Lodz to transfer a large part of their industries from Russian to German territory.

The fact that Russia is no longer invulnerable has lately dawned upon the Russians themselves. Formerly they thought that in case of war their armies would overrun Germany, and that their navy would drive the German fleet into Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. Therefore they had stationed large bodies of cavalry close to the Russo-German frontier, and had spent no less than £18,000,000 in converting Libau, the Russian port nearest to the German frontier, into a naval base. Libau would indeed have been an excellent naval harbour for an attack upon Germany by a Russian fleet of superior strength. Before the Russo-Japanese War the Russian fleet was on paper considerably stronger than the German fleet. After the destruction of the Russian fleet and the defeat of the Russian army by Japan there came an awakening. The highest military authorities in Russia began to realise the insecurity of Russia's position and the possibility of a sudden German attack upon St. Petersburg from the sea. Notwithstanding the enormous expenditure incurred, the port of Libau was hurriedly abandoned as a naval base, and the projected works were not completed. Instead the Russian authorities resolved to concentrate their efforts upon the defence of St. Petersburg and the Gulf of Finland leading to it. The sum of £22,000,000 was voted for the construction of defensive works around the capital and for transforming the port of Reval, which lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, into a naval harbour. Russia is building battleships of the Dreadnought type, of 23,370 tons, not for a war of revenge

with Japan, but for the defence of St. Petersburg. She has revised her somewhat exaggerated ideas of her military and naval strength.

The fact that Austria-Hungary has lately adopted an ambitious naval programme, and that she is building four battleships of 22,000 tons each, has attracted universal attention. It has been surmised that her new fleet of Dreadnoughts is intended to help her German ally in defeating Great Britain and despoiling the British Empire. However, every one who knows Austria-Hungary is aware that that country has no need and no use for colonies over-sea, and that it would scarcely be in her interest to see Great Britain weakened. Moreover, those who have watched her policy know that her greatest interests lie in the Near East, especially in Salonica and Constantinople, and that it has been her traditional policy to promote those interests. In 1878 she prepared for war with Russia in defence of Constantinople. Austria-Hungary's recent action in incorporating Bosnia and Herzegovina, and her menacing attitude towards Russia in connection with that coup, shows that she has not changed her policy. The Austrian Dreadnoughts may become exceedingly useful in promoting Austria's policy in the Balkan Peninsula—and the lands beyond. After all, the future of Austria-Hungary is quite as much threatened by the Russian colossus as is that of Germany. Therefore it is within the region of possibility, to say the least, that Germany and Austria-Hungary have formed a plan of meeting the danger which threatens them from the East by combined action, by pushing the Russians back towards the steppes of Asia whence they have come.

Russia's most valuable and most densely-populated provinces are the Baltic provinces, industrial Poland

with Warsaw and Lodz, and the very rich agricultural provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, Kieff, and Kherson with the towns of Kieff and Odessa. All these provinces lie along her western frontier, in tempting proximity to Germany and Austria-Hungary. The wealth and power of Russia are as much concentrated upon her western border as the wealth and power of the United States are centred in the Eastern States of the Union. The joint Austro-German Ultimatum of 1909, despatched in connection with the discussion of the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina, awakened Russia to a sense of her danger. As her navy had been destroyed and her army been greatly weakened, she was compelled to retire in ignominious haste before the Austrian and German threats. At that moment her statesmen must have bitterly regretted having frittered away the wealth and strength of their country in barren adventures in Eastern Asia.

It has often been stated that Russia is politically unreliable, that the Franco-Russian Alliance is a sham, that Russia concluded it only in order to be able to float her loans in Paris, that she would forsake France in her hour of need, that the Russo-British *entente* likewise is due only to Russia's wish to avail herself of the London money market, and that she would give no assistance to Great Britain in time of danger. These ideas are erroneous. Russia has become aware that a strong France and a strong Great Britain are absolutely necessary for her own security, that the defeat of France or Great Britain by Germany might mean her own downfall. Russia is certainly not anxious to have the balance of power in Europe altered in Germany's favour.

Germany's colonial and anti-British policy has either been very wise or very foolish. Secrecy is the

soul of statesmanship. If Germany has been building her great fleet with the intention of humiliating Russia and conquering the Baltic provinces from the sea, she has acted very wisely in proclaiming at the outset that she wished to have a fleet strong enough to meet "the mightiest naval Power," and that she strengthened the impression of her ostensible aim by an active anti-British policy. If, on the other hand, the German fleet is really intended for use against Great Britain, Germany will waste her strength in barren adventures exactly as Russia did in Eastern Asia. Germany will scarcely be able to create a fleet strong enough to defeat or to overawe Great Britain. Besides, if she makes war upon Great Britain, France and Russia would undoubtedly come to Great Britain's aid, actuated not by friendship or treaty fidelity, but by the instinct of self-preservation. Neither France nor Russia can afford to see Germany greatly strengthened. War with Great Britain would probably be for Germany a war on three fronts. Germany's position in Europe is too insecure to allow her to embark upon a venturesome colonial policy. She may threaten Great Britain, but she will find it dangerous to act. A bold colonial policy can be safely pursued only by a nation which lives securely on an island, such as Great Britain and Japan, or which need not fear continental neighbours, such as the United States. As long as the armies of France and Russia hover on Germany's flanks, Germany cannot afford to pursue a policy which may bring her into collision with Great Britain or the United States. For many years Germany's future will continue to lie not on the water, but on the land, and she will endanger her future by disregarding that fact.

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY AND HER ATTITUDE TOWARDS ANGLO-SAXON COUNTRIES

Up to 1870 the ambitions of the Germans were for national unity and for a leading rôle among the Continental nations. Since this object has been achieved by Bismarck's genius, and since the fabric of the German Empire has been consolidated and strengthened, the German horizon has rapidly been enlarged. Though not unmindful of her exposed Continental position and of the possibility of seeing her empire expanding east, south, and west, by the absorption of the German population in the Baltic Provinces of Russia, in Austria, and Switzerland, and of the "Low Germans" of Holland, her ambition has grown, and is still growing, to become a great colonial power.

Many decades back some of the greatest German thinkers, including Treitschke, Schliemann, Roscher, List, Droysen, and many others, pointed out that the problem of disposing of Germany's surplus population in a temperate zone was an urgent one, but at the time when these men wrote and spoke Germany was still divided against herself and was powerless and poor. She then possessed neither a navy nor a merchant marine worthy the name, nor manufacturing industries, nor foreign commerce, and for some thirty years the agitation for colonies was restricted to the Universities, being ignored or even discountenanced

in official and in commercial circles. Nothing illustrates the attitude of the German people and Government in those times better than the acquisition, in 1848, of a small fleet paid for largely by the voluntary contributions of colonial enthusiasts, and its subsequent sale by auction, in 1852, by the Government.

During the last sixty years, but especially since Germany's consolidation in 1871, the population of the empire has increased with wonderful rapidity. The population of Germany within her present limits has risen as follows :—

	German population	Average increase per annum
1840	32,800,000	—
1850	35,400,000	260,000
1860	37,700,000	230,000
1870	40,800,000	310,000
1880	45,200,000	440,000
1890	49,400,000	420,000
1900	56,300,000	690,000
1912	66,000,000	850,000

At present the German population is estimated to increase by no less than 900,000 per annum. German emigration, which accounted for the loss of 220,000 citizens in 1881, has sunk to only 24,921 in 1909, but as a matter-of-fact this slight loss in population has been more than counterbalanced during the last few years by immigration into Germany from Austria, Russia, and Italy. Professor Schmoller estimates that the German population will amount to 104,000,000 in 1965, Hübbe-Schleiden prophesies that it will rise to 150,000,000 in 1980, and Leroy-Beaulieu, the first French authority on these things, has estimated that it will be 200,000,000 within a century. With so rapid an increase of the population in view, it becomes clear that the question of over-population, and of eventual emigration, may soon become a pressing

one for Germany. But Germany is loth to strengthen foreign nations, her present and future competitors, with her emigration, which earlier or later must set in in a powerful stream. Hence it comes that the necessity to provide in advance for future emigration is clearly recognised by the German Emperor and his advisers, by German business men, and by the people. The existing German colonies do not offer an outlet for the emigration of white men. Consequently the resolution has arisen to acquire colonies in a temperate zone whenever and wherever possible.

The rooted conviction that Germany must possess colonies almost at any price, which sixty years ago emanated from professorial circles, gradually pervaded the whole nation from the highest to the lowest.

The German politicians and bureaucrats, who had no experience in colonial policy, who often lacked sympathy, understanding, enterprise, and imagination regarding colonial matters, and who viewed the turbulent clamour for colonies of the professor-led multitude with the hearty dislike with which the initiative of the people is frequently viewed by official Germany, quickly became the most enthusiastic and the most uncompromising of colonial fanatics when the Emperor lent the unreserved support of his powerful personality to the colonial movement, and gave to it its anti-Anglo-Saxon character.

Astonishment has been frequently expressed in this country at the peculiar and forceful means by which Germany tries to acquire colonies, but those who are well acquainted with the character of official and unofficial Germany cannot wonder at those means. Present-day Germany owes her greatness to the sword, and her national character has nothing in common with the better-known character of the Germany of

former years, which is wrongly imputed by many to the present Empire.

In old Germany the centre of gravity lay in the more easy-going south, and her character resembled that of present-day Austria. New Germany has been conquered by the East Prussian nobility, the descendants of those hardy knights of the Teutonic Order, who, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, wrested East Prussia from the Slavs in countless battles, and converted the independent heathen inhabitants into obedient Christian serfs. The East Prussian nobility ruled the aboriginal inhabitants of Prussia with the greatest harshness, and various mediæval institutions—for example, serfdom—prevailed in Prussia even in the eighteenth century. Though serfdom in Prussia was nominally abolished in 1807, its last remnants continued to exist until a short time ago, and even now the downtrodden peasant in East Prussia calls his master "Herr Wohlthäter" (Mr. Benefactor), humbly kisses the hands of the squire and of his children, and the hem of his wife's garment, and submits to correction by the whip. East Prussia, with her arrogant nobility and submissive peasantry, strongly resembles her neighbour Russia, in which country also the nobility and the Government established themselves by force. In East Prussia, as in Russia, the nobility are wasteful, their estates are encumbered with mortgages, the peasantry are ignorant, poor, and hard-worked, manufacturing industries are practically non-existent, and the only way to acquire money known to noblemen is by force or by craft, not by industry. The descendants of the valorous Teutonic knights do not introduce industries on their estates, or up-to-date methods into agriculture, as will be shown in another

chapter, but try to obtain from the Government high protective tariffs and other favours through their representatives in the Reichstag, the Agrarians.

The best example of the new German spirit is afforded by Bismarck, who was a typical East Prussian in his policy and in his methods. His appearance and his personality suggest that he had a considerable amount of Slav blood in him; at all events, Slavs and Slav methods were most sympathetic to him, and nowhere did he feel more at home than amongst the Russians in Russia. Bismarck's political methods, which at first shocked German sentimentalism, have made her great, and, owing to the assiduous and somewhat uncritical Bismarck cult which is carried on in that country, these methods have become in German eyes the natural and classical methods of German statecraft and diplomacy.

The East Prussian squires have always been considered to be the chief pillars of the throne, and they occupy the most important official positions in Prussia and in Germany. Consequently, it is only natural that, when the question of acquiring colonial possessions came to the front, through the action of the present Emperor, Prusso-German officialdom turned instinctively to those means which had proved so eminently successful in the past under Bismarck. It did so the more readily as to the Prusso-German official, who has grown up in feudalistic ideas, the liberal Anglo-Saxon institutions are as hateful as they are to the Russian official, for the spreading of the Democratic idea threatens to subvert the reign by caste and to destroy the privileged position of bureaucracy. To the German or Russian patriot, who looks back upon the glorious history of his country by conquest from the small beginnings made by the

Hohenzollerns and the Ruriks, the continued expansion of his country by conquest seems as natural and as legitimate as does expansion by peaceful means to the Anglo-Saxon, and to him the sword is not the *ultima ratio Regis*, but the usual and natural means of expansion and nationalisation.

It is, unfortunately, only too true that the late anti-British, as well as the late anti-American, movement in Germany was not a spontaneous outburst of irresponsible popular opinion, as it has been described by the inspired part of the German press and by the Germanophil part of the British press, but an agitation which was kindled, fanned, and infuriated, so that at last it got quite beyond control, by those who now explain it as having been an irresponsible and spontaneous outburst of popular passion. The anti-British, as well as the anti-American, movement directly emanated from the Government and those near it, and was assisted by the intellectual leaders of the nation at the Universities. It was not caused by sympathy with the Boers or the Spaniards, but solely by the appetites and ambitions of the German colonial enthusiasts.

In considering the opinions expressed by leading Germans on German colonial expansion and on Anglo-Saxon countries, the fact that those opinions are by no means merely the private opinions of irresponsible private citizens should never be lost sight of. The rigorous discipline which Germany enforces on her citizens is doubly rigorous in respect of officials and officers both on active service and on the retired list. An opinion unfavourable to the Government or to a measure taken by the Government, even though it be privately expressed by an official or an officer, will, if reported to his superior, bring on him severe

"disciplinary" punishment, or even dismissal. The Government can also bring considerable pressure to bear upon the nominally independent University professors, who all thirst after preferment by the State, titles, and decorations. Consequently, it may be said that the publicly expressed opinions of acting and retired officials and officers, and of the University professors, with regard to German colonial policy and Anglo-Saxon nations were on the whole approved of and endorsed by the Government.

The anti-Anglo-Saxon agitation by German professors should not be taken too lightly, for German professors have in the past played a great part in German history. The renascence of Prussia after her collapse in 1806–1807 was largely due to the patriotic activity of the German professors, among whom professors Arndt, Fichte, and Niebuhr were most prominent, and the unification of the German Empire was their ideal and constant thought long before the advent of Bismarck, though they intended to attain it by methods less vigorous than those of blood and iron. The old national Parliament of Frankfort and the German fleet of 1848 are witnesses to their aims. Therefore professorial utterances on matters of policy should not be dismissed as being only "irresponsible professors' talk." The professors are a great power in Germany.

German politicians and German colonial enthusiasts think very highly of the value of tropical colonies, but the acquisition of settlement colonies in a temperate zone is their principal aim and ambition, because these would afford an outlet to the rapidly increasing German population. Seeing that most habitable and thinly-populated lands over sea are in Anglo-Saxon hands, official and unofficial Germany

have been seriously considering the question whether it would be possible to wrest suitable territories from Great Britain or America. In making their plans for colonial expansion and surveying their chances against Anglo-Saxon countries, the Germans have come to the conclusion that Great Britain is a senile nation which is declining, and that the United States are a young and vigorous nation, whose political future and military potentialities seem unlimited unless, indeed, their progress be arrested by force. The plans of the colonial enthusiasts, and probably of official Germany as well, are shaped in accordance with these views.

The official and semi-official publications of Germany are of course very careful not to reveal Germany's ultimate aims as a world power, which can only be gauged from the opinions and hopes expressed by persons who move in well-informed circles. Those ultimate aims which are in everybody's mouth in Germany are expressed with delightful candour in a pamphlet, "Die Abrechnung mit England," by C. Eisenhart, Munich, 1900. In this book we are shown how Germany, with the help of her new fleet, first destroys the navy of Japan and gains a footing in the East; how afterwards, whilst Great Britain is crippling Russia in Asia for the convenience of Germany, she destroys the British fleet; and, lastly, how the "insolence" of the United States is punished by their complete defeat, Germany's victories resulting in the acquisition of the best Anglo-Saxon colonies, including Australia, and in Germany's paramountcy over Anglo-Saxondom the world over. To this writer, as to many others, German world policy is synonymous with German world supremacy and German domination over the entire globe. Another

candid writer, who, however, either does not see as far as Mr. Eisenhart, or who does not care to make known to the world the whole of his views, from political considerations, says in his book, "Deutschland beim Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts," Berlin, 1900 :—

"We consider a great war with England in the twentieth century as quite inevitable, and must strain every fibre in order to be prepared to fight that war single-handed. The experience of all time shows that colonial empires are more fragile and less enduring than continental empires. We do not require a fleet against France or Russia, let them even ravage our coasts in case of a war. We require a fleet *only against England.*"

In a similar strain the *Koloniale Zeitschrift* writes on the 18th January 1900 :—

"The old century saw a German Europe ; the new one shall see a German world. To attain that consummation two duties are required from the present German generation ; to keep its own counsel and to create a strong naval force."

Again, on the 28th March 1900, the same journal says :—

"The nineteenth century was not the German century ; it was the Prussian century. In the history of the world the twentieth century will be called the German century."

In a leading article entitled "German World Policy," the *Deutsches Wochenblatt* writes on February 1st, 1899 :—

"It can hardly be doubted that at the outbreak of the next great war Russia will take Constantinople. . . . It is possible that a general war against England will come before the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. . . . If Russia attracts to herself the Slavonic peoples round the Danube, our way *via* Salonika towards Asia Minor and Suez will be lost for all time. . . . Our motto should be : With the whole Continent against England ; with Austria against Russia when the time comes."

"Teutonicus" writes in the same journal on August 19th, 1899:—

"Our adversaries in a naval war would probably be our Samoa partners (the United States and Great Britain). . . . Now, as ever, the existence of our fleet depends upon the good will of England. Therefore, it is clear that the North Sea will be the theatre of war where our fate will be decided, whether we fight for our interest in the China Seas or on the eastern coast of America. Consequently, in a future naval war, our North Sea fleet and our army of embarkation would be mobilised at the moment when the English Mediterranean fleet should effect a suspicious movement."

These utterances are more than the bombastic rodomontades of fantastical sensation-mongers, for the authors of them have palpably taken their cue from the no less unmistakable though slightly more diplomatically expressed utterances of the Emperor, who set the ball rolling and gave to the colonial movement its aggressive character by pointing out that German colonial ambitions could only be satisfied *after Germany had secured the supremacy on the ocean*—that is, at the cost of Anglo-Saxon countries. As far back as the 24th April 1897, William II. said in Cologne at a banquet: "Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have new tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together. Everywhere we have to protect German citizens, everywhere we have to maintain German honour: that trident must be in our fist!" On other occasions his Majesty coined the winged words, "Our future lies upon the water." "Without the consent of Germany's ruler nothing must happen in any part of the world." "May our Fatherland be as powerful, as closely united, and as authoritative, as was the Roman Empire of old, in order that the old 'Civis

Romanus sum' be replaced by 'I am a German citizen'!"

On the 18th of October 1899, his Majesty made a speech in which he said, "We are in bitter need of a strong German navy. . . . If the increase demanded during the first years of my reign had not been continually refused to me in spite of my pressing entreaties and warnings, for which I have even experienced derision and ridicule, how differently should we be able to further our flourishing commerce, and our interests over sea." It can hardly be doubted that the Emperor's bitterness at his inability to "further our interests over sea" was caused by the political situation in South Africa. At the time when he was speaking the Boer ultimatum had been despatched only nine days, and a strong German fleet, had it then existed, might no doubt have been able to further "the German interest in the Transvaal as an independent State." On the 1st of January 1900, the Emperor William announced in a speech his determination to possess an overwhelmingly strong navy, in the following words: "As my grandfather reorganised the army, so I shall reorganise my navy, without flinching and in the same way, so that it will stand on the same level as my army, and that, with its help, the German Empire shall reach the place which it has not yet attained."

It may be objected that these and similar utterances of his Majesty were the spontaneous and ill-considered private opinions of a private man who happens to be the head of the State, not *pronunciamientos* deliberately launched by the head of the Empire; that they were in fact not sanctioned by the official representatives of German policy, and, therefore, devoid of political significance. People

who express such views are evidently ignorant of the far-reaching, nay, almost unlimited, political power vested in the German Emperor under the German Constitution, and are not aware that William II. is virtually his own Chancellor.

Similar views to those pronounced by the German Emperor were also uttered by his responsible ministers. For instance, on the day of the disaster at Magersfontein, the 11th of December 1899, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Prince Bülow, said in the Reichstag in support of an immensely increased naval programme: "The necessity to strengthen our fleet arises out of the present state of the world, and out of the circumstances of our over-sea policy. Only two years ago, no one would have been able to foresee in which way things would start moving. It is urgent to define the attitude which we have to take up in view of what is happening. . . . We must create a fleet strong enough to exclude attack from *any* Power." Again, a fortnight after the disaster of Spion Kop, Admiral Tirpitz, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, spoke thus: "We do not know what adversary we may have to face. We must therefore arm ourselves, with a view to meeting *the most dangerous naval conflict possible.*" Prince Bülow said on the 12th of June 1900, "It is necessary that Germany should be strong enough at sea to maintain German peace, German honour, and German prosperity, all the world over." In all these official speeches a distinct hint was conveyed as to the probability of a conflict with Great Britain, from whom the supremacy at sea was to be wrested, and the regret was guardedly expressed that Germany could not turn the British difficulties and disasters in South Africa to account, owing to the weakness of her fleet.

That the German Emperor's phrase, "That trident must be in our fist," was not merely a metaphor spontaneously born from banquet-heated enthusiasm, but the deliberate statement of a well-considered policy, may be seen from the dry, matter-of-fact preamble to the German Navy Bill of 1900, which says: "*Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power.*" Some time ago Mr. Bassermann, the leader of the Liberal Party in the German Reichstag, thought it necessary to endorse also, on behalf of his party, the official utterances quoted in the foregoing, and said at the Liberal Party Congress on the 13th October 1903: "In our attitude towards England we must keep cool, and, until we have a strong fleet, it would be a mistake to let ourselves be drawn into a hostile policy towards her. . . . The development of the United States of North America and their desire for expansion is likewise a lesson for us not to be forgetful of our armaments, especially at sea."

Bearing in mind the dependence of German public opinion upon the views of the Emperor and his Government, it need hardly be asserted that the official and authoritative utterances cited above were carefully weighed and well-considered, and that official statements such as these were responsible for the less veiled, but more forcible, views expressed in "Die Abrechnung mit England," "Deutschland beim Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts," the *Koloniale Zeitschrift*, the *Deutsches Wochenblatt*, and hosts of others, and that the violent anti-British campaign had little or nothing to do with German sympathy with the Boers.

Some years ago, M. E. Lockroy, a man of great

ability and of sound judgment, who has been three times Minister of Marine in France, visited Germany and was allowed to inspect the German fleet and dockyards, even to the smallest details. That this permission was granted to Germany's "hereditary enemy" seems astonishing, unless we bear in mind that the numerous advances to France, latterly made by the Emperor William II. and his Government, are less aimed at insuring the peace of Europe, or at breaking up the Dual Alliance, than at securing the assistance of the French fleet for the overthrow of Great Britain. This view has repeatedly been expressed in *Die Grenzboten*, by far the most influential political weekly in Germany, which has very frequently spoken with the authority of the German Foreign Office. In view of the close relations existing between that journal and the German Foreign Office, the views expressed in it are of exceptional weight and interest, and they will consequently be occasionally cited hereafter. On the 5th October 1899, an article appeared in *Die Grenzboten*, which said :—

"All differences between France and Germany benefit only the nearly all-powerful enemy of the world. As long as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is no good that they occasionally look at England with the other eye. Only when the German fleet has a strength commensurate with her sea interests, will the French seek our friendship instead of being humiliated by their hereditary enemy."

M. Lockroy, who might have become an important factor in favour of a Franco-German alliance, in the event that he should have returned to the Cabinet, seems not to have been left in the dark about Germany's ambitions by his official German hosts, for in his "Lettres sur la Marine Allemande," which appeared in 1901, he sums up his impressions about

the purpose of the German navy in the following way :—

"Germany will be a great naval power in spite of her geographical position and history. Her claim to rule the waves will bring on a war with Great Britain earlier or later. That war will be one of the most terrible conflicts of the twentieth century. What its result will be no one can foretell, but so much is sure, that Germany does everything that human forethought and the patience and energy of a nation can suggest."

His words evidently confirm the existence of the wish of German diplomacy to form an anti-British alliance with France, a wish which was hinted at in 1899 in *Die Grenzboten*, and in many other inspired journals. This wish dictated also the numerous personal advances made by William II. to individual Frenchmen, and the political advances made by German diplomacy. These personal and diplomatic advances deserve the greater notice as German statesmen were well aware that France would have been found on the side of Great Britain had the outcome of the famous Kruger telegram been a war between this country and Germany, and therefore Germany's assiduous advances to France are most remarkable and very portentous.

The views of the most distinguished and most respected German professors with regard to Germany's policy of colonial expansion at Anglo-Saxon cost coincide with those expressed in "Die Abrechnung mit England" and similar publications, and breathe the fiercest hatred against Anglo-Saxon countries, especially against Great Britain, the more immediate object of Germany's attention.

Count Du Moulin-Eckart, professor of history at Munich, wrote in his book, "Englische Politik und die Mächte" :—

" Our present relations with England are similar to our former relations with Austria. To both nations we are related by race, by both we have been hampered in our progress, and by both we have been deceived times without number. Time will show whether co-operation with England is possible. If it be impossible, a war will become necessary, and then: Hail thee, Germany! May the genius of a Bismarck grant us then a second Königgrätz!"

Professor Schmoller, a most prominent lecturer on political economy at the Berlin University, a member of the Prussian Privy Council and of the Prussian Upper Chamber, gave a lecture in Berlin, Strasburg, and Hanover, which has been largely circulated in print, in which he said:—

" In various States, arrogant, reckless, cold-blooded daring bullies (Gewaltmenschen), men who possess the morals of a captain of pirates, as Professor Brentano called them so justly the other day, push themselves more and more forward and into the Government. . . . We must not forget that it is in the freest States, England and North America, where the tendencies of conquest, Imperial schemes, and hatred against new economic competitors are growing up amongst the masses. The leaders of these agitations are great speculators, who have the morals of a pirate, and who are at the same time party leaders and Ministers of State. . . . The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines by the United States alters their political and economical basis. Their tendency to exclude Europe from the North and South American markets must needs lead to new great conflicts. It must also not be forgotten how England tried to wreck our Zollverein, how she tried to prevent us from conquering Schleswig-Holstein, and how anti-German she was in 1870. . . . These bullies (Gewaltmenschen), these pirates and speculators *à la* Cecil Rhodes, act like poison within their State. They buy the press, corrupt ministers and the aristocracy, and bring on wars for the benefit of a bankrupt company, or for the gain of filthy lucre. Where they govern modesty and decency disappear, as do honesty and respect for justice. Legitimate business cannot maintain itself, and all classes of society are exploited and ill-used by a small circle of capitalistic magnates, stock-

jobbers, and speculators. . . . We mean to extend our trade and industries far enough to enable us to live and sustain a growing population. We mean to defend our colonies, and, if possible, to acquire somewhere agricultural colonies. We mean to prevent extravagant mercantilism everywhere, and to prevent the division of the earth among the three world powers, which would exclude all other countries, and destroy their trade. In order to attain this modest aim we require to-day so badly a large fleet. The German Empire must become the centre of a coalition of States, chiefly in order to be able to hold the balance in the death-struggle between Russia and England, but that is only possible if we possess a stronger fleet than that of to-day. . . . We must wish that at any price a German country, peopled by twenty to thirty million Germans, should grow up in Southern Brazil. Without the possibility of energetic proceedings on the part of Germany our future over there is threatened. . . . We do not mean to press for an economic alliance with Holland, but if the Dutch are wise, if they do not want to lose their colonies some day, as Spain did, they will hasten to seek our alliance."

Another distinguished professor of political economy, Professor Dr. von Schäffle, wrote in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* on the 4th of February 1898 :—

"The progress of our sea commerce has become so immense that Germany must be prepared for anything on the part of her rivals. Let us not deceive ourselves. The English, if they can summon up the necessary courage, will try at the first opportunity to give the deathblow to our commerce over sea, and to our export industries. The Transvaal quarrel has made evident what we have to expect. Cecil Rhodes, Chamberlain, and their accomplices, are, in this respect, only types of the thought and intentions of present-day England towards new Germany. Great Britain will move heaven and hell against the sea commerce of the new German Empire as soon as she can."

Another eminent scientist, the professor of political economy, Von Schulze-Gaevernitz, wrote in the *Nation*, the 5th of March 1898 :—

"In order to strengthen the sensible and peaceable elements in England, and to confine commercial envy within harmless bounds, we require the defence of a fleet. . . . The British Cape to Cairo idea is opposed to French and German interests, but German vital interests would be affected by British control of the still undivided portion of the world especially of China and of Turkey.

Then, referring to the rapid colonial expansion of Great Britain during the last decade, he significantly adds: "But should in future the day of liquidation arrive, Germany must have the power to participate in it."

Professor Mommsen, probably the greatest historian of modern times, wrote regarding England in the *North American Review* for February 1900 :—

"The repetition of Jameson's Raid by the English Government (I won't say the English nation), dictated by banking and mining speculations, is the revelation of your moral and political corruption."

The former Under-Secretary of State, professor of political economy, Von Mayr-Strasburg, wrote in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* :—

"Our national policy requires the firm backbone of a strong fleet in order to oppose with energy the brutal instincts of exporting countries, especially of those which export agricultural produce. Our commercial policy requires it in order to give to our home industries the certainty of the continued supply of raw material and of open markets for their exports."

Hans Delbrück, the distinguished professor of history at Berlin, and former tutor to Prince Waldemar of Prussia, wrote in the *North American Review* of January 1900 :—

"England insists upon being the only great commercial and colonial power in the world, and is only willing to allow other nations the favour of owning small fragments as

enclaves wedged in helplessly between her possessions. This it is which we neither can nor intend to tolerate. . . . The good things of this world belong to all civilised nations in common. As England is not expected to give way peaceably, and as her great naval power cannot be overwhelmed by a single State, the best remedy would be the alliance against her of all her rivals together, especially of Russia, France, and Germany. . . . Such is the state of public opinion in Germany. There is only one person in the whole country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser."

From the foregoing small but representative selection of professorial opinions expressed by the *élite* of the German professors, which might easily be increased sufficiently to fill a volume, the nature of Germany's colonial ambitions and the cause of her fanatical hatred against Anglo-Saxondom, which found expression in the late anti-British movement, should be sufficiently clear.

The last phrase of Professor Delbrück, "There is only one person in the country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser," was literally true at the time when it was written, for the combined agitation by the official classes, the Universities, the entire German press, and the Protestant clergy, had roused Germany to a frenzy of hatred; and though the "poor Boers" were constantly in the mouth of the multitude, the utterances of the leaders, like those cited, make it clear that the clashing of German colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests, not German sympathy with the Boers, was at the bottom of the anti-British propaganda.

For the practical politician it is not only of the greatest interest to be aware of the existence of an aggressive, powerful, and therefore dangerous current of political sentiment that pervades a neighbouring nation, such as the colonial movement in Germany,

with its aggressive anti-Anglo-Saxon tendency, but it is important also to be acquainted with the ways and means by which such a sentiment is likely to be translated into action. In attempting to make a forecast of what Germany is likely to do in order to acquire colonies, we must learn from her past, and we must, before all, take note of the fundamental differences between German and Anglo-Saxon policy.

Owing to the rule of democracy, Anglo-Saxon diplomacy works in the full glare of publicity, and cannot pursue a far-seeing, secret, or unscrupulous policy, but is forced to take short views and to act honestly; whilst German as well as Russian Cabinet policy is enabled to work with infinite patience and foresight, and in absolute secrecy, because it is unhampered by popular control. An example will illustrate this point. Between 1860 and 1863 an expedition, sent out by the Prussian Government, and accompanied by the celebrated geographer, Freiherr von Richthofen, explored China, Japan, and Siam. After the most painstaking investigation of the Chinese coast and mainland, Freiherr von Richthofen came to the conclusion that Kiau-chow was in every respect by far the most valuable harbour of China, and when, in 1897, more than thirty years after his survey, two German missionaries were murdered in China, Germany immediately occupied Kiau-chow, which port was certainly not selected by coincidence.

Besides remembering the powerful and aggressive colonial ambitions of Germany, and the foresight, tenacity, patience, and secrecy of German diplomacy, we should also bear in mind the boldness and the startling rapidity of her military action as shown in 1866 and 1870. Furthermore, in order to under-

stand in what way German colonial ambitions may affect her policy in the future, we should study the effect of Germany's colonial ambitions upon her foreign policy during the last few years.

On the 5th May 1898, a few days after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, *Die Grenzboten*, the most influential political weekly, which is frequently inspired by the Government, wrote, probably not without official sanction :—

"The number of Germans in the United States amounts to nearly twenty millions, but many of them have lost their native language or their German names. Nevertheless, German blood flows in their veins, and it is only required to gather them together under their former nationality in order to bring them back into the lap of their mother Germania. The German volunteers will, of course, have to pay the heaviest blood tax in the war, as they alone form the warlike element of the army. The promiscuous mob of Englishmen, half-breeds, Irish, and negroes, is too incoherent and too unmilitary to show any soldierly qualities. Nevertheless, Germanism has to take a back seat in the army, and generals' positions are almost exclusively in the hands of Englishmen.

"We have to consider that more than three million Germans live as foreigners in the United States, who are not personally interested in that country. A skilful German national policy should be able to manipulate that German multitude against the shameless war speculators."

Had the issue of the Spanish-American War been unfavourable to the United States, or had the attempt at forming an anti-American coalition succeeded, the "skilful manipulation" from Berlin of the German vote "against the shameless war speculators," might have been possible, and might have borne much fruit to German diplomacy. Germany's miscalculation as to the issue of the war, and as to the strength and leanings of the German-Americans, seems to have

caused great disappointment in Berlin. This disappointment appears to have been responsible for the reckless provocation which Admiral Dewey received from Admiral Diedrichs before Manila, and which very likely would have resulted in hostilities between the American and German fleets, had it not been for the timely presence of the British squadron and the determined attitude of its admiral.

During the South African War the clashing of German colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests became particularly marked, because in Africa German colonial ambitions were clearly defined, and had become the ambitions of the nation and of the populace; in the Spanish-American War they were vague and hazy, and exclusively the ambitions of German diplomacy, for to the German masses the Spanish-American War had little significance. Already in 1884, at the beginning of her colonial career, Germany attempted to gain a footing in Santa Lucia Bay with an eye to the possibility of joining hands with the Boer republics close by, and of gaining, with their help, supremacy in Africa, but Bismarck's attempt failed through the incapacity of his son, who conducted the negotiations in London.

Undaunted by her first failure, Germany continued to believe that her best chance of acquiring settlement colonies lay in South Africa, and worked patiently and in silence for the attainment of her ambition. The Jameson Raid gave her a rude awakening; she feared the absorption of the Boer republics by Great Britain before either Germany or the Boers were ready to co-operate. In his anxiety to maintain his hold upon South Africa, the German Emperor sent his celebrated telegram to Mr. Kruger, thus prematurely revealing Germany's innermost ambitions

with regard to South Africa. The existence of these ambitions was still further proved by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein's official declaration that "the continued independence of the Boer republics was a German interest."

By the Emperor's impetuousness, Germany's ultimate aims regarding South Africa were clearly disclosed to Great Britain, a mistake which Bismarck would never have committed, and the Kruger telegram and the attitude of the semi-official press left the German nation with the erroneous impression that the British Government had been behind Jameson, and that the Emperor's veto had, once and for all, put an end to the aggressive plans of Great Britain. Thus misled, it was not unnatural that the Germans believed themselves to be the masters of the situation in South Africa, and that the German press constantly advocated the expulsion of Great Britain from that country. For instance, on the 4th July 1895, a few months after the Jameson Raid, *Die Grenzboten* wrote :—

"For us the Boer States, with the coasts that are their due, signify a great possibility. Their absorption into the British Empire would mean the blocking up of our last road towards an independent agricultural colony in a temperate clime. Will England obstruct our path ? If Germany shows determination, Never ! "

After surveying the globe, official Germany had evidently come to the conclusion that South Africa would be an ideal colony for her, more desirable even than South Brazil, and that the most natural way to acquire it would be to wrest it out of British hands with the help of the Boers. *Die Grenzboten* wrote on the 15th April 1897 :—

"The possession of South Africa offers greater advantages in every respect than the possession of Southern Brazil. If we look at the map our German colonies look very good positions for attack."

In a similar strain the *Koloniales Jahrbuch* for 1897 wrote :—

"The importance of South Africa as a land which can receive an unlimited number of white immigrants must rouse us to the greatest exertions, in order to secure there supremacy to the Teuton race. The greater part of the population of South Africa is of Low German descent. We must constantly lay stress upon the Low German origin of the Boers, and we must, before all, stimulate their hatred against Anglo-Saxondom. . . . No doubt the Boers will, with characteristically German tenacity, retake their former possessions from the English by combining slimness with force. In this attempt they can count upon the assistance of the German brother nation."

These quotations contain an unmistakable programme and a very interesting forecast.

As the idea that Germany was the heir-presumptive to South Africa was constantly discussed in the German press, that idea sank deeper and deeper into the German mind, and the succession to her inheritance soon became, with the masses, an impending event to be looked forward to. It was only a question of time when that event would come to pass. In German eyes South Africa had become indispensable to Germany, it was already half-way reckoned as a national asset by the masses, and in innumerable lectures, books, and articles, its resources and possibilities were discussed.

Whilst despatches regarding the suzerainty of the Transvaal were being exchanged between Great Britain and that country, the leading organs of the German press continued preaching the expulsion of the British from South Africa, an action calculated to strengthen

the resistance of the Boers against British demands, and to make them look to Germany for protection. On the 16th June 1898, when war between the Transvaal and Great Britain seemed unavoidable, *Die Grenzboten* wrote :—

"The existence of the Boer States makes it, perhaps, possible to regain the lost colony, including Delagoa Bay. Here in the north of Cape Colony a well-considered German policy must be pursued, and the Emperor's telegram to Kruger has already demonstrated our firm will to return the Gladstonian 'hands off' to the English. The possession of the natural harbour of Delagoa Bay is a vital condition for the Low German States in South Africa. Without Low Germanism in South Africa our colonies are worth nothing as settlements. Our future is founded upon the victory of Low Germanism, and upon the expulsion of the English from South Africa, where, even in Cape Colony, they are still in the minority. The prosperity of our South African colonies, which singly are worth as little as Cameroon and Togo, depends upon the possibility of connecting those two colonies, whereby England will be confined to the south, and the dream of a great British colonial empire from the Cape to Cairo will vanish."

If we look at the South African question from the German point of view, and remember how German diplomacy had plotted and laboured for the acquisition of South Africa for fifteen years and more, how the telegram and the speeches of William II. and the attitude and propaganda of the German press had created the universal belief in Germany that Great Britain could not move in South Africa without Germany's consent, and that Germany's influence there was becoming paramount, we can understand with what dismay and exasperation the outbreak of the South African War and the prospect of seeing the Boer States absorbed by Great Britain was greeted by the German people.

The disappointment felt in German official circles was no less keen, and, not unnaturally, the question suggested itself whether Great Britain's progress in South Africa might not be stopped by force. Remembering her failure to form a coalition against Great Britain in 1895, and against the United States in 1898, Germany found herself isolated and unable to save South Africa for herself. The large naval programme of 1898, providing for seventeen battleships, &c., coincided with the Spanish-American War. Similarly, the outbreak of the South African War coincided with the German Navy Bill of 1900, providing for a further huge increase. Smarting under the sense of her impotence to act single-handed against Great Britain, the Navy Bill of 1900 was brought forward, which was to provide a fleet of such strength that, according to the preamble of the Bill, "a war against the mightiest naval power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that power." That fleet was to cost about £100,000,000. In spite of that staggering amount, the Navy Bill was rapidly passed, for its object to destroy the power of Great Britain was greeted with delight by the nation, and with hysterical jubilation by the masses. At last Great Britain was to be brought to her knees.

It has been asserted in this country that the powerful Social Democratic Party might prove an effective obstacle to the execution of Germany's colonial ambitions, because that party disapproved of the Navy Bill and voted against it. However, though the representatives of Labour objected to the Navy Bill, they objected neither to the prospective humiliation of Great Britain nor to the acquisition of foreign markets by conquest. The following lines

from the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* for December 1899 faithfully depict the opinion of the German Labour Party :—

"That Germany be armed to the teeth, possessing a strong fleet, is of the utmost importance to the working men. What damages our exports damages them also, and working men have the most pressing interest in securing prosperity for our export trade, be it even by force of arms. Owing to her development, Germany may perhaps be obliged to maintain her position sword in hand. Only he who is under the protection of his guns can dominate the markets, and in the fight for markets German working men may come before the alternative either of perishing or of forcing their entrance into markets sword in hand."

From this and many similar manifestations it is clear that no effective opposition against Germany's colonial ambitions can be expected to come from the ranks of the Social Democratic Party.

In due course the German Government discovered the danger of its somewhat too openly anti-British policy, and, too late in the day, appeared official declarations that that huge new fleet was required for the defence of the German coast against Continental Powers. However, some of the foremost German soldiers and sailors had already laid down the maxim that Germany does not require a strong fleet for a Continental war, and had given proof for that assertion. Consequently, the argument of the Government, that the huge new fleet was to be for the defence of the coast, does not stand examination. Field-Marshal von Moltke, for instance, wrote in his memorandum of 1884: "Naval battles alone rarely decide the fate of States, and, as far as can be foreseen, the decision of every war in which Germany may be engaged lies with her army."

Owing to the peculiar formation of the German coast her harbours are hardly assailable. The former Commander-in-Chief of the navy, Admiral von Stosch, wrote in his memorandum of 1888: "The North Sea harbours defend themselves. If the buoys are removed from the endless sandbanks, which change their shape from year to year, even the most expert pilots would not dare to take a ship through the tortuous channels"; and Secretary of State Admiral Hollmann said, as late as March 1897, before the Committee of Ways and Means: "We require no navy for coast defence; our coasts defend themselves." It seems hardly likely that, in the three years elapsing between Admiral Hollmann's statement and the appearance of the Navy Bill of 1900, Germany's military position towards her neighbours or the formation of her coasts should have so materially altered as to controvert the well-considered views of her foremost military and naval advisers.

From the foregoing it should be sufficiently clear that Germany's new fleet has been created for the purpose of fighting Great Britain or the United States, or both nations, in the pursuit of colonies and of commerce. It remains now to consider her plans of attack on this country.

The German Generalstab as well as the Admiralstab keep their secrets well, and it would be idle to retail officers' gossip with regard to the aggressive plans of official Germany. However, a fair indication of the spirit and the intentions existing among the highest German officers may be found in a remarkable article contributed to the *Deutsche Rundschau* of March 1900, by General C. von der Goltz, an article which is all the more remarkable when we consider that General von der Goltz is on active service. It

should be added that General von der Goltz is the reorganiser of the Turkish Army, and one of the most talented of German officers, who is to act as generalissimo in case of war. He says :—

". . . . We must contradict the opinion, which has so frequently been expressed, that a war between Germany and Great Britain is impossible. Great Britain is forced to distribute her fleets over many seas in peace as well as in war, and her home squadron is surprisingly weak in comparison with her fleets in the Mediterranean and in India, the Far East, Australia, the Red Sea, South Africa, the West Indies, and the Pacific. In that necessary distribution of her strength lies Great Britain's weakness. Germany is in a better position. Her navy is small, but it can be kept together in Europe. Our colonies want no protection, for a victory in Europe would give us our colonies back at the conclusion of peace. With Great Britain matters are different. If India, Australia, or Canada should be lost in a war, they would remain lost for ever. . . .

". . . For the moment our fleet has only one-fifth the fighting value of the British fleet, and Great Britain's superiority over us is striking, but when the projected increase of our fleet has been effected, the outlook for us will be bright. The British home squadron, with which we should have to deal, amounts to 43 battleships and 35 large cruisers. Even if that fleet should be increased in the future, it would no longer be an irresistible opponent to us. Numbers decide as little on the sea as they do on land ; numerical inferiority can be compensated for by greater efficiency. . . .

" As places are not wanting where England's defences are weak, it would be a mistake to consider a landing in England as a chimera. The distance is short enough if an admiral of daring succeeds in securing supremacy on the sea for a short time . . . .

" The material basis of our power is large enough to make it possible for us to destroy the present superiority of Great Britain, but Germany must prepare beforehand for what is to come, and must arm in time. Germany has arrived at one of the most critical moments in her history, and her fleet is too weak to fulfil the task for which it is intended. We must arm ourselves in time, with all our might, and pre-

pare ourselves for what is to come, without losing a day, for it is not possible to improvise victories on the sea, where the excellence of the material and the greatest skill in handling it are of supreme importance."

The existence of views identical with those of General von der Goltz in the highest military circles in Germany may also have dictated the visits of the German fleet to the Irish Channel and the appearance of a "Handbook of the South Coast of Ireland and the British Channel," published in 1901 by the Imperial Seewarte, and of a short "English Military Interpreter" published in the same year by the School of Artillery and Engineering.

Germany's policy is far-sighted, and German statesmen are as well aware of Germany's lack of naval harbours as are her admirals. Germany possesses practically only two naval bases, Kiel on the Baltic, and Wilhelmshafen on the North Sea. The harbour of Kiel is an immense natural basin which could receive all the fleets of the world; Wilhelmshafen is a very small harbour which has been dug out of the mainland with infinite trouble and expense. Notwithstanding recent enlargements it is far too small, and it suffers under the additional disadvantage that, at low tide, entrance for large ships is difficult. However, in spite of all these grave defects of Wilhelmshafen, not Kiel but Wilhelmshafen is the chief naval base of Germany, because of its more favourable position for striking westward.

In commencing the construction of her enormous new fleet, the problem of finding a harbour advantageously situated for an attack upon Great Britain became an urgent one for Germany, and, lacking an adequate natural harbour in the North Sea, she

turned her attention to Holland, which abounds in excellent harbours, well situated for Germany's strategical purposes. From Wilhelmshafen a German squadron would take about thirty hours' steaming to cross to England; from the Dutch harbours it could cross in about eight hours, and the danger of failure in a raid upon England, arising from delay caused by a fog in the Channel, or by insufficient accommodation at the base for ships, would be reduced to a minimum.

When it was recognised of what enormous value Holland might be to Germany in a war with Great Britain, official and semi-official attempts without number were made in order to entice or to coerce her into a closer union with Germany. Although details of these attempts are given in another chapter, an abstract from a series of unsigned articles, which appeared in *Die Grenzboten* during July and August 1901, entitled "Holland and Germany," whose carefully thought-out and picturesque diction bears a striking resemblance to the well-known style of the then German Chancellor von Bülow, might perhaps here be repeated. The writer speaks with the authority of one who possesses an inside view in politics, and it can hardly be doubted that that series directly emanated from the Wilhelmstrasse. The contents of these interesting articles may be summed up in the following way:—

"Holland's wealth is chiefly derived from the German transit trade. That trade can be diverted by the new Dortmund-Ems canal, which will give to the Rhine an outlet at Emden. That port, which lies on the Dutch frontier, has so far been neglected, but is being equipped in order to make it an efficient competitor of Rotterdam. If she chooses, Germany can cripple Dutch commerce and bring Holland on her knees by diverting the Dutch transit trade and by

imposing hostile tariffs. Consequently Holland is economically dependent upon Germany, and Holland's economic incorporation with Germany in one form or the other is for Holland an unavoidable necessity.

"Politically, Holland is threatened by other nations. Her guaranteed neutrality is no more than a shred of paper, which would prove worthless in war. Spain has been brutally crushed by the United States; Portugal hangs like a fly in the spider's net of England, a prey to her monopolistic mercantile system. The Dutch will not share the fate of the Boers, but, if they are not careful, they may be caught in British snares. 'From all these dangers incorporation with Germany is the only salvation. The movement of naval expansion in Germany will not end until a German navy floats on the sea that can compete with the fleet of Great Britain. Equally strong on sea and on land, the world may choose our friendship or our enmity. The strong may take their choice, but Holland will do well to stand by us in friendship, not so much for our sake as for her own existence.'"

When we consider the spirit of irreconcilable hostility against Anglo-Saxondom that pervades the countless expansionist manifestations in Germany, emanating from official and semi-official quarters, from professorial and mercantile circles, from the clergy and the proletariat, we cannot help being struck by the unanimity of hatred and by the unflinching determination of Germany to erect a German world empire upon the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom. Nowhere is the celebrated word of Sir Walter Raleigh, "Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself," more frequently quoted and more thoroughly appreciated than in Germany, and something of Sir Walter Raleigh's daring spirit of conquest seems to stir the German masses and animate their rulers. History alone will show whether the parallel will end here, or whether Germany is destined to take the place which

England took in Sir Walter Raleigh's time, and to succeed by force of arms in becoming a world Power at the cost of Great Britain and the United States in the same way in which, three centuries ago, England, by her naval superiority, succeeded in building up her greatness on the ruins of the then leading commercial and colonial Powers, Spain and Holland.

Germany has become great by the sword, but present-day Germany, though she would like to walk in the steps of her greatest rulers, Frederick II. and Bismarck, disdains the advice of those most successful expansionists. Frederick the Great's counsel, "Secrecy is the soul of foreign politics," is as little heeded by Germany's present rulers as Bismarck's recommendation, "Not to meddle in the affairs of foreign States unless one has also the power to accomplish one's intentions." By the impetuousness of her present rulers Germany's plans have been prematurely and unmistakably revealed to the world, and if the Anglo-Saxon nations should be so blind as not to take the measures necessary to frustrate those plans, of which they have received such ample and such long-dated warning, they will have fully deserved the fate of Spain and Holland.

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS—HER ATTEMPTS TO DEFEAT IMPERIAL RECIPROCITY

GERMANY strives, not unnaturally, to weaken in every way her rivals and her possible opponents. With this object in view she induced France to waste her strength in Africa, and urged Russia to waste hers in Asiatic adventures. Besides, by encouraging their colonial and expansionist policy, Germany produced dangerous friction between Russia and Great Britain and between France and Great Britain—friction which brought these nations repeatedly to the brink of war.

To Germany a firmly united British Empire is no doubt undesirable. Nothing could be more unwelcome to Germany than the realisation of Mr. Chamberlain's policy. A pan-Britannic Customs Union, a system of fiscal protection in Great Britain and of mutual preferences throughout the British Empire, would seriously curtail Germany's industrial exports to Great Britain and to her daughter states. It would injure and weaken the German manufacturing industries very materially, and thus undermine Germany's prosperity. Besides, the fiscal union of the British Empire would inevitably lead to a further, a political, union of motherland and colonies. It would bring about imperial federation; it would make the British Empire an empire indeed; it would make it a unit for defence.

Germany aims at challenging Great Britain's naval

supremacy. That intention was clearly expressed in the introduction to the Navy Bill of 1900. Germany is so rich that she can, perhaps, hope to outbuild the cramped and over-taxed islands of Great Britain; but she can never hope to outbuild the British Empire with its boundless resources. The unification of the British Empire would destroy Germany's naval ambition.

Most Germans believe that they can acquire extensive colonies suitable for the settlement of white men only if their fleet is so strong as to be able to defeat, or at least to overawe, the fleet of Great Britain. Many Germans believe that the break-up of the British Empire is inevitable, that the great British dominions are bound to follow the example set by the American colonies and to secede, and they believe, as I have shown in another part of this book, that Germany ought to be Great Britain's heir. The unification of the British Empire would destroy Germany's colonial ambitions as well.

The foregoing considerations have shaped Germany's policy towards Great Britain and the great dominions. As Germany fears the unification of the British Empire, she tries to prevent it. That policy has found its strongest expression in her attempts to prevent the dominions, and especially Canada, giving a fiscal preference to the motherland. Hence it is worth while to study Germany's attitude towards the British imperialist movement and her policy towards the British dominions by means of the original diplomatic documents relating to her differences with Canada, for these reveal most clearly Germany's policy.

On May 14th, 1897, Sir Frank Lascelles, who at the time was the British Ambassador in Berlin, reported

to Lord Salisbury, who then was the Foreign Secretary :—

"In the course of conversation this afternoon, Baron von Marschall informed me that he had telegraphed to Count Hatzfeldt to make a representation to your Lordship on the subject of the resolutions recently submitted to the Canadian legislature to grant preferential treatment to the products of the United Kingdom. His Excellency said that Article VII. of the Treaty of Commerce, which he read to me, was so explicit that he did not understand how any question could arise as to the right of Germany to claim any preferential treatment which (by Canada) might be accorded to Great Britain. . . . He would be grateful to me if I would draw your Lordship's attention to the great importance which the German Government attached to the question. . . . Baron von Marschall said that the (Commercial) Treaty of 1865 had been concluded with Her Majesty's Government, and it was to them that Germany must look for its due execution, and, moreover, *Her Majesty's Government had the right of over-ruling Canadian legislation.*"

The foregoing extract makes it clear that, when Canada offered a fiscal preference to Great Britain, the German Government opposed the granting of that preference, and urged the British Government to "over-rule" Canada, a step which would not have failed to bring about a conflict between Great Britain and that great Dominion.

On the same day, the 14th of May 1897, when Baron von Marschall spoke to the British Ambassador about Canada, the German Ambassador in London

sent, on behalf of his Government, a letter to Lord Salisbury, which was very peremptory in tone, and which was worded as follows :—

"It has come to the knowledge of the Imperial Government that the Canadian Government have decided that from the 25th of last month German goods were to be treated differentially as against British goods on entering Canadian territory, a deduction of duty of one-eighth being granted in the case of British goods, while this advantage is denied to importers of German goods.

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency, in accordance with instructions received, that, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, there can be no doubt that this measure is a contravention of the clear terms of Article VII. of the Treaty between the Zollverein and Great Britain of the 30th May 1865, by which we are expressly granted in the British Colonies a footing of equality for our products with those of the mother country.

"Under these circumstances I have to request your Excellency, in the name of my Government, to be so good as to cause steps to be taken by Her Majesty's Government to put an end to the violation of the Treaty involved in the action of the Canadian Government.

"Trusting that your Excellency will inform me of the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government in the matter, I have, &c.,

"(Signed) P. HATZFELDT."

In consequence of Germany's representations Great Britain decided to terminate the Treaty of Commerce of 1865, which, according to the official German view,

prevented Canada giving a preference to the mother country. Therefore, on July 28th, 1897, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Frank Lascelles :—

"With reference to my preceding despatch, I have to request you to address a note to the German Government informing them, in the sense of the present despatch, of the reasons which have decided Her Majesty's Government to give notice of termination of the Treaty of Commerce of the 30th May 1865."

In explanation Lord Salisbury added :—

"The German Government are aware that for many years past the British self-governing colonies have enjoyed complete tariff autonomy, and that in all recent Commercial Treaties concluded by Great Britain it has been customary to insert an Article empowering the self-governing colonies to adhere, or not, at will. No such Article is contained in the Treaty of 1865 between Great Britain and the (German) Zollverein, and the consequence is that certain of the British colonies, which are all comprised within its operation, find themselves committed by Treaty to a commercial policy which is not in accordance with the views of the responsible colonial Ministers, nor adequate to the requirements of the people.

"Beyond this, the provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of 1865 constitute a barrier against the internal fiscal arrangements of the British Empire, which is inconsistent with the close ties of commercial intercourse which subsist and should be consolidated between the mother country and the colonies.

"Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Govern-

ment find themselves compelled to terminate a Treaty which is no longer compatible with the general interests of the British Empire."

Negotiations were opened with the German Government, and on April 1st, 1898, Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Sir Frank Lascelles :—

"With reference to the negotiations for a new Commercial Treaty, I request that you will inform the German Government that Her Majesty's Government regret their inability, under any circumstances, to renew the provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of 1865, which grant to Germany the same treatment in respect of import and export duties in the British colonies as is accorded to the United Kingdom."

On April 4th, 1898, Lord Salisbury received a letter from Sir Frank Lascelles, which was written on March the 31st, in which we read :—

"In an interview which I had with M. de Bülow yesterday, I asked his Excellency whether he could now inform me of the conditions under which it was proposed to temporarily extend most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain and her colonies, after the existing Commercial Treaty should have terminated.

"M. de Bülow replied : *A provisional arrangement to continue most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain and her colonies would give rise to discussion and might be rejected.* If this should be the case, it would be impossible to avoid the application of the Autonomous Tariff to English goods, which would cause great disturbance to trade. The present Treaty had existed for upwards of thirty years, and he hoped

that, under the circumstances, Her Majesty's Government might consent to its continuance for one year more."

In May 1897 the German Government had rather peremptorily suggested that Great Britain should "over-rule" Canada and disallow her granting a preference to the motherland. In March 1898 the German Government went further, and threatened to withdraw most-favoured-nation treatment from Great Britain and to penalise the entire British trade with Germany in the event that the British Government should refuse to "over-rule" Canada in Germany's interest. German diplomacy said plainly to Great Britain: "You must disallow the Canadian preference. If you accept the preference, we shall penalise your entire trade. You can keep most-favoured-nation treatment in the important German market only by refusing to accept the Canadian preference."

Happily Lord Salisbury could not be bluffed and browbeaten. In reply to Germany's extraordinary demand he wrote on April 9th, 1898, to Sir Frank Lascelles:—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *April* 9, 1898.

"SIR,—I instructed your Excellency by telegram on the 1st instant to inform the German Government that Her Majesty's Government could not in any circumstances agree to the renewal of Article VII. of the Treaty at present in force between the two countries.

"The reasons which led Her Majesty's Government to denounce this Treaty were fully explained in my despatch of the 28th July 1897. . . .

"It is the fixed policy of Her Majesty's Government not to conclude in the future any Treaty engage-

ments which would interfere in any way with such fiscal or tariff arrangements as may be determined on between the different parts of the British Empire.

"Your Excellency should explain to the German Government that it would be incompatible with this determination to renew even for a time the provisions of Article VII. of the existing Treaty, which would limit and restrain the freedom of the colonies in this respect."

The German Government continued threatening Great Britain with penalising her trade in the event that the British Government should accept Canada's proffered preference. On June 3rd, 1898, Sir Frank Lascelles wrote to Lord Salisbury :—

"BERLIN, *June* 3, 1898.

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to report that I took an opportunity of speaking to Baron von Richthofen this morning on the subject of the proposal as to a provisional commercial arrangement.

"Baron von Richthofen said that the German Government were not prepared to make any further proposals with regard to a provisional commercial arrangement. The German Government had proposed the prolongation of the existing Treaty for a year, but Her Majesty's Government had declined this proposal, and his Excellency did not see what further proposals the German Government could make.

"I replied that, in that case, it would be very important if his Excellency could inform me whether the Federal Council would make use of the power which they had obtained from the Reichstag to extend most-favoured-nation treatment to British merchandise after the expiration of the Treaty on the 30th

July. I explained that many complaints had been received at your Lordship's Office of the uncertainty which prevailed on this point, and which was causing considerable injury to trade.

"Baron von Richthofen replied that he was unable to give me an official answer on this subject. Many similar complaints had been received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from German merchants, but the Federal Council had not yet come to any decision on the subject, and it was, therefore, not possible to give an official answer. His personal opinion was that no change would be made with the United Kingdom or those parts of the British Empire in which the system, which had hitherto prevailed, continued, but that a difference would probably be made as regards those parts of the Empire which should affect any change in the system. As far as he knew, Canada was the only colony which intended to alter the system, and it was his opinion that it would be in regard to Canada alone that any change would be made by the German Customs authority."

Ten days later, on June the 14th, 1898, Germany gave formal notice that she would withdraw from Canada "until further notice" the most-favoured-nation treatment in the German market which she had hitherto enjoyed. Canada was to be punished because she had refused to grant on compulsion to Germany the same terms which she had voluntarily granted to the mother country. Viscount Gough, the British Chargé d'Affaires, telegraphed on that day from Berlin :—

"The following Notification, dated the 11th instant, was published last night in the *Reichsanzeiger* :—

"'The Federal Council have decided, by virtue of the Law of the 11th May last relative to commercial relations with the British Empire, that on and after the 31st July next, *and until further notice*, all the advantages which are granted by the German Empire to the subjects and products of the most favoured nation shall be granted to the subjects and products of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as also to those of the British colonies and possessions, with the exception of Canada.'"

On June the 15th, the day following this Notification, Lord Gough wrote to Lord Salisbury :—

"I venture to call your Lordship's attention to the fact that this decision, being given '*until further notice*' only, may at any time be altered so as to exclude British colonies who may, before the conclusion of a new Treaty, grant preferential treatment to the United Kingdom."

Notwithstanding the formal declarations of Lord Salisbury that he would not fulfil Germany's unreasonable demands, the German Government thought that, at the eleventh hour, the British Government might still change its mind if it were sufficiently pressed, for on June the 22nd the German Ambassador in London, Count Hatzfeldt, wrote to Lord Salisbury on behalf of his Government :—

"As your Excellency will see from the annexed copy of No. 27 of the German *Reichs Gesetzblatt*, p. 909, the Bundesrath determined, on the 11th instant, in accordance with the Law of the 11th May last relative to commercial relations with the British

Empire, to continue to allow most favoured treatment to the nationals and to the products of Great Britain and British colonies and foreign possessions, with the exception of Canada, from the 31st July until further notice.

"In explanation of this resolution I venture to add, by direction of my Government, that they would gladly have granted most favoured treatment to Canada also, but in the meantime they are, to their regret, not in a position to do so, as, from information which has reached them, it must be considered as certain that in Canada, after the 30th July next, Germany will not be left in enjoyment of her present position, but will be treated differentially as regards the British mother country. *Should Canada, however, determine to continue, after the term in question, to accord Germany an equal position with Great Britain, the Imperial Government would not hesitate to have the decision of the Bundesrath subsequently extended to that colony.* I have, &c. (Signed) P. HATZFELDT."

Germany's refusal to grant most-favoured-nation treatment to Canada because Canada had given a preference to Great Britain was inconsistent, inasmuch as Germany had not denied most-favoured-nation treatment to the colonies of other countries which had given a preference to their motherland. Therefore Lord Salisbury wrote, on August the 12th, to Sir Frank Lascelles :—

". . . I have received from the Colonial Office a letter from the High Commissioner for Canada, in which he expresses the regret of the Dominion Government at the decision of the German Government to discontinue most-favoured-nation treatment of imports

from Canada on the expiry of the Zollverein Treaty of 1865, and requests that representations may be made to the German Government with a view to inducing them to reconsider their decision.

"The Secretary of State for the Colonies observes that, *if, as stated by Lord Strathcona, it is the case that Germany extends most-favoured-nation treatment to the colonies of other countries which grant preferential treatment to the products of the metropolitan country, it is not apparent on what grounds they refuse most-favoured-nation treatment to the products of the Dominion.*

"I request that you will ascertain and report the practice of the German Government in this respect, in order that I may be in a position to decide whether any useful object would be attained by making a representation to the German Government on the subject."

On June 24th, 1899, Lord Salisbury wrote to Viscount Gough, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin :—

". . . I have to instruct your Lordship to request the German Government to furnish you with a distinct statement of the grounds upon which they claim to distinguish the case of Canada from that of the French colonies, and also from that formerly occupied by the Spanish and Portuguese colonies under the Treaties of 1883 and 1872.

"The fact that Canada has a larger measure of independence than the French, Spanish, or Portuguese colonies does not appear to Her Majesty's Government to have any necessary bearing on the matter. These colonies have, in most instances, like Canada, independent fiscal systems, and the grant by them of preferential treatment to their metropolitan country

appears not to have excluded them from most-favoured-nation treatment in Germany."

In consequence of the foregoing instructions, Lord Gough made the necessary inquiries, and in reply to these inquiries Baron von Richthofen wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin on August the 5th, 1899 :—

"The Federal Council of the German Empire did not extend to Canada the most-favoured-nation treatment granted autonomously and *as an act of exception* to Great Britain and the British colonies and possessions."

In plain and non-diplomatic language Great Britain was told that she was given most-favoured-nation treatment not by right, not by treaty, not because she charged no duties on Germany's imports, but that she was given most-favoured-nation treatment "as an act of exception," one might almost say as an act of favour, as an act of grace. The threat of penalising the trade of Great Britain, if Great Britain should accept the preference freely granted to her by Canada, was employed once more, for in conclusion Baron von Richthofen stated :—

"It cannot be expected of Germany that upon a change being made by one party in the state of affairs which has hitherto prevailed, she should accept the change without more ado ; it is the less to be expected, as *it is in the interests of the development of the commerce of the world,* and of the mutual relations of trade and navigation between Germany and the British mother country, *that, in the British colonies,*

equal treatment should be given to the products of Germany and of Great Britain."

Germany demanded that "in the British colonies equal treatment should be given to the products of Germany and Great Britain," as if Germany, not Great Britain, was their motherland, and she threatened Great Britain with commercial war unless her demands were granted. Great Britain's difficulties were Germany's opportunity. The foregoing extraordinary and unjustifiable demands would, perhaps, not have been made had not Great Britain at the time been in a difficult and embarrassed position owing to the Boer War. It was not merely by coincidence that, about the same time, Germany repudiated the so-called "Yangtse Agreement," which she had concluded with Great Britain.

In further explanation of Germany's high-handed and overbearing attitude, Count von Posadowsky stated on behalf of the German Government in the Reichstag on May the 26th, 1900 :—

"It is of the greatest importance that there should be no disturbance of the favourable international commercial relations now existing between Germany and England. . . . When single British colonies deviate from the present arrangement and refuse most-favoured-nation treatment (to Germany), there are only two courses open : either to apply the 'autonomous' tariff to these single colonies, or, should a considerable portion of the British colonial empire differentiate against Germany as regards other States, to utilise the power granted by applying the 'autonomous' tariff to the whole of the British dominions in the world" (*Weltreich*).

Germany refused to recognise the existence of the British Empire, she refused to recognise that the arrangement of inter-imperial preferences was a purely domestic matter in which she had no right to interfere, and she threatened Great Britain once more with a customs war if the colonies should be allowed by Great Britain to give better fiscal treatment to the motherland than to Germany.

In 1903 Germany still relied in her treatment of the imperial preference question on threats, for on April the 16th, 1903, Sir Frank Lascelles wrote to Lord Lansdowne, who meanwhile had succeeded Lord Salisbury :—

"I asked Baron von Richthofen how matters stood with regard to the conclusion of a new Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and Germany. His Excellency replied that, as regards Great Britain, he was convinced that there would be no difficulty in coming to a satisfactory arrangement. The most-favoured-nation treatment would, he thought, certainly be prolonged, but as the South African colonies had decided to give preferential treatment to English goods, it was now to be considered whether they as well as Canada should not be excepted from such treatment, and if the Australian colonies should also decide to give the mother country preferential treatment, a situation would be created which would increase the difficulty for the German Government to obtain the consent of the Reichstag to the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty between our two countries."

Germany's threat to penalise Great Britain's trade unless she was given the same privileges in the colonial market which Great Britain was voluntarily offered was not merely a verbal one, for on the previous day,

on April the 15th, 1903, Baron von Richthofen had sent to Sir Frank Lascelles the following most extraordinary letter :—

"BERLIN, *April* 15, 1903.

"*The undersigned has the honour to reply to Sir Frank Lascelles' communication of the 25th March, that the Imperial Government on their part intend to bring about at the proper time a prolongation of the Law by which the Bundesrath is empowered to grant most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain and Ireland as well as to the British colonies and possessions.*

"*The Imperial Government think, however, that they should not conceal the fact that it appears doubtful, especially having regard to the opposition to be expected in the Reichstag, whether this intention can be realised if Germany is differentiated against in important parts of the British Empire, and if, in particular, the report is confirmed that German goods will in the future be less favourably treated than British not only in Canada, but also in British South Africa.*

"The undersigned avails himself, &c.

"(Signed) RICHTHOFEN."

On April the 23rd, 1903, Sir Frank Lascelles wrote, with regard to the foregoing threatening note :—

"In an interview with Baron von Richthofen . . . Baron von Richthofen said that it was the action of Canada in giving preferential treatment to Great Britain that had brought about the denunciation of the Treaty of Commerce, and *if other British colonies followed her example, and large portions of the British Empire were to give preferential treatment to Great Britain, it would be very difficult to obtain the consent of the Reichstag to the prolongation of most-favoured-*

nation treatment to Great Britain herself. His Excellency added that *the competent authorities were now considering what measures should be taken in consequence of the action of the Canadian Government.*

"I said that the commercial relations of our two countries were so large that anything in the nature of a customs war would do incalculable harm to both, an opinion fully shared by his Excellency, but that I fully believed that if any serious damage were done to British trade by the non-prolongation of most-favoured-nation treatment, the outcry in England would be so great that His Majesty's Government would be forced, however unwillingly, to take retaliatory measures."

The position had become an intolerable one. From May 1897 to April 1903, during six whole years, Germany had been threatening Great Britain to penalise her trade if she should accept the preference voluntarily offered by her own citizens residing across the ocean. Not daring to strike at Great Britain, Germany had actually penalised Canada's trade with Germany. Her threats became louder and louder, and culminated in the extraordinary note of Baron von Richthofen, quoted in the foregoing, which was sent to the British Ambassador on April the 15th. At last Lord Lansdowne's patience became exhausted, and he sent, on June the 20th, 1903, the following instructions to Mr. Buchanan, who, at the time, acted as Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin :—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *June* 20, 1903.

"SIR,—His Majesty's Government have had under their careful consideration Sir F. Lascelles' despatches of the 18th and 23rd April last relating to commercial

relations with the German Government, and more especially to commercial relations between the German Empire and Canada. . . .

"It was pointed out that Canada was extending to Germany the same privileges as those accorded by the Dominion to other foreign Powers, and would on her part be gratified to continue this policy. In these circumstances, the Dominion Government expressed the hope that the German Government would find it possible to alter their decision.

"*After having patiently waited for five years in the hope of coming to an arrangement with Germany,* the Canadian Government decided, in April 1903, that they could no longer allow the matter to remain on a footing so detrimental to Canadian interests. A clause was accordingly inserted in the Canadian Tariff to the effect that when any foreign country treated imports from Canada on less favourable terms than imports from other countries, *a sur-tax* amounting to one-third of the duty according to the general tariff might be *imposed.* This clause was general in its terms, and applicable to the goods of any country which might treat Canadian products unfavourably. It was applied immediately in the case of Germany, and took effect on the 16th of that month, except as regards goods purchased before the 17th April. In the case of such goods it is to apply from the 1st October next.

"During Sir F. Lascelles' conversation with Baron von Richthofen of the 21st April last, his Excellency stated that if the example of Canada in giving a tariff preference to the United Kingdom were followed by other British colonies so as to cover large portions of the British Empire, there would be great difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Reichstag to a continua-

tion of most-favoured-nation treatment for this country; and he further informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the competent authorities were considering what measures should be taken in consequence of the recent action of Canada, to which I have referred.

"This communication has greatly increased the difficulty of the situation, and I have now to give you the following instructions as to the language which you should hold with regard to this most important question. You should, in the first place, remind the German Government that the Treaty of 1865 between the United Kingdom and Germany was terminated by His Majesty's Government, in order that this country and her colonies might be at liberty to make such arrangements as might be considered desirable in respect of their mutual trade. To this policy His Majesty's Government adhere.

"As regards Canada, *the action of the Dominion was taken only after every effort had been made to secure fair treatment for Canadian produce in Germany. It was only after these efforts had failed, and Germany had persistently refused to accord to Canadian produce the same most-favoured-nation treatment that Canada accorded to German produce, that Canada was driven in self-defence to measures of retaliation. If Germany will restore Canadian produce to the most-favoured-nation terms, His Majesty's Government have not the least doubt that the increased duties which have just been imposed on German goods will be at once removed.*

"*Should the German Government, however, persist in the attitude which they have taken up on this matter, and, further, extend to the products of other British colonies, and even to those of the United Kingdom, whose tariff is at the present moment based upon the*

most liberal principles, the discrimination which they have enforced against Canada, a very wide and serious issue must inevitably be raised involving the fiscal relations of this country and the German Empire."

Mr. Buchanan handed a copy of the foregoing instructions to Baron von Richthofen.

Lord Lansdowne's energetic language and Canada's determination to retaliate upon Germany by putting a sur-tax upon Germany's imports into Canada proved more effective than all the arguments which had been exchanged between Great Britain and Germany in the course of six years. Germany's loud threats ended abruptly, and her diplomats tried to explain their attitude. Baron von Richthofen stated in a long and involved despatch that Germany had been obliged on technical grounds to act as she had acted, and he disclaimed all intention of interfering in the relations between the British motherland and the dominions. He wrote on June the 27th to the German Ambassador in London :—

"In Germany there are, as is well known, two tariffs—the General Customs Tariff, which, by law, is applied to all those countries with which no Agreements to the contrary are in force ; and the so-called Conventional Tariff, which comes into force when Treaty arrangements on the subject are made, and which is purchased by concessions on the part of the various Treaty States, consisting especially in the modification of numerous items in their own autonomous tariffs. Consequently, after the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty had ceased to be valid, the provisions of the autonomous German Customs Tariff had to be applied to Great Britain and her colonies.

It required a special Act of the German Legislature to make an exception to the rule in question. . . . This procedure shows a special desire on the part of Germany to meet the wishes of Great Britain, for which there is no example in German legislation either before or since. It was caused by the wish of the Imperial Government to make their commercial relations with Great Britain and her colonies as friendly as possible. . . .

"Moreover, *there is in the German procedure*—for we wish also to correct this supposition, which has been often repeated—*no interference in the relations between mother country and colony*. After the expiry of the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty, Germany could only choose whether she would apply her General Tariff to Great Britain and all her colonies, as according to German law would have been necessary in the ordinary course, or whether she would limit the application of the General Tariff to those parts of the British Empire in which there had been an alteration of the *status quo* affecting imports from Germany. . . .

"If the English colonies are to be in a position to follow out their own customs policy, other countries must be allowed to treat them as separate customs territories."

In a despatch of admirable lucidity of July the 8th, 1903, Lord Lansdowne replied as follows in a letter addressed to Mr. Buchanan, of which a copy was to be handed to the German Government :—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *July* 8, 1903.

"SIR,—The German Ambassador left with me on the 1st instant a copy of the note addressed to him

on the 27th ultimo by Baron von Richthofen respecting the commercial relations between Canada and Germany.

"His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the friendly tone in which the note is couched, as well as the desire expressed in it to arrive at a practical solution of the question at issue between the two countries.

"That desire is shared by His Majesty's Government, and it is only with the object of removing misapprehensions that they offer the following comments upon Baron von Richthofen's statements :—

"They observe that the exclusion of Canada from most-favoured-nation treatment in Germany is represented as the natural and inevitable consequence of the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty of 1865, and complaint is apparently made of His Majesty's Government for having suggested that this exclusion was to be regarded as a punitive measure, or as an undue attempt by Germany to interfere in the relations of the mother country with her colonies.

"His Majesty's Government desire that it should be clearly understood that they have no intention to call in question the motives of the German Government. His Majesty's Government are, indeed, in no wise concerned with those motives, but only with the action of Germany and its consequences to the different parts of the British Empire.

"That action has incontestably had the effect of bringing about the loss by Canada of the relatively advantageous position which she occupied prior to 1897, a loss which she has sustained not because she had imposed upon German imports customs duties exceeding those to which they were previously sub-

ject, nor because she had treated Germany differently from other foreign countries with which she had commercial relations, but because Canada had refused to extend to Germany a special concession made by her to the mother country, in pursuance of a policy deliberately adopted for the purpose of promoting the national trade of the British Empire. It is not disputed that Germany has the right to regard this question from her own point of view, and to deal with it in whatever manner may best suit her interests. There remains, however, the fact that in the result *a British colony has been made to suffer not for discriminating against Germany in favour of other foreign countries, but for according preferential treatment to the imports of the mother country.* It was in reply to this action on the part of Germany that, in April 1903, the Canadian Government imposed upon German imports the additional taxation to which reference is made in the German note. . . .

"The importance of the question, already one of the utmost moment to Great Britain and her colonies, was greatly increased by the intimation contained in *Baron von Richthofen's note of the 15th April* last, enclosed in Sir F. Lascelles' despatch of the 18th April.

"Baron von Richthofen apparently desires to treat this intimation, which he describes as having been confidentially made to Sir F. Lascelles, as an *obiter dictum* of no great importance. It was, however, impossible for His Majesty's Government so to regard it.

"*The announcement made in Baron von Richthofen's note, which was not marked Confidential, and was of the most authoritative character, seemed to them at the time, and still seems to them, capable of no other*

interpretation than this: that if other British self-governing colonies should follow the example of Canada and accord national treatment to British imports, the German Government might find themselves compelled to refuse not only to those colonies but to Great Britain herself the treatment which, in view of the liberal terms upon which German imports are admitted to this country, we are entitled to expect upon the most ordinary grounds of reciprocity.

"*Whether such a refusal were to be the result of a policy recommended to the Reichstag by the German Government, or were to be imposed upon the German Government by the Reichstag, would, so far as British interests are concerned, be immaterial. Baron von Richthofen's intimation was regarded by His Majesty's Government as not lightly given and not to be lightly received.*

"*Such retaliation on the part of the German Government would, in our opinion, not be justifiable in itself, and would be inconsistent with the attitude which, as we understand Baron von Richthofen's argument, the German Government desire to assume towards the British self-governing colonies.* If it be true, as stated in the note, that those colonies are regarded by the German Government as 'independent customs districts' which foreign Powers are at liberty to treat as such, it would follow that no responsibility would attach to the mother country for their external tariff arrangements, and that it would be wholly inequitable and illogical to retaliate upon the mother country in consequence of the manner in which the colonies had made use of their opportunities. This argument, however, although it appears to *His Majesty's Government* a legitimate rejoinder to that of Baron von Richthofen, is not one

on which they desire to lay stress, for, so far as the present controversy is concerned, they *have no intention of drawing a distinction between their own interests and those of the self-governing colonies.* . . .

"You are authorised to make a communication in the sense of this despatch to the German Government, and to leave a copy with Baron von Richthofen. I am, &c. (Signed) LANSDOWNE."

That despatch put an end to the Anglo-German controversy regarding imperial preference and to Germany's claim to be treated by the British colonies on the same footing as Great Britain. Thus Germany's attempt to step between Great Britain and the great dominions and to defeat imperial reciprocity ended in failure.

I think it was worth while to rescue the Anglo-German correspondence relating to imperial reciprocity from obscurity. The important documentary evidence given in the foregoing pages shows that it was Germany's intention to prevent the federation of the British Empire on the basis of preferential trade throughout the Empire, and that she pursued that policy doggedly and determinedly during six years. Incidentally the correspondence throws a vivid light upon Germany's diplomatic methods, and explains in part Germany's numerous failures in the realm of foreign politics. Germany's policy towards the British dominions suffered from two defects: it was unintelligent, and at the same time overbearing. After six years of bluster the German Government effected a precipitate and undignified retreat as soon as it encountered that energetic resistance which it was bound to encounter, and which, had her diplomats

used ordinary foresight, they should have expected to encounter.

As the unity of the British Empire is not in Germany's interests, we must expect to see Germany trying again to prevent its unification should there arise a situation more favourable to Germany's aims.

CHAPTER VIII

ENGLAND, GERMANY, AND THE BALTIC

DURING many decades the Baltic was to the average Briton not much better known than the Kara Sea or the Sea of Okhotsk is known to him at the present moment. Ignored in official despatches and Parliamentary speeches and unvisited by British warships, the Baltic Sea seemed to be of no interest to our politicians, to the Government and to the Admiralty. In fact, the Baltic had come to be generally considered to be a sea in which Great Britain had no political interest. Lately the Baltic has attracted some attention. In July 1905, it became known that a powerful squadron of British warships would visit the Baltic and manœuvre in it. This news created considerable excitement throughout Germany. Most German journals saw in that cruise a political demonstration of serious portent, and the most indiscreet of these went so far as to declare that the Baltic was by nature not a sea open to all nations, but a closed sea, that British warships had no business in the Baltic, and that it ought to be converted into what is technically termed a *mare clausum*. Numerous German writers urged that the States bordering on the Baltic, namely, Germany, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, should agree that the Baltic was to be given the status of an inland lake, that it was to be open to the warships of none but the four Baltic Powers. This recommendation appeared in some papers which

CHART OF THE ACCESSES TO THE BALTIC SEA.
Scale of Miles
20 0 20 40 60 80 100
NORWAY
SWEDEN
SKAGER RACK
KATTEGAT
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
Sound
Helsingborg
Elsinore
COPENHAGEN
Great Belt
Little Belt
SCHLESWIG
HOLSTEIN
BALTIC
HELIGOLAND
Ol. Düne
Baltic & North Sea Canal
KIEL
Brunsbüttel
Wilhelmshaven
HAMBURG
STETTIN
BREMEN
220 miles
R. Elbe
75 miles
R. Weser
GERMANY
BERLIN

apparently were inspired by the Government, and it was undoubtedly levelled at this country.—The following pages will show that Germany's excitement at the news of the British naval visit to the Baltic was not without cause, and they will likewise show that the British Government and public were wrong in neglecting that sea in the past, for they will make it clear that the Baltic seems bound to become a place of very considerable interest and importance in any great war in which Germany may be engaged, and especially in a war in which she has to rely largely on her fleet. Therefore it behoves us carefully to consider the position of the Baltic from the strategical, political, and economic points of view, and especially to inquire into the nature of the British interests in that sea.

The northern frontier of Germany is formed by the North Sea and the Baltic. These two seas are separated from one another by the Danish Peninsula, which stretches out northward towards Sweden and Norway. The connection between the North Sea and the Baltic is formed by the Skager Rack and the Kattegat, which separate the Danish Peninsula from the mainland of Sweden and Norway. The Skager Rack, to the north-west of the Danish Peninsula, is the continuation of the North Sea, and is about seventy miles wide. The continuation of the Skager Rack, the Kattegat, on the east of the Danish Peninsula, affords a passage about fifty miles wide down to the 56th degree. To the south of the 56th degree between sixty and seventy islands, with shoals and sandbanks innumerable, suddenly occur, almost block up the Kattegat, and convert the broad open passage into a labyrinth full of dangerous narrows, shallows, and treacherous cross currents. There is probably no sea in the world to which access is more difficult, more

intricate, and more dangerous than it is to the Baltic.

Through the cluster of the Danish Islands and sandbanks which almost close the Kattegat, three narrow and tortuous passages lead to the Baltic. These are the Great Belt, the Little Belt, and the Sound, and these passages—especially the Little Belt, which in parts is less than a thousand yards wide—have rather the appearance of meandering rivers or canals than of sea straits such as the Strait of Gibraltar. So tightly is the Kattegat closed by the Danish Islands, that the Baltic is rather a fresh-water lake filled by the rivers of north-eastern Europe and fortuitously connected with the sea than a part of the sea itself. Therefore the Baltic has practically no tides, and the percentage of salt contained in the water is infinitesimal and in parts nil.

As both the Great Belt and the Little Belt are very difficult to navigate, the third passage, the Sound, on which Copenhagen is situated, has always been the favourite route chosen by the world's shipping. However, the Sound, though it is the easiest, is not the deepest passage to the Baltic. South of Copenhagen the Sound is not sufficiently deep for the largest warships. Therefore these have to pass through the more tortuous, awkward, and dangerous Belts, whilst ships of medium draft prefer going through the Sound passing Copenhagen. Copenhagen is a fortress, which dominates the Sound through its strong land fortifications and island batteries. At Copenhagen the Sound is about ten miles wide, but it gradually narrows towards the north, and twenty miles north of Copenhagen, at Elsinore, it is but four thousand yards wide. An ordinary field gun carries easily from Elsinore in Denmark across the Sound to the Swedish town of

Helsingborg opposite, and no squadron can approach Copenhagen from the north if the narrows of Elsinore-Helsingborg are adequately fortified, for at that short distance every shot fired from the land batteries at passing ships should hit the mark aimed at.

The foregoing imperfect sketch shows that the passage into the Baltic by way of the Skager Rack and the Kattegat is a very difficult one, and that Denmark possesses the very greatest strategical importance in any war in which Germany may be engaged, because she holds the keys to the Baltic. With a few forts armed with heavy guns and a number of torpedo boats and of floating and of fixed sea mines, she can close absolutely the Sound and the two Belts against a purely naval attack, but she cannot close the Baltic against a combined naval and military attack, as will be shown in due course. A Power which desires to control the entrance to the Baltic must seize one or several of the Danish Islands in order to be able to dominate the passages leading through them.

In a great war Denmark may make use of her commanding position, and may thus influence the decision, or she may observe an attitude of strict neutrality. At any rate, whether she adopts the one course or the other, so much is certain, that no ship can pass into or out of the Baltic unobserved by Denmark, and the transmission or non-transmission of her observations of naval movements to one or the other of the belligerents may decide battles and perhaps the issue of a great war. Hence Denmark is a very important factor in any war which has the Baltic for its scene, and it may be said without exaggeration that she is bound to exercise a very powerful, and perhaps a decisive, influence in the next great European war.

Germany has two naval harbours, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. Kiel Harbour, or rather Kiel Fiord, on the Baltic, is a deep and well-sheltered natural inlet of the sea which affords ample room to all warships of Germany present and to come. Wilhelmshaven, on the North Sea, is a small port laboriously dug out of the mainland. It is quite insufficient for Germany's naval requirements as regards size, and the narrow entrance has to be kept at a proper depth by constant dredging. Thus Nature has placed the chief German war harbour in the inaccessible Baltic.

Kiel is Germany's principal naval base. Germany's naval battles might have to be fought in the North Sea. Under these circumstances the precariousness of the connection between the Baltic and the North Sea by way of the Skager Rack and Kattegat and through the Danish Archipelago, the length of the roundabout journey, and the fact that in war time the German fleets would constantly have to pass to and fro under the eyes and under the guns of Denmark, were exceedingly irksome to Germany, especially as, until lately, Denmark was not friendly to her mighty neighbour, remembering her spoliation of 1864. Germany had to be prepared to fight either France or Russia, and perhaps both Powers simultaneously. Therefore, she had to maintain strong fleets in both the Baltic and the North Sea, and she had to be able to fight with her whole naval strength in either sea and at short notice.

To effect rapidly and unnoticed a junction of her fleets either in the North Sea or in the Baltic, Germany created an artificial link connecting the North Sea and the Baltic by the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal. The Baltic and North Sea Canal has been planned with great wisdom, and has been built without regard to expense. It leads from the

interior of Kiel Harbour to Brunsbüttel, a town which lies on the lower reaches of the Elbe twenty-five miles above the mouth of that river, and the shallows surrounding it. Therefore the North Sea opening of the canal is exceedingly well sheltered. It is neither easily accessible to a hostile fleet of warships and of transports carrying landing parties, nor can it easily be observed by hostile sea-keeping cruisers and naval balloons, because the distance which separates the canal opening from the open sea is too great.

The distance which separated Kiel and the mouth of the Elbe before the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal was 650 miles. The cutting of the canal has reduced that distance to but fifty-five miles. As the canal has no gradients to be overcome by locks, as its banks are so very solidly built that the wash of ships passing through at speed will not damage them, as all along the route numerous commodious basins have been built where ships going in different directions may pass one another, and whereto disabled ships may be dragged in order not to block the passage, and as the fixed bridges leading across the canal are so high above the water level as to allow high-masted ships to pass easily underneath, warships are able to traverse the canal with great rapidity. The passage from Kiel to Brunsbüttel can, under favourable circumstances, be made in five hours or less. Therefore Kiel protects Hamburg very effectively, and it may be said that, thanks to the canal, Kiel has become a harbour on the North Sea as well as on the Baltic.

If we now look at the peculiar configuration of the German coasts, it will become apparent that Germany's position for naval defence is by nature one of very considerable strength, and that her naturally so very favourable position has been greatly improved

since, through the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, she has been enabled to make Kiel, in the inaccessible Baltic, her principal naval base for the defence of the North Sea.

The North Sea lies within easy reach of all those nations with which Germany will conceivably fight a naval war, for Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have practically no fleets, whilst Russia has a fleet mainly on paper, and will for many decades hardly be able to fight Germany on the sea. On the North Sea, or, rather, near the North Sea, are situated the two most valuable commercial harbours of Germany, Hamburg and Bremen, for these ports lie not on the sea-shore but on rivers about fifty miles inland. Therefore, Hamburg and Bremen are quite out of the reach of a hostile fleet, as are all the other harbour towns of Germany. It would not be easy for an enemy to approach the northern coast of Germany at any point in the North Sea, or to effect a landing on the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein in order to seize the Baltic and North Sea Canal, because a belt of shallows which is from ten to twenty miles wide surrounds these coasts. After the removal of the buoys and other signs of navigation, it would be almost impossible for hostile ships to thread their way through the narrow channels which lead through the shifting sandbanks round the German North Sea coast, and which constantly alter their course. In consequence of these difficulties a landing in force on the shores of the North Sea would require so much time that Germany, with her excellent railway system, which has been specially designed with an eye to facilitate the rapid concentration of troops in case of war, should easily be able to collect in time a force superior to that landed by the invader.

The points of the greatest strategical importance in the North Sea are three in number: the mouth of the Elbe, which gives access to Hamburg and to the western entrance of the Baltic and North Sea Canal; the naval harbour of Wilhelmshaven; and the mouth of the Weser with Bremen. These three points are admirably defended by permanent land fortifications of great strength, and by the sea fortress of Heligoland, which is likely to play a very important part in any naval war of defence in which Germany may be engaged.

Heligoland is a rock some hundred and fifty feet high, and not much larger than a park of moderate size, such as Hyde Park. It is almost exactly equidistant from the mouth of the Elbe with Hamburg and the entrance to the Baltic and North Sea Canal, from the mouth of the Weser with Bremen, and from Wilhelmshaven. Therefore Heligoland provides a most excellent advanced point of observation. It is amply provided with signal stations and with appliances for wireless telegraphy, and it is connected by cable with Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven. Besides, Heligoland will serve in war as a base for torpedo boats, which can lie in its shallow harbour whilst larger ships will be able to anchor close to Heligoland sheltered by the "Düne," and there to take in ammunition and coal. Heligoland is so strongly fortified that it is not only secure against a *coup de main* but that it would be a very awkward antagonist to all ships within reach of its heavy guns and howitzers, and it will no doubt take a very active part in any naval battle which may be fought in its vicinity. Heligoland lies about forty miles in front of the German coasts, but, owing to the extensive shallows already referred to, it lies only about fifteen miles in front of the open sea zone

of Germany. Consequently its guns are able to cut very effectively into the manœuvring field of a hostile fleet, whilst they would give an invaluable support to a German fleet issuing from the mouth of the Elbe or from Wilhelmshaven or retiring to one of these points. Lastly, all merchantmen going to or coming from Hamburg must pass close to Heligoland. Consequently Heligoland makes the blockade of Hamburg difficult, and facilitates the protection of merchant shipping going to, or issuing from, that point. Thus Heligoland serves at the same time as an advanced point of observation, and as a powerful floating battery which admirably covers the most vulnerable spots of Germany in the North Sea. The foregoing makes it clear that Heligoland is a strategical point of considerable importance, and that those British statesmen who light-heartedly handed it over to Germany in exchange for some concessions in East Africa, believing it to be of no value, made a very bad bargain.

To a strong Power at war with Germany the Baltic should be more attractive as a field of action than the North Sea, for the following reasons: firstly, from the Baltic the harbour of Kiel may be watched, and the warships contained in it be attacked and destroyed. Secondly, a landing can be far more easily undertaken on the shores of the Baltic than on those of the North Sea, partly because the Baltic coast can be approached more easily, partly because it is about three times longer than the coast of the North Sea, and can therefore less easily be defended against an invader. Thirdly, a landing demonstration or a landing in force would be more effective on the shores of the Baltic than on the shores of the North Sea, because Berlin lies less than a hundred miles from the nearest point on the Baltic, whilst it lies more than two hundred

miles from the nearest point on the North Sea. A landing is most effective when it threatens directly the centre of national vitality. In case of a great European land war, a telling diversion could be made, and the German armies invading France or Russia or Austria might be turned back, by landing a large army in Mecklenburg or Pomerania within easy reach of Berlin.

Germany's position in the Baltic strongly resembles Russia's position in the Black Sea. Russia's best naval harbour is in the Black Sea, Germany's best naval harbour is in the Baltic. Germany is practically as much master of the Baltic as Russia is of the Black Sea, because the Russian North Sea squadron and the fleets of Sweden and Denmark are so weak that they cannot possibly face the German navy. Both the Black Sea and the Baltic are land-locked. Both can be entered by an enemy only by a narrow opening which is in the hands of a third Power. Both seas are practically inland lakes which are almost unapproachable to a hostile fleet except by permission of the Power holding the straits which lead to it. Germany is almost as vulnerable in the Baltic as Russia is in the Black Sea, provided the entrance to that sea can be seized. Both the Baltic and the Black Sea can easily be defended by the State which controls it, and both provide ideal conditions for preparing and effecting a surprise attack on the largest scale. These facts show that Germany's position in the Baltic is similar to Russia's position in the Black Sea, but a closer investigation will prove that Germany's position in the Baltic is comparatively far stronger than is Russia's position in the Black Sea, and that Germany's control of the Baltic is a far greater danger to this country in case of an Anglo-German war than

is Russia's control of the Black Sea in case of an Anglo-Russian war.

Germany's position in the Baltic is far stronger than Russia's position in the Black Sea, for the following reasons. The Black Sea has but one opening formed by the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and these cannot easily be seized by Russia, because the Russian army, being distributed over vast districts, can only very slowly be concentrated and carried either by land or sea towards the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Besides, Turkey has a large and excellent army, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles can easily be defended even by small numbers against an attack of a great host. Therefore Russia would find it very difficult to seize the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Germany, on the other hand, can issue far more easily from the Baltic than Russia can from the Black Sea. The German fleet can sail out of the Baltic either through the Kattegat or through the Baltic and North Sea Canal, two alternative openings which lie several hundred miles apart from one another. The Baltic and North Sea Canal lies entirely in German territory, and cannot easily be seized by a nation with which Germany is at war, whilst the three straits leading through the Danish Archipelago cannot easily be defended by Denmark against a determined German attack by sea and land. Whilst the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles possess a frontage of only a few miles, the principal Danish Islands in the Kattegat have a circumference of several hundred miles, a distance which the weak Danish army cannot possibly hold against an energetic German attack. Besides, the Danish mainland north of Schleswig Holstein cannot possibly be defended against a German invasion, and from the shores of the Danish mainland, which is

not defendable by Denmark alone, the Little Belt can be dominated. In a few hours Germany could throw a very large number of troops from Kiel and other Baltic harbours into the Island of Fünen or Zealand, and in a few days the whole of the Danish Peninsula might be occupied. Thus Germany may at the critical moment acquire the mastery over all the openings of the Baltic without much difficulty, and close these to all but German warships, unless Denmark is immediately and most energetically supported by a third Power which is strong on land and sea.

In view of the fact that it would be of the greatest importance to Germany to be able to dominate all the entrances to the Baltic, it seems by no means unlikely that in a war in which the decision depends largely on the navy Germany will take such a step either before or immediately on the declaration of war, pleading necessity, and acting in the same manner in which Prussia acted in 1866 towards Hanover and Hesse. Perhaps the extensive landing manœuvres which Germany has carried on in the Baltic were undertaken in preparation for such a contingency.

If the German fleet is able to pass from Kiel out of the Baltic either *viâ* the Kattegat or through the Baltic and North Sea Canal, Germany's naval opponent would have to watch at the same time the mouth of the Elbe, and the three passages described in the foregoing which lead from the Baltic through the Danish Archipelago. Germany's naval opponent would find it difficult to watch the mouth of the Elbe, because of the extensive shallows surrounding it and of the commanding position of Heligoland. It would be at least equally difficult to blockade the Kattegat, because of the peculiar configuration of the Danish Islands and of the intricacy of the passages

leading through them. Besides, the weather in the Kattegat is often very rough. If Germany is able to issue with her fleet from the Baltic and North Sea Canal, or through the Kattegat, Germany's opponent would have to divide his fleet into two squadrons of equal strength, which would be separated from each other by a distance of five hundred miles. At that distance, which could be covered only in about thirty hours, mutual support of the two blockading squadrons would hardly be possible. Hence the German fleet, working on what is technically called interior lines, could in combined strength fall in a few hours upon one or the other blockading squadron. In other words a blockade of the Elbe and of the Kattegat could be maintained only if each of the blockading squadrons were strong enough to meet the whole German fleet. Hence for every German ship lying at Kiel one ship would have to be maintained in the Kattegat and another one near Hamburg. In other words, the Baltic and North Sea Canal doubles the strength of the German navy, or reduces to one-half the strength of the fleet attacking Germany.

Most wars have been caused by the stress of competition, not by national vanity. Germany and Great Britain are competitors for trade and colonies. Therefore the possibility of a collision between these two countries cannot safely be disregarded, and if we contemplate the possibility of an Anglo-German war, it will be clear that Germany's position in the Baltic is more dangerous to Great Britain than Russia's position in the Black Sea has been, or ever can be, to this country. The Russian danger consists mainly in this, that a large Russian fleet issuing suddenly from the Black Sea could destroy the British trade in the Mediterranean and cut in two our road to India

and the East *via* the Suez Canal. That danger is after all not one of the first magnitude. The temporary, or even the permanent, loss of the Mediterranean trade would be comparatively a small matter, and, if the route through the Suez Canal was no longer practicable, English ships would again sail to the East *via* St. Helena and the Cape of Good Hope, as they did before the Suez Canal was opened. The damage which Russia could do to Great Britain by attacking us from the Black Sea would be very small, even if Russia should absolutely control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Therefore England need not be afraid of Russia's seizing Constantinople and making herself the absolute mistress of the Black Sea and of the straits leading to it.

Whilst Russia controlling the Black Sea could threaten only a secondary interest of the British Empire, Germany controlling the Baltic could threaten, and would be able to strike directly at, the British shores. Russia in the possession of Constantinople might at the worst attack Malta, which lies a thousand miles from that town. Germany controlling the Baltic might attack London, which lies but five hundred miles from Kiel.

Many English people who merely compare the number of warships possessed by Great Britain and Germany believe that Germany is not able to meet this country at sea, and they are ready to conclude that Germany will never be able to dispute with this country for the rule of the sea and the possession of colonies, the wish being father to the thought. The importance of facts and figures is affected by circumstances, and it cannot be too widely known and too often asserted in this country that the Baltic and North Sea Canal doubles the strength of the German

navy, for this fact is ignored by most Englishmen, naval officers included.

The foregoing description of Germany's maritime position makes it clear that, if that country should be engaged in war with a naval Power of the first rank such as England, the decisive battle would possibly be fought near the principal naval base of Germany, that is not in the North Sea but in the Baltic. Foreseeing this possibility, the German navy has, by constant manœuvring, made itself familiar with all the intricacies and difficulties of that sea, and of the entrances leading to it. Naturally it suited Germany admirably that Great Britain was short-sighted enough to believe that she had no interests in that sea, and that British naval officers were as unacquainted with the Baltic as British military officers were with the Transvaal before the outbreak of the South African war. As British naval officers were quite unfamiliar with navigation in the Baltic, the naval officers of Germany could contemplate with some confidence the possibility of a struggle with Great Britain, notwithstanding the great superiority of the British fleet. It is therefore easy to understand that a feeling approaching dismay and consternation was created in Germany when, in July 1905, it became known that the British Channel Squadron would cruise in the Baltic. Thinking Germans could not disguise to themselves the fact that British statesmen had at last discovered the great strategical importance of the Baltic, and that the British Admiralty had determined to make the British fleet familiar with that sea. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that Germany would have liked to exclude the British warships from the Baltic by some diplomatic arrangement which, though osten-

sibly beneficial to all the Baltic Powers, would only have served to make Germany all-powerful in the Baltic—to make the Baltic Sea a German lake.

During the next few years Germany's naval position will be one of considerable difficulty, and may become one of very great anxiety in time of war. Germany is building at vast expense a fleet of some twenty ships, each of which is to be larger and stronger than our own *Dreadnought*. None of these monster ships will be able to pass through the Baltic and North Sea Canal, which is too small for them. Therefore Germany has resolved to widen and deepen that canal, which doubles the strength of her fleet. After having spent £8,000,000 on the original construction of the canal, she is spending an additional £11,000,000, or no less than £19,000,000 in all, a sum much larger than that expended on the Manchester Ship Canal, and sufficient to build ten *Dreadnoughts*, in order to make it practicable for the largest ships which she is planning. It is expected that three years will be required to finish the Baltic and North Sea Canal. Therefore during the next three years Germany will be unable to avail herself of the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North Sea Canal except for her smaller and older ships. Her magnificent new ships will for about three years be restricted to one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, during the next three years, do all in her power to avoid a conflict with a first-class naval Power. During the next three years Germany has every reason to keep the peace. Only when the enlargement of the Baltic and North Sea Canal has been accomplished will she be ready for a great naval war, and then her maritime position will be a very formidable one. In three years her naval opponents may require one fleet of more than twenty *Dread-*

noughts to watch the mouths of the Elbe and Weser and a second fleet of more than twenty *Dreadnoughts* to watch the Kattegat. In the near future the British naval budget should have to be vastly increased.

It may be argued by the advocates of a cheap navy that Great Britain does not require a navy of overwhelming strength; that in case of an Anglo-German war the British fleet should abandon its traditional policy; that our fleets need not search out the German navy at its bases, an undertaking which would clearly require that Great Britain should lay down at least two ships for every ship laid down by Germany; that Germany, which had become dependent upon her foreign trade for her existence, could, in case of need, be fought more cheaply by a vigorous blockade carried on at a safe distance, where a surprise attack from either opening of the Baltic on a part of the British fleet would be impossible. These arguments seem plausible, but they are misleading, for it will not be easy to stop Germany's foreign trade by means of a blockade. Germany's principal trading ports are not Hamburg and Bremen but Antwerp and Rotterdam, which lie in neutral territory, and which serve as outlets to the Rhine, by far the most important trade route of Germany for her exports as well as for her imports. As soon as the great German Canal system which is to connect the Rhine with Dortmund, with the Elbe and with the Danube—the German inland canal system, like the Baltic and North Sea Canal, will serve both strategical and commercial purposes — is finished Germany's foreign trade may in war time be made independent of Hamburg and Bremen. The trade going now *via* Hamburg and Bremen may then be diverted to neutral ports. Saxony, for instance, will

be able to ship her manufactures and to receive her raw cotton, corn, &c., *via* Belgium and Holland and the Rhine instead of *via* Hamburg and the Elbe, and it may be doubted whether the neutral Powers which provide Germany with cotton, corn, &c., will allow the British fleet to interfere with a large and profitable trade which ostensibly is neutral. Great Britain might conceivably blockade not only Hamburg and Bremen, but Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Trieste, and other neutral ports in easy reach of Germany as well, and search the shipping there for German goods, but it seems likely that the vigorous protests of the nations interested in the continuance of that trade, such as the United States, would soon lead to the raising of that blockade.

The foregoing details show that Germany's maritime position is already an exceedingly strong one, and that it seems likely that it will become increasingly strong, one might almost say dangerously strong, in the near future. Therefore the question arises: How can the vast advantages which Germany enjoys owing to her strong position for defence and attack be neutralised? Where is the weak spot in Germany's armour? The answer to this question will promptly suggest itself if we remember the resemblance which Germany's position in the Baltic bears to Russia's position in the Black Sea, to which attention has been drawn in these pages. Exactly as Russia cannot be attacked in the Black Sea, except by permission of Turkey, Germany cannot be attacked in the Baltic except by permission of Denmark. It is therefore clear that both Germany and Great Britain have the very greatest interest in securing Denmark's goodwill. Little Denmark may, in an Anglo-German war, be at least as valuable an ally as any one of the great Powers.

Therefore it is clear that both Germany and Great Britain are bound to do all in their power to secure Denmark's support in case of war if possible by a treaty of alliance. Perhaps it has been with this object in view that the German Emperor has, during the last few years, made the most assiduous advances to both the Royal House of Denmark and to the Danish people, and that, by his command, in every year a German naval demonstration of the greatest magnitude and of unmistakable meaning takes place in the Baltic.

What will Denmark do? Will she throw in her lot with Great Britain or with Germany, or will she reject the advances of either, preferring to observe an attitude of strict neutrality in case of an Anglo-German war? Denmark may wish to step outside the ring in case an Anglo-German conflict should take place, but she will hardly be able to act the part of a mere spectator. The mastery of the Kattegat may decide the issue of an Anglo-German war—and more. The possession of the Danish Straits would be of vital importance to both belligerents. Consequently Denmark can hope to observe a strict neutrality only if she is strong enough to keep her territories neutral and to defend them against all comers. This she cannot do, for she is too weak.

The attitude which Denmark should adopt with regard to the contingency of an Anglo-German conflict may be outlined in three proverbs which are daily used in Denmark: "Naar Naboes Vaeg braender, maa hver raedes sin egen," Look to your own house when your neighbour's house is on fire; "Ingen kan tjene to Herrer," Nobody can serve two masters; "Vorsigtighed er en Borgemesterdyd," Wise foresight is a Burgomaster virtue. It may be too late for the

Danes to make up their minds what to do in case of an Anglo-German war if they wait until such a war, which may possibly end Denmark's existence as an independent State, has actually broken out. Denmark should decide in good time whether she will side with Germany or with this country, for at the critical moment she will probably not have time for reflection.

The German people may be a peace-loving people, and the German Emperor and his ministers may entertain feelings of most cordial friendship and esteem for this country. Nevertheless, it is only reasonable to expect that the rulers of Germany and the German people will pursue rather a policy beneficial to their country than one advantageous to Great Britain. Since Russia's defeat by Japan, Germany has become pre-eminent on the continent of Europe. Her three land frontiers are fairly safe against invasion. She is vulnerable only on the sea. Her North Sea coast being practically inaccessible, the coast of the Baltic is the only frontier which need cause anxiety to Germany in case of war, and the Baltic coast would become unapproachable to an enemy, if Germany should acquire the mastery of the Sound and of the two Belts. Therefore it is only logical that even the most peaceful German citizens will desire most ardently that Germany should acquire the Danish Islands which dominate the entrances to the Baltic, and that every patriotic German statesman will strive unceasingly and with all his power to fulfil that wish. From the German point of view the possession of the entrances to the Baltic is absolutely necessary for the peace, safety, and greatness of the country.

If Denmark values her independence, she should

side with this country, which has every interest in seeing Denmark independent and strong. If Denmark does not value her independence, she may side with Germany, which has every interest in acquiring, or at least in dominating, the territories of Denmark in order to possess herself of the command of the Baltic and of the excellent Danish harbours. It can hardly be doubted that Denmark, if she knows where her interests lie, will place herself at the side of Great Britain, though she may not do so unreservedly.

In order to understand the attitude of the Danes and the policy which Denmark is likely to follow, we must look at the possibility of an Anglo-German conflict not so much from the British as from the Danish point of view. Denmark is a small and weak State. Both her army and her navy are insignificant, and the country is not rich. Denmark has consequently every reason to avoid being drawn into a great European war. Therefore many Danes will argue that their country should not unnecessarily commit itself either with Great Britain or with Germany. Those Danes, on the other hand, who see clearly that their country cannot possibly remain neutral in case of an Anglo-German struggle, who value the independence of their Fatherland, and who would rather support Great Britain than Germany, will nevertheless hesitate to conclude a formal alliance with this country, and the reason of their hesitation is obvious. From the Danish point of view, Great Britain is far away, Germany is near at hand. The Danish mainland can easily be entered from the German province of Schleswig-Holstein which adjoins it. Besides, the Danes will remember that there has been much muddle in the South African war, and they may fear that the Danish mainland and the

principal islands may be occupied from end to end by the ever-ready German army before the first ship of the British ally has started for the Kattegat. Therefore the Danes may hesitate to enter upon any diplomatic arrangements with this country for mutual support unless they are assured by their own military and naval experts that Great Britain will take the necessary measures for the defence of the independence of Denmark, and that those measures are well devised and will promptly be carried out. The British and Danish military and naval authorities should therefore jointly settle a plan for the military and naval defence of Denmark.

Denmark should welcome co-operation with Great Britain not only from political but also from economic reasons. Denmark is a purely agricultural and pastoral country. As she possesses neither coal nor ore, her manufacturing industries are insignificant, but her rural industries are very highly developed. Per head of population Denmark has three times more cattle, four times more horses, and six times more pigs than has this country. The quantity of rye, barley, oats, butter, cheese, &c., which she produces is enormous. Denmark has to buy from foreign countries vast quantities of coal and of manufactured articles, and she pays for these with the surplus produce of her rural industries which she exports. Owing to her lack of coal and manufacturing industries, the Danes are more dependent upon their foreign trade for their sustenance than is Great Britain herself. This may be seen from the fact that the Danish foreign trade per head of population is no less than 20 per cent. larger than is the British foreign trade per head of population. As Denmark is dependent for her existence upon her foreign markets, it is of

vital importance for her that her foreign trade should not be interrupted by war, for the interruption of her foreign trade would mean acute distress to the people. Great Britain is their best market, whilst Germany has closed her frontiers to the agricultural products of Denmark. The United Kingdom takes no less than three-fifths of the Danish exports, and she is able to take much more than she is taking at present. Great Britain is by far the best open market to the Danish farmers, and this country may remain an open market to them, even if Protection is introduced in this country, for politics and trade go hand in hand.

The foregoing shows that from the strategical, political, and economic points of view co-operation between Great Britain and Denmark is most desirable. For the sake both of Great Britain and of Denmark it is to be hoped that diplomatic arrangements of a permanent kind, securing their mutual support in case of need, will be entered upon between the two States. They will be beneficial to both, and they will tend to preserve peace in Europe.

CHAPTER IX

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE

On September 1st and 2nd, 1870, more than four decades ago, the great tragedy of Sedan was enacted, and, after a series of defeats, which stand unparalleled in the world's history, France emerged from the ordeal of the "Terrible Year," crushed, humiliated, reduced and impoverished—the very shadow of her former self. Since then, France has played a very inconspicuous *rôle* on the stage of Europe, and from the very reserve which, in matters political, France has imposed on herself since then, it has been assumed that she has almost forgotten her defeat, that she has become reconciled to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, that she has definitely abdicated her historic position in Europe, that she is willing to play henceforth a secondary part in the world, and that all her energy and all her genius are now exclusively bent upon developing the material well-being of the nation and the Republican institutions of the country. France has come to be considered as a parochial concern.

So strongly was it assumed that *le feu sacré de la revanche* had died down that official and semi-official Germany thought the time had come for Franco-German co-operation. Guided by the German Emperor, official and semi-official Germany bestowed graceful compliments upon distinguished Frenchmen at every opportunity. French and German ships were

seen side by side in Kiel harbour at the occasion of the opening of the Baltic and North Sea Canal; in the Far East, Russian, French, and German ships conjointly demonstrated the Japanese out of Port Arthur, and M. E. Lockroy, France's ablest Minister of Marine, was allowed to minutely inspect the German Navy and the German Navy yards. France had, apparently, forgotten her defeats, the time for reconciliation seemed to have arrived, and German writers began strongly to advocate a Franco-German political alliance, and a Central-European Customs Union.

Lately, however, Franco-German relations have become somewhat overclouded. When, through the instrumentality of M. Delcassé, France settled her differences with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, and made a somewhat hesitating attempt to have again a policy of her own, the German Emperor intervened and forbade the execution of the Morocco bargain, which had already been concluded between France and those Powers which, through their geographical position, may claim a special interest in Moroccan affairs. How serious and threatening the Morocco incident of 1905 was is apparent from the steps towards the mobilisation of her Army which were taken by Germany at the time. As the German exports to Morocco amounted then, on an average, to a paltry £90,000 per annum, it is clear that the defence of Germany's commercial interests was merely a pretext for Germany's action in supporting Morocco against Great Britain, France, and Spain. Her aim in creating the Moroccan crisis was not to foster Germany's exports to Morocco, but to detach France from Great Britain, and to attach her to Germany.

Hitherto, German policy has been marvellously successful. Will German diplomacy also succeed in

reconciling France and in making her Germany's ally ? If a Franco-German alliance or a Franco-Russo-German alliance should eventually be concluded, against which Power would such an alliance be directed ? These are questions which, at the present moment, are of supreme interest to all nations, for the future of France depends on France's decision.

In order to gauge how the relations between France and Germany are likely to develop, we must investigate the position, the political aims, the interests and the traditional policy of the two countries. Let us first look at Franco-German relations, from the French point of view.

French policy, although apparently most erratic and unstable of purpose, has, through centuries, constantly pursued the same aim. During centuries, France has fought for the preservation of the Balance of Power in Europe and for the possession of the Rhine frontier. To obtain these ends, France has successively made war against the strongest Continental States which threatened to enslave the Continent and ultimately to engulf France. From the time, four centuries ago, when she opposed Charles V., the mightiest monarch of Christendom, who ruled over Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, down to the present time, France has been the champion of liberty on the Continent of Europe. When Charles V. ruled almost the whole Continent, Christian France allied herself with Turkey, the abhorred Infidel Power, who was considered to stand outside the pale of the *comitas gentium*, rightly thinking self-preservation the first law of political ethics and the first duty to herself. History repeats itself. When Germany had crushed France and when Bismarck had succeeded in raising all the Powers of Western

Europe against France and in isolating her, France turned to Russia for support, notwithstanding the incompatible differences existing between the Western Republic and the Eastern autocracy, differences which make truly cordial relations impossible between them.

During four centuries, France and Germany have fought one another for supremacy in Europe, and as long as Austria was the strongest State in Germany, France supported Austria's German enemies against her. Thus it was that France, up to 1866, encouraged Prussia to aggrandise herself at Austria's cost, and that Bismarck, in crushing Austria, received Napoleon's sympathy and support.

Since Bismarck's advent to power, or during about half a century, France has been the dupe of Prusso-Germany's policy. Napoleon III. received no gratitude for supporting Prussia against Austria. On the contrary, even at the time when Napoleon was doing a priceless service to Bismarck by supporting Prussia against Austria, Bismarck contemplated ruining France, and building up Germany's unity on the ruins of France. A fortnight before the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, when Austro-Prussian relations were already strained to breaking-point, Bismarck sent General Von Gabelenz, who then was in Berlin, to the Austrian Emperor in Vienna, and proposed, through the General, to the Emperor that even at the eleventh hour peace might be preserved among the Germanic nations by making a common onslaught on France, conquering Alsace, and creating a Greater Germany at the end of a victorious campaign. Thus, the Prusso-Austrian differences were to be settled at the cost of France at the very moment when France was lending Bismarck her support in his anti-Austrian policy. Only through Austria's hesita-

tion to follow Bismarck's lead was France saved from destruction in 1866, but she became the victim of Bismarck's machinations four years later.

In order to keep France in good humour during the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck verbally promised France the Rhine as a reward for her support, but when France wished to have this promise given in writing, Bismarck skilfully drew out negotiations and delayed and procrastinated during the critical period of the war, until the decisive victory gained by the Prussians at Königgrätz had made France's support against Austria superfluous and had brought peace in sight. Before the conclusion of peace, France, who began to fear that Bismarck was playing false to her, pressed for the territorial compensation which Bismarck had held in view before the war, but her demands were met with derision, and the intimation that, in case of need, Bismarck would not hesitate to make peace at any price with Austria, and induce her to march together with Prussia against France. In that case Austria and Prussia would aggrandise themselves at the expense of France. As a considerable part of the French army was fighting in Mexico at that time, Napoleon was unable to prevent the undue strengthening of Prussia, and it became clear that the historic struggle for supremacy between France and Germany would soon have to be renewed.

Since 1866 Bismarck skilfully increased the bitterness which France, after having been deceived by Bismarck, naturally felt for Prussia, partly by inflicting a number of humiliations upon French diplomacy in the Luxemburg question, the Belgian question, &c., partly by rousing the discontent of the excitable French masses against Prussia. The convenience of Bismarck's policy required a Franco-German war,

for only the enthusiasm created by such a war, which was likely to be immensely popular in Germany, where the remembrance of the first Napoleon was still kept green, could make the unification of Germany possible. Since 1866, a Franco-Prussian war had become unavoidable, but French diplomacy was unskilful enough to walk into the Spanish trap which Bismarck skilfully had baited, and declared war against Prussia upon a pretext which, in the eyes of the world, put France in the wrong. The mistake of France's diplomacy was Bismarck's opportunity. On the ruins of France and in accordance with Bismarck's programme a united Germany was founded, whose main object it was proclaimed to be to resist for all time the wanton aggression of Germany's hereditary enemy. Thus the unity of Germany was cemented with French blood, and Thiers spoke truly when he said to Bismarck at Versailles, "C'est nous qui avons fait l'union de l'Allemagne."

It is often said that the war of 1870–71 has been forgotten, and that France no longer bears Germany any ill-will; but it seems doubtful whether this is the case, for the ill-effect of that war has been much greater to France than is generally known. It appears that almost 700,000 lives were lost to France, partly through the war, partly through the subsequent outbreak of the Commune, and the loss of French capital occasioned by the war must be estimated at about £800,000,000. In Alsace-Lorraine France lost a stretch of territory which is about three times as large as the county of Lancashire, and which, by its highly-developed industries, might have been called the Lancashire of France. If we look at the population returns of France for 1866 and 1872, we find that during that period the population of France decreased

by 1,964,173, and if we add to that figure the average yearly increase of the French population during the six years between 1866 and 1872, we arrive at the result that the war and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine combined must have caused the loss of about 2,800,000 people to France.

By now France has, no doubt, recovered from the enormous monetary losses which the war caused. Nevertheless, the war has left indelible traces upon the country. The enormous wastage of national capital and the enormously increased National Debt of the country, together with the necessity for France to recreate her army on the largest scale, and to maintain it, notwithstanding her shrunken resources in men and money, has made necessary a most oppressive taxation, which can be met only by the exercise of the most rigid economy on the part of all individual tax-payers. Hence the Franco-German War seems to have led to a falling-off in the birth-rate of France, which was much smaller after the war than it had been before, and it cannot be doubted that the stationariness of the population of France is greatly, and perhaps chiefly, caused by the after-effects of that unfortunate war.

In view of the fact that the Franco-German War has inflicted four decades of suffering upon all French families, it can hardly be expected that the masses of the French nation have become the friends and well-wishers of Germany. The small *rentiers* of France and the thrifty peasants, with all their love of peace and quiet, know quite well that taxation in France will remain high as long as France is compelled to maintain her enormous army. Nevertheless, they are determined not to expose themselves to the possibility of another disastrous defeat. Hence the high

taxation is borne without grumbling in the silent hope that a time may arrive when, in consequence of the weakening of France's eastern neighbour, France may again be able to lighten her oppressive armour.

The German newspapers speak the truth when they assert that the old spirit of *revanche* has died out in France. *Revanche* is not a policy but a sentiment, and France has learned, to her cost, how dangerous it is to be led by sentiment in matters political. It is, therefore, not so much the aim of French policy to endeavour to weaken Germany as it is to strengthen France. France wishes to live in peace and security with all her neighbours, Germany included, but at the same time she wishes to be strong enough to be able to hold her own in the world. All policy is, after all, based on force, and no policy can be successful which is not backed by sufficient military and naval strength. Therefore, France has endeavoured to create and to maintain an army sufficiently strong to meet that of Germany, but she finds her task from year to year more difficult, owing to the increasing discrepancy between the population of France and that of Germany, which is apparent from the following table :—

	Population of Germany.	Population of France.
1872	41,230,000	36,103,000
1876	43,059,000	36,906,000
1881	45,428,000	37,672,000
1886	47,134,000	38,219,000
1891	49,762,000	38,343,000
1896	52,753,000	38,518,000
1901	56,862,000	38,962,000
1912 (estimated) .	66,000,000	39,600,000

From the foregoing figures it appears that, in 1870, France and Germany were about equally populous,

but that now the population of Germany is more than fifty per cent. larger than is that of France. Notwithstanding her great numerical inferiority, France has, until now, succeeded in maintaining an army as large as is that of Germany, but if the German population continues to increase at the present rate, the time will not be far distant when France will no longer be able to rival Germany in the number of her soldiers, and then France will automatically sink to a secondary rank among the Great Powers of Europe. Time is fighting on Germany's side, and therefore it is to the interest of Germany to maintain peace with France as long as possible, whilst it is to the interest of France to utilise the earliest opportunity that may offer for crushing Germany. Even the most peaceful Frenchmen who have, personally, the best dispositions towards Germany are bound to work for Germany's downfall.

If France should succeed in defeating Germany, she will certainly claim Alsace-Lorraine, but she would probably demand all German territory up to the Rhine, for reasons which will be shown later on. On the territory between the present Franco-German frontier and the Rhine 7,000,000 inhabitants are living, who would be greatly welcome in France, and who would, to some extent, improve her unfavourable population figures.

France has fought for centuries for the possession of the Rhine, which the French consider the natural political frontier of their country; and it must be admitted that, from the French point of view, the possession of the Rhine is indispensable for the security of the country.

Every nation strives to secure itself against invasion by obtaining strong natural defensive boundaries.

The sea, the Pyrenees and the Alps protect France nearly from all sides. In the sea-shores and the high mountain chains surrounding her, France has found her natural frontiers long ago. Only her north-east frontier is an open one, and has been an open one for centuries, and, consequently, France has always striven, and will continue to strive to make the Rhine her protection against Germany. Besides, France has a historical claim to the Rhine. We read already in Tacitus, "Germania a Gallis Rheno separatur," and Cæsar also mentions that Gaul extends from the Rhine to the ocean.

A glance at the map shows why the possession of the Rhine is now more than ever an absolute necessity to France. In Continental warfare, the main object of an invading army is the capital, which, owing to the great centralisation of the political and economic administration, is at the same time the heart and the head of the body politic. By the exposed and insecure position of her capital, France is most unfortunately situated compared with Germany. Whilst Berlin lies 400 miles from the Franco-German frontier, only 170 miles separate Paris from Metz. Besides, Berlin is protected against an invasion from the west by a triple line of exceedingly strong natural defences. A French army advancing upon Berlin would have to cross three huge, swift-flowing rivers, the Rhine, the Weser, and the Elbe, which lie at right angles with its line of march, and between these three broad and deep streams numerous large mountain chains, which afford splendid opportunities for defence, are found. Germany's main defensive frontier towards France is not formed by her fortresses in Alsace-Lorraine, but by the Rhine and by a dozen powerful fortresses on that river, which extend from the Isteiner Klotz

opposite Basle down to Wesel on the Dutch frontier, and the towns on the Rhine are so strongly fortified that it seems almost impossible for an army to cross it in the face of a determined opposition.

Whilst Berlin lies far away from the French frontier and is splendidly protected against an invasion from the west, Paris lies but eight days' march from an open frontier which is almost completely devoid of natural obstacles. The small, easily-fordable Meuse is the only stream between Metz and Paris, and no great mountain chains, which could stop an invader, are found between Paris and the German frontier. Paris is, indeed, within easy reach of the German army.

Not satisfied with her triple line of defences against France, Germany has made Alsace-Lorraine enormously strong for defence, and has converted it into an advanced work in front of the Rhine frontier. At the same time, Alsace-Lorraine has been turned into an ideal starting-point for an attack against France. Germany has prepared, throughout Alsace-Lorraine, permanent defensive positions of the greatest strength at all points where a battle is likely to occur. Besides, the fortresses of Alsace-Lorraine have lately been enormously strengthened. Metz, for instance, has been surrounded with forts which lie eight miles from the town, and these defences have been joined with the fortifications on the Gentringer Höhe, near Diedenhofen, through the inclusion of which the fortress of Metz now practically extends over twenty-five miles of country, and is, therefore, almost unbesiegable.

The offensive strength of Alsace-Lorraine lies in its excellent railway net. Whilst seven railway lines run from Alsace-Lorraine into France, eight or nine purely strategical lines run towards France and

end abruptly near the French frontier. Furthermore, enormous sidings and huge open-air stations, which are solely meant for use in time of war, have been constructed, and thus Germany is able to unload in the minimum of time a huge army in any part of the country close to the French boundaries. It is estimated that Germany is able to detrain 150,000 to 200,000 men per day between Metz and Strasburg.

France, being deprived of a natural frontier facing Germany, and even of natural obstacles between her north-eastern frontier and Paris, has constructed a line of forts along the 200 miles of her frontier. These forts lie, on an average, about five miles apart and form a continuous line. Only two gaps, the Trouée de la Meuse, between the Belgian frontier and Verdun, which is twenty miles wide, and the Trouée de la Moselle, between Toul and Epinal, which is thirty miles wide, are left open, and in these openings the French armies are to be assembled at the outbreak of war.

The weak artificial screen of forts facing Germany is the sole obstacle which an invader meets in advancing upon Paris. As soon as he has passed the line of forts, Paris is in his grasp. It is therefore clear that the north-eastern frontier of France is a most unsatisfactory one, and all French patriots must desire to obtain again a strong natural defensive frontier, further away from Paris. Even the most peaceful boulevardiers in Paris must have that desire. From the foregoing it is clear that the wish of all thoughtful Frenchmen to obtain again the Rhine frontier is not a sentimental, but a purely logical one, and the weaker France is as compared with Germany, the greater is her need for a strong frontier such as that which is formed by the Rhine.

It is therefore only natural that all patriotic Frenchmen must strive to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and, if possible, the Rhine. To acquiesce in France's present mutilation, to make peace with Germany and to allow France gradually to become a Power of secondary rank, would mean national extinction. Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain possess powerful natural defensive frontiers, which protect them against their mightiest neighbours. France, if she accepts her present position as final, will sink to the level of Spain without, however, possessing a strong frontier such as Spain possesses, and in course of time she will become a second Belgium.

Whilst patriotic Frenchmen cannot possibly contemplate with satisfaction the present position of France, Germany has every reason to be gratified with the *status quo*, and to wish that, by the natural development of things, France should gradually and peacefully sink to the second, or even to the third, rank among the nations of the world.

No nation desires to have a strong neighbour, least of all a nation which wishes to expand at the cost of other nations. Between 1870 and 1912 the population of Germany has grown from 40,000,000 to 66,000,000. Professor Schmoller estimates that the German population will amount to 104,000,000 in 1965, Professor Hübbe-Schleiden is of opinion that it will come to 150,000,000 in 1980, and M. Leroy-Beaulieu thinks that the Germans will number more than 200,000,000 within a century.

Germany will hardly be able to feed and clothe her rapidly growing population much longer within her present boundaries, and, as she is loth to strengthen foreign nations with her surplus population, she wishes to have her elbows free in order to be able

to expand. Expansion by peaceful means, whether it be within or without Europe, seems out of the question. Hence, it is Germany's interest to weaken beforehand her potential enemies; and France is considered by Germany as a potential enemy, who waits only for a favourable opportunity to attack Germany. On this point, Bismarck said in the Reichstag, on the 11th of January 1887:

"Has there ever been a French minority which could venture publicly and unconditionally to say, We renounce regaining Alsace-Lorraine. We shall not make war for Alsace-Lorraine, and we accept the Peace of Frankfort in the same spirit in which we accepted the Peace of Paris in 1815? Is there a ministry in Paris which would have the courage to make such a declaration? Why is there no such ministry? For the French have hitherto not lacked courage. No such ministry exists, because such a policy is opposed to public sentiment in France. France is like an engine which is filled with steam up to the point of explosion, and a spark, a clumsy movement of the hand, may suffice to cause an explosion, to bring on war. However, the fire is so carefully tended and nursed that it seems at first sight not likely that it will ever be used for causing a conflagration in the neighbouring country.

"If you study French history, you will find that the most important decisions have been taken in France not by the will of the people but by the will of an energetic minority. Those people in France who contemplate war with Germany, at present only prepare everything in order to be able to commence such a war with the maximum of force. Their task is to keep alive *le feu sacré de la revanche*, a task which Gambetta defined in the motto: 'Ne parlez jamais

de la guerre, mais pensez-y toujours,' and that is to-day still the attitude of France. French people do not speak of the possibility of an aggressive war against Germany, but only of the fear of being attacked by Germany.

"France will probably attack us as soon as she has reason to think that she is stronger than we are. As soon as France believes that she can defeat Germany, war with Germany is, I think, a certainty. The conviction that France is stronger than Germany may arise from the alliances which France may be able to conclude. I do not believe that such alliances will be concluded by France, and it is the task of German diplomacy either to prevent the conclusion of such alliances, or to counterbalance such alliances with counter-alliances."

It was Bismarck's conviction that France would seek revenge for her defeat, and therefore he endeavoured to ruin France by the severe conditions of peace. Although the Franco-German War had cost Germany only about £60,000,000, he exacted almost £250,000,000 from France, and was greatly disappointed that France so easily paid that sum and recovered so rapidly. Fearing France's revenge, Germany contemplated already, in 1875, an attack upon France, and in February of that year Herr von Radowitz was sent to Russia to sound the Czar and to find out whether Russia would remain neutral in the event of the struggle between France and Germany being renewed. Happily for France, Germany's design miscarried owing to the energetic opposition of Great Britain and Russia.

Finding himself foiled in his design to ruin France before she had recovered from her defeat, Bismarck strove to isolate France, being of opinion, as he said

in his Memoirs, that France would certainly aid Russia if a collision should take place between Russia and Germany. Therefore he wrote, on the 20th December 1872, to Count Arnim, the German Ambassador in Paris: "We do not want to be disturbed by France, but if France does not intend to keep the peace we must prevent her finding allies." With this object in view, Bismarck skilfully isolated France by bringing her into collision with Italy, Spain, and Great Britain; and as long as Bismarck was in power the foreign policy of France was directed from Berlin, and France had not a friend, not a champion in the wide world. France was an outcast among nations.

Bismarck most carefully watched France's relations with foreign countries, and as soon as he thought that France was trying to pursue a policy of her own without consulting Berlin, and was endeavouring to improve her relations with a foreign country, he at once raised the spectre of war. In 1887, for instance, the Goblet Ministry was trying to settle the Egyptian Question, and thus to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain. However, before France was able to come to the desired arrangement, Bismarck used the ridiculous Schnäbele incident on the Franco-German frontier for a violent war-agitation, compared with which the recent Morocco incident was merely child's-play. France was almost frightened out of her wits. The contemplated arrangement with Great Britain was dropped, and on May 7th, 1887, M. Goblet said at Havre: "For fifteen years we have been asking the country each year for £40,000,000, and now, when the country has been smitten on the one cheek, we can only advise her to turn the other cheek to the smiter."

Soon after Bismarck had been dismissed by the

Emperor William, France succeeded in coming to some arrangement with Russia, the character and scope of which have remained secret; but although both Frenchmen and Russians have frequently been speaking of a Franco-Russian alliance, there is very good reason for believing that there exists no Franco-Russian alliance, but at the best a Franco-Russian military convention. Bismarck sceptically remarked, shortly before his death, "'Nations alliées' need by no means signify that there is an alliance, and words like these are sometimes only used for the sake of politeness." From what has since leaked out, it appears that Bismarck was right, and that there never was a Franco-Russian alliance, notwithstanding the numerous solemn assertions to the contrary.

The conclusion of the Franco-Russian "alliance" was taken very philosophically at Berlin, for such an event was considered to be inevitable in view of the friction which had taken place between Russia and Germany after the present Emperor had come to the throne. Therefore, German diplomacy concentrated its efforts upon keeping the Anglo-French differences alive, and tried to forestall France by previously coming to an understanding with this country.

At that time Germany's most valuable colonies, including Zanzibar, were exchanged against the then valueless rock of Heligoland, an exchange which was greeted with dismay by all Germans, for it was clearly recognised by them that that bargain was a very one-sided and a most unsatisfactory one for Germany. Even in Great Britain people shook their heads at this exchange, the advantage of which to Germany could not be seen. Nevertheless, from the German point of view this exchange was a most excellent bargain, for France had been forestalled by it. Von Caprivi,

the then Chancellor, did not even try to explain that Germany had received an adequate *quid pro quo* in giving up her best colonies, but he simply stated in the Reichstag, in defending the exchange: "We meant, before all, to maintain our good understanding with Great Britain."

It was Bismarck's policy not only to isolate France by embroiling her with all her neighbours and by discrediting her everywhere, but also to weaken her financial and military power by encouraging her to waste her military and financial strength in unprofitable colonial adventures in every quarter of the world. France went to West Africa and to Tonkin at Bismarck's bidding, and, imagining to create colonies, she founded vast military settlements which sap her strength. How greatly France is weakened by her possessions abroad may be seen from the fact that she has to keep about 70,000 white soldiers in her colonies, and she can ill spare them.

If we review the policy which Germany has continually pursued towards France from 1871 down to the present day, we find that Germany has consistently and persistently endeavoured to weaken France in every possible way, and that she has succeeded in turning all her neighbours into enemies to her. Foreign ministers came and foreign ministers went in France in rapid succession, but, whether they liked it or not, all had to play Germany's game to the harm of their country. France was the abject tool of Germany and the laughing-stock of the world, until at last, in the year 1898, M. Delcassé entered the French Foreign Office.

When M. Delcassé became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he found, with amazement, that the foreign policy of France was directed by Germany,

and that, at the bidding of German statesmen, France had obediently embroiled herself with Italy over Tunis, with Spain over various questions, and with Great Britain over Egypt. Notwithstanding the fact that it was his first task to settle the thankless Fashoda problem, M. Delcassé entered upon his duties with the firm determination to reconcile France with Italy and Spain, and especially with Great Britain, and no longer to oppose Great Britain in Germany's interests. In the beginning of November 1898, a few days after Colonel Marchand had been ordered back from Fashoda, M. Delcassé said in his study to a friend of mine: "I mean not to leave this fauteuil without having re-established good relations with Great Britain." Such a declaration required considerable moral courage at a time when Great Britain and France stood on the brink of war.

When Germany saw that France was slipping away from German control, that France was trying to pursue a national policy, and that she succeeded in making friends with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, she tried for a long time to regain control over the foreign policy of France by personal advances to individual Frenchmen, by flattering the vanity of France, by urging that the interests of France and Germany were identical, and by persistently extolling the benefits and the necessity of a Franco-German alliance as the best guarantee for maintaining peace in Europe. However, notwithstanding Germany's advances, M. Delcassé remained passive and almost indifferent, and observed a cautious reserve towards Germany. Nevertheless, Germany continued her advances until the battle of Mukden had shown that the Russian army was no longer a factor upon the support of which France could reckon in case she should be attacked by

Germany. Then, and then only, came the Morocco crisis and Germany's threat of war.

M. Delcassé has made many mistakes during his seven years' tenure of office. Still, he has deserved well of France, for he has led her into the path of independence after twenty-seven years of political dependence upon Germany.

As the German Press still recommends the conclusion of a Franco-German alliance for preserving peace in Europe, we may cast a glance at the true inwardness of that proposal. Germany is surrounded by weaker nations on every side, and she is threatened by none. So strong is Germany considered to be by her foremost military men, that the late Count Waldersee stated, a few years ago, at the officers' casino at Kaiserslautern, that Germany alone was strong enough to defeat, single-handed, France and Russia combined. Therefore Germany, who is backed by Austria-Hungary and Italy, need not seek a defensive alliance with France against any Continental nation or any Continental nations. The only nations against which a Franco-German alliance could possibly be directed would be England or the United States, and as neither England nor the United States is an aggressive nation, a Franco-German alliance could hardly bear a defensive character.

Recent history supplies the proof that a Franco-German alliance would not be a defensive alliance. At no time were Germany's advances to France more assiduous than when Germany was trying to raise a coalition against this country. At the outbreak of the Boer War the whole German Press entreated France to join hands with Germany and to assist in humbling Great Britain to the dust. On October 5th, 1899, three days after the mobilisation of the Boer

troops, an article appeared in *Die Grenzboten*, the leading journal of the semi-official press of Germany, in which it was said :

"All differences between France and Germany benefit only the nearly all-powerful Enemy of the World. As long as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is no good that they occasionally look at England with the other eye. Only when the strength of the German fleet is commensurate with her sea interest will the French seek our friendship, instead of being humiliated by their hereditary enemy."

In this and numerous other articles France was entreated to crush England, her hereditary enemy, joining a coalition of Continental Powers.

I was in Paris during the Morocco crisis of 1905, when extreme nervousness had taken hold of many French politicians, journalists, and Stock Exchange operators. In the highest military circles, however, the possibility of an outbreak of war with Germany was contemplated with perfect confidence in the strength and excellence of the French army.

Clausewitz, the greatest military writer of modern times, has justly said : "He must be a good engineer who is able to gauge the value of a very complicated machine whilst it is at rest, for he must not only see that all parts are there, but he must also be able to analyse the state of each individual part when it will be in action. But which machine resembles in its many-sidedness and intricacy of construction the military power ?" It is, of course, a difficult matter to form an opinion of an army in time of peace. Still, the confidence of the French generals in their army seems by no means to be misplaced. In case of war, France can mobilise three million men and more. And the men are alert and willing ; they are well disciplined

and well trained, and their training is a thoroughly practical one. The first article of the *Réglement sur les Manœuvres de l'Infanterie* says: "La préparation à la guerre est le but unique de l'instruction des troupes," and that principle governs the training of the whole French army.

The equipment of the French army is, on the whole, very superior to that of the German army. The boots, clothes, knapsacks, cooking utensils, &c., of the men appear to be more practical and more serviceable than those of the German army; the French horses are distinctly superior to the average of the German horses; the rifles of both armies are about equally good; the French artillery is supposed to be superior to the German artillery.

In 1870, France did not possess a national army. Her troops were a rabble, they fought without enthusiasm for a cause which, at least at the beginning of the campaign, was not understood by them, and they were pitted against a national army which fought for the greatest of causes. To-day every Frenchman knows that, in a war with Germany, he will fight for all that is dear to him, that he will fight for his hearth and home. The French would enter upon a war with Germany conscious that such a war would be a struggle for life or death to France, whilst the German army would hardly in a similar spirit enter upon a war of wanton aggression over the Morocco Question or some similar shallow pretext for war. For these reasons, the best-informed French soldiers did not fear an encounter with Germany at the time of the first Morocco crisis. French nervousness was restricted to the civilian element of the population, but even civilian France is becoming conscious of her

strength. That consciousness is bound to affect the nature of Franco-German relations.

Formerly France tried to emulate the navy of this country; now she is a third-rate naval Power which is no longer able to meet Germany on the seas. According to the German Naval Year Book Nauticus of 1911, the French and the German fleets will compare as follows in May 1913:—

BATTLESHIPS OF MORE THAN 10,000 TONS AND ARMOURED CRUISERS OF MORE THAN 5000 TONS LAUNCHED SINCE 1894

	France.		*Germany.*	
	Number	Tonnage	Number	Tonnage
Battleships	19	282,210	30	459,000
Armoured Cruisers . .	19	200,320	12	160,590

It will be noticed that the tonnage of the German battleships is exactly 60 per cent. larger than that of France, and that supremacy should soon be very much larger than 50 per cent. At the moment Germany is building more super-Dreadnoughts than France, and Germany builds much faster than France can build. Besides, the organisation and discipline in the French navy and in the French dockyards leave much to be desired. They are honeycombed with Socialism, and have suffered much from the misrule of political demagogues.

In comparing the French and German naval forces, we must remember that France has many vulnerable spots on her coast to defend, for all her great harbours can be shelled from the sea, whilst the German coasts, with their extensive sandbanks, which every year change their shape, need no mobile defence whatever. Then again, half of the French fleet is in the Mediterranean, far away from the northern coast of France,

whilst the whole of the German fleet can be concentrated within a few hours in the North Sea. Lastly, the German ships possess a far greater homogeneity than the French ships, and the former can therefore be more easily manœuvred than the latter. From all these facts it would appear that the German fleet possesses a marked, one might almost say an overwhelming, superiority over the French fleet.

A few years hence the German fleet should possess a positively crushing superiority over the French fleet, unless France soon bestirs herself and increases her navy. France will be well advised if she strengthens her naval forces as soon as possible. If, in a war with Germany, the French fleet should be defeated, Germany would be able to turn the defences on the north-east frontier of France by landing large bodies of troops on the northern coast of France, and this possibility has been very seriously considered by both French and German officers. On the other hand, if France should succeed in defeating the German fleet, she would be able to greatly damage Germany by destroying her export trade, of which between two-thirds and three-quarters are carried on over-sea.

The foregoing short sketch shows the real character of the relations existing between France and Germany. The Franco-German relations were truly, but very indiscreetly, described by the great German historian, Professor Treitschke, in his book *Politik*, as "a latent state of war." Whatever compliments may be exchanged between the two countries, the aims and ambitions of France and Germany are incompatible, and they will remain incompatible as long as Germans are Germans and Frenchmen are Frenchmen. Hence the latent state of war existing between France and Germany seems likely to continue until France has

either regained her natural frontier or until she has become a third-class Power, a second Belgium. Only then can France and Germany become friends.

France is under no illusion as to Germany's feelings towards her. Silently she has borne the latent state of war for forty-one years, and the patriotism of the French citizens in giving their services and their money without stint and without grumbling to their country is worthy of the greatest admiration. But the French may some day be rewarded for their patient patriotism. Already the forty-one years of a latent state of war have worked wonders in the national character of France, and have created a race of strong and earnest men in that country. Besides, forty-one years of concentrated military endeavour have given France an army which need not fear any foe. Perhaps that army will some day be the instrument for re-creating France and gaining back for her what she has lost.

CHAPTER X

THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1911

ON July 2nd, 1911, the German papers published the following official announcement :—

"The German firms interested in the south of Morocco have requested the Imperial Government, having regard to the dangers which threaten the important German interests in these parts in view of the possible spread of the disorders prevailing in other parts of Morocco, to take measures to protect the lives and property of Germans and German *protégés* in this region. The Imperial Government, with this object in view, thereupon decided to send His Majesty's ship *Panther*, which happened to be in the neighbourhood, to the harbour of Agadir, and apprised the Powers of the fact. The influential Moors of the district have been simultaneously informed that no sort of unfriendly intention towards Morocco or its inhabitants is associated with the appearance of the German warship in the harbour."

Thus ran the translation published in *The Times* of July 3rd of that year. Ostensibly the German Government sent the *Panther* to Agadir in the south of Morocco "to protect important German interests in these parts" and "to protect the life and property of Germans and German *protégés* in this region." Yet it was known to all who had studied Moroccan affairs that Germany had no important commercial interests in that country, and that no German lives were

endangered in or near Agadir, which happens to be the best harbour on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. However, the official communication carefully explained in its opening words that the warship was sent at the request of "the German firms interested in the south of Morocco." The onus of proof that German interests and German lives were actually threatened was therefore laid with skilful vagueness on unnamed, unenumerated, and unspecified German firms, which, for all we know, had their seat in Germany, and which conceivably were previously asked by the Government to make a request for protection. By the wording of the *communiqué* the German Government had left open a loophole for escape. In case of need it could explain that "the German firms" had called for protection without sufficient cause, and that the ship would be withdrawn because, upon inquiry on the spot, it had been found that neither the property nor the lives of Germans and of German *protégés* in the south of Morocco were endangered.

In Bismarck's time German diplomacy was dramatic and vigorous. Now it is dramatic and futile. For a second time within a few years it interfered with menacing suddenness in Morocco, but once more the stage managing seems to have been defective, and the dispatch of the *Panther* was to prove as unprofitable, and as little creditable, to German diplomacy as was the Emperor's personal demonstration at Tangier on March 31st, 1905, when he promised his support to the Sultan.

The Morocco crisis of 1905 almost led to war between France and Germany. Germany had actually begun mobilising her army when France bowed to the demonstration of force, giving Germany what is usually called a diplomatic victory. However, she

lost nothing substantial by giving way, but Germany received in the following year a diplomatic defeat at Algeciras, whence she returned empty-handed, and she quietly withdrew for a time her loudly advertised claims upon Moroccan territory.

At the time of the Morocco crisis of 1905 the German Emperor, Prince Bülow, and the semi-official German Press had asserted that Germany had important economic interests in that country, and in the official *communiqué* printed at the beginning of this chapter stress was laid on the important interests of German firms in Morocco. The economic interests of Germany in that country may best be gauged by the extent and development of Germany's trade. According to the British Consular Report on Morocco (Cd. 5465–17), published in March 1911, the total foreign trade of Morocco, both export and import trade, was during the three preceding years as follows :—

VALUE OF ALL ARTICLES IMPORTED INTO AND EXPORTED FROM MOROCCO BY SEA AND LAND

	1907.	1908.	1909.
	£	£	£
United Kingdom	1,713,969	2,448,977	2,204,771
France	1,633,823	2,260,416	2,195,109
Germany	651,956	676,413	564,147
Spain	263,658	327,891	523,715
Belgium	125,395	190,746	92,926
Austria-Hungary	30,821	63,397	91,889
Italy	33,655	67,786	83,928
United States	67,651	52,403	62,347
Egypt	87,258	39,769	24,917
Netherlands	30,165	52,150	13,771
Portugal			10,946
Other Countries			46,130
	4,638,351	6,179,948	5,914,569

It will be noticed that Germany's trade was insignificant. Both France and Great Britain had a trade with Morocco which is four times as large as that of Germany. Moreover, the proportion of Germany's trade in Morocco was not increasing, but decreasing. In 1904–1905 Germany asserted for the first time that she had important economic interests in that country. Yet notwithstanding all her efforts to increase her trade among the Moors, her position in the Moroccan market has since then steadily deteriorated, for Germany's proportion did, according to the Consular Report mentioned, change as follows :—

PROPORTION OF GERMANY'S TRADE WITH MOROCCO.

	German Exports to Morocco.	German Imports from Morocco.	Total.
1904 . . .	7.4 per cent.	20.4 per cent.	12.5 per cent.
1905 . . .	7.1 „	19.3 „	11.8 „
1906 . . .	7.2 „	18.6 „	11.4 „
1907 . . .	6.0 „	25.0 „	14.1 „
1908 . . .	6.0 „	18.2 „	10.9 „
1909 . . .	5.9 „	15.9 „	9.5 „

Both in exports and imports Germany had been steadily losing ground in Morocco. However, as German statesmen and publicists have frequently asserted that the statistics given by the British Consul, which are collected at the ports and the land frontiers, are untrustworthy, let us measure the importance of the Moroccan market to Germany by means of the official German statistics :—

	German Exports to Morocco.		German Imports from Morocco.	
	Marks.	£	Marks.	£
1904 . . .	2,500,000	= 125,000	5,500,000	= 275,000
1905 . . .	1,700,000	85,000	5,900,000	295,000
1906 . . .	1,800,000	90,000	5,500,000	275,000
1907 . . .	1,200,000	60,000	8,500,000	425,000
1908 . . .	1,800,000	90,000	9,500,000	475,000
1909 . . .	3,500,000	175,000	7,800,000	390,000

Germany imports from Morocco small quantities of food and raw produce, such as barley, almonds, beans, gums, bees-wax, wheat, goat-skins, linseed, and sheep-skins, and she exports to Morocco insignificant quantities of sugar and of manufactured goods. Her exports to Morocco are admittedly overstated by the inclusion of Austrian sugar and manufactures, which go largely *via* Hamburg, and which figure as German exports in the German Customs statistics. However, if we credit Germany with the whole of the trade which stands in her name, it will be found that Germany's entire yearly trade with Morocco is about as large as the yearly turnover of a moderate-sized shop in a provincial town. The importance of the Moroccan trade to Germany may be summarised in two lines as follows :—

	Marks.
Total Foreign Trade of Germany in 1909 . .	16,945,700,000
Total German Trade with Morocco in 1909 .	11,300,000

Germany's trade with Morocco was, in 1909, when that trade was particularly brisk, exactly equal to $\frac{1}{1500}$, or one-fifteenth of one single per cent., of her whole foreign trade. No one envied Germany for her microscopic trade in Morocco, and no one wished to diminish it or take it away from her. It was not worth mentioning, and not worth taking.

The Germans could not deny that their participation in the trade of Morocco was merely an insignificant portion of an insignificant total, but then they alleged that their shipping interests in that country were very important. It is true that of the tonnage which entered the Moroccan ports in 1907 21.9 per cent. was German, in 1908 20.6 per cent. was German, and in 1909 16.6 per cent. was German. Apparently

Germany's merchant marine was proportionately far more interested in Morocco than Germany's trade. However, the proportion of Germany's shipping was shrinking as rapidly as was the proportion of Germany's trade. Besides, the proportion of Germany's shipping was comparatively high because the German ships called at Moroccan ports, not in order to do business, but in order to put in an appearance and to swell artificially the Moroccan shipping statistics in Germany's favour. The German lines were able to make these unprofitable, and chiefly political, calls owing to the Government subsidies which they receive. The artificial character of the German shipping figures will be seen as soon as we compare them with the corresponding figures relating to British shipping. Let us make such a comparison.

TONNAGE OF SHIPPING WHICH ENTERED THE PORT OF TANGIERS

	German.		*British.*	
	With Cargo.	In Ballast.	With Cargo.	In Ballast.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
1907 . . .	40,504	104,537	195,245	21,835
1908 . . .	25,375	147,176	191,606	25,387
1909 . . .	42,896	135,670	193,230	34,636

Of the British shipping entering Tangiers between 1907 and 1910 almost nine-tenths was with cargo. Of the German shipping entering that port during the same years only one-fifth was with cargo. We cannot wonder that the British Consul wrote: "Several of the foreign lines of steamers receive considerable subsidy from their Government, or they would not be able to maintain their services to this coast." That remark applies particularly to the German ships and the fictitious showing which they make.

German merchants were interested not only in the

foreign trade of Morocco, but also in the exploitation of its lands and minerals. The mineral concessions of a certain German firm were frequently paraded in the papers, but their validity was strongly doubted in the best informed German circles. They could be described as concessions rather *in posse* than *in esse*. Hence the concessionnaires were more in need of valid documents than of German ships and guns for the protection of their interests.

The foregoing facts and figures suffice to show that Germany's important economic interests in Morocco were merely a diplomatic fiction.

The second reason given in the official *communiqué* for sending the *Panther* to Agadir was the necessity to protect the lives of Germans and of German *protégés*. Agadir is a village of 300 or 400 inhabitants, and, according to the well-informed French authorities, it contained at the time not a single German. The 1909 edition of the semi-official—one might just as well say the official—German Naval Year Book, edited by Nauticus, contained a long and very interesting paper, entitled "Morocco and its Relations to the German National Economy," in which we read: "In 1901 there were in Morocco 193 Germans, of whom 150 belong to the German Empire, the remaining 43 being Austrians and Swiss. Of these about 100 were in Tangiers, 30 in Casa Blanca, 22 in Mogador, 12 in Safi, 11 in Mazagan, 6 in Rabat, 5 in Larache, 4 in Fez, 3 in Marakesh." Although Austrians and Swiss were, for the sake of simplicity, and for swelling the total, counted as Germans, no Germans were mentioned in Agadir. In Mogador there were 22 Germans, including Austrians and Swiss. Yet the *Panther* did not go to Mogador "to protect the threatened lives of German citizens." Apparently, the

explanation that the *Panther* was sent to Agadir to protect the threatened lives of Germans and German *protégés* was another diplomatic fiction. According to the latest Consular Report, there are 16,485 Europeans in Morocco. Therefore the Germans are apparently less than one single per cent. of the European population. The Germans padded the Customs returns, they padded their shipping statistics, and they padded their statistics of Germans living in Morocco. Yet notwithstanding this most industrious padding, Germany's tangible interests in Morocco were almost nil. Germany's policy in Morocco was not entirely sincere.

It must be clear even to the most credulous, the most unsuspecting, and the most uncritical that in 1905 the German Emperor did not go to Tangier and almost make war upon France for the love of the Sultan of Morocco, and that in July 1911 Germany did not send the *Panther* to Agadir to protect German lives and property. German diplomacy has asserted from 1905 to 1911 that it was anxious to preserve the independence and the integrity of Morocco, and the open door for all nations, because of her important economic interests in that country. That was merely a diplomatic pretext, and it can scarcely be doubted that Germany desired to acquire Morocco, or at least the south of that country, and that she wished to defend its integrity and independence until she was ready and able to make it a colony of her own.

On the 19th January 1912, in the course of a lawsuit for libel which the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* brought against the *Grenzboten*, the editor of the former stated: "I demand that Mr. Class, the president of the Pan-Germanic League, be called. At my wish he put himself in contact with the Foreign Secretary,

Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter. The Foreign Secretary invited Mr. Class to meet him at the Hotel Pfälzer Hof in Mannheim, and there they have conferred for hours. The Foreign Secretary stated to Herr Class: 'I support the policy of partitioning Morocco. The Pan-Germanic demand is absolutely justified. You can rely upon it that we shall stick to Morocco, and that you will be greatly pleased with the German Morocco policy. I am as much a Pan-German as you are.' Some time afterwards Mr. Class called upon the Foreign Secretary, but, failing to find him in, met Mr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. It was the day of the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir. Herr Zimmermann told Herr Class that he could give him some cheering news: 'You come just in time. At this moment the *Panther* appears before Agadir. We shall retain Agadir, and we intend to seize the whole district and not to give up anything. After all, we absolutely require settlement colonies for our excess of births. Take care that no claims for compensation are raised in the Press. We do not want compensations. We want Morocco. France wishes to offer us the Congo.'" The foregoing extract, which is a careful translation, and which is taken from the report of the law-court proceedings published in the *Tägliche Rundschau* of January 20, 1912, shows that, notwithstanding all official statements that Germany had never intended to seize Moroccan territory, statements which were made by the German Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary in December 1911, the German Government had actually intended to take a part of Morocco.

Germany's interests in Morocco, as her interests in Asia Minor, South Africa, and Southern Brazil, are not of yesterday. Many decades ago the most far-

seeing and patriotic Germans recognised that colonies in a moderate zone, able to receive the German surplus population, were the greatest need of their country. Animated by this conviction, many professors and other leaders of public opinion agitated for the creation of a large German fleet—the first ships of the German navy were built in the 'forties of the last century with moneys raised by voluntary private subscriptions; others created important and purely German settlements in Santa Catherina, in Rio Grande do Sul, in the Cape Colony, and in Natal; others explored, with or without Government assistance, uncivilised countries which they believed to be suitable for German colonisation and which had not yet been appropriated by the European Powers. Morocco was one of these, and it was explored in the 'sixties of last century by the Germans, Gerhard Rohlfs and von Maltzan, in the 'seventies by Noll, von Fritsch, Rein, and Koch, in the 'eighties by Lenz and Quedenfeld, and Professor Theobald Fischer travelled through that country in 1888, 1899, and 1901. Professor Fischer is considered to be the greatest German authority on that country.

Prusso-Germany was the first country which introduced a system of compulsory and national education directed by the State. The education of the German citizen by the State does not end with the time when the child leaves school. It is continued during the rest of his or her life. Prominent among the great German State institutions for the education of the adult are the semi-official Press and the semi-official literature in the form of books, the teachings of which are reinforced by the activity of a host of Government inspired professorial and non-professorial lecturers, writers, and clergymen, who are let loose whenever their assistance is required. The larger half of the German Press of

all parties, the Socialist papers excepted, is constantly inspired by the Government. Thus public opinion is created and constantly educated, and the more serious and thoughtful minds are provided with information by weighty semi-official books crammed with facts and arguments which are written, or inspired, by the Government departments. They serve the same purpose as the "handbooks for speakers" and "campaign books" which are issued by the British party organisations at election time. In 1904–1905 a large portion of the semi-official Press preached, in consequence of direct inspiration from the chief of the German Foreign Office, the doctrine that Germany required the south of Morocco, and in 1911 we read again in papers which stand under Government influence demands for territorial "compensation" in Morocco. The prevailing official view of the value of Morocco to Germany may best be gauged from the very lengthy paper, "Morocco and its Relations to the German National Economy," published in the semi-official German Naval Year Book for 1909, and I would quote from it the following important passages in their proper sequence ;—

"Morocco is a kind of African peninsula, being isolated by the sea and separated from the African continent by vast mountains. The most important trade routes along the West Coast of Africa, from Europe to South America, and towards the future Panama Canal, pass its coast. The country occupies the corner of Africa, and the corner position of a continent is always a favourable world-strategical factor. By its geographical and world-strategical position Morocco is exceedingly favoured for commerce and war. Only lately, when the traffic on the trade routes through the Mediterranean along the northern shore, and through the Atlantic along the western shore, of Morocco has become so active, the country has become important. It lies to-day in the centre of the world's traffic.

"Morocco is separated from the African continent by high mountains, which separate it at the same time from the desert. These give it a favourable climate by catching the moisture which the wind brings from the Atlantic. Morocco slopes from the mountain ranges in the interior towards the Atlantic. Therefore the mountains act as an enormous reservoir to the lower-lying lands. The province of Sus is perhaps the most richly endowed part of Morocco. One can scarcely form an exaggerated idea of the fruitfulness of a large part of the plains near the Atlantic coast. The rainfall is small, but owing to the abundance of water in the sub-soil, only a few feet below the ground, irrigation can easily and cheaply be provided which would make cotton growing possible.

"Marakesh, like Milan and Munich, is, owing to its position, a natural railway centre. Although animals are raised in the most primitive fashion, and although the prohibition to export them kills all enterprise, Morocco possesses; according to a French official expert, 40,000,000 sheep, 11,000,000 goats, from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 cattle, 4,000,000 donkeys and mules, and 600,000 horses. However, these estimates are probably too large. Morocco is rich in minerals, especially in iron, copper, antimony, and salt. Mining used to flourish especially in the province of Sus. Morocco has about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and is able to maintain perhaps 40,000,000 people. In that healthy country, which is nearly quite free from malaria, the living conditions for European emigrants are far more favourable than in Algeria. Morocco, situated within sight of Europe and occupying an exceedingly important world-strategical position, possesses vast natural resources which have not yet been touched. Its conditions are mediæval, but in view of the proximity of the over-populated States of Europe which require expansion, its exclusiveness cannot be preserved much longer. Morocco may become the granary and the ranch of Europe, and may provide it with fruit, oil, cotton, and ore. At present it has not a single mile of road or of railroad, and not a single bridge. Its waterfalls will provide power. Morocco is an important field for industrial activity."

It will be noticed that the semi-official year book considered in the first place the great strategical

value of Morocco, and only in the second place its great economic possibilities. It is also very interesting that it described the province of Sus as the richest part of Morocco for both agriculture and mining, and recognised in Marakesh its natural railway centre. Now, Agadir is not only the best harbour on the west coast, with 47 feet of water within 30 yards of the shore, but it is also not far from Marakesh, and is by far the best entrance gate to the province of Sus and to the Soudan. Owing to the depth and sheltered position of its harbour and to its geographical situation, Agadir is far more important that Mogador, which has 24,000 inhabitants. The latter has become a large port only because the Moroccan Government closed the port of Agadir in order to punish its citizens for a revolt. Monsieur de Segonzac, a leading French authority on Morocco, wrote in his book, *Voyage au Maroc*, published in 1903, the year before the German Government had taken an active interest in Morocco :—

"Agadir is believed to be the best harbour on the Moroccan coast. It is an open roadstead without obstacles, which is sheltered against the breakers and the wind from the open sea. I have been told that thirty metres from the coast the water is fifteen metres deep. On the day when the harbour of Agadir will be opened to European commerce Mogador will cease to exist."

The greatest German authority on Morocco, Professor Fischer, who has devoted more than thirty years to the study of that country, and who has explored it on three journeys, saw, like the semi-official German Naval Year Book, in the land of the Moors a world-strategical position of the very greatest importance. He was naturally less reserved in his utterances than the Year Book, which is written throughout in the ponderous, stodgy, and impersonal

style of official Germany, and I would quote from some of his writings the following most interesting opinions :—

" Morocco occupies to-day a position of the very greatest importance. The most important trade routes pass by its coast: through the Mediterranean, to the rapidly developing West Coast of Africa, to Central America with the Panama Canal, towards South America, which is rapidly becoming settled and which already is of the greatest importance for the food supply of Europe. The importance of the Moroccan harbours lies in their position, for thence many a vital nerve of the nations of Europe may be cut through.—(*Die Seehäfen von Marokko.*)

" Morocco lies on the most important route of the world's trade. It takes part in commanding that route, and its ports on the Atlantic can become important bases for peaceful and warlike enterprises on the West Coast of Africa and towards Central and South America.—(*Geog. Zeitschrift,* 1907.)

" In the hands of a European Power able to develop its rich resources, Morocco may become a source of strength of the first importance, able to cause a change in the balance of power in Europe. It is strange that Germany has no political interests in Morocco. Our position as a world Power and a commercial Power would be endangered should Morocco fall into the hands of France. It is Germany's task to maintain Morocco's independence. But should an alteration of the map become inevitable, Germany must have its part: El Haus and Sus. Our interests at the Straits of Gibraltar are guarded by the jealousies of France and Great Britain.—(*Geog. Zeitschrift,* 1903.)

" *After thirty years' occupation with Moroccan affairs, and after three journeys through that country, I have arrived at the conviction that the world-political position of Morocco is so great that that State which succeeds in taking it will, through its possession, receive such an enormous increase in power that all other States, especially Great Britain, Spain, and Germany, will feel it as an unbearable hardship.* — (*Die Seehäfen von Marokko.*)"

The italics are in the original.

Morocco looks small on the map, but it is, as the following figures show, a large country :—

Morocco	219,000 square miles.
Algeria (limits of 1901) . . .	184,474 ,,
Tunis	45,779 ,,
Germany	208,780 ,,
United Kingdom	121,391 ,,

Morocco is almost as large as Algeria and Tunis combined, and is larger than Germany. Its superior size and climate, its vast agricultural and mineral resources, and its superior geographical and strategical position make it infinitely more valuable than Algeria. Besides, it is a natural fortress. Its fruitful plains and uplands along the Atlantic, which evoked the enthusiasm of Pomponius Mela 1900 years ago, are sheltered towards the north and west by the sea, and towards the east and south by the enormous ranges of the Atlas Mountains, the peaks of which rise up to 13,000 feet, and by the Sahara. Thus thinly-populated Morocco is an ideal country both for European settlement and for defence. Its world-strategical position, upon which the German Navy Year Book and Professor Fischer have rightly dwelt, is very great, and its possession would have been of particular value to Germany, especially if she should wish to strike at France, Great Britain, or the United States. At present the German fleet is tied to the North Sea through the lack of coaling stations. Agadir, or some other port on the west coast of Morocco, which could be reached in about a week by ships steaming from Wilhelmshaven round the north of Scotland, would have been a very convenient half-way house on the way to the West Indies and Panama in case of a German-American war ; it would

have been the best possible base for cruisers, or liners converted into cruisers, told off to prey on British shipping, in case of an Anglo-German war; it would have been an ideal position in case of a Franco-German war, or of Franco-German friction, by enabling Germany to cause serious trouble in Algeria. Algeria has an army of occupation of 75,000 men, of whom 43,000 are Europeans. France intends in case of a great European war to bring over from Africa her European troops and some coloured troops as well, replacing the Algerian garrison with West African soldiers. The spirit of revolt is not yet dead in Algeria. The Germans in Morocco could have caused countless risings in the neighbouring Algeria in peace time by encouraging the disaffected, and could have overthrown the French mobilisation scheme in Africa at the moment of the outbreak of war by bringing about a revolt. As a matter of fact, a German settlement in Morocco would have made Algeria untenable for France. The assiduous advances which Germany made to the Moors after the Franco-German war were probably inspired by the wish of causing trouble to France in Algeria if the war should be renewed.

Spain's encroachment upon Morocco and her provocative attitude towards the French in that country coincided with that of Germany, and it seems probable that Germany and Spain were working in unison. Spain has only a small army, but her support would be of great value to Germany in a war with Great Britain or with France, or with both combined. A Spanish demonstration on the Franco-Spanish frontier would compel France to divide her armies of defence, and a Spanish demonstration near Gibraltar would create a useful diversion in a war with Great Britain. Did Germany try to secure Spanish co-operation

against France and Great Britain by arranging with her the division of Morocco ?

Germany's occupation of the Moroccan west coast would have threatened France and Great Britain in the first, and the United States in the second, instance, but the danger, at least to Great Britain and the United States, would not have been an immediate one. Naval bases do not spring up overnight. Moreover, the immediate creation of a naval base would have been difficult, and would scarcely have been tolerated by the Powers chiefly concerned. Germany would have begun by creating a good, but purely commercial, harbour on the Atlantic, and would have created coaling facilities and built docks, repairing-shops, &c. Against a possible attack by the Moors light temporary fortifications, armed with a few field-guns and quick-firers, would, of course, have been thrown up, and these might gradually have been improved into strong permanent forts armed with heavy artillery without attracting much attention.

After all, a Great Power can do what it likes on its own soil. By the Treaty of Paris, Russia bound herself not to fortify her Black Sea ports, but she fortified them all the same, and laughed at England's protests. Germany would not have bound herself to leave the harbours on the Moroccan west coast unfortified, although she might, of course, have declared that she had no intention of fortifying them. Such declarations of intentions, however, are not binding.

Some Englishmen argued at the time that it would be in the interest of Great Britain to see Germany installed on the west coast of Morocco. That would divide the German fleet. This argument is fallacious. A German war harbour at Agadir would have enabled a few German ships to do incalculable damage to the

British carrying trade, and to restrict very seriously Great Britain's supply of food and raw material. Great Britain would therefore, in case of war, have been compelled to detach a very large number of ships to protect her merchant marine against German depredations, and to blockade the German port or ports in Morocco. Thus a German settlement in Morocco would have weakened the German fleet very little and the British fleet very seriously.

The world policy lately pursued by Germany in Morocco and elsewhere has not been a happy one. It has caused friction and annoyance in many quarters. All the Powers of Europe, Germany excepted, are satisfied with their possessions and wish to be left in peace. But Germany is setting the pace in armaments by land and sea, and she is compelling all the Powers against their will to increase their armaments unceasingly. The armies and navies of Europe and of America would be much smaller than they are were it not for Germany's armaments and the activity of Germany's diplomacy. Germany's ambitions are very expensive to the Powers of the world, her allies included, and they may lose patience with Germany. There is always a Power which threatens the peace of the world. Up to 1870 France was the mischief-maker of the world, then it was Russia's turn, and now Germany is apparently qualifying for that thankless and dangerous part. If the Powers of the world should arrive at the firm conviction that Germany is a danger to the peace of the world, she may share the fate which overtakes earlier or later those who are considered to be the disturbers of the world's peace.

CHAPTER XI

ANGLO-GERMAN DIFFERENCES—GERMAN EVIDENCE ON THE SUBJECT

ANGLO-GERMAN relations, which used to be satisfactory and cordial in the past, have during the last few years become more and more strained and embittered. During the Morocco crisis of 1911 the tension increased to the breaking-point. The two countries prepared for war and their fleets for instant action. Every British and every German sailor waited impatiently for the signal. Had a British and a German warship unexpectedly encountered one another, mutual distrust might have led to the charging and training of guns; and if, through the loss of nerve on the part of an officer, through the misunderstanding of an order, or through an accident, a gun had gone off—and at such a moment of supreme tension guns are apt to go off in an unaccountable manner—a war to the death between England and Germany might have ensued. That is an intolerable situation, a situation which urgently requires to be dealt with, and Germans and Englishmen ought to ask themselves: Why have Anglo-German relations become lately so strained and embittered? Is Sir Edward Grey to blame? Can Anglo-German relations be improved? What can be done to improve them?

Let us first of all consider the situation from the

German point of view, relying exclusively upon German evidence.

We have been told officially and semi-officially by German statesmen, writers, and lecturers that Germany is a peaceful nation, which ever since the Franco-German War of 1870–1871 has kept the peace, that she cannot in any way be blamed for the Anglo-German tension, that all is England's fault. Countless German Government officials, professors, and journalists have asserted that Great Britain envies Germany for her economic success, and that she works unceasingly, both openly and secretly, for Germany's downfall, in order to rid herself of an inconvenient competitor. They have asserted that Great Britain pursues towards Germany that traditional policy of envy and plunder which caused her to attack and despoil one by one all the great industrial, commercial, and colonial nations of the past. In hundreds of books and newspapers and from thousands of platforms the Germans have been informed that the leading principle of British statesmanship is the promotion of British trade by the destruction of Great Britain's commercial rivals, that Great Britain grudges Germany her "place in the sun," that she envies Germany her commerce and her shipping, that British diplomats have cribbed and confined Germany with a network of hostile alliances, and that they perfidiously hamper and oppose Germany's progress in all parts of the world.

The current German description of British policy is a calumny and a fantastic distortion of history. Every one who is acquainted with British history is aware that during the last two centuries the principal aim of British policy has not been the pursuit of commercial aggrandisement and colonial expansion,

but the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent of Europe. Great Britain has fought all her greatest wars not for trade and colonies—for "plunder," as the Germans say—but for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. For that great principle she has fought the Spaniards under Philip II., the French under Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon I., and the Russians in the Crimea; and the eventual conquest of the Spanish and French colonies was, as Professor Seeley has shown, merely the accidental consequence, but not the cause, of our great wars against Spain and France. The great majority of England's wars were not wars of aggression, but wars of defence.

The maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent of Europe is one of the greatest of British interests. It is clear that only a nation which has destroyed the balance of power on the Continent, and which has become supreme on the Continent, can hope successfully to attack Great Britain. It is equally clear that no nation can maintain the mastery of the Continent of Europe as long as a strong and independent England exists on its flank. Hence a nation which strives for supremacy in Europe feels impelled to attack Great Britain earlier or later. History confirms this argument. All the rulers from Julius Cæsar to Napoleon I. who have striven to become supreme in Europe have made war upon Great Britain. National security is more important than a profitable commerce and extensive colonies. A little consideration shows that Great Britain's island position is secure only as long as the balance of power on the Continent is maintained intact; and the more evenly the balance of power on the Continent is adjusted, the greater is Great Britain's security from

continental attack. Consequently the greatest and the most important task of British statesmanship has been in the past not the promotion of trade and the acquisition of colonies, but the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Great Britain has been actuated in her foreign policy not by greed, but by the instinct of self-preservation.

In the course of the last few decades British statesmanship has been given another task, which has become even more important than the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent of Europe. A century ago, when Great Britain fought Napoleon I., the British islands were practically self-supporting. In the 'fifties of last century Great Britain raised at home nine-tenths of the bread and meat which her people required. Now nine-tenths of the bread-corn and one-half of the meat which the British people require come from abroad. Philip II., Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon I. could hope to subdue England only by the slow process of invasion and conquest; now Great Britain can more easily and more rapidly be subdued by starvation. Occasionally the supply of wheat stored in Great Britain suffices for less than a month. Even a short interruption of the grain imports would bring about a famine. No nation in the world possesses a more precarious food supply than Great Britain, and none is more vitally dependent upon the free and unhampered entrance of food-ships into her ports. As Great Britain has only sea frontiers, we can protect ourselves against the danger of being starved into surrender only if our fleet is strong enough to defend the freedom of the sea against any Power and against any possible combination of Powers. Hence the possession of an unchallengeable supremacy of our navy is now more

important to Great Britain than it has been at any time of her history, and the maintenance of British naval supremacy has become even more important a principle of British statesmanship than the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. The Germans themselves are aware that he who threatens Great Britain's naval supremacy threatens not only her trade and her colonies but her very life. In 1909 a little book for the use in schools, entitled *Die Flotte als notwendige Ergänzung unserer nationalen Wehrmacht,* written by Adolf Schroeder, was published in Germany. In it we read :—

"Were it possible to cut off Great Britain's supply of food, *in less than six weeks would the inhabitants die of starvation.* Britons are fully aware of the danger, and all, from the noble lord to the labourer, are convinced that *it is the most important duty of the State to keep open and secure* the broad highway of the ocean on which British merchantmen import food and raw material and export British manufactures. However, the security of the import and export trade in the case of a country which is entirely surrounded by the sea can be guaranteed only by a navy which is stronger than that of any other State. But the Briton requires more. *He demands a fleet which, both ship for ship and by their combined number, should be superior to the combined fleets of the two most powerful nations which conceivably might make war upon his country.* That conviction is deeply rooted in the minds of all Britons, and all Parties agree in this principle which is *a question of the national existence.*"

The italics are in the original. The Conservative *Kreuz Zeitung* wrote on the 28th January 1911 :—

"England must protect her enormous and indispensable imports of food against every disturbance, especially in case of war. Therefore the English Government is compelled to maintain a Navy strong enough to open all trade routes and, if possible, to blockade all hostile squadrons in their ports in order to protect the British Isles against the danger of starvation and of a panic affecting the prices of foodstuffs."

Captain Hartwig Schubert wrote in his pamphlet, *Die Deutsche Schlachtflotte eine Gefahr für Deutschland's Machtstellung*, published in 1911 :—

" Great Britain imports approximately five times as much bread, corn, and flour as Germany. Whilst England can receive food only by sea, Germany can obtain it by land across the frontiers of Denmark, Russia, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxemburg and Holland. It follows that Germany requires no navy for the protection of her food supply, whilst Great Britain can secure a sufficiency of foodstuffs only as long as she possesses a fleet which is strong enough to face any hostile combination of Powers."

No British statesman could have given clearer and fairer statements proving Great Britain's need of the possession of a paramount navy than the three given in the foregoing. Most thinking Germans agree that Great Britain requires a fleet of unchallengeable power for the protection of her food supply. Therefore it must also be clear to all Germans that a nation which challenges British naval supremacy threatens Great Britain's very existence. Captain Schubert (late of the German army) wrote :—

" In the Franco-German War France had a superior fleet. Germany's victories on land compelled the French to land their sailors and to employ them for the defence of their country on land. In a future war with France and Russia we must strive to bring about the same result. A German naval victory in a war against France and Russia would be unnecessary to us in case we are victorious on land. It would be worthless to us should we be defeated on land because our land armies would be weakened by the men on board our ships. Besides, if defeated on land, we could not follow up a naval victory by the landing of armies in the enemy's country, for we should then have no land troops to spare. It is therefore clear that the German navy is built only for use against England."

Captain Schubert's arguments are faultless and unanswerable. His statement that the German navy is built only for use against England cannot be disproved.

In an interview which Professor Hans Delbrück, one of the leading German professors, gave in December 1911 to the *Daily Mail*, he spoke of "Britain's long-standing and traditional political hostility to Germany." Germans are fond of asserting that Great Britain has "always" been hostile to Germany. This is one of their greatest grievances. However, that complaint also can be disproved out of German mouths. Herr Eduard Bernstein, one of the leading Socialist writers and a man of widely recognised eminence, fairness, and honesty of purpose, published at the end of 1911 a pamphlet entitled *Die Englische Gefahr und das Deutsche Volk*, in which we read :—

"All that has been written as to England's hostility towards Germany before the foundation of the German Empire in 1870 is merely idle and mischievous talk and invention. England and Prussia and England and Austria were sometimes friends and sometimes opposed to each other, but in their relations there was no fixed tendency and there could be none, because no important clashing interests existed between the British Empire and the two great German States. Even during the first years of the German Empire there was no friction worth mentioning between Great Britain and Germany.

"During the struggle for Protection (in 1879 and afterwards) German Free Traders were pilloried as 'English agents.' The Protectionist literature of the period abounds with attacks upon England. . . . In consequence of the Protectionist movement the instinct of self-preservation impelled England to secure markets for the future, and when in 1883 Germany began acquiring colonies she met with British resistance. However, one must recognise that that resistance was not the result of British illwill towards the German nation, for that resistance was caused, or at least greatly increased, by Germany's introducing in economic matters the

policy of the closed door. It is only fair to say that in many cases British resistance did not emanate from the British Government itself, but from the British colonies or from individual British colonists whose claims for protection the Government in London was bound at least formally to support. In several cases Germany recognised the existence of old and valid British claims. . . . When in 1888 the Emperor Frederick III. came to the throne the nationalist German press began a violent anti-British campaign, attacking the Empress Victoria, 'the Englishwoman.'

"On the 7th February 1896 (shortly after the Jameson Raid) the Foreign Secretary, Freiherr von Marschall, declared in the Reichstag that the continued independence of the Boer Republics was a German interest. Now the publication of the correspondence of several of the Boer leaders has shown that the leading Boers aimed not only at the shaking off of England's paramountcy over the Boer States, but that they intended to drive England out of South Africa, and that they relied in this policy upon Germany's support. Meanwhile Germany had begun to increase her fleet in feverish haste. In 1898 a Navy Bill was passed providing for nineteen battleships, eight armourclads for coast defence, and forty-two cruisers at a a cost of £20,000,000, and William II. declared in Hamburg: 'We are in bitter need of a strong German fleet.' Two years later, in 1900, came another Navy Bill which doubled the battle fleet provided by the Bill of 1898, and which increased the sum required for shipbuilding to £40,000,000. Can one wonder that the English were startled by our action? Whilst Secretary of State Admiral Hollmann had declared in the Reichstag 'The German coasts require no protection, they protect themselves,' the Emperor had loudly proclaimed: 'The trident must be in our fist.'"

By the Navy Bill of 1898, the provisions of which were doubled by the Navy Bill of 1900, the building programme of the German navy was firmly laid down up to the year 1917. However, the year 1905 brought a second, and the year 1908 a third, and the year 1912 a fourth enlargement, and the monies voted in respect of these five Navy Bills greatly exceeded

in the aggregate the sum of £250,000,000. The introduction to the Navy Bill of 1900 stated: "Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." Germany deliberately set to work to challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy, and she proclaimed in 1900 that intention officially from the housetops. The original Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900, and their amendments of 1905, 1908 and 1912, were carried after a passionate anti-British campaign which was undoubtedly encouraged by the Government. It has been shown in the foregoing that the possession of an unchallengeable naval supremacy is a matter of life or death for Great Britain, and that most Germans who have given the matter a moment's thought agree that Great Britain must have a navy which is stronger than that of any other Power or of any probable combination of Powers. Consequently it is clear that by the naval policy which Germany inaugurated in 1900 she deliberately challenged not only Great Britain's position in the world, but her very existence as an independent nation.

Most Germans who complain about British "intrigues" assert that King Edward VII. was Germany's greatest enemy, and that he was responsible for hedging Germany about with a network of alliances and understandings. Yet a well-known and eminent German writer on foreign politics, the Councillor of Legation, Herr von Rath, wrote on November 3, 1911, in *Der Tag*:—

"To-day it cannot be denied that England strove in the first instance for a political rapprochement with Germany, and that King Edward VII. pursued this plan as soon as he had come to the throne. The strongest sea Power gravitated towards the strongest land Power, and nobody can deny

nowadays that Germany rejected at that time the repeated advances of British Conservative statesman, such as Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and the Duke of Devonshire."

As a matter of fact, Great Britain's attempts to be on the best and the most intimate terms with Germany began long before King Edward VII. had come to the throne. Formerly Great Britain had followed the policy of "splendid isolation." In the 'eighties of last century, when Bismarck's policy of alliances divided Europe into two camps, British statesmen began to recognise the desirability of entering upon more intimate relations with one of the two groups of nations. Englishmen and Germans are far more closely akin by race, national character, and religion than are Englishmen and Frenchmen or Englishmen and Russians. Most Englishmen instinctively desired to march side by side with their German cousins. Besides, at that time there was constant friction in the colonial sphere between France and Great Britain and between Russia and Great Britain. Desiring to enter upon more intimate relations with Germany, British diplomacy began to settle all outstanding differences between the two countries so as to abolish all causes of friction and of dispute. With this object in view it concluded the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, which defined the British and the German spheres of influence in East, West, and South-West Africa. This Agreement was followed by the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of 1894, and later by an Anglo-German understanding regarding the Portuguese colonies in the event of their coming into the market. When in 1897 Germany occupied Kiaochow, Great Britain supported her, and renounced all intentions of connecting Wei-hai-wei by railway with the Shantung hinterland, thus giving to

Germany the monopoly in the exploitation of that important and wealthy province. In 1899 Great Britain concluded with Germany the Samoa Agreement, according to which Great Britain retired altogether from Samoa, whilst Germany received the two most important islands of that group. In 1900 Great Britain concluded with Germany an agreement defining Anglo-German interests in China, the so-called Yangtse Agreement. The mere enumeration of these various agreements shows that during the decade 1890–1900 British diplomacy consistently strove to abolish all differences with Germany in all parts of the world, with the object of bringing about an Anglo-German rapprochement. Unfortunately all attempts of British diplomacy to win Germany's goodwill and all the advances made by British statesmen were rejected by Germany with scorn. Great Britain, her statesmen, and even her rulers were treated by practically the whole semi-official press of Germany with contempt, insults, and ridicule, and complaints arose in responsible quarters that German statesmen were taking unfair advantage of Great Britain by the employment of questionable diplomatic methods.

When British statesmen discovered that they had wasted ten years in fruitless attempts at reconciling Germany, and that Germany had treated every British advance as a sign of cowardice on the part of a hateful enemy, and especially when they saw that, almost within sight of the British coast, an enormous fleet was being constructed which, it was officially proclaimed, was intended to challenge the supremacy of "the mightiest naval Power," they recognised that it was vain to hope any longer for Germany's political friendship, and they turned elsewhere. The Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes were brought

about not by King Edward, but by Germany herself, by her anti-British policy. Germany forced Great Britain to enter into arrangements with Germany's opponents. If Germany is now hedged around by a network of ententes and alliances, she should accuse not the late King Edward, but her own leaders.

Many years ago the Emperor William II. proclaimed, "Germany's future lies upon the sea." During more than twenty years Germany has striven to acquire colonies for her surplus population. The expansion of States is a natural movement. Continental States such as Germany can expand on the land. Insular ones are compelled by nature to expand over-sea. Over-sea colonies are a necessity to an over-populated State such as Great Britain, but they are not so much a necessity to Germany. During a considerable number of years immigration into Germany has been far greater than emigration from Germany. At the census of 1907 it was found that no less than 1,342,292 foreigners were living in Germany. German agriculturists, mine-owners, and manufacturers complain constantly about a shortage of labour. Germany does not yet suffer from over-population. A nation can in safety embark upon a great transmaritime policy only if the motherland is secure, if it occupies an island like Great Britain or Japan, or if it possesses practically an insular position such as the United States. At the time when the Triple Alliance was a reliable entity, and when France, Russia, and Great Britain were all isolated, Germany's position on the Continent was so strong that she could safely devote a very large part of her means to her navy and her over-sea interests; but matters have changed since then. The Triple Alliance exists merely on paper. That alliance was based on

Italy's fear of France and on Austria's fear of Russia. Italy and France, and Austria and Russia, have become friends. The *raison d'être* of the Triple Alliance has gone. It is generally recognised in Germany that Germany cannot count upon Italy's support in the hour of danger, and Austria's support may possibly be doubtful. Germany, as Bismarck foretold in one of the most impressive passages of his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, may be faced by a Pan-European coalition including Austria-Hungary. Bismarck wrote: "If Russian policy succeeds in winning Austria, then the coalition of the Seven Years' War against us is complete, for France can always be induced to act against us, her interests on the Rhine being more important than those in the East and on the Bosphorus."

The greater part of the German colonies was acquired by Bismarck. However, although in Bismarck's time Germany's position in Europe was infinitely stronger than it is now, Bismarck's principal care was to ensure Germany's security on the Continent of Europe, and he attached the greatest value to Great Britain's goodwill and support in view of the possibility of continental complications. Considering Germany's continental interests infinitely more important than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused to pursue a transmaritime and colonial policy in opposition to England, fearing that an anti-British policy would drive England into the arms of France and Russia. Even when diplomatic differences had arisen between the two countries, Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great Britain. On the 2nd March 1884, for instance, he stated in the Reichstag with reference to an Anglo-German dispute :—

"I shall do everything in my power in order *sine ira et studio*, and in the most conciliatory manner, to settle this matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly intercourse which has at all times existed between England and Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse which is most natural because neither Power possesses vital interests which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power. I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies us our modest attempts at colonising."

He laid down at greater length his guiding principles in his intercourse with Great Britain on the 10th January 1885, when he stated in the Reichtag :—

"The last speaker has told us that we must either abandon our colonial policy or increase our naval strength to such an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or, to speak more clearly, that our navy should rival that of England herself. However, even if we should succeed in building up a navy as strong as that of England, we should still have to fear an alliance of England and France. Those Powers are stronger than any single Power in Europe is or ever can be. It follows that the policy indicated by the last speaker is one which can never be striven after.

"I would also ask the last speaker not to make any attempts either to disturb the peace between England and Germany or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I absolutely deny that possibility. Such a possibility does not exist, and all the questions which are at present being discussed between England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really do not know what disputes might arise between England and Germany. There never have been disputes between the two countries. From my diplomatic experience I cannot see any reasons which can make hostilities possible between them unless a Cabinet of inconceivable character should be in power in England, a Cabinet which neither exists nor which is ever likely to exist, and which criminally attacks us."

Four years later, on the 26th January 1889, only

a short time before his dismissal, he stated with reference to the Anglo-German Zanzibar dispute in the Reichstag :—

"I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived at an understanding with England, we shall take the necessary measures in Zanzibar in agreement with England. I do not intend either actively to oppose England or even to take note of those steps which subordinate British individuals have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa we act in perfect harmony with the British Government. We are marching hand in hand, and I am firmly resolved that our relations shall preserve their present character. English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous places, and subordinate colonial officials are occasionally hostile to German interests. Nevertheless we are acting in perfect unison with the British Government, we are absolutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve Anglo-German harmony and to continue working in co-operation with that country.

"The preservation of Anglo-German goodwill is, after all, the most important thing. I see in England an old and traditional ally. No differences exist between England and Germany. If I speak of England as our ally, I am not using a diplomatic term. We have no alliance with England. However, I wish to remain in close contact with England also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched side by side during at least 150 years, and if I should discover that we might lose touch with England, I should act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing England's goodwill."

Modern Germany has erected to Bismarck countless statues. Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and Bismarck's memoirs have been printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, and they are found on the bookshelves of the people by the side of Schiller and Goethe. But modern Germany has forgotten, or she deliberately disregards, Bismarck's policy and Bismarck's warnings. Through the shortsightedness of Bismarck's successors the bonds of the Triple

Alliance have been so much loosened that Germans themselves raise periodically the cry that they are isolated in a hostile world. Yet modern Germany has needlessly increased the danger which threatens her on the Continent still further by throwing Bismarck's warnings to the winds and antagonising Great Britain, which might prove Germany's best and most valuable friend in her hour of need.

The reason that Great Britain is no longer Germany's "old and traditional ally," as Bismarck called her, must be sought not in Great Britain's envy but in the culpable mistakes of Germany's diplomacy. The Germans themselves have begun to find out that the policy and the peculiar diplomatic methods of their statesmen are responsible for the numerous discomfitures which they have experienced in the domain of foreign policy. Among the independent German newspapers the *Frankfurter Zeitung* occupies the leading place. It is conducted, as regards the treatment of foreign questions, with remarkable fairness, fearlessness, and ability. On the 8th November, 1911, that journal published in the most prominent place an article from its London correspondent in which the causes of the Anglo-German differences in connection with the Morocco question were unsparingly exposed in the following words :—

"On the 15th May the German Emperor came to England in order to attend the unveiling of the national memorial to the late Queen. He was received by the people of London with the greatest cordiality. Five weeks later the German Crown Prince arrived in London to attend the Coronation, and he was greeted with the same universal goodwill. A week after King George's Coronation came the bomb of Agadir. Of course one may say: The fact that the Emperor was cordially received by the English people has nothing to do with diplomatic relations. Germany cannot regulate

her political action by the visits of her Sovereign. Such arguments show a complete lack of understanding of the spirit of western democracy. A foreign monarch comes to England. He drives during a week through London. He constantly takes off his grey top hat to cheering crowds, and the man in the street says smilingly: 'Jolly fellow, isn't he?' Now the man in the street makes public opinion, and, after all, Mr. Lloyd George himself is a man in the street who has become a minister.

"When the German Emperor arrived in London, the impression became general in England that Germany would remain quiet. If, at that time, the German Morocco policy was already mapped out, then the Imperial visits to England were a mistake. They brought us with the English people the regrettable reputation of perfidiousness (*Untreue*). Now the reproach of perfidiousness has adhered to German policy for some time. That is known to everybody who is in contact with international diplomacy. It is the irony of fate that the German diplomatic apparatus, which is exclusively served by men belonging to the best families of the aristocracy, does not at all enjoy the credit which is owed to gentlemen."

Editorially the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote on the 29th December 1911:—

"The German navy alone cannot have been the cause of the acute differences which exist between Great Britain and Germany. If we Germans strive for once to place ourselves without prejudice in the position of the British, we must confess that the distrust of Germany which prevails on the other side of the Channel is not without cause. If we Germans had had to hear certain utterances from the mouth of a foreign sovereign, we also would have been startled and would have thought it necessary to strengthen our defences. Now we can only say to the British that the monarchical utterances in question need not be taken too tragically, because we have learned by experience that big words are not followed by big deeds. We know now that the Kruger telegram, the Imperial call to arms against the Yellow Peril, the Emperor's speech at Damascus, his journey to Tangier and the despatch of the *Panther*, were only dramatic gestures devoid of consequences. However, they have had the unfortunate effect of

evoking hostility on the one side and high hopes on the other, which soon were converted into bitter disappointment, and people received the impression that German policy was either dangerous or unreliable. Of late things have improved because injudicious utterances from the highest quarter are no longer reported. Still the distrust of Germany remains, and we cannot be surprised at it. We tell the English unceasingly that the German nation is peaceful, and that it desires to live in harmony with England and all other nations. However, these assurances make no impression, for we are told: We are quite sure that the German people is peaceful, but the German people does not make German policy. German policy is made in a single, irresponsible, and incalculable quarter. Therefore the peaceful assurances of the German people have for us not a practical, but merely a Platonic, value. What can we reply to that argument?"

In Bismarck's time German diplomacy enjoyed a twofold distinction: it pursued a wise, sane, and far-seeing policy, and the diplomatic apparatus was faultlessly served by men of high ability. Modern German diplomacy fails, unfortunately, in both respects, and the German people have begun to complain bitterly about the men in their diplomatic service. Towards the end of December 1911, Mr. L. Raschdau, a former German ambassador, published in several German papers an article on German diplomacy in which he stated that the German ambassadorial service had become defective because the diplomatic career had been reserved to members of the German aristocracy. On this point the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote editorially on the 29th December 1911:—

"The Emperor's advisers and assistants are not selected according to their talent and experience but according to circumstances unconnected with their career and duties. One man is made an ambassador because he is an aristocrat and a man of wealth, another one because he has pleasing social talents, and the third is simply 'commanded' to take

up the post of Imperial Chancellor. The result of such a system, if one can call it a system, is naturally incapacity, amateurishness and lack of success."

In the foregoing pages it has been shown exclusively by means of reliable German evidence that Germany is responsible for the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-German relations, that Anglo-German relations have become what they are because, as the German witnesses quoted have admitted, Germany has deliberately pursued an anti-British policy during a considerable number of years. It has furthermore been shown that Germany's colonial and transmaritime policy, with its strong anti-British bias, was disapproved of by Prince Bismarck, and that many thinking Germans are profoundly dissatisfied not only with the direction of Germany's foreign policy, but also with the men who occupy high positions in the German diplomatic service.

Now we must ask ourselves, Why does Germany pursue towards Great Britain a policy which has compromised her position in the world, which has caused great disappointments to her, and which in the end may lead to a national disaster? The answer is simple. Before the Boer War, when Germany embarked upon her trans-oceanic and anti-British policy, Great Britain's power was much under-estimated in Germany. During many decades German university professors, schoolmasters, and publicists had taught the doctrine that Englishmen were too selfish and too cowardly to defend their country, and that England, like Carthage, was bound to fall through the lack of patriotism among the people and their reliance upon hired soldiers. They had taught that the principal characteristics of the people in the British colonies also was selfishness, that they lacked patriotism, that

they would cling to the motherland only as long as the connection was profitable to them, that the dissolution of the British Empire was inevitable, that Canada and the other great British dominions would earlier or later follow the example of the United States and secede. Roscher, Treitschke, Schmoller, and many other eminent German writers propounded these views. Thus Germany's colonial and anti-British policy was based upon a false estimate of the character and the latent strength of Great Britain and her daughter States, and that false estimate was not revised when the colonies supported Great Britain in the Boer War in splendid loyalty with troops and money, when Canada initiated the system of inter-imperial preferences and bore cheerfully Germany's fiscal hostility, when a number of imperial conferences and imperial defensive arrangements created the nucleus of an imperial army and navy and of an imperial organisation, when Australia and New Zealand introduced universal military service, and when Australia, New Zealand, and Canada began to build powerful squadrons of their own and voluntarily took a share in the Empire's burden of defence.

In their endeavours to challenge British naval supremacy the Germans were encouraged by a singular misconception. They had been told by numerous writers on naval and political subjects that, whilst the British yards could provide any number of warships, the British nation could not furnish enough sailors for manning them. On the 28th October 1908 the *Daily Telegraph* had published an interview with the German Emperor in which he had declared that, in opposition to the majority of the German nation, he was a sincere friend of England. The Emperor's Anglophil utterances aroused the fury of the German

Nationalist press, and, referring to that interview, the *Allgemeine Evangelische Lutherische Kirchenzeitung*, a leading Protestant Church paper, wrote in November of the same year :—

"The Emperor labours strenuously with the object of gaining the goodwill of the British nation. That is not very inspiring for us, but that policy is necessary as long as we have to avoid a war with England for which we are as yet not strong enough. Only since a short time has the German nation learned to understand the necessity of having a powerful fleet. And we must continue building ships in competition with England till the moment arrives, when England may still possess many more ships than we Germans have, but when the English can no longer find the men for navigating and fighting their fleet. Until that moment has arisen, it is madness to urge for war, and meanwhile the Emperor tries to make up for the indiscretions of the German press by his advances to England."

The *Kirchenzeitung* summed up in a few lines the policy which Germany has pursued towards Great Britain during more than a decade. There is evidently a confusion of thought somewhere. Even in the best-informed circles of Germany the opinion is widely held that Great Britain cannot find as many sailors as she requires, probably because the British merchant marine is always short of British sailors and has to employ many thousands of Scandinavians, Lascars, &c. Only a very short time ago one of the most eminent and best-informed German professors told me that Great Britain experienced already the greatest difficulty in manning her fleet, and he looked at me with open-eyed astonishment when I told him that the British naval authorities can always obtain ten recruits for every single one they want, and when I suggested to him that he should study the official recruiting returns.

Germany's transmaritime, anti-British policy is founded on a series of misconceptions and erroneous estimates. Herein lies the reason that her foreign policy has been a gigantic mistake, a mistake which may have the most serious consequences for her. Germany's position is a dangerous one. A great defeat may mean for her the upbreak of the empire. France still remembers Sedan, and wishes to revenge her defeat, and Russia is France's ally. Italy is not trusted by Germany, and Austria may at the critical moment choose to remember that from 1740 to 1866 she has been attacked and despoiled by Prussia, and that Prussia has deprived her of the leading place among the Germanic States which she used to occupy. Should Germany be involved in a great European war, Austria-Hungary might conceivably choose to observe a waiting attitude, and abandon it only when the probable issue had become apparent. The Germans are still the ruling race in Austria. They are the natural supporters of the Hapsburg dynasty, but their number is too small, for they form only a minority. The incorporation of Southern Germany, which is more Austrian than Prussian in character, would greatly strengthen the German element in Austria, and might, at the same time, give back to Austria the hegemony in Germany. It follows that, should fortune desert Germany in a great continental conflict, Austria may revenge herself on Prussia for her past wrongs, and try to wrest from Prussia the paramount position in Germany and recreate a greater Austria at Germany's expense. Thus "the war on three fronts," which was Bismarck's nightmare, might end not only in Germany's defeat, but in Germany's partition.

If, as so many leading Germans assert, it was Great Britain's constant aim to bring about Germany's

downfall, Great Britain should welcome such an event. It is true that, as many German observers have told us, Germany's defeat would benefit British trade and industry. However, Great Britain's policy is not made by shopkeepers. A disastrous defeat of Germany would upset the balance of power in Europe. It would greatly increase the power of France and Russia, it would logically lead to a series of great wars on the Continent, and in the end Great Britain might have to step in and to rebuild Germany at the cost of a great war in order to re-establish a balance of power on the Continent of Europe. Only the short-sighted and the foolish can wish for Germany's downfall.

Great Britain has little cause to plead for Germany's goodwill, for she suffers little through the existing Anglo-German tension, whilst isolated Germany suffers much and risks more. Whilst Great Britain's position throughout the world is secure, that of Germany is very precarious because of her exposed frontiers. As matters stand at present, Germany has far more need of Great Britain's support than Great Britain has of Germany's. It is true that Germany possesses still the strongest army in Europe, but it is not strong enough to face a great European combination. She is no longer a danger to the peace of the world, owing to her isolation and to the estrangement of Great Britain. The minds of her statesmen must rather be preoccupied with the problem of defending Germany than with ambitious wars of aggression. Under these circumstances it is madness for Germany's rulers to continue proclaiming that Germany requires more Dreadnoughts, and still more Dreadnoughts, and ever more Dreadnoughts against Great Britain.

Germany's prospects are dark and threatening.

She is not rich enough and not strong enough to maintain at the same time the strongest army and a navy able to challenge the strongest navy. Every nation which has tried to become supreme on land and sea has failed. Germany has undoubtedly neglected her army whilst constructing her fleet. Already some of her leading men are pointing out her danger. In the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for January 1912 Professor Hans Delbrück, one of Germany's leading historians and political writers, warned the Government not to enlarge once more the Navy Bill of 1900 at the bidding of the German Navy League, but to increase instead the insufficient strength of the German army. In *Der Tag* of the 10th January 1912 General von Loebell complained that Germany raises yearly only 44 recruits per 10,000 of population, whilst France raises 63 recruits per 10,000 of population. In *Die Post* of the 9th January 1912, a leading article urged the Government to increase the German army greatly, because "the German army was of a strength commensurate to a nation of 45,000,000, but not of 65,000,000 people." Many similar views have been expressed, and so concerned have patriotic Germans become about the exposed position of their country and the insufficient strength of their army that, on the model of the great German Navy League, a Wehrverein, a society for promoting a great increase of the German army, has lately been founded by the citizens.

Can Anglo-German relations be improved, and what should be done to improve them ?

Unfortunately, deep distrust exists between Great Britain and Germany. That distrust is unwarranted on the part of Germany, and it has been artificially created among them by a campaign of misrepresentation. The German masses have so persistently been

told that Great Britain is envious of Germany's prosperity, and that she plots to bring about her downfall, that they have at last come to believe it, and are clamouring for a powerful fleet for their defence against Great Britain. British distrust of Germany, on the other hand, is due to this artificial German agitation, to the attitude of Germany's diplomacy, to the anti-British pronouncements of Germany's leaders and the German press, and especially to the most palpable evidence of Germany's intentions, the great German fleet, which, as many Germans have admitted, can only be meant for use against Great Britain.

The continued enlargement of the German fleet will not increase Germany's security, for under no conceivable circumstances will Great Britain and her colonies allow the unchallengeable supremacy of the British navy to be in the least reduced by Germany. On the other hand, the continued enlargement of the German fleet is bound to increase the tension between the two countries. Therefore the first step towards an improvement of Anglo-German relations must be taken by Germany, and it must take the shape of a limitation of naval armaments.

The Navy Bill of 1900, with its subsequent enlargements of 1905 and 1908, fixed Germany's output of warships till 1917, and provided for two large ships in every year between 1912 and 1917, or twelve altogether. However, the German Navy League and the German Nationalist Press demanded in 1912 that the Navy Bill of 1900 should again be increased, and that in every year from 1912 to 1917 three super-Dreadnoughts should be constructed. Their demands were granted. If the German Government construct between 1912 and 1917 eighteen super-Dreadnoughts, Great Britain will have to produce thirty-six super-

Dreadnoughts. Had the German Government really wished to improve Anglo-German relations, it could have shown that it was in earnest by keeping her shipbuilding programme within the limits laid down by the Navy Bill of 1900 and the amendments of 1905 and 1908. It has missed a great opportunity, and in view of Germany's attitude and naval armaments, it is quite useless for Germans and Englishmen to talk of Anglo-German friendship and co-operation and of the natural union of the countries of Goethe and Shakespeare.

As soon as Germany has shown by deeds that she wishes to live on good terms with Great Britain, as soon as she has shown that she desires no longer to create for herself "a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power," Great Britain will reciprocate. Great Britain can give valuable assistance to Germany in all parts of the world. As soon as Great Britain feels convinced that Germany's intentions are peaceful, the Anglo-German differences regarding the greatest transmaritime undertaking of Germany, the Baghdad Railway, which at present is considered in Great Britain to be rather a German strategical railway than a Turkish business undertaking, will no doubt be adjusted. In course of time colonies may come into the market, and with British support Germany will easily obtain the outlets which she requires. If, on the other hand, Germany again enlarges her naval programme and continues antagonising and demonstratively threatening Great Britain, Anglo-German relations will steadily become worse, and we shall have every reason to take a pessimistic view of the future.

I have lately spent six weeks in Germany, where

I have met many of the leading people, and I have unfortunately received the distinct impression that the German Government does not wish for an improvement in Anglo-German relations. Apparently its policy is to keep alive the artificially created national animosity against Great Britain by encouraging the unceasing misrepresentations and attacks upon Great Britain in the semi-official Press. Its principal aim seems to be the creation of an extremely powerful navy. Ever since 1900 it has appealed to popular passion for support, and has called upon the people to provide the necessary sums "to protect Germany against England's hostility." As long as the possession of a powerful navy is Germany's principal aim, it does not suit the German Government to be on good terms with Great Britain. In view of Germany's deliberate and calculated ill-will, all advances on the part of Great Britain will be useless.

The German Press is still repeating the fable that, during the Morocco crisis, Sir Edward Grey had threatened Germany, who had never intended to occupy a part of Morocco. Unfortunately a portion of the British Press have echoed the German story, and has violently attacked Sir Edward for his unwarranted interference. It is true that the German Chancellor and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs have publicly declared that Germany had never intended to occupy Moroccan territory, but since then revelations have been made which belie their assertions. Before a court of law, in a political libel suit brought by the editor of the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* against the *Grenzboten*, the editor of the former paper stated on the 19th January 1912 :—

"Mr. Class, the President of the Pan-Germanic League, is prepared to state upon oath before this Court that the

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Kiderlen Wächter, writing to him from Kissingen, requested Mr. Class to meet him at the Hotel Pfälzer Hof in Mannheim. During the interview, which occupied several hours, Herr von Kiderlen Wächter stated: 'The Pan-Germanic demand for the possession of Morocco is absolutely justified. You can absolutely rely upon it that the Government will stick to Morocco. Monsieur Cambon is wriggling before me like a worm. The German Government is in a splendid position. You can rely upon me, and you will be very pleased with our Morocco policy. I am as good a Pan-German as you are.' On the 1st July Mr. Class called at the German Foreign Office and, failing to find Herr von Kiderlen Wächter, was received by Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. Mr. Zimmermann told him: 'You come at an historic hour. To-day the *Panther* appears before Agadir, and at this moment (12 o'clock midday) the Foreign Cabinets are being informed of its mission. The German Government has sent two *agents provocateurs* to Agadir, and these have done their duty very well. German firms have been induced to make complaints and to call upon the Government in Berlin for protection. It is the Government's intention to seize the district, and it will not give it up again. The German people require absolutely a settlement Colony. Please prevent, wherever in the Press you have influence, the raising of claims for compensation elsewhere. Possibly France will offer us the Congo. However, the German Government does not want compensation elsewhere, but a part of Morocco.'"

The foregoing most important and most interesting statement throws a vivid light upon the Morocco crisis and explains its genesis. This statement appeared, as far as I am aware, only in the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* and in the *Tägliche Rundschau*, but it was suppressed by the German semi-official Press, which preserved a judicious and significant silence. However, as it was not repudiated by Herr Class, by Herr von Kiderlen Wächter, or by Herr Zimmermann, we must assume that it was correct

in substance and in detail. The statement shows clearly that it was Germany's deliberate intention to occupy Morocco, notwithstanding the protestations to the contrary of the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary. It has made it clear that, but for Great Britain's energetic intervention, war would most probably have broken out between Germany and France over Morocco. We may therefore conclude that, through the British Government's timely and vigorous action, peace was preserved, and that the German complaints about Sir Edward Grey's "unwarranted interference" are baseless.

CHAPTER XII

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—CAN GERMANY RELY UPON HER PARTNERS ?

WHENEVER one of the Powers belonging to the Triple Alliance takes some decisive action without consulting its partners, statesmen and politicians begin to speculate whether the Triple Alliance is still valid. Soon their speculations are reflected in the public Press, and in due course semi-official and official statements appear assuring us that the Triple Alliance is more necessary than ever for the peace of the world, that its binding power continues unimpaired, and that the tie between the three allied monarchs and nations is stronger than ever. Therefore many people have come to believe that the Triple Alliance is as strong and as permanent a factor in international politics as is the German Empire or the Swiss Confederation.

Italy's seizure of Tripoli and her attack upon Turkey has been strongly disapproved of by her partners, and especially by Austria-Hungary. Austria's reproaches have met with very vigorous Italian replies. However, acts are more important than words. It was noticed that practically the whole of the Italian expeditionary force sent to Tripoli was drawn from the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th army corps, that is, from the west of Italy and Sicily. Whilst Italy thus to some extent denuded of troops her western frontier facing France, she not only maintained unimpaired, but actually strengthened,

her garrisons facing the territory of her ally, Austria-Hungary, and her garrisons on the shore of the Adriatic, where an Austrian landing might possibly take place. The military correspondent of *The Times* wrote: "The Italian Staff retains as much as possible the power to act against Austria should the necessity arise." Commenting on this curious fact, and various other facts of similar portent, we have again been told that the Triple Alliance is breaking up, but once more the official sources of information have assured us that nothing has occurred to weaken the tie between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

Many British people are insufficiently acquainted with the binding force of international agreements in general, and very few people are aware of the serious differences which exist, and which have existed for a long time, within the Triple Alliance, and especially between Austria-Hungary and Italy. These differences are so great, and they have lately become so acute, that they may and probably will lead at an early date to an important change in the grouping of the Powers. Therefore we should ask ourselves: What is the binding force of international treaties and alliances, and what is Italy's position in the Triple Alliance?

Agreements between States are frequently compared with agreements between persons because of the similarity of the quasi-legal wording used in both. However, notwithstanding the analogy of the language used, and the apparent similarity of the transaction, such comparison is not justified. A civil agreement is absolutely binding upon its signatories and can be enforced by a court of law. A merchant who has agreed to sell certain goods at a certain price cannot successfully try to avoid performance by ad-

vancing the plea that fulfilment of the contract would be unprofitable or disastrous to him. The binding force of a civil contract is absolute. On the other hand, an agreement between nations possesses neither unconditional validity nor unlimited binding force. By signing a contract a merchant binds only himself, and he must fulfil the contract even if he has signed away his property. His misfortune affects only himself. Hence it is right that the law courts enforce the unconditional fulfilment of private contracts. But an agreement between States bears a totally different character. Such an agreement is concluded, not by the principals—that is, by the nations themselves—acting in full knowledge of the case and of their responsibility, but only by their temporary agents who are acting on the nation's behalf, by statesmen who have been appointed to promote the interests of the nation and to increase the prosperity of the people. They are the trustees of the nation, and they are neither entitled to sign away the happiness and prosperity of the nation on behalf of which they are acting, nor to fulfil treaty obligations if they are convinced that their performance would be ruinous to the people. Hence a statesman is in certain circumstances bound to deny the validity and binding force of an international agreement, even if it has been signed, not by a predecessor in office, but by himself. Treaties of alliance resemble laws in their conditional validity. Laws lapse automatically when they are no longer in accordance with the spirit of the time.

On the British statute book there are many laws which can no longer be enforced, although they have not been formally repealed. Similarly treaties of alliance, having been concluded between nations with

the object of promoting their common interests, lapse automatically when the treaty Powers cease to possess those common interests and aims in furtherance of which the treaties were originally concluded. Bismarck, the father of modern statesmanship, explained repeatedly with his usual directness and lucidity that treaties of alliance possess neither unconditional validity nor unlimited binding force, that both were affected by changing times and circumstances. He stated, for instance, in the Reichstag on February 6th, 1888 :—

"No great Power can, for any length of time, be tied by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests of the people, and if it has done so it will eventually be compelled openly to declare: 'The times have altered. I cannot do it.' And it must justify its action before the people and before its allies as best it can. But to ruin its own people by fulfilling one's treaty duties to the letter, that is an action which no great Power can assent to. However, this is by no means demanded in any treaty. . . . Treaties are only the expression of a community of aims and of risks which are run by the treaty-concluding Powers."

In his political testament, his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, Bismarck wrote :—

"All contracts between great States cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the struggle for existence. No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity. . . . To-day it is hardly possible for the Government of a great Power to place its resources at the disposal of a friendly State when the sentiment of the people disapproves of it. . . . The clause *Rebus sic stantibus* is tacitly understood to apply to all treaties which involve performance."

The Triple Alliance was originally a purely defensive instrument. It has been repeatedly renewed, and

there is no reason for believing that it has changed its character. Bismarck foresaw that this Alliance might come to an end by a change in the political conditions of Europe, for he wrote in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* :—

"The Triple Alliance has the significance of a strategical position which was taken up in view of the threatening dangers which prevailed at the time of its conclusion. It has been prolonged from time to time, and it may be possible to prolong it still further, but eternal duration is assured to no treaty between great Powers, and it would be unwise to consider it as affording a permanently secure guarantee against all possible contingencies which may modify the political, material and moral conditions under which it was brought into being. The Triple Alliance no more constitutes a foundation capable of offering perennial resistance to time and change than did the numerous other Triple or Quadruple Alliances which preceded it."

The great German statesman actually foretold that the Triple Alliance would come to an end if the relations between Italy and France should become friendly, that Italy might turn against Austria-Hungary if she could feel secure of French aggression. He told Moritz Busch in 1888: "We cannot quite rely upon Italy. The French may again gain ground in that country. France and Italy may become friends not only after a change has taken place in France's form of Government, but even if the Republic should be maintained. In case of a reconciliation with France, Italy might resume her Irredentist policy and renew her claims upon Austrian territory." It will appear in the following pages that Bismarck's prophecy has come true. However, before considering Austro-Italian relations and Italy's policy towards Austria-Hungary, let us inquire why Italy joined the Triple

Alliance, for only then shall we be able to understand Italy's attitude towards her allies.

Bismarck created bitter hostility between France and Italy by giving Tunis to France at the Congress of Berlin. Tunis lies at a distance of only a hundred miles from the coast of Sicily and from that of Sardinia. Italy had the strongest claims upon Tunis, partly because of her geographical proximity, partly because nearly all the European residents in Tunis were Italian citizens. Under these circumstances France's occupation of Tunis was felt as a serious attack upon Italy's interests. Soon after having taken possession of Tunis, France converted into a first-class arsenal and war harbour the port of Bizerta, which is equidistant from Sicily and Sardinia, and stationed a fleet there. Thus she was able to threaten Italy's enormous and exposed coast-line simultaneously in the north-west from Toulon and in the extreme south of the country. It is widely known that Bismarck caused Italy to join the Austro-German Alliance by giving Tunis to France, but only a few people, most of whom are diplomats, are aware that Bismarck threatened Italy with a war with Austria-Hungary unless she should ally herself with the two Germanic States, that Italy did not join the Austro-German Alliance by her own free choice, but was actually coerced into joining it. Describing the foreign policy of Count Robilant, a former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who took a very prominent part in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, the Marchese Cappelli, who himself has been a Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in his book, *La Politica estera del conte de Robilant* :—

" None knew better than Count Robilant how much we were isolated and how great was the danger arising from the

hostility which certain Powers displayed towards us. When Prince Bismarck went to Vienna in 1879 in connection with the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, the Italian Ambassador was the only Ambassador in Vienna who was not visited by the Prince. That was not the only evidence of Germany's attitude towards Italy. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassy, told Bismarck that Austria had been constantly provoked by the agitation of the Italian Irredentists and that she might at last feel compelled to make war upon Italy, and he asked the Prince whether, in that event, Germany would have any objection to Austria taking possession of part of those Italian Provinces which had been Austrian and which Austria had lost to Italy in 1859 and 1866. Bismarck hesitated a moment and then answered: 'No, we would not raise any objections. Italy is none of our friends.' About the same time the Papal Nuncio inquired whether Germany would object to the re-establishment, or at least the partial re-establishment, of the Pope's temporal power, and he received exactly the same reply. These utterances showed Germany's sentiments towards Italy."

Monsieur A. Billot, who from 1890 to 1897 was the French Ambassador in Rome, wrote :—

"Italy's hesitation to join the Austro-German Alliance was overcome by alarming the Italian Government. Germany pretended to be favourably inclined towards the Vatican, and took openly steps towards a reconciliation with the Pope. Thus Italy was trapped into an alliance of which the first advantage was to be this, that Italy would be guaranteed against all attempts to restore the temporal power of the Pope, a policy which was favoured, or at least not disapproved of, by Germany."

Apparently Bismarck had the greatest contempt for Italy. In 1880 he said to Busch: "The Italians are like carrion crows on the battlefield that let others provide their food. They were prepared in 1870 to fall upon us with others if they were promised a piece of Tyrol. At that time a Russian diplomat

said: 'What! They are asking for something again, although they have not yet lost a battle!'" Nevertheless he forced Italy into joining the Austro-German Alliance, because he wished to be sure that in a war between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side, and France and Russia on the other side, Austria-Hungary should be able to use her entire army against Russia.

Long before 1883, the year when Italy joined the Austro-German Alliance, it had been Bismarck's policy to create differences between France and Italy with regard to the Mediterranean, differences which by weakening France were likely to benefit Germany. He wrote, in 1868, to Count Usedom, his Ambassador in Italy:—

"Italy is France's natural rival, and the two countries will always be rivals and sometimes enemies. Nature has thrown between the two an apple of contention, for which they will fight for ever: the Mediterranean, that wonderful inter-continental harbour of Europe, Asia, and Africa, that channel between the Atlantic and the Pacific, that basin which is surrounded by the fairest countries in the world. It is surely not idle to believe that France envies Italy and its position, which stretches far into the Mediterranean, and which possesses the most beautiful shores and the shortest route to the Orient. France and Italy can never become allies, sharing the advantages of the Mediterranean, for this is an indivisible heritage. It belongs undoubtedly to Italy, whose Mediterranean shores are twelve times as extensive as are the Mediterranean shores of France."

How deeply Italy was wounded by France's occupation of Tunis will be seen from the fact that the signature of the Franco-Tunisien Treaty on the 12th May 1881 was followed two days later by the fall of the Cairoli Cabinet. Franco-Italian relations became exceedingly strained. Italy began in haste to

increase her army and to build a fleet able to encounter the strong French navy. The tension between the two countries caused the outbreak of a customs war which lasted ten years. Her vast expenses on armaments, and the virtual closing of the French frontier to Italian products, and of the Paris money market to Italian loans, impoverished Italy greatly and brought her to the verge of national bankruptcy.

The policy of keeping France and Italy apart by artificial means was successful only as long as Bismarck directed Germany's policy. After his dismissal Germany's policy lacked a firm, directing hand, France began to display independent diplomatic initiative, and to pull the diplomatic wires of Europe as Bismarck had done during thirty years. Monsieur Delcassé resolved to clear away the differences which Bismarck had created between France and Great Britain on the one side, and between France and Italy on the other, and he succeeded. The Franco-Italian understanding began with the Agreement of 1898 regarding Crete, and with a Treaty regarding Tripoli in 1899. The Franco-Italian customs war, which had been so disastrous to Italy, was ended. France and Italy arrived at a thorough understanding as to the Mediterranean, and the two Powers became friends. Italy felt no longer threatened by France, for France acted towards her with the greatest loyalty. As far as Italy was concerned, the Triple Alliance was no longer a necessity.

If we wish to understand Italy's foreign policy, we must acquaint ourselves with two great political currents—the Irredentist movement, and the Expansionist movement. *Irredenta Italia* means the unredeemed Italy. The larger part of Italy was until lately under Austrian domination. The policy of the

Irredentists is to "redeem" those territories which, though Italian in character, still belong to foreign countries, and to unite them with the kingdom of Italy. The lands which the Irredentists claim most loudly and most persistently belong to Austria-Hungary. They are the Southern Tyrol and parts of the provinces of Istria and Dalmatia, with the towns of Trieste, Pola, and Fiume. The spirit of the Irredentist has become the spirit of Young Italy with the approval of the Italian Government. In the school-book history of Giovanni Soli, which is used in the majority of elementary schools in Italy, occurs the following passage: "By the conquest of Rome Italy was freed nearly entirely from the domination of foreigners. We say *nearly* entirely, because two parts of Italy belong still to Austria—namely, the South of Tyrol and Istria with Trieste, two beautiful countries which possess more than 1,000,000 inhabitants."

Austria-Hungary possesses, indeed, almost 1,000,000 Italian inhabitants, and these live in dense masses close to the Italian frontier. It is not generally known that of the 900,000 inhabitants of the Austrian Tyrol about 400,000 are Italians, and that the south of that country, with the towns of Trento, Rovereto, Ala, Bondo, Borgo, &c., is purely Italian, 95 per cent. of the inhabitants being Italians. France and Switzerland also possess small districts peopled by Italians, but the Irredentists are particularly hostile to Austria-Hungary because the Austrians have in the past ruled Italy tyrannically, and are endeavouring now to stifle and suppress Italian culture among the Italians living in the Dual Monarchy by opposing the creation of Italian schools, &c.

Austria's greatest harbour is Trieste. Trieste, the Hamburg of Austria, is as Italian as is Genoa: nine-

tenths of its inhabitants are Italians. Of the inhabitants of Fiume, Austria-Hungary's second largest commercial harbour, one-half are Italians; and of the inhabitants of Pola, her most important naval harbour, more than half are Italians. Italy has ancient historical claims to the possession of the whole of the eastern shore of the Adriatic, and especially to that part which is now in Austria's hands. The coasts of the Adriatic Sea were conquered, colonised, and civilised by the Venetians. The names of the greatest Austrian coast towns on the Adriatic, such as Trieste, Capo d'Istria, Parenzo, Rovigno, Pola, Alona, Fiume, Veglia, Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Ragusa, &c., proclaim their Italian origin. They are Italian in appearance and in civilisation, and in most of them the emblem of the Venetian lion will still be found prominently displayed on the old public buildings and on the gates and walls. The Adriatic used to be a purely Italian sea. In old Italian documents it is called Il Golfo di Venezia, or simply Il Golfo, and the modern Italians refer to it frequently and significantly as "Il mare nostro."

Italy is a very densely populated country, and as the birth-rate is very high she has a great surplus population. Italy is naturally a poor country, for she possesses practically no coal, no iron, and scarcely any timber. The largest part of her territory is covered with mountains and rocks. Owing to the natural poverty of Italy, her citizens are forced to emigrate in large numbers. Italian emigration is by far the largest in the world. In 1909 it amounted to 625,637 people. Per thousand of population there were, in 1909, 3.9 emigrants in Germany, 64.2 emigrants in Great Britain, and no less than 182.6 emigrants in Italy. These extraordinary figures show

that Italy's need for settlement colonies is far greater and far more urgent than that of Great Britain or of Germany. Italy is loath to strengthen foreign nations with her surplus population.

In which direction can Italy expand?

Modern Italy is the heir of ancient Italy. She wishes to renew the ancient greatness and glory of the country and to increase its national strength. She cannot expand to the north, west, and south, but only to the east. She sees in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula a natural and legitimate field for expansion and colonisation. Albania, which lies almost within sight of the Italian shore, is her more immediate goal.

The King of Italy, the Italian Government, and the Italian people have shown that they take the strongest interest in Albania. Numerous Italian travellers have visited, studied, and described the country, and numerous Italian capitalists have financed Albanian enterprises. The Government has endeavoured to befriend the Albanians and to win their goodwill by creating and subsidising Italian schools in the country, and by sending there medical, scientific, and charitable missions. It is worth noting that the Italian Government does not subsidise the Roman Catholic Church, except in the Balkan Peninsula, and especially in Albania. It has created commercial agencies and has subsidised lines of steamers trading between Albania and Italy, and the result of these endeavours has been very gratifying to the Italians, but not at all pleasing to the Austrians.

The marriage of King Vittorio Emanuele of Italy to the fourth daughter of King Nicolas of Montenegro, which took place in 1896, was not by any means devoid of political significance. Already in 1896 Italy looked towards Albania as a promising field of

expansion, and was concerned about the future of the Balkan Peninsula. The young Italian king testified to his interest in the Balkans by marrying a Balkan princess. Montenegro is the neighbour of Albania. The country is very small. It forms a natural mountain fortress of great strength. It has only 250,000 inhabitants, and the population is exceedingly brave and warlike. Montenegro is likely to play an important part in the settlement of the Balkan question. One daughter of the King of Montenegro has married the King of Italy, another one has married the King of Servia, and two others have married Russian Grand Dukes. Owing to his powerful friends and relatives he wields an influence which is quite out of proportion to the size of his country. He is "the father-in-law of Eastern Europe," and his little State is a pivot of European policy. Montenegro stands, so to say, under Russia's and Italy's joint protection, and Russia and Italy have provided the little State with an ample supply of guns, rifles, ammunition, &c., for the country is too poor to supply its own arms. Thus Montenegro has become a fortified Russian-Italian outpost on the road from Vienna to Salonica, and it is able to block that road. Herein lies its great importance.

Austria's ambition to acquire Salonica is nearly as old as Russia's ambition to acquire Constantinople. Austria recognised the strategical importance of Montenegro in connection with Salonica many years ago, and in 1879, at the Congress of Berlin, she took steps designed to bring Montenegro into her power. Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin placed the policing of the port of Antivari, Montenegro's only port, under Austria's control. It closed Antivari to the warships of all nations, and forbade the Montenegrins to have a navy of their own. It also allowed Austria to control

the building of a road and of a railway in Montenegro. Last, but not least, Austria insisted in Berlin upon the cession of Spizza, a point which dominates the harbour of Antivari, and upon the right of fortifying it, and she obtained what she had asked for. When at the Congress Count Launay, the Italian plenipotentiary, asked why Austria wished to annex Spizza, and explained that Italy had special interests to guard in the Adriatic, Baron Haymerle, the Austrian representative, replied that the territory of Spizza covered only about half a square mile and had a population of only about 350 families. Austria was guided in her demand by the consideration that the possession of Spizza, which dominates the port of Antivari, would ensure that Antivari and the surrounding coast should preserve a purely commercial character.

Austria's real reasons are evident. The two most important towns in Montenegro are Cettinje, the capital, and Antivari, its only seaport. Cettinje lies at a very short distance from the Austrian harbour of Cattaro. Spizza might be made to dominate Antivari, and Cattaro Cettinje. Since the Treaty of Berlin Austria has strongly fortified Cattaro and Spizza, and has mounted heavy guns in both places. From the new Austrian fortress of Cattaro shells can be thrown into Cettinje, and the guns at Spizza can easily destroy Antivari and the shipping in the port. When the King of Montenegro looks out of the window of his palace at Cettinje, he can almost look down the muzzles of the Austrian guns mounted at Cattaro; and when he goes down to Antivari, his only seaport, he is within range of the Austrian guns at Spizza. Austria has deliberately tried to strangle Montenegro. She is not beloved at Cettinje.

Salonica is likely to become the most important harbour in the Mediterranean, being situated close to Constantinople and the Suez Canal and on the most direct route from London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna to the countries of Asia Minor and the Far East. It may in the future almost monopolise the European trade with the East *viâ* the Mediterranean. But in order to be able to hold that port, Austria must secure the possession of its hinterland, of Albania, and she cannot tolerate that Albania should fall into Italy's hands. Freiherr von Chlumecky wrote :—

" The possession of Salonica is our hope for the future. At a time when Asia Minor has been opened to civilisation, and when railways cross Mesopotamia, Macedonia will flourish greatly, Salonica will become a place of very great importance. However, the possession of Salonica could never make up for the loss of the Adriatic which would be caused if Albania should become Italian. Salonica would be of value to us only as a complement to Trieste and Fiume."

Ten years ago, on the 7th June 1901, Signor Guicciardini, who at one time was Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in the Italian Parliament :—

" The principal interests of Italy are in the Mediterranean. They centre round Tripoli and Albania. Whilst Tripoli is a great Italian interest, Albania is an absolutely vital interest of ours. We can never allow Albania to fall into the hands of a first-class Power, and we can still less allow it to fall into the hands of a second-class Power which belongs to the political system of a first-class Power. We have tolerated the rise of Bizerta, but we cannot tolerate the creation of another Bizerta at Valona or at Durazzo."

Valona and Durazzo are the principal harbours of Albania. The foregoing quotations show—and many similar ones might be given—that Austria's and Italy's aims and ambitions in Albania are incompatible.

Apparently Austria aims at obtaining the direct control of Albania, whilst Italy, in conjunction with Montenegro, aims at creating an independent Balkan Federation. The Serbians, Bulgarians, Croats, and Montenegrins belong all to the Serbian race. They speak the same language, and no valid reason against the co-operation of the different Serbian nations can be urged by any nation—except Austria-Hungary. The Austrian provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia are inhabited principally by Serbians. Austria-Hungary keeps all her different nationalities together by the principle *Divide et impera.* The creation of a great Serbian confederation in the Balkans close to the Austrian frontier—there are altogether about 8,000,000 Serbians in the east of Europe, and of these about 3,000,000 live in Austria-Hungary itself—might make her Serbian provinces untenable to Austria.

King Nicolas of Montenegro is not only the greatest citizen but also the greatest poet of his country, and his great ideal has always been that peace and prosperity should be created in the Balkan Peninsula through the co-operation of all the Serbian Balkan nations. He has expressed this ideal in numerous poems, songs, and dramas which, as far as I am aware, have not been translated from the Serbian into the English language. I have endeavoured to render some characteristic and significant lines from his allegorical drama *The Empress of the Balkans,* which run approximately as follows :—

" In fervent love for our ancestral soil
Let us replant that grand and ancient tree,
And 'neath its boughs let all the Serbians dance
In God-like liberty. And those who fall
In fighting for their country will be blest.

And let the Serbian to his Bulgar brother
Say: Now this Servia does belong to me,
Yours is Bulgaria, and these other lands
Belong to the Croatians.—Oh, my brothers,
We three must stand together and must call
For the assistance of the clever Greeks,
And let the angels upon high Olympus
Rejoice at our great unity."

One of the characters in the play is made to say :—

" The Germans and the Magyars, I am sure,
Will help us mightily to free our country."

To this the father replies :—

" May of the Germans and of the Magyars
Almighty God defend us. For the wolf
Will never change his skin. We fought alone
In our great past, and fate decrees
That men cannot have liberty
Unless they pay for it with pain and tears."

If the problem of European Turkey should be solved by the creation of a great Balkan Confederation—and this solution seems quite feasible—the question of the presidency will arise. Possibly the presidency will be offered to the King of Montenegro. Possibly, and perhaps one ought to say probably, it will be offered to an Italian Prince or to the King of Italy upon the recommendation of the King of Montenegro. He might become Emperor of the Balkans. Italy would acquire a position of the greatest prestige and influence in the Balkans, a protectorship but not a protectorate. However, Italy would first have to overcome Austria-Hungary's determined opposition, for Austria will not easily give up her claims to Salonica. The policies pursued by Austria and Italy, not only in Albania, but throughout the Balkan

Peninsula, are incompatible. Yet the Powers are allies.

The first need of a great country is security from foreign aggression. The Italian Irredentists and Expansionists are equally anxious that their country should be secure from foreign attack. Now, although Italy is separated from France and Austria-Hungary by great mountain ranges, her position on the land side is by no means secure except towards France, because in that direction large mountain chains situated on Italian territory impede an invasion. On the other hand, the mountain ranges which separate Italy from Austria-Hungary are situated, not on Italian soil, but in the Austrian Tyrol. An Austrian army can without difficulty descend from the Tyrolese mountains into the plains of Italy, and, by the irony of Fate, the Tyrolese mountains which should protect Italy are inhabited by Italians.

Italy is extremely vulnerable, not only on her Austrian land frontier, but also on the coasts, and especially on the coasts of the Adriatic facing Austria. Many large towns, such as Genoa, Livorno, Naples, Reggio, Messina, Palermo, Catania, Taranto, Brindisi, Ancona, Venice, and countless smaller ones, are open coast towns which are exposed to forced contribution, bombardment, and capture from the sea. Rome, Padua, Ravenna, Pisa lie only about ten miles from the coast. Italy's principal railways and high-roads hug the shore from one end to the other of the peninsula, and they can easily be destroyed in many places by small landing-parties. Nature has been very partial in creating the Adriatic. She has given an open and almost defenceless coast to Italy, and has created a large number of excellent, natural harbours protected by high surrounding hills and mountains

all along the coast which faces Italy. The western, or Italian, shore of the Adriatic is mostly flat and sandy, and is devoid of natural bays and harbours. Therefore the ships anchoring in the small Italian ports are exposed to all winds, and especially to the Bora, the most dangerous wind of the Adriatic. The flatness of the shore makes the landing of an army on the beach easy. The eastern, or Austrian and Albanian, shore of the Adriatic is rocky and mountainous, and possesses a profusion of deep and excellent bays, harbours, and inlets. The Austrian ports of Pola, Cattaro, and Sebenico are among the finest and largest protected natural harbours in the world. Between Pola and Ragusa, a distance of three hundred miles, there are some sixty ports on the Austrian part of the Adriatic shore which can be used as stations for torpedo-boats. The southern prolongation of the Austrian coast, the Albanian coast, also has excellent natural harbours, which could easily be fortified and converted into war harbours.

At present Italy's only important naval harbour on the Adriatic is Venice, which, by its geographical position and through the absence of surrounding hills, is of very little value if compared with the Austrian port of Pola which faces it. The harbour of Pola, situated near the northern end of the Adriatic Sea, consists of a spacious bay. It is surrounded with hills, and it is protected from the sea by several well-fortified hilly islands lying in front of it. It is defended by no less than twenty-eight forts. Signor Pellegrini wrote: "A naval balance of power in the Adriatic could be said to exist only if there were on the Italian coast a counterpoise to the Austrian Pola, but there is no such counterpoise. It is merely a phrase devoid of meaning to speak of a balance of

power in the Adriatic as long as there exists the naval harbour of Pola." Similar views have been uttered by the highest naval authorities in Italy.

South of Pola, and 125 miles distant from it, lies the magnificent natural harbour of Sebenico. It is surrounded by an amphitheatre of hills. Several large fleets could find shelter in its waters, which are more than a hundred feet deep. South of Sebenico, and 185 miles distant from it, lies the magnificent and strongly-fortified harbour of Cattaro, which dominates Cettinje. Naturally the Italians are asking themselves: "Against which Power is Austria fortifying the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic? What use will she make of the magnificent natural harbours opposite our own unprotected shore?" South of Cattaro, and ninety miles distant from it, in Albanian-Turkish territory, lies the magnificent and naturally-protected harbour of Durazzo; and south of Durazzo, and sixty miles distant from it, lies the magnificent and naturally-protected harbour of Valona, which is also called Ablona. The Adriatic is a long arm of the Mediterranean. It has a narrow opening, the Strait of Otranto. Now the port of Valona lies on the narrowest part of the Strait of Otranto, and is separated by a distance of only forty miles from the Italian shore opposite. By its position at the narrow opening of the Adriatic and its great natural strength, Valona is undoubtedly the most valuable among the many valuable strategical harbours which face the east coast of Italy, and Austria and Italy are equally anxious to secure its control. The question whether Austria or Italy is to control the Adriatic is another point with regard to which Austrian and Italian interests are irreconcilable. Whilst Italy argues that her security compels her to control the Adriatic, and

especially its strong eastern shore, Austria argues that her only way to the sea is *viâ* the Adriatic, and that she cannot allow another nation to control her only outlet to the sea. Besides, she argues that the trade of Albania is by nature Austria's trade, for the whole of Austria's inward and outward shipping must pass the Albanian coast, whilst the Italian steamers have to go out of their way if they wish to touch Albania. Italy's economic policy in Albania, and Austria's economic policy in that country, are evidently as conflicting as are the political aims of the two countries in that region.

The modern history of Italy is the history of her wars with Austria. In the Southern Tyrol Austria holds the key to Italy's door. In the Adriatic and in the Balkan Peninsula Austria opposes Italy's political and economic expansion. Besides, she oppresses the Italians living in Austria. Italy was forced against her will to enter the Austro-German Alliance. It is therefore only natural that many patriotic Italians are bitterly opposed to Austria and to the Triple Alliance.

In the year 1906 Signor Pellegrini wrote in his important book, *Verso la Guerra ?—Il dissidio fra l'Italia e l'Austria* :—

"I believe we cannot live any longer under an illusion which deceives us. We have lived under the impression that the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so great as to prevent her from aggressive action towards ourselves and from expansion towards the East. We have believed that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after the death of the present Emperor. These views are erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria-Hungary should become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, Austria-Hungary's need to expand and to acquire new markets in the East will become all the greater. And as long as Italian commerce pursues its

triumphant course in the East, the more are the opposing interests of the two nations likely to bring about the final collision. . . .

"We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve the outward form of the Triple Alliance. We must ask ourselves: What are our interests? Are we ready to defend them? What are the conditions of the Italians who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domination? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared with those of Austria? What are the wishes of our people, and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula? Is it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria? I believe I have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our ally and our open enemy, against whom we must prepare for war."

Signor Pellegrini proposed to meet the danger of a collision with Austria-Hungary by an Alliance between Italy and Russia:—

"We have to calculate in the future with the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, it is meet that we should enter into more intimate relations with Russia, the only nation which, in co-operation with Italy, can act as an adequate counterpoise. Only thus we can secure the maintenance of the threatened balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula."

Already in 1902 Monsieur Delcassé had recommended to Italy, in an interview which was published in the *Giornale d'Italia* on the 4th January of that year, that she should enter upon intimate relations with France and Russia for the protection of her interests in the Balkan Peninsula.

For some considerable time the Italians have been earnestly considering the possibility of a war with Austria-Hungary. The *Rassegna Contemporanea*, perhaps the best Italian monthly, which seems to be quite unknown in this country because it was started only

a few years ago, began publishing in July 1911 a series of articles by Colonel Angelo Tragni, entitled "Ai Confini d'Italia," in which the military factors which are important in a war with Austria-Hungary are discussed at length. Italian military and naval men have published many books, pamphlets, and articles on the same subject. However, the Italian soldiers are not alone in considering professionally and publicly the possibility of an Austro-Italian war. One of the leading Austrian military papers, the very important *Danzer's Armeezeitung*, printed during 1911 a series of articles on a possible Austro-Italian war. They were recently printed in pamphlet form under the significant title, "Without Victory on Sea no Victory on Land: the Decisive Significance of a Naval Victory in the Conduct of a Land War with Italy." The pamphlet has a preface written by the Austrian Vice-Admiral Chiari, in which we read :—

"*Alliances do not last for ever and the ally of to-day may be the enemy of to-morrow.* One must not under-estimate one's opponents. We should no longer meet the Italian soldiers who were beaten by the Austrians at Novara, and *still less the Italian sailors who were beaten by the Austrians at Lissa.* I have always admired the splendid naval material of Italy with feelings of envy."

The most important passages of the pamphlet itself follow, and I would mention that the italicised portions of its preface and of its text are also italicised in the original. All military technicalities have been omitted :—

"The crisis during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that *notwithstanding our alliances we must still reckon with the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . .* In Italy nearly all warlike preparations are directed against Austria, her hereditary enemy, and her standard of armaments

is supplied not by Italy's interests, but by our own military power. We must prepare armaments sufficient to meet the whole force of Italy, but not of the Italy of to-day, but of the Italy of *to-morrow*, when the unavoidable collision will occur. . . . *It is certain that we have to reckon with a war on several fronts.* Without hesitation one can prophesy that our ally in peace will be our enemy in war, that Italy will rather be found on the side of our enemies than on our side, that we shall have to meet the combined armies of Russia, Italy, Servia, and Montenegro. That was probably in the mind of the Minister of War when he spoke of the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . . We should naturally aim our first and our strongest blow at our nearest and most dangerous opponent, at Italy. . . .

"During forty-five years we have been perfecting Austria's armaments in order to arrive at military superiority in general, and, since some time, to be able to defeat Italy in particular. But we must not deceive ourselves. We shall no longer meet the Italians of Novara and Custoza, for Italy has not stood still. Nor shall we meet the Italians who were defeated on the Adowa, for she has made up for past neglect with redoubled energy. . . .

"*Is, in case of a European conflagration, the superiority of our armies operating in the Italian province of Venetia against the Italian army so striking that we may reckon upon the immediate and sweeping success which is necessary for us in view of the difficult position in which we may find ourselves?* Consideration of all factors shows that this question must be answered in the negative. Our superiority is not sufficiently great. The Italian army is, through its numbers, organisation, armament, and training, able to offer the most determined resistance even against the mightiest enemy, and its power of resistance will be greatly increased in a war which the Italian nation will wage with all its heart. . . .

"Whilst the North-east of Austria-Hungary has sufficient room for employing armies of from fifteen to twenty army corps, the territory of Venetia is limited. Its narrowness is a factor of the greatest importance. Owing to its narrowness *we can turn the flank of the Italian army only by operating over sea, and herein lies one of our best chances and the absolutely necessary condition of a victory on land. A decisive victory of our fleet enables us to turn the Italian position and leaves unde-*

fended the great centres of the country. Preparations must be made on the largest scale for the transport of troops across the sea in very large numbers. A decisive victory on sea! That will be the principal need of the situation in a land war against Italy. The protection of our coasts and harbours, which, according to semi-official statements is the object of our fleet, is, in reality, an unimportant matter."

Deeds reveal most clearly a country's aims and intentions. Of late years the Italian and Austrian naval manœuvres were frequently merely rehearsals of an Austro-Italian war. Both Italy and Austria have greatly strengthened their fortifications and their garrisons on the Austro-Italian frontier, and, following Germany's example, Austria-Hungary has begun building a large fleet. At present she is building or completing four Dreadnoughts of 20,000 tons each. Many English people have surmised that the Austrian and Italian Dreadnoughts were intended to fight on Germany's side against Great Britain. The foregoing pages should make it clear that the Austrian Dreadnoughts are perhaps more likely to be employed against Italy.

The Italians are not idly looking on whilst Austria-Hungary is building Dreadnoughts and creating numerous naval bases opposite the Italian coast. Italy is rapidly increasing her fleet so as to maintain her present lead, and she is transferring its headquarters from the west coast of Italy to the Adriatic. She has considered creating, at the cost of £40,000,000, a war harbour to the south of the Isole delli Tremiti. She has begun converting the port of Taranto, close to Brindisi, into a war harbour, and she has created bases for torpedo-boats on her eastern coast at Ancona, Porto Corsini, Isole delli Tremiti, Manfredonia, Barletta, Bari, Brindisi, Otranto.

An alliance is an impossibility without mutual

trust and without a community of aims and interests. Between Italy and Austria-Hungary there exists evidently not a community, but an incompatibility, of aims and interests.

By her attack upon Turkey Italy has seriously damaged the Triple Alliance. The support of Turkey in case of an Austro-German war against Russia would have been far more valuable than the support of Italy in case of a war with France. Italy could only have done a little damage on the strongly-fortified and very mountainous French frontier, but Turkey could have aided Germany and Austria-Hungary against Russia very materially in the Black Sea. Germany and Austria-Hungary have allowed their unreliable partner to knock down their strong and reliable friend. Italy's ultimatum to Turkey ought to have been answered by a German ultimatum to Italy which would have prevented the war. By abstaining from action, Germany and Austria have at the same time lost the friendship of Turkey and not gained the goodwill of Italy. By attacking Turkey, Italy has revenged herself upon Germany and Austria for the Congress of Berlin. For all practical purposes the Triple Alliance is dead.

Italy may conceivably remain a member of the Triple Alliance and enter into suitable secret arrangements elsewhere. If she should formally withdraw from the Alliance, she will probably immediately join the Triple *Entente*, for she is not strong enough to stand alone. In that case Germany's only ally will be Austria-Hungary. Except for Austria-Hungary, Germany would be isolated in the world, and then another prophecy of Bismarck might come true. He wrote in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* :—

"In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error to exclude the possibility of a hostile policy such as was pursued

by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust. May not the policy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Russia, be again pursued against another Power ? . . .

"The field in which Russia can make offers to Austria is a very wide one; there is not only the East at the expense of the Porte, but Germany, at our expense. If Russian policy succeeds in winning Austria, then the coalition of the Seven Years' War against us is complete, for France can always be induced to act against us, her interests on the Rhine being more important than those in the East and on the Bosphorus."

The weakening of the central European group of Powers by the secession of Italy, and the strengthening of the Franco-Russian group by Italy's joining them, would alter completely the balance of power in Europe. It would again make France the predominant Power on the Continent, and then France might feel tempted to seek revenge for Sedan and endeavour to induce Austria to seek revenge for Königgrätz. Germany is in danger of becoming completely isolated. Herein lies the great seriousness of the situation.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ARMY AND NAVY OF GERMANY

ALL the great empires which the world has seen, with perhaps one solitary exception, that of the Chinese Empire, have become great by force; and all the great empires which have declined, or which have disappeared from the world's stage, have been diminished or destroyed by force. Diplomacy is fond of euphemisms, and diplomats like to speak of gradual expansion by allowing free play to the national forces and to the forces of Nature. They speak of creating protectorates, of mapping out spheres of interest, &c., when they are in reality bent on the aggrandisement of the nation by force. Hence it comes that countries are permanently and forcibly taken from their rightful owners by what diplomats are pleased to call temporary occupation, by peaceful penetration, by lease, by loan, &c. However, notwithstanding all these conventional euphemisms and diplomatic fictions, and notwithstanding the fact that the foreign policy of all countries is always ostensibly guided by the noblest motives, such as justice and humanity, the fact remains that all policy is based on force. Might is right between nations. The territories which are possessed by modern States are held by right of conquest—that is, by that right which springs from the possession of superior force.

Even the cleverest diplomat will prove unsuccess-

ful unless his words are backed with adequate force. The diplomatic ability and success of Frederick the Great, Napoleon I., Talleyrand, Metternich, Palmerston, Bismarck, &c., consisted largely, if not principally, in the superior material force which these men were able to wield; and, owing to the fact that their diplomacy was backed by sufficient force, they were exceedingly successful in their policy.

The fact that all policy is based upon force was nowhere more clearly understood than in Prussia, the forerunner of Modern Germany; and Modern Germany remains faithful to Prussian traditions and to the Prussian faith, that the best policy is the *ultima ratio regis*. For two hundred and fifty years, since the time of the Great Elector, Prussia has been always proportionately by far the strongest military power in Europe.

It is generally assumed that the military burden which is borne by Continental nations was never so heavy and so crushing as it is at the present time; but that assumption, which is very widely held, especially among the members of the various Peace Societies and their friends, is by no means in accordance with fact. The standing armies of the great Continental nations amount now, on an average, only to one per cent. of the population. Formerly, the proportion of soldiers to the total population was much higher, especially in Prussia.

At the death of Frederick William I., Prussia, which then had only about 3,000,000 inhabitants, had a standing army of 80,000 soldiers; at the death of Frederick the Great, Prussia had 5,500,000 inhabitants and an army of no less than 195,000 soldiers. Modern Germany has a population of 66,000,000 inhabitants and a standing army of 630,000 men,

but if the proportion of soldiers to the total population were now as great as it was at the time of Frederick William I. or Frederick the Great, she would have a standing force of more than 2,000,000 men.

Germany is a nation in arms. Every able-bodied man has to serve in the army, and the number of men enrolled year by year amounts now to about 280,000. The army on a war footing is made up of a number of these levies, and it can be made greater or smaller at will by calling out a greater or lesser number of such yearly levies which are called Reserves, Landwehr, and Landsturm.

The number of men yearly enrolled has of late greatly increased, in accordance with the increase in the peace strength of the army. Therefore, the average number enrolled every year is considerably smaller than 280,000. Besides, we must make allowance for those trained soldiers, who, through disease, are not able to serve in the ranks in case of mobilisation, and for those who have died. Hence, we may assume that the average yearly levy will, in case of war, produce about 200,000 men.

Service in the army begins when men reach twenty years, and the men who have passed through the army may be called upon up to the age of forty-five; but, in case of need, the age at which men may be called for military service can be extended. It therefore follows that the war strength of the German army amounts to about 2,400,000 trained soldiers, if the men between twenty and thirty-two years are called out, that about 4,000,000 trained soldiers could be raised if the men between twenty and forty-two years are enrolled, &c. The arms, ammunition, and accoutrements existing should suffice for equip-

ping at least 4,000,000 soldiers with everything that is required for war.

Every nation strives to create an army commensurate in number and adapted, as to its organisation, composition, equipment, and training, to the tasks which it may be called upon to fulfil in case of war. Great Britain has an insular army and a colonial army, and she relies for the defence of her home frontiers and of her colonial frontiers mainly upon her enormous navy. Germany requires an enormous army for the defence of her extensive land frontiers, or for a possibly necessary attack upon her neighbours, and her navy is distinctly of secondary importance to her, especially as her coast line is most excellently protected by extensive sandbanks, which make the approach of warships almost an impossibility, as the tortuous channels which lead through these sandbanks to the German harbours change their shape continually.

Germany, like all other great Continental nations, can raise enormous masses of soldiers, and as her huge armies will have to fight on comparatively exceedingly restricted ground, they are trained to fight in more or less dense masses. The central-continental theatre of war is not large enough to allow of individual fighting between millions of men, especially as natural obstacles and fortresses abound. On either side of the Franco-German frontier, for instance, there are only two or three narrow gaps between fortifications where battles can take place, and where an extension of troops such as we have seen during the Boer War and during the Russo-Japanese War could not possibly be effected.

Individual training is difficult with a citizen army, an armed nation. Hence, Continental army com-

manders try to utilise rather the enormous weight and momentum of a mass of armed men, making their armies, by constant, wearisome drill, huge and absolutely obedient fighting machines, than to trust to the highly trained fighting capacities of the individual soldier.

Great Britain has a comparatively very small military force, which is exceedingly costly, and she has the good fortune that the geographical position of the country and of its colonies makes impossible a sudden invasion by a million armed men, which Germany must be prepared to meet ten days after a declaration of war. Evidently the military tasks of Great Britain and of Germany are totally different. The British army would be useless to Germany, and likewise Great Britain would have no use for an immense citizen army after the German model, for which many statesmen and generals are clamouring. The position of Great Britain and that of her colonies, as well as the independent character of the population, compels her to strike out an original line. She cannot possibly create an immense, well-drilled, well-armed, and absolutely obedient citizen army, and she is therefore forced to create an individualistic army composed of individualistic fighters. The national character makes that necessary.

How useless Continental tactics are for British soldiers and for British fighting-tasks, was clearly seen in the Boer War. Continental mass tactics are excellent for the densely populated Continent and for the "Massenschlacht." Out of Europe the best German soldiers and the most approved German tactics are apt to prove a complete failure. In the Boer War, the best drilled German soldiers would have done no better, perhaps they would have done

worse, than did British soldiers, who, with their national individualism, had not entirely lost their adaptability in strange surroundings. In fighting the natives in her South-West African colony, the German army, which was such an excellent instrument of war against the French and the Austrians, has proved an instrument totally unsuited for its task. Directed against a European foe on a European field of battle, the same soldiers would probably prove excellent.

From the foregoing, it should be clear that an attempt to copy the German army would prove disastrous to Great Britain, and British officers might give up studying the Franco-German War of 1870–71, which, for thirty years, has been almost exclusively studied in the country, and which has a large share of the responsibility for the numerous defeats in the Boer War.

It is true that the Franco-German War is unique as a military success in the world's history. It is true that six weeks after the declaration of war all the French armies were swept from the field and Napoleon a prisoner. It is true that in six months the Germans took 400,000 prisoners, about 8,000 guns, and more than 800,000 rifles. But it is also true that Great Britain will scarcely be called upon to fight a war on a similar scale on similar lines, on a similar field, with a similar army against a similar enemy. Great Britain should certainly not copy the German army, but she can learn much from the organisation of that army, which, on the whole, appears to be almost perfect, and which is far too little studied.

The Prusso-German army has gone through varying vicissitudes. Under Frederick the Great it proved itself to be the first army in Europe. Twenty years

after Frederick's death, it was found to be quite worthless against Napoleon I., and it fell to pieces at Jena and Auerstadt. After the fatal year 1806, the Prussian army was rapidly reorganised and reformed by Scharnhorst and his able co-workers, and later on it was again reorganised and remodelled by Roon and Moltke. In view of the fact that the British army wants reforming very badly, it is worth while to see why Frederick the Great's incomparable army so rapidly decayed after his death, and how the rotten army of 1806 was rapidly and thoroughly reformed.

The army with which Frederick the Great had successfully fought the united forces of nearly the whole Continent during the Seven Years' War was organised upon an utterly bad, wrong, and unhealthy basis. Only noblemen could become officers, advancement went by length of service, obedience was absolute and blind, restricting all initiative among officers as well as among the rank and file. Detailed regulations made thinking unnecessary, and had to be carried out to the letter without question. The whole military organisation of Prussia was absolutely centralised in Frederick the Great, who attended to its smallest details. If a foreigner wished to witness a parade, he had to appeal to the King. But what the army lacked in a practical common-sense organisation, in individuality, and in initiative, which qualities alone can make an army a healthy living organism, was amply made up for by the King's immense personal capacity. He ruled the army with a hand of iron, and knew how to manage it notwithstanding its fundamental unsoundness. He inspected his troops very frequently, his sharp eyes saw everything, and every officer who did not come up to the

King's expectations was immediately dismissed. He knew the capacity of every officer, foresaw all and prepared all, his detailed regulations were to the point, his magazines were well filled, all was ready for war, and his army remained up to his death by far the first in Europe. Yet, but twenty years after his death, it was easily smashed by Napoleon the First at Jena and Auerstadt. When the great King was dead the faulty system remained, and no personality arose either to fill his place in that perverted system or to reform it root and branch. With the death of Frederick the Great the huge Prussian army became a body without a soul, imposing to look upon by reason of its size, but deficient in every other qualification. Therefore it was predestined to fall.

Lacking the necessary understanding and energy, his two successors, Frederick William II. and Frederick William III., were contented to administer the army according to Frederickian tradition, exactly in the spirit of precedent and with the same absence of thought with which the British army was until lately administered. They would have considered it a crime to introduce any reform into the army, and blasphemy to doubt its proved excellence. The warnings and entreaties of sagacious patriots to modernise the army fell on deaf ears, and the whole interest of Frederick William the Third with regard to military matters was concentrated upon parades and drills, the buttons and laces of uniforms, the shape of shakos and helmets, and similar futilities, in which, as Napoleon remarked, he was a greater expert than any army tailor.

Only after Prussia's terrible defeat, and the loss of half her territory in 1806, did the King and his

advisers wake up and begin to inquire seriously into the state of the army and the cause of its defeats. Progressive military men, among them the future Field-Marshal Gneisenau, the intellectual leader of Blücher's army and his Chief of Staff, attributed the collapse of the army largely to the neglect of preparations for war in time of peace, to its occupation with futile drill exercises calculated only for show on the parade-ground, to the neglect of warlike manœuvres and of target-shooting, to the inferiority of the Prussian arms as compared with the armament of the French in guns and rifles, to the slavish copying of various institutions existing in foreign armies, which were quite unsuitable to the needs of Prussia, to the blind conceit of officers and of the nation in the invincibility of the army, and to the incapacity of generals automatically promoted by length of service, and not by merit, who had partly become imbecile with old age.

A commission for the reorganisation of the army was called, which happily did not consist of fossilised generals, or of civilians unacquainted with war and with the military needs of the nation, but of a select few of the ablest young officers who had proved their value in the field, and who were sure neither to be doctrinaires nor to be unduly bound by traditions and text-books. This commission consisted of two major-generals, four lieutenant-colonels, and one major. It did not dazzle the nation with an imposing array of titles, but it was destined to accomplish great things, for among its members were men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolmann, and Boyen. The members of this commission were young men. Scharnhorst, the oldest commissioner, was 52 years old, Grolmann, the youngest, was only 29 years old. It

was essentially not an old men's commission. Their recommendations were thorough and to the point. Soldiering was to be taken seriously by the officers. The army was to lose its character of a Society institution, it was to be democratised, and was to be managed on business principles. Among the recommendations of the committee the following were the most important :—

"Advancement shall take place, without regard to the years of service, solely by merit. In case it is found necessary, the youngest general is to command all others. Age or length of service is to have no influence upon appointments. Few generals are to be made in peace, and brigades are to be largely commanded by staff officers in war, so that those who prove themselves the worthiest on active service may be advanced to generalship. In peace a claim to officer's position can only rest upon military knowledge and education, and in war upon conspicuous bravery, activity, and circumspection. Therefore all individuals in the whole nation who possess these qualifications have a claim to the highest command.

"In giving only to the nobility those privileges, all talent and ability in the other classes of the nation was lost to the army, and the nobility did not consider itself under the obligation to take soldiering seriously, and acquire military knowledge, as good birth and a long life were bound to advance well-born individuals to the most exalted military commands, without either merit or exertion on their part.

"This is the reason why our officers were so behindhand in knowledge and education as compared with men of other professions in Prussia. For these reasons the army had become a State within the State, instead of being the union of all moral and physical forces of the nation. Advancement by years of service had killed all ambition and emulation among officers, for a good robust constitution alone granted all that could be desired. True merit and talent proved in free competition among officers was lost to the State, and the deserved advancement of military genius became impossible."

Besides, the commission insisted on the decen-

tralisation of the administrative machinery of the army. Each corps was to be made independent, but was to be fully responsible, and everything required for mobilisation, arms, stores, horses, commissariat, &c., was to be kept at the headquarters of each corps or division in order to facilitate rapid and smooth mobilisation in case of war. The endless train of baggage, which had so greatly hampered the movements of the Prussian army when opposed to the mobile troops of Napoleon, was to be diminished, new arms were to be introduced, up-to-date tactics were to take the place of obsolete barrack-square drills, and the soldier was to be treated better in peace time in order to make soldiering more attractive.

Greatly owing to the measures taken upon these recommendations, without overmuch regard to the obstinate resistance of the tradition-bound generals of the old school, Prussia, which Napoleon believed crippled for ever, was able seven years later to meet the French army in the field with conspicuous success.

The failure of the Prussian army in 1806 affords an excellent parallel to the failure of our own army in Africa, and the recommendations of the famous Scharnhorst Commission might largely, and perhaps *in toto*, be applied to the British army. At the same time we ought not to forget that since the time of Napoleon the First the art and science of war has made enormous progress. A new era opened with the advent of the prince of military scientists, the "Schlachtendenker," Moltke, who has elevated the art of war to the level of an exact science. Let us see what Moltke can teach us.

Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First used already to make elaborate preparations for war, but their preparations were clumsy and superficial if

compared with the minute study and the detailed preparations for war made by Moltke. As Napoleon concentrated the fire of hundreds of guns on that point of the enemy's position which to him was of the greatest importance, and battered it in, even so Moltke concentrated the organised intelligence of hundreds of the best brains in his army on the one point which to him was the most valuable one. Moltke's chief aim was to surprise the enemy by the unparalleled celerity of the mobilisation of his army, to fall upon him while he was still unprepared, and to smash him before an attack was expected. With this end in view he recreated the Prussian General Staff, and made it the active brain of the army.

Moltke, like most great commanders, did not lay down his principles for the conduct of war in the shape of a book. He evidently did not believe in taking the world and possible enemies of his country into his confidence. We must therefore look to his campaigns and to the official accounts of his wars for his guiding principles. In the introduction to the history of the Franco-German war, edited by the historical department of the Generalstab, over which Moltke presided, occurs the celebrated passage :—

"One of the principal duties of the General Staff is to work out during peace in the most minute way plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view to meet *all* possible eventualities to which war may give rise.

"When an army first takes the field the most multifarious considerations—political, geographical, as well as military—have to be borne in mind. Mistakes in the original concentration of armies can hardly ever be made good in the whole course of a campaign. All these arrangements can be considered a long time beforehand, and—assuming the troops are ready for war and the transport service properly organised—must lead to the exact result which has been contemplated.'

How Moltke acted upon the principle of " working out all possible eventualities of war in the most minute way " may be seen from a few examples. Every reservist and every militiaman (*Landwehrmann*) possessed written or printed instructions which told him exactly to which place he had to go for enrolment in case of war. When he arrived at his place of enrolment, his complete outfit for war, measured to his person in peace, would be found waiting for him. Every commander throughout the empire had complete general instructions what to do in the case of war. The confidential particular instructions regarding the final disposition and direction of troops, transport, &c., towards the frontier, were also in the possession of each commander, contained in sealed envelopes, which were only to be opened on the receipt of the order to mobilise. The military stores were placed where they were wanted in case of war, in order to avoid loss of time and congestion of railways in forwarding them. A special department of the General Staff, consisting now of about twenty officers, studied the means of transport, the capacities of the railways, and the number of trucks and engines required for the conveyance of each unit, and drew up a most marvellously complete programme for the despatch of the countless trains required in case of war, upon which programme the confidential sealed instructions were founded. Consequently the transport of a million men or more, with their horses, guns, stores, and baggage, to any frontier could take place smoothly and rapidly without a hitch. The arrival of each corps at the point where it would be required, was calculable, so to say, to the minute, and every now and then the whole enormous arrangement of time-tables had to be recast in order to allow for the

conveyance of additional troops or stores, or for the use of an additional piece of railway recently completed. Furthermore, the detailed plans for any and every campaign in which Prussia could possibly be involved were always kept ready in time of peace, and were frequently changed and brought up to date. For instance, Moltke's first plan of campaign in case of a war with France was dated 1857, and his final dispositions, which were exactly carried out in 1870, were made in winter, 1868.

However, not only were the resources of Germany studied "in the most minute way" by Moltke and his staff, but also those of all possible enemies. As a matter of fact, he knew more about the strength and armaments of the French army, the time required for its mobilisation, the configuration of the French frontier provinces, the capacity of the French railways for transport, &c., than did any man in the French War Office. In other words, Moltke created an organisation which, by means of most minute studies and the painstaking collection and comparison of countless exact data, made war no longer the risky vague encounter with hostile elements of uncertain strength, at an uncertain time, and in an uncertain and unknown country, as it had formerly been, but made war an encounter with certainties, and with clearly defined calculable chances.

How well Germany was prepared for war may be seen from the fact that we read in the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of the then Prussian Minister of War, Count Roon :—

"Roon has frequently said that the two weeks following the memorable night of the mobilisation have perhaps been the idlest and the freest from care during his career. As a matter of fact, the mobilisation machine worked with such exemplary

exactitude, and so completely without friction, that Roon and the War Office had not to reply to *one* inquiry of the commanding generals or of other commanders. This was the case though the order for mobilisation was given without any previous warning, and though many commanding generals and Staff officers were on their summer holiday, and a good number of them were even abroad."

Napoleon the Third was vaguely aware of the numerical inferiority of his army, as compared with the troops of Germany. Consequently his idea had been to act with the lightning rapidity and energy of his great ancestor, to throw himself upon the south of Germany before Germany was ready, carry the Southern States with him, whether they offered resistance or not, and then march against Prussia, strengthened by the accession of the South German contingents. The plan was well conceived, and might have succeeded if Napoleon the Third had calculated, not guessed, how long it would take France and Germany to mobilise their respective armies, and if he had prepared everything in peace time for such a rapid stroke in the complete manner of the Prussian Generalstab. But in view of the preparedness of Prussia, and of France's unpreparedness, this plan of campaign was simply childlike. The Prussian Generalstab knew better than Napoleon the Third what France was able to do. In Moltke's memoir of 1868 we find the time necessary for the mobilisation of the French army correctly given. While France wanted three weeks to complete the mobilisation of her army, Germany took only eleven days. Consequently Napoleon's brilliant plan of campaign, which looked as fine on paper as did his army, miscarried, for the well-schooled and perfectly-equipped German army corps fell into their places with the mathematical precision of a well-timed clockwork,

and with incredible rapidity crossed the frontier in overwhelming numbers long before the French were ready for their contemplated dash into the south of Germany.

The terrible defeats of France were the natural and logical consequence of her going lightly to war with an army which was chiefly for show on parade, and which was only able to win easy victories over inferior races. It was a court and society army, in which the best men of the nation found no place. It was neglected by the people, and ruled by society men, not according to common sense, but according to tradition, and was managed by a bureaucracy devoid of foresight, prudence, and common sense, but endowed with determined meanness, narrow-mindedness, and an exaggerated sense of its own importance, being at the same time stupid, petty, and tyrannical.

Germany's victory over France was less due to superior strategy or to superior tactics than to her great superiority in methodic organisation for war. The victory of 1870–71 is a triumph of German organisation, and if we study the history of the collapse of the French army in 1870 in detail, and try to deduce the principal causes of the success of the German army, we arrive at the conclusion that highly organised foresight, fore-study, and fore-calculation, represented by the Prussian Generalstab, led the Germans to victory, and that the absence of these qualities caused the defeat of the French.

The Prussian Generalstab did not only directly prepare for war in the manner already described, but it also prepared indirectly for war by studying strategy and the innovations introduced into the tactics of other nations, studying new arms and equipments, investigating everything and adopting what was use-

ful, educating officers in regular courses under Moltke's personal supervision, surveying the country, &c. In short, the Generalstab served as the intellectual centre of the army, as the clearing-house of most valuable information. It was the highest supervising, inspecting, inventing, and organising authority. It was an organism which enabled Moltke to hold all the threads of the army in his hand, and make it obey the slightest pressure like a well-trained horse.

Ruled by the Generalstab, the German army was no longer a clumsy and soulless military machine as it was in 1806, but became a living, sensitive, and intelligent organism, which acted like one man, and to perpetuate his work Moltke implanted firmly his spirit of thoroughness and his strategical ideas into the Generalstab, being its chief during thirty-one years. Thus Moltke has not only served as an example to his officers, and has created a school, not of imitators, but of independent military thinkers, in Germany; but his principles of minute comprehensive inquiry and of careful foresight have also been applied to commerce and industry, and have made Germany surprisingly successful in the more peaceful arts.

It appears that to a modern army an effective Generalstab like that of Moltke is as indispensable for modern warfare as is smokeless powder or the repeating rifle. What the laboratory is to a chemical factory, that is the Generalstab to the modern army, and its place can as little be taken by the ablest commanding general as the analytical chemist, with his assistants, can be replaced by a practical manufacturer who goes by rule of thumb and his grandfather's prescriptions, and disdains new-fashioned inventions.

The success of Germany in 1870 has led to the

adoption of certain German institutions in the British army, but unfortunately the spirit of the German army has not been adopted. Among others, a General Staff was created, but while the German General Staff is of supreme weight and importance, employing over 400 officers and spending altogether some £270,000 per year, or twice as much as is spent on the Prussian War Office, the Intelligence and Mobilisation Division at the War Office was a shabby hole-and-corner institution, which employed recently seventeen officers at a cost of £11,000. The disproportion between the British and the German institutions became particularly startling when we remember how restricted the confines of Germany are, and how few the possible points of attack, if compared with the huge British Empire, its worldwide responsibilities, and its countless possible fields of action. While over 400 officers are thought necessary to serve a homogeneous sedentary army in one country, seventeen officers were thought sufficient to attend to the complex problems of a world empire which extends over five continents, and to an army whose contingents are strewn all over the globe.

Our General Staff really smacked of Savoy Opera. The seventeen officers composing it were gravely subdivided. Two officers were to look after the Colonial section, two after France, Italy, Spain, Portugal—and all America, &c. The task allotted to each officer was simply ludicrous, and their position was even more grotesque than that of a former Chinese ambassador who was appointed to the courts of Spain and Russia, and to the United States. In consequence of this state of affairs the British Intelligence Office was reduced to the ignominious position of a second-hand information bureau, for it was evidently impos-

sible for these few men unaided to get information themselves, or to accomplish anything really useful.

While the Prussian Generalstab represents the highest intelligence in the army, and while its chief is the greatest military genius, as Moltke was, who does not waste his time in administrative routine work, but is free to use his talents to rule and improve the army through the Generalstab, and to prepare everything for every possible war, the chief of the British General Staff was, until recently, a subordinate officer of unknown military capacity, and the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War consequently considered the second-hand information which that shabby office could supply hardly worth looking at. Happily, British statesmen have at last recognised the necessity of providing an Imperial General Staff. However, even to-day the functions of a General Staff are not sufficiently appreciated, and the provisions made for it appear quite insufficient. Still, a very good beginning has been made, and it is to be hoped that the Imperial General Staff will grow in power and become an adequate instrument for the organisation of imperial defence.

Because we have had commanders like the Duke of Wellington, or Lord Roberts, or Lord Kitchener, who have helped the country with their brilliant successes out of military scrapes, and have made up for the brainlessness of our army by their own great capacity, we evidently believe more in a commander of genius than in a good system, forgetting that a commander of genius *and* a good system is a far more valuable possession to the nation than the same commander *without* a good system. Besides, it should be remembered that the coincidence of an inferior commander and a bad system would be absolutely fatal to the empire in case of war; while a good

system, like that of the Prussian army with its Generalstab, will single out able commanders and is devised to constantly regenerate the army.

In former centuries, when armies were small, armaments simple, and the problems of war few and of easy solution, a good general was able, with the help of some assistants, to create his army, to administer it in peace, educate it, prepare it for war, and lead it in battle, as did Frederick the Great. The British army organisation has been handed down from former centuries when it was adequate, and it has unfortunately not been sufficiently adapted to modern requirements. Hence our discomfitures in South Africa.

The highly complicated machinery of civilisation, the rapidity of progress, and the manifold inventions influencing war have caused rapid changes in the art of war, and have made the preparation for war a most important and most complicated duty. Consequently, we require now for the conduct of war and for the organisation of an army what we require for the successful conduct of a very large business—a chief unhampered by routine work who can devote all his time to improving the service, intelligent division of labour, the service of highly-trained specialists, wise decentralisation, free competition among officers, free play to individual initiative coupled with absolute responsibility, a clearing-house of information, the best appliances and arms, and, before all, the application of science to warfare by an organised thinking department.

Unless an *Imperial* department on the lines of the Prussian Generalstab is created, with the ablest soldier of the nation at its head, the important duties of preparing for war in the most minute way, of

educating officers for the highest commands, not by Staff College theorists but by a Roberts or a Kitchener, will remain neglected, and the important duty of reforming and regenerating the army will remain unfulfilled. The British army will remain brainless, and the nation will in the next war experience disappointments similar to, if not worse than, those it has experienced during the late South African campaign.

The German navy had to be created out of nothing, for, until a few decades ago, Prusso-Germany possessed no warships whatever. In 1848, the first attempt was made to create a German fleet, which was largely paid for by voluntary contributions, as has been mentioned in the chapter on Germany's world-policy. A few small ships were got together, and a Mr. Bromme, an adventurer, who had served in the Greek navy, was made "Captain of the Imperial Marine," which, four years after its creation, in 1852, was sold by public auction.

In 1849, Prussia created a navy of her own, and a Dutchman, Commodore Schröder, was made the commander of the Prussian fleet, which at the beginning was composed of two armed steam-boats and 27 rowing gun-boats (which mounted together 67 guns), 37 officers, and 1521 men. I believe the present navy of Siam or Liberia is considerably more formidable than was the Prussian navy at its commencement. From these small beginnings sprang the present German fleet. Prusso-Germany's maritime experience was so small that foreigners had to be engaged as instructors and commanders, and not only fifty years ago, but even until a comparatively recent date, it was thought advisable to entrust the supreme command of the German navy to military officers of proved ability, not to naval men.

After the foundation of the German Empire, in 1871, Lieutenant-General von Stosch was made Chief of the Admiralty. His successor was Lieutenant-General von Caprivi, who became Chief of the Admiralty in 1883. Only since 1888 has the German Admiralty received an Admiral for its head.

In Cromwell's time, the British navy, which then was in a very bad state, was handed over to Colonels Blake and Monk, who were made "Generals at sea," and they reformed the navy by adapting Cromwell's excellent army organisation to the sister service. Strange to say, Colonels Blake and Monk proved themselves two of the most capable British Admirals. Germany, consciously or unconsciously, followed Cromwell's precedent, and she has no reason to regret that she put two of her ablest Generals at the head of her new navy. Stosch and Caprivi proved excellent organisers, and under their command the German navy became thoroughly up-to-date, exceedingly well-managed, thoroughly efficient, and completely ready for war. The organisation of the German General Staff was adapted to naval requirements, and Germany created an Admiral Staff, which she possessed for some considerable time, until, at Lord Charles Beresford's urgent representations, a similar, but apparently insufficiently strong, organisation has been created for the British navy.

The German navy is numerically smaller than the British navy, but it is very rapidly growing. It is perfectly prepared for war, down to the smallest detail, and practically the entire fleet is kept in home waters, ready to strike with full force at once when war breaks out. According to Monsieur Lockroy, the former Minister of the Marine of France, who was granted special facilities by the Emperor

to study the German navy, the German fleet is the best organised in the world, and the Germans are confident that they can defeat any navy except that of Great Britain.

On sea and land, Germany is equally ready for war, and equally able to strike with surprising celerity and with all her force at once. The maxim of Archduke Charles, "He who is surprised in war is already half-defeated," has become the motto of the armed forces of Germany, and at the next war Germany may surprise the world by the suddenness with which she will strike her first blows, and these first blows may decide the issue.

Many people believe that armies and navies are relics of a barbaric age, that wars will soon be abolished by international agreement, that in the future international differences will be settled not by force of arms but by the force of the law, by international arbitration. Let us see whether international arbitration is a practicable policy, or merely a chimera and a delusion, as is international Free Trade, which exists only in the text-books, and consider Germany's views on war and peace.

International arbitration is by no means an invention of yesterday, as many believe. Since the day when, more than 2000 years ago, the Amphictyonic Council was created, which, by-the-by, did not prevent Greeks exterminating Greeks, numerous international tribunals have been in existence, but they have invariably proved utterly unsuccessful, and the cause of their failure is obvious. Every vigorous State pursues two principal aims: to enlarge its dominions and to preserve its independence. Every healthy nation, like every healthy tree, endeavours to grow and to increase. Besides, neither right nor chance

but the instinct, and, before all, the will, of expansion supported by might have created nations out of tribes, and evolved empires out of nations. By the right of the stronger a little tribe of Northmen possessed itself of England, and by the right of the stronger England acquired her enormous empire. By the right of the stronger the Hohenzollerns, a poor Swabian family who came to the wilds of Prussia with a handful of retainers a few centuries ago, created modern Germany. Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Switzerland, Holland, the United States, in fact all States, were created by might, not by right. To might all States owe the title to their possessions, and only by might can their possessions be retained.

Might being the foundation of every State and practically the sole title to its possessions, no powerful nation is willing to stake its possessions which were won by force upon the hazard of a judicial decision, especially as the law is proverbially uncertain and unsatisfactory. Therefore every great nation, and none more than Germany, relies upon its armed strength for the defence, not of her "rights," which are disputable, but of her "interests," of which every nation claims to be the sole competent judge. Only trifling questions have so far been submitted by nations to the decision of foreigners, and it seems unlikely that any great nation would leave the adjustment of her vital interests to outsiders who can only be expected to weigh legal "rights," but who cannot be expected sympathetically to weigh justified national aspirations, pretensions and claims to expansion, to supremacy and to dominion. Prince Bismarck said on this subject:

"It is true that great armies are a great burden. By our armaments we conduct a kind of warfare with other nations in which we give blows to one another with our money-bags.

Armed peace may be ruinous, but disarmament is a chimera, for who will enforce an unpalatable decision upon a strong nation unwilling to submit to it? To make international decisions enforceable by third parties would mean to make the *casus belli* permanent among nations."

The leading German authority on political theory agrees with the leading German authority on practical statesmanship, for Professor von Treitschke wrote in his *Politik*:

"The institution of a permanent international court of arbitration is incompatible with the very nature of the State, for a State can only by its own will set limits to itself. Only questions of secondary or tertiary importance can be submitted to arbitration, for in matters of vital national importance an impartial referee does not exist. Could we seriously expect to find an impartial arbitrator to decide on the question of Alsace-Lorraine? Besides, it is a matter of national honour that a nation should settle her difficulties without foreign interference. An authoritative tribunal of nations is impossible. To the end of history national arms will preserve their rights, and herein lies the sacredness of war."

In another place von Treitschke says:

"Wars will never be abolished by international courts of arbitration, for in judging of the vital questions between two States other States cannot be impartial. In the society of nations the interests of every nation are so interwoven with the interests of every other nation that impartiality cannot be reckoned on."

Numerous speeches of William the Second and innumerable declarations of German statesmen and professors confirm that the leading political, scientific, and social circles of Germany rely exclusively on Germany's army and navy for the defence of German "rights," among which there is the "right" to the possession of extensive colonies in a temperate zone.

Therefore, all German statesmen and responsible thinkers unconditionally reject a League of Peace and Goodwill and international arbitration in Lord Avebury's sense. By her attitude at the first Hague Conference, official Germany has clearly shown her conviction that the international tribunal and the Czar's scheme of international disarmament were not to be taken seriously. Germany's statesmen believe with Lord Bacon that "wars are no massacres and confusions, but the highest trials of right."

The corrosive influence of Free-trade cosmopolitanism has no doubt blunted the sense of nationality and of patriotism in Great Britain, and has raised in it many supporters of internationalism in the form of international Free Trade, international disarmament, and international arbitration. Whilst at the bidding of unpractical doctrinaires, pushful manufacturers and political intriguers, Great Britain has wasted her political and her economic strength to the benefit, the delight, and the derision of foreign countries, Germany has steadfastly and determinedly pursued a thoroughly national and deliberately selfish policy, a policy which is based on might, which is promoted by a most unscrupulous diplomacy, and which is furthered by conquest.

It cannot be pointed out too strongly that Anglo-Saxon and German ideas of the State, its nature, its functions, and its policy, vastly differ. The German political philosophers teach, in accordance with Machiavelli, "the State is power." Bismarck stated "the only healthy basis of a great State is national selfishness, and not romantic idealism;" and in taking office he gave to the world his programme, to which he has unflinchingly adhered, in the words "the German question will be decided, not by parliamentary

speeches, but by diplomatic action and by war." A year later Bismarck made the ominous declaration, "Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are great questions decided, but by blood and iron." Germany is determined to rely for her greatness on blood and iron rather than on beautiful sentiments.

The romantic and idealistic ideas of a league of peace and of international goodwill created and headed by Great Britain may be excellent in the abstract, and they may be very profitable, if generally adopted, from the British point of view, for Great Britain has all the territory she wants, and she strives only to preserve in peace that which she has won by war. However, Englishmen must be simple if they believe that beautiful speeches and beautiful sentiments will cause Germany to be satisfied with the fact that Great Britain has practically all the colonies in the world whilst Germany has none.

CHAPTER XIV

THE GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

FOR those who wish to understand Germany's foreign policy, and especially Germany's policy towards Great Britain, it is quite indispensable to be acquainted with the organisation, character, power, influence, and policy of the German Navy League, and to closely follow its activity. This is all the more necessary because very little is known of this organisation outside of Germany, and because the vast majority of Englishmen believe that the German Navy League is an enthusiastic, somewhat noisy, and not very influential body, composed of private and irresponsible individuals, which in scope and in character closely resembles the British Navy League. In the following it will be shown that this conception of the German Navy League, which is generally held in this country, is erroneous. It will be shown that the German Navy League is a huge official organisation, and that its political power and influence in Germany are exceedingly great, and probably greater than that wielded by any of the German political parties.

When the German Emperor and his advisers contemplated creating a navy which was to rival, and perhaps even to exceed, that of Great Britain, they were fully aware that the Reichstag would not be found willing to vote the huge funds which would be required for carrying out such a policy. The small

Navy Bill of 1898, which embodied only a part of the Emperor's great naval programme, had with difficulty been passed through the Reichstag, on March 28, 1898, and it was clear that any further demands for the navy on the part of the Government would be refused by the German Parliament. Therefore, it was recognised that some means would have to be found wherewith to overcome the expected Parliamentary opposition against any further naval demands, and it was thought best that the electorate should be influenced by a huge organisation, founded on the model of the British Navy League, which, by extra-Parliamentary agitation, should exercise an irresistible pressure on the German Parliament. With this object in view, the German Navy League was founded on April 30, 1898, exactly a month after the first Naval Bill had been passed by the Reichstag. The chief and most active mover in the foundation of the German Navy League was the late Mr. Alfred Krupp, an intimate friend of the Emperor. The Emperor's brother, Prince Henry, immediately on the foundation of the League, was made the "Protector," that is, the honorary President of the Society, Prince William of Wied, who then was the President of the Upper Chamber of the Prussian Diet, became its acting chairman, and the venerable and generally beloved Grand Duke of Baden joined the German Navy League as honorary member.

The fact that the three most prominent men in Germany had placed themselves at the head of the German Navy League gave it the greatest prestige from the very outset. Soon, many of the foremost aristocrats and of the highest military officers and officials all over Germany offered their services to the League. The services of these men were accepted,

the official and social leaders of Germany were directed to enrol members of the League among the masses, and soon a keen competition for winning the greatest number of adherents to the League arose among the high officials of Germany.

In most countries the man in the street dearly likes to be associated with the aristocracy in some movement or another, but nowhere in the world is that desire stronger than in Germany, where the nobility and the high officers and officials form a caste of the greatest exclusiveness, being placed by the State on a level high above the masses of the people. Skilfully taking advantage of this disposition of the German masses, the Navy League was designed to be an organisation popular and democratic in character, but most aristocratic in organisation and government, thoroughly centralised to ensure absolute discipline, yet giving the greatest scope to individual emulation and exertion. The people, irrespective of age, sex, means, rank, party and creed, were invited to join the League, but at the same time the foremost men were designed to be the organisers and the officers of its local branches.

Not only were leisured aristocrats, generals and admirals on half-pay, and retired Secretaries of State appointed as agents and officers of the League, but the State placed the whole of the governmental machine of Germany at the disposal of the society. The highest officials in the provinces, the Regierungspräsidenten, who occupy a position similar to that of our Lord-Lieutenants, were allowed to become the chairmen of the provincial centres of the Navy League. The Navy League associations in the administrative sub-divisions of the provinces were placed under the direction of the highest acting officials, the Regier-

ungsräte, and in the towns the mayors, or the most prominent citizens, were induced to undertake the organisation and the management of the local branches. The provincial Government offices and the local town-halls everywhere were placed at the disposition of the League, and became the domicile of the Navy League. Thus the official character and the prestige of the League was greatly increased in the eyes of the German masses. As there are more than four thousand local branches of the Navy League in Germany, almost every village has now its naval society which is directed by the local magnates, the squire, the doctor, the clergyman, the forester, the chemist and the schoolmaster, who divide among themselves the various honorary offices, and who can easily gain adherents or create "a popular movement" among the villagers without much trouble and within a few hours, especially as the headquarters of these rural branches of the Navy League are usually at the principal inn.

In order to attract people of all ranks, the amount of the yearly subscription was left by the founders of the League to the discretion of the members who were asked to tax themselves for the benefit of the German navy and of the Fatherland in accordance with their means. The minimum contribution of a member of the Navy League was placed as low as fifty pfennigs (sixpence) a year, in order to enable even the poorest men to join it. On the other hand, a single donation of 1000 marks (£50), created the donor a life-member of the League, and brought him a diploma which was handed to him by the aristocratic President of the League. Thus well-to-do shopkeepers were given an opportunity of satisfying their desire of coming into contact with the aristo-

cratic personages who filled the presidential position in the various districts, and of approaching the local celebrities. To stimulate the ambition of all members to carry on the propaganda and to obtain new adherents to the League, marks of distinction were conferred upon the most successful promoters of the League. By permission of the Emperor, Navy League Badges, and a special Navy League flag were created, and enthusiastic young Germans were officially encouraged to parade the emblem of the Navy League in the form of tie-pins, cuff-links, brooches, &c.

The Emperor has, for various reasons, kept personally away from the League. Nevertheless, he has identified himself with the Navy League and with its ceaseless agitation in every possible manner, and has shown himself the chief promoter and protector of that society. During the year 1905, for instance, the Emperor sent numerous telegrams of congratulation and of encouragement to the League. On the 1st January he telegraphed to the President of the Navy League, "hearty thanks for your loyal congratulations. May your wishes for the strengthening of our naval power be fulfilled, and may your ambitions and those of the German Navy League be crowned with success." On the 9th March his Majesty wired, "I thank the assembled representatives of the German Navy League for the expression of their homage, especially as I see in that expression the embodiment of patriotic sentiments which still further increase and strengthen my confidence in the activity of the Navy League." On the 27th May he telegraphed to the President of the League, "I thank you for the greetings and the homage of the Navy League, the patriotic activity of which is a strong guarantee for me that I shall attain the end which I have in

view." The other German sovereigns have naturally followed the Emperor's example, and they have done all in their power to strengthen the League.

How important is the position which the German Navy League holds may be seen by its yearly meetings, such as that which took place in Stuttgart, from the 25th to the 29th of May 1905. The festivities began with a State dinner at the Royal Palace of Stuttgart, to which the King of Würtemberg had invited the leading men of the Navy League. The 26th of May was dedicated to business. On the 27th the general meeting took place, which was attended by Prince Henry, the Emperor's brother, and by the King of Würtemberg. On the evening of the same day an entertainment was given to the members of the Navy League, which was attended by Prince Henry, the King of Würtemberg, numerous German princes, and by the whole Cabinet of Würtemberg. On the 28th the members of the League were received by the King and Queen of Würtemberg and by Prince Henry of Germany. On the 29th a performance was given for the members of the Navy League at the Opera, which also was attended by the King and Queen of Würtemberg and by Prince Henry. After the meeting, the President of the Würtemberg branch of the Navy League, Prince Carl Von Urach, and his assistant, Herr Pflaum, received each a framed and signed picture of the Emperor, "as a token of his Majesty's recognition of the services which they had rendered to the League."

The meetings of the provincial Navy League associations closely resemble the general meeting held at Stuttgart. These provincial meetings are attended by all the foremost people of the district, who provide a brilliant reception and a sumptuous entertainment,

and thus these provincial meetings powerfully assist in gaining new members for the Navy League, perhaps more from social than from patriotic reasons.

Owing to the skilful organisation of the German Navy League and to the most liberal imperial, royal, and official patronage bestowed on it, the members of the League rapidly increased in number, especially in the large towns. But the villages were not to be neglected. In order to enrol the country people as well, an army of travelling lecturers were engaged by the Navy League, and a number of cinematographic apparatuses were purchased, which all the year round travel through the districts allotted to them, and bring the idea of the German navy to the door of the peasants who live far away from the coast, in remote rural or mountainous districts. From the statistics published by the Navy League, it appears that, on an average, about 150,000 people attend every month these cinematographic performances. The Emperor William takes a great interest in them. On February 22, 1905, for instance, the Navy League was commanded to give a cinematographic performace before the Emperor at the Palace in Berlin.

In order to strengthen the local navy societies, frequent social meetings take place. To make these a success the central office of the Navy League issues suitable instructions for holding such meetings, supplies lists of lecturers and their topics, sends out lecturers and theatrical plays written for promoting the objects of the League, &c. Besides, the Navy League has published a book of popular naval songs, which contains no less than sixty-seven songs on the subject of "Our future lies upon the water."

The German Navy League has not only individual

members, but it admits whole societies, clubs, &c., to membership. Even a number of town corporations are members of the German Navy League.

Apart from the four thousand branches in Germany, the German Navy League has about one hundred branches in foreign countries, "excepting the United States and Russia," and the German consuls abroad are, in many cases, the founders and chairmen of these naval associations. These foreign naval associations contributed during the first ten months of 1905 considerably more than £2000 to the central association in Berlin, an amount which was larger than the takings of the British Navy League in the whole British Empire during that year, and it is remarkable that the largest individual contribution came from Cape Town, which, in January, sent to Berlin 2034 marks; in June, 10,200 marks; and in October, 1543 marks, or about £700 in all. It is certainly remarkable that so much enthusiasm for the creation of an overwhelmingly strong German navy should be found in Cape Town, and it is perhaps allowable to surmise that the larger part of this contribution came from the pockets of South African Boers, and not from German colonists, especially as the contributions sent from all other British colonies and from England itself are exceedingly small, the largest contribution from Great Britain being that of Glasgow, which sent £30 10s. to Berlin during the year, whilst London sent only £6 8s.

The foregoing details show clearly that the German Navy League is a private association only inasmuch as its members join the League voluntarily, but the fact that its central and its local organisations are in the hands of the highest German aristocrats and officials show that, by its direction, it is an official

body which stands under the influence and constant control of the Emperor and of the highest officials. Therefore we may assume, as will be shown in the following, that the policy of the Navy League is the policy of the German Emperor.

Now, let us consider the strength of the German Navy League, and let us see what it has achieved so far, what it is likely to achieve in the future, and how it is likely to make use of its power.

According to the latest statements of the monthly journal, *Die Flotte*, which is published by the German Navy League, that association has more than 1,000,000 members, and is therefore the largest voluntary association for patriotic purposes, not only in Germany but in the world. The income of the German Navy League should, in the present year, amount to more than £50,000. The monthly journal of the Navy League, *Die Flotte*, is issued in no less than 370,000 copies, and it has very likely a larger circulation than all other monthly periodicals published in Germany combined. How enormous a circulation of 370,000 copies is for Germany may be seen from the following figures, giving the circulation of the leading political dailies of that country:

Frankfurter Zeitung	32,000 copies
Kölnische Zeitung	30,000 „
Berliner Tageblatt	65,000 „
Vossische Zeitung	25,000 „
Total	152,000 „

The circulation of the other leading dailies of Germany is not obtainable, but the foregoing statement shows that the four leading political journals of Germany combined have less than half the circulation of the journal of the German Navy League.

The greatness and importance of the German Navy League becomes clear to us only if we compare it with the British Navy League. The German Navy League has almost a million paying members, the British has but a few thousand. The organ of the German Navy League, *Die Flotte*, is to be found in almost every restaurant, every inn, every hairdresser's shop, and in almost every private house of the well-to-do in Germany. The Navy League journal, although it is far better written than the very dull *Flotte*, may occasionally be found in an English club, but hardly anywhere else is it to be seen. Of a hundred Englishmen hardly one has ever seen the Navy League journal, of a hundred Germans probably ninety know *Die Flotte*. The British Navy League has, on an average, an income of about £2000 per year, out of which amount only about £500 are spent upon propaganda, the rest being swallowed up by salaries, postages, and sundry expenses. The German Navy League has now an income of about £50,000 per annum, and of this sum nearly the total is available for purposes of agitation. As postages, fares, and various other expenses for carrying on a campaign of propaganda are very low in Germany, and as countless workers for the German Navy League can be obtained gratis, £50,000 in the hands of the German Navy League will probably go as far for naval agitation as would £150,000 in the hands of the British Navy League, which has to pay heavily for all it does in the absence of a large number of efficient voluntary workers. The funds in hand of the British Navy League amount, as a rule, to about £200, whilst the funds of the German Navy League are so large that that organisation actually suffers from a glut of money. Therefore, the German Navy League has presented

the nation with a small gun-boat, and has given very substantial donations for the troops which took part in the expedition against the Boxers, for the troops which were fighting in South-West Africa, for missions to seamen, and for charitable purposes. Besides, the German Navy League trains a number of cadets free of charge, and distributes gratis an enormous quantity of literature for obtaining seamen and naval officers from the inland population. Placards illustrating "Germany's sea power," which are revised every two years, are sent by the Navy League free of charge to all schools which apply for them, and these placards are fastened to the wall and serve to impress the youthful mind with the conviction that "Germany stands in bitter need of a strong navy."

The German Navy League endeavours to create national enthusiasm for the navy among the German children. Not only provides the Society literature, pictures, lectures, entertainments, cinematographic performances, naval exhibitions, &c., for the young, but it takes every year a large number of children to the sea. This is a very useful and a very wise step, for most German towns lie so far inland that hardly 1 per cent. of the German children have seen the sea. Every summer the German Navy League brings many thousands of children to the sea, and many of these will, when they are grown up, no doubt, owing to their trip, be induced to enter upon a naval career. These children, of whom hundreds come from far away Bavaria and Thuringia, are accompanied by their teachers, and they are frequently conducted by a retired major or colonel, whose duty it is to show them what is to be seen, and to rouse the military spirit in the future defenders of their country. These children are taken over the warships, they are fêted

everywhere, and everything is done to ensure that their holiday will for ever remain one of their most pleasant recollections, and thus, these excursions probably assist very materially in converting a race of landsmen into potential seamen.

Now let us see what the German Navy League has, so far, achieved.

At the beginning of January 1900, within two years from its foundation, the German Navy League had created a perfect organisation for carrying through a campaign of propaganda among the masses, 286 local naval societies had been established, and 246,967 members had been enrolled. On January 25, 1900, the celebrated Navy Bill was brought forth, which, according to the preamble of the Bill, was to create a fleet of such strength that " a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power."

Even before this Bill had been announced, the Navy League had begun its campaign in the electorate, which shows that the League must have been taken into the confidence of the Government, or rather of the Emperor, before the public, and the Navy League commenced a campaign of agitation which is unprecedented in the history of Germany. In the spring of 1900, countless meetings in favour of the creation of a fleet sufficiently strong to meet the British navy were held all over the country, an army of lecturers taken from the *élite* of official, intellectual, and social Germany, delivered 3000 lectures to several million people, generals, admirals, Regierungspräsidenten, and the most distinguished University professors vied with one another in demonstrating to the public that the rapacity of the Anglo-Saxon nations was a danger to Germany, that Great Britain intended to attack

Germany's trade, that the danger could only be provided against by a fleet strong enough to overawe Great Britain, and that it would be best for Germany if Great Britain's naval supremacy was destroyed. In the course of this extraordinary campaign, books and pamphlets advocating the creation of a fleet of overwhelming strength were sold by ten thousands by the League, and no less than seven million books and pamphlets were, according to the Year-Book of the Navy League for 1901, distributed gratis by that Society. We cannot wonder that this strenuous campaign caused the Reichstag to pass the Navy Bill of 1900, for the violent agitation of the Navy League had proved irresistible, and had carried before itself all parties, including even the Social Democrats. On January 24, 1901, the President of the Navy League summed up the result of the campaign in favour of a navy strong enough to meet the British fleet, and he announced with pride that, during the year, the number of local naval societies had increased from 286 to 1010, that the number of members had grown from 246,967 to 566,141, and that during the year 939,251 marks, or almost £50,000 had been spent on the anti-British propaganda in favour of the German fleet. It is undoubtedly true that, as the Year-Book of the German Navy League declared, "the successful passing of the Navy Bill of 1900 was principally due to the enormous strength and the excellent organisation of the German Navy League, which embraced the whole Empire, and to its energetic agitation."

During the four years following the passing of the Navy Bill of 1900, the membership of the Navy League grew but slowly. On January 1, 1904, the membership had risen to 633,000, and was, therefore, only a little larger than in 1900. On the other hand,

the number of the all-important local societies had grown meanwhile from 1010 to 3600, and thus the potential strength of the Navy League had been more than trebled during four years of suspended agitation. Hence, a future naval agitation will find the German Navy League a still more formidable factor than it was in 1900.

The enormous strength of the German Navy League may be seen from the fact that the number of its paying members is about as large as the average number of the members of the great political parties of Germany, excepting only the Social Democratic party. As a matter of fact, however, it would appear that the German Navy League is, in reality, much stronger than any of the Parliamentary parties, because apart from the million paying members, it possesses probably a much larger number of adherents who are unwilling to pay a yearly contribution to that association. Besides, it should not be forgotten that almost the whole of the aristocracy, of the bureaucracy, of the military and naval officers, and of the professors and schoolmasters are active supporters of the League. Therefore, it may well be assumed that the German Navy League is, for all practical purposes, much stronger than any one of the German parties. Its organisation is perfect, it disposes of ample funds, and its agitations will probably, in the future, prove as irresistible as it proved in 1900.

The Navy Bill of 1900 was brought forward only after the Navy League had carefully prepared the ground by an unceasing agitation. A similar agitation was going on in Germany in 1905. In January 1905, *Die Flotte*, the official organ of the German Navy League, brought a diagram which was to show that of

the thirty-eight battleships which had been sanctioned by the Bill of 1900, thirteen were antiquated, and four of little fighting value, so that Germany possessed, apart from those ships building and contemplated, in reality only ten battleships of full fighting value. In an article by Major-General Keim accompanying that diagram, it was stated "unfortunately, we are at present, and shall be in the immediate future, not strong enough at sea, notwithstanding, or rather because of, the Navy Bill of 1900, for that Bill unfortunately laid down too long a time for the construction of the ships voted." Since January 1, 1905, when this statement was issued, down to the end of that year, the German Navy League has unceasingly condemned the Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900 as being totally inadequate. Although by the latter more than £200,000,000 were altogether voted for naval purposes, that enormous amount was treated as a contemptible contribution towards the German fleet. The leading article of *Die Flotte* for February 1905 closes: "We Germans spend £150,000,000 a year, or one-seventh of the national income, on drink, but the whole country, headed by the Reichstag, shrieks aloud if another shilling is demanded for the German fleet. A nation which can spend hundreds of millions every year upon alcohol has money in heaps for warships, but let us spend our money quickly, for, otherwise, it will be too late."

During the whole of 1905 it rained pamphlets and newspaper articles in Germany, which painted Germany's future in the blackest colours. Germany was declared to be helpless on the sea, and to be surrounded by watchful enemies who were only too anxious to destroy Germany. Only an overwhelming fleet could save the country from destruction. Notwithstanding

these hysterical declamations, the German public could not be roused to the necessary frenzy of enthusiasm as in 1900, and it seemed that the agitation of the Navy League would be unsuccessful when, to the great relief of the directors of that organisation, the visit of the British fleet to the Baltic was announced. The *Reichsbote*, the *Staatsbürger Zeitung*, and the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, which always have preached that Germany required an overwhelming navy to protect German commerce against Great Britain, declared in articles, which certainly were inspired from Berlin, that Great Britain was bent on destroying the German fleet, that the errand of the Channel Fleet was a reconnoitring expedition, that the Baltic should be closed to the English, &c. Whilst these and other papers went into hysterics, and shrieked that it was now too late to increase the German fleet, Admiral Tirpitz smilingly declared that the visit of the British fleet was a godsend, and the greatest blessing that could happen to the German Navy, for it would bring home to all Germans the necessity for a stronger fleet, and the German State railways announced that they would run excursion trains at specially low rates to the sea in order to enable all Germans to convince themselves of Germany's helplessness against Great Britain.

Whilst the Press of Germany thus endeavoured to frighten the general public, until the people themselves should clamour for an augmentation of the navy, the German Navy League issued in its Mitteilungen the following notice:

"Part of the German Press has seen in the visit of the British warships to the Baltic a hostile demonstration against Germany. We believe this opinion to be unjustified, for England is as much entitled to send her ships to the Baltic

as Germany has a right to send her ships to the North Sea. However, the appearance of the powerful British fleet will be of advantage to us, inasmuch as all Germans may now convince themselves with their own eyes how great is the inferiority of the German ships in size, armament, &c., if compared with the British fleet, and it should be noted that these British ships are not even the most powerful ones which England possesses."

Commenting upon this notice, the *Berliner Tageblatt* of August 2 observed that this statement appeared to have emanated from an official source, and it cannot be doubted that this was the case.

The chief business of the great gathering of the Navy League at Stuttgart, which has been described in the foregoing, consisted in the passing of two resolutions. In the first resolution the Navy League declared emphatically that it would support with all its power the policy of the Government to increase the number of cruisers and of torpedo boats. In the second resolution it had formulated a policy of its own, which it was determined to urge upon the Government. This resolution was worded as follows : " The German Navy League recommends an acceleration in the building of the German fleet, and wishes energetically to express the desire that the German battleships of inferior strength should as rapidly as possible be replaced by battleships of full fighting value." This resolution, by which the Government was called upon very largely to extend the great shipbuilding programme of 1900 has, since then, been vigorously endorsed by naval meetings all over Germany.

Since the time when these resolutions were passed, the German Government allowed the Navy League to prepare the public for the new naval demands which were placed before the Reichstag early in 1906. The Government asked that the eighteen battleships of

medium size, which under the Navy Bill of 1900 were to be laid down, should be replaced by battleships of the very largest size, that six cruiser-battleships of the very largest size should in addition be constructed, and that the German harbours and docks and the Kiel Canal should be enlarged. All these demands were readily passed. About £50,000,000 were voted, and Germany is planning, or already constructing, twenty-four ships, each of which will be larger and more powerfully armed than our own *Dreadnought*.

As soon as the Navy Bill of 1906 was passed, it was denounced and condemned by the League as utterly insufficient, and at the annual meeting of the League at Cologne in May 1907 the following resolution was unanimously and most enthusiastically passed:

"In view of the fact that other nations constantly strengthen their fleet in such a degree as to increase the disadvantage of our naval position, and in view of the serious dangers in which the insufficient strength of our naval forces involves Germany, the seventh annual general meeting of the German Navy League hereby resolves as follows: It is absolutely necessary to accelerate the completion of the naval programmes of 1900 and 1906."

This semi-official resolution has been supported by numerous articles to the same effect which have lately appeared in the inspired section of the German press. Their coincidence is hardly fortuitous, and it appears likely that the German Government, as is generally believed in Germany, intends greatly to extend the shipbuilding programme of 1900–1906, and especially to accelerate the completion of the ships voted. It is also noteworthy that a petition, covered with more than three hundred thousand signatures, the largest petition that has been got up ever since the foundation of the Empire, was sent to the Reichstag, in which it was

prayed that the building of the German fleet should be greatly accelerated. These straws show in which direction the official wind is blowing in Germany.

It might be thought that the Germans would become tired of adding additional enormous sums to those already devoted for their huge naval armaments, but so far there are no indications that Germany will refuse to pay for her navy whatever the Government chooses to ask for. Through the unceasing agitation of her Navy League, Germany has grown navy-mad. Toyshops which were filled with tin soldiers are now filled with tin battleships.

All differences of party have disappeared before Germany's ambition to conquer the rule of the sea. Although the Social Democratic deputies vote, for party reasons, against naval supplies, and ostensibly condemn them as unnecessary, they heartily approve of them in reality, and not a few Social Democrats belong to the German Navy League. The Social Democratic party of Germany will certainly support a further increase of the German navy, and the commercial circles and the agrarians also will not oppose a large additional increase of the fleet. Many German Chambers of Commerce have lately passed resolutions recommending that the German navy should be greatly augmented, and although a substantial minority may possibly in Parliament vote against increasing the fleet, it seems likely that the vast majority of the nation will be in favour of such a step, unless some unforeseen event should suddenly intervene.

In 1900 it was the argument of the German Navy League that the German fleet was weaker than that of Russia or France or Japan. At present the German fleet is in tonnage inferior only to the British fleet. The German fleet is considerably stronger than the

French fleet. France has to distribute her ships over two seas, she has numerous coast towns to protect, and her ships are, on the whole, old, slow, ill-built, and they lack uniformity and homogeneity. The French have *une flotte d'échantillons*, as they say themselves, and they will find it very difficult to manœuvre them in battle. Germany, on the other hand, has nothing to protect with her fleet. Her coasts are so well defended by extensive sandbanks that they require no protection. Hence Germany can, with her modern homogeneous and exceedingly well-managed fleet, easily defeat the French squadrons. The leading naval authorities in Germany admit no longer even a paper superiority on the part of the French fleet, and have no hesitation as to the issue of a naval struggle between the two countries. As Germany feels confident that she could defeat France on the ocean, it is perfectly clear that the additional naval armaments which are now clamoured for can only be directed either against this country, which alone possesses a distinct superiority over Germany on the sea, or against the United States.

We have heard much of the agitation of the Pan-Germanic League, but that League, though violent in agitation, indiscreet in its statements, and most aggressive by its programme, is not very dangerous, for it has no settled policy, and before all it possesses comparatively little influence in Germany. On the other hand, the German Navy League, with which, by-the-bye, the Pan-Germanic League is very intimately associated, is very dangerous. The German Navy League does not try to astonish the world with boundless plans of conquest, but it works quietly and in silence at creating for Germany an irresistible weapon wherewith the ambitions of the Pan-Germans may some day

be satisfied, and the danger of the German Navy League is all the greater because it has only a narrow programme, because it concentrates all the energy of the nation upon a solitary and eminently practical purpose, because it is most discreet, and because it never indulges in bluster. For these reasons Great Britain ought to watch the activity of the German Navy League with the greatest attention.

CHAPTER XV

THE GERMAN NAVY AND OPERATIONS OVER SEA

AGAINST which Power is the German fleet likely to be used? Germany need not spend several hundred million pounds on her fleet in order to be able to defeat France, which has an open frontier towards Germany, nor need Germany fear the Russian fleet. Therefore the great German fleet, which is building, can logically have only two opponents—either the United States or Great Britain.

We have been assured by a British Prime Minister and various politicians and officers that Great Britain cannot be invaded. Are their assurances to be relied upon? Does Germany also believe that an invasion of Great Britain is impossible? According to all great Austrian authorities, it was hopeless for Prussia to attack Austria in 1866. According to most of the great French authorities, it was hopeless for Prussia to attack France in 1870. According to various British authorities, it is hopeless for Germany to attack this country. "Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall." In the knapsacks of Austrian prisoners, taken by the Prussians in 1866, proclamations to the inhabitants of Berlin were found; the troops of Napoleon the Third were lavishly supplied with maps of Germany, but with none of France; the British troops entered upon the South African War with maps of the Transvaal, but

with none of the British colonies, where they so often were defeated. History is apt to repeat itself, and Great Britain may experience a naval "black week" if she thinks that the German navy need not be taken seriously.

Of course, if Germany was stupid enough to give Britain fair warning and to meet her in fair battle, the superiority of the British fleet would be overwhelming; but wars are not conducted, at least not by Germany, on the principles of a cricket match. Germany will, in a difficult war, certainly follow the advice which Bismarck gave to his nation in his memoirs. He said:

"When it becomes a matter of life and death, one does not look at the weapons that one seizes, nor the value of what one destroys in using them. One is guided at the moment by no other thought than the issue of the war."

In diplomatic and military warfare Germany has no other object than to defeat and crush her opponents. In politics and in war she leaves sentimentality to old women and amateur statesmen who have gathered their wisdom from shallow theorists, for Germany is administered by men of action, not by a miscellaneous crowd of glib orators and skilful vote-catchers.

The highest naval officers of Germany have an astonishing confidence in their well-handled and ever-ready fleet, and they do not fear an encounter with a superior British force. At the same time the German navy would not rashly attack a superior British fleet under normal conditions. A declaration of war is, according to usage and to the law of nations, unnecessary. Therefore Germany need not scruple to choose the most convenient moment for an attack on this country, and she may conceivably defeat a superior, but unprepared, British fleet in the same way in which she has defeated superior forces on land.

Very possibly Germany will endeavour to effect a landing in Great Britain. It is true that Lord Haldane has, on the 8th of March 1906, assured us that "the navy in the present strength is capable of defending these shores from invasion," and that "our coasts are completely defended by the fleet, and our army is wanted for purposes abroad and oversea." Therefore Lord Haldane proposed, for the sake of economy, to "do away" with numerous defensive positions on the coast and around London. Although Lord Haldane considered that a landing in considerable force was impossible on our shores, Lord Roberts and the leading German officers who have studied the question are of a different opinion. The German army is constantly ready for war. In a few hours all the ships which happen to be in the German harbours could be seized, filled with soldiers, and sent to the British coast, in accordance with detailed plans which the general staff has prepared. According to Lord Haldane, the risk of such an enterprise would be very great, but in reality the risk run by Germany in such an expedition is so infinitesimally small that it certainly should be run in time of war. The Germans know that the British are a humane people, not cannibals. If a hundred thousand men can be landed in England, Germany's object may possibly be attained. If the transports are discovered in time and are attacked by a superior British force they will hoist the white flag, and Britain will have to feed a hundred thousand prisoners, whose loss will make no appreciable difference to an army of 6,000,000 trained men. Lord Haldane's arguments may seem plausible to unmilitary people, but they are singularly unconvincing to all those who have had some experience in handling large bodies of troops. But that was, after all, not Lord Haldane's profession.

A superior British fleet, "capable of defending these shores from invasion," may at the critical moment have been lured away, or it may be occupied in another quarter of the world, for Britain cannot permanently tether up her fleet at her front door and convert her ships into floating coast fortifications. In the absence of the fleet, a hundred thousand German soldiers, perhaps more, could be landed, but, according to the Parliamentary arm-chair strategists, they would soon be "cut off from their base" by our ships. That operation would be very serious if Great Britain was a savage country. However, as the troops landed would find in the country plenty of guns and ammunition in the arsenals near the coast, and as plenty of horses, carts, &c., could be "commandeered," the lightest equipment and a few guns would suffice, and immediately a rush for London could be made. With London the British Empire would fall. I do not think that I betray a secret if I mention that the German General Staff has made a most careful study of England, and that the country has to such an extent been travelled over and surveyed by German officers that a German invading force would feel as much at home in England's winding lanes as on the straight *chaussées* of Germany.

The German troops would meet with the resistance of some hastily collected British regulars, territorials, and volunteers, but the highest German officers have singularly little respect for British troops, as I have had occasion to ascertain. Since Free Trade has ruined agriculture, the army has become composed of starving slum-dwellers, who, according to the German notion, are better at shouting than at fighting. German generals have pointed out that in the South African War British regular and auxiliary troops often raised the white flag and surrendered, without neces-

sity, sometimes to a few Boers, and they may do the same to a German invading force. Free Trade, which "benefits the consumer" and the capitalist, has, unfortunately, through the destruction of agriculture and through forcing practically the whole population of Great Britain into the towns, destroyed the manhood of the nation. Lord Roberts's recent statement that "our armed forces as a body are as absolutely unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899" is, unfortunately, only too true. Of course, if Lord Roberts and the German generals are right and Lord Haldane is wrong, which very likely is the case, we may impeach him or his successor—if there is a Parliament left by the invader who may have come to stay.

The essence of maritime warfare, especially for a country the interests of which are worldwide, is mobility. Therefore Britain cannot tie her ships to her shores. Her shores must defend themselves. The army cannot leave the defence of our coast to the navy. Our coasts can easily be defended, for we have a sufficient number of citizens willing to bear arms and to defend their country, and owing to the density of our population and of our railway net we can, with some little preparation, assemble 200,000 armed men, almost at any possible spot of debarkation, within a few hours. But that cannot be done if the necessary organisation is created by orating amateurs. Military experts must be allowed to manage military affairs.

If, in case of an Anglo-German war, an invasion of Great Britain, which almost certainly will be attempted, should prove a failure, Germany might either try to cause Russia to invade India, or she might strive to invade India in co-operation with Russia. Such an attack would be exceedingly dangerous, since the new Russian railways have placed Moscow within easy reach

of India. The support of Russia against Great Britain would be invaluable to Germany, and this is one of the principal reasons for Germany's unvarying friendship for her Eastern neighbour, but our armchair strategists have apparently never thought of a Russo-German attack on India. Happily the Anglo-Russian Entente protects Great Britain against such a contingency, and in that protection lies one of the most important reasons for the existence of that arrangement. Unfortunately it has been attacked by many who have never given a thought to the great strategical problems of Great Britain in Asia. Notwithstanding the Entente many Germans hope for Russia's co-operation in case of a war with Great Britain. Hence the possibility of a Russo-German attack upon India must not be lost sight of, for alliances do not possess eternal duration.

The foregoing shows that a war between Germany and Great Britain might, even at the present time, not be confined to target practice on moving objects on the part of the British fleet. A very few years hence Germany may even be able to challenge our fleet on the high sea. At any rate she has already immobilised our entire naval resources and confined our naval power to the seas in the immediate vicinity of our coast, especially as we have neglected our coast defences and home army, and thus Germany is making it impossible for us to assert our rights in any quarter of the globe except with Germany's permission.

I would now give, in extract, a translation of a very interesting German pamphlet entitled *Operationen über See*, by von Edelsheim, a member of the German General Staff :—

"Moltke declared that landings and operations with landed troops were enterprises of subordinate importance; but the military commanders of the

future will have to count the preparation for, and the execution of, wars over sea among their most important tasks. There is no State in the whole world which possesses better forces and greater means than Germany for the enterprise of war by landing. In the first place the excellence and the readiness of our army, and the celerity with which large masses of troops can be mobilised, are not equalled by any other great Power; in the second place, Germany disposes of the second largest commercial marine in the world, and has in the rapid large steamers of her shipping companies a splendid transport fleet, the excellence of which is not exceeded even by that of England herself; in the last place, the increase and strengthening of our navy which is at present taking place will guarantee increased security to the transport of our troops over sea. These factors, which are peculiarly favourable for Germany's power, open a large field for our world policy, and render it possible for us to make our strong military forces also useful for the greatness of the Empire, and to conquer by the development of German power over sea the same feared and esteemed position in the world which our victories of the last decennia have earned for us in Central Europe.

"A further stimulus in this direction is to be found in the fact that our navy will not be able at once to attain such development that it can alone solve all tasks which may have to be solved in an energetic world policy. Therefore it is desirable that the strength of our army should be made visible and available over sea to such nations as have so far looked at Germany as a State by which they cannot be reached. Thus we must consider not only landings in conjunction with territorial wars but also operations against States which we can reach only by sea.

"Operations over sea must not be improvised, because there is hope for their success only when the whole complicated mechanism down to the smallest details has been prepared in time.

"The possibility of utilising favourable situations and favourable times for undertaking operations over sea is one of the most important conditions for their success. When the landing has been effected in such a way that the opponent has been taken by surprise, even a strong country will hardly succeed in concentrating sufficient forces in time wherewith to meet the invader. The preparations for landing operations must therefore be furthered in time of peace to such an extent that in time of war we feel sure of having the advantage of surprising the enemy by our celerity in mobilising and transporting our troops.

"The aim of our operations must be kept entirely secret, and attempts should be made to deceive the enemy at least with regard to the purpose for which the first preparations are undertaken. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the manner in which it was commenced may be considered still to-day as a model.

"A landing on the coast of the enemy is only possible if the assailant has forces superior to those which the defender can collect at the decisive moment in order to prevent a landing. If a landing has taken place, even a victorious naval battle is useless to the defender unless he disposes of armies sufficiently strong to meet the invader with success. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the strength of our German navy should be developed so far that the security of the troops during a possible crossing is certain, and that it is able to defeat, or at least to detain, any hostile fleet which the opponent may collect at the moment when the landing operation is contemplated. There-

fore the way for a transport of troops over sea should usually be opened by an operation of the fleet, and the fact that a landing becomes absolutely impossible if the battle on sea has an unfavourable issue for us has to be taken into account. Thus the principle may be deduced that all men-of-war which can be used should be used for operations over sea in order to open the way for a fleet of transports.

"For operations over sea a detailed plan of mobilisation must be drawn up in exactly the same way as is done for operations on land. The troops which are to be mobilised must be determined in peace, their transport by railway, their harbour of embarkation and the preparation for embarkation must be prepared in order to ensure the greatest possible celerity. As we have seen in the foregoing, it is before all necessary to proceed with a surprising quickness which alone can assure us success.

"If the opponent disposes of considerable forces a simultaneous landing at several spots seems questionable. . . . If several places of debarkation are chosen, the protection of these places towards the sea requires many ships of war; the scouting towards the land is made more difficult, and the enemy will easier be able to attack in superior numbers the separate parts of the landing troops. Lastly, the unity of command at the beginning of the operations will meet with great difficulties, and time and means will be missing to obviate these difficulties. Therefore it is recommendable, if it is at all possible, to select only one spot of debarkation and to bring up the transport fleet as closely as possible to the coast.

"For a debarkation a harbour is naturally best. Less favourable but still advantageous is a closed, protected bay; least favourable is the open coast. On the other

hand, a landing on the open coast will find the least resistance on the part of the enemy because it can be executed with the greatest chance of surprise. If the point of landing selected is close to a bay or to a harbour the first task of the troops which are landing will be to take possession of such a place in order to enable the fleet of transports to disembark the majority of the troops, horses, and material at that spot. The possession of a harbour will greatly accelerate these operations and increase the security of the disembarkation against a hostile attack from sea and land. If such a coup does not succeed the landing of the whole expeditionary army must immediately take place by boats on the coast without loss of time, and all preparations must be made for such a possibility. Every transport must have with it a sufficient quantity of material for disembarkation in order to be able to land everything on the open shore. It is impossible to land in the face of strong fortifications or of a strong hostile force; the Russian landing manœuvres which have been made have fully proved that.

"The best security for landing by boats is always afforded by the surprise. Therefore it is impossible to explore a point of landing by ships sent in advance, which would only show the opponent which the probable point of landing would be and he would therefore be enabled to take his measures in time. Such proceedings can only be used in order to deceive the enemy. The exploration of the possible points of landing must have taken place already before the beginning of the operations.

"The well-known naval author Mahan, recognises that the offensive is characteristic of landing operations. The history of war teaches how the success of well-executed landings, such as those at Aboukir or

Cape Breton, have been partly marred by over-great caution of the landed troops, because it was not recognised by the commanders that energy and celerity in execution will counterbalance all strategical disadvantages to such an operation. Quick and energetic operations with closely concentrated forces on the line of the smallest resistance are absolutely necessary for the success of landing operations.

"Napoleon's campaign in Egypt proves that an army may subsist for years, even in a country possessing poor resources, when the connection with the home country is cut off. Such independence is greatly facilitated in a civilised, thickly peopled, and rich country, as it will then be much easier to get all that is required in the way of food, horses, material, &c., from local sources, and even ammunition may be manufactured in the enemy's country.

"An expeditionary army must economise to the greatest extent its forces. Bloody victories may act like defeats on them. Therefore, attacks on fortifications must be avoided if they are avoidable. The chief thing is always the surprising celerity of the operations, and in order to attain the main object aimed at all forces must be used with the greatest energy and with an absolute lack of all consideration.

"At present the view prevails in our military circles that operations over sea in connection with territorial wars are worthless, and are even harmful, as greater success appears likely by using those troops on land which might be used as an expeditionary force.

Operations against England

"A conflict with England must be considered by Germany, for a powerful progressive German trade

forms for the power of England at least as great a danger as the progress of Russia towards India. In a purely naval war with England we could count on success only at the beginning of operations, but soon England would be able to bring to the field such enormous naval forces that we should be limited to the defensive and could hardly count on a fortunate issue of such operations. Even if we conclude an alliance with Russia we might harm England permanently, but we would not be able to directly threaten that State. Only an alliance with France could menace England, but owing to her geographical position and the great loss of time which is occasioned by every operation initiated by allies, England would always be able to bring into the field a maritime superiority even against that alliance unless she be taken by surprise.

"England's weakness lies in that factor which constitutes our strength, the army. The English army corresponds neither in quantity nor quality with England's position as a Great Power, and does not even correspond with the size of the country, for England feels convinced that the invasion of her territory can be prevented by the fleet. That conviction is, however, not at all justified . . . for though England can collect immense fleets after some time, those of her naval forces which are ready for war during the very first days are not so overwhelming. Consequently an opponent who is considerably weaker on the sea, and who concentrates his forces and keeps them in a state of readiness can expect a temporary success. Therefore, in case a war with England should be threatening, Germany should endeavour to throw part of her army on the English coast, and thus to shift the decision from the sea on to the enemy's country. As our troops are far superior to the

English troops, England's enormous naval power would not have the slightest influence upon the final decision.

"The army of England consists of the field army, the reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the yeomanry. In case of an invasion by surprise, we need only consider of these the field army with its reserve. The militia requires so much time for concentration and equipment that only a small fraction will be able to assist the field army in the first and decisive struggle. The volunteers and the yeomanry cannot in a short time bring into the field any considerable forces useful for war. Besides, we must remember their small military value, owing to which they would not be serious opponents to our well-trained troops. The English field army consists nominally of three army corps, each composed of three divisions. Of these corps half the third is composed of militia. Therefore it has either to be completed from the militia and will then come too late for action in the first decisive battles, or it will march in its peace strength, and can then not be much stronger than a division. Of the second army corps two divisions and one brigade of cavalry are quartered in Ireland, of which at any rate the larger part will remain there in order to prevent a rising of the Irish, to whom the German invasion would bring the liberty they long for. Immediately ready for war are therefore only:

Three divisions of the first army corps,
About two divisions of the second army corps,
About one combined division of the third army corps and three brigades of cavalry.

"As the mobilised strength of an English division amounts in round numbers only to 10,000 men, whilst

that of a German division amounts to 16,000 men, four German divisions and one cavalry division would already possess a superiority over the British field army. However, we are able to ship in the shortest time six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry division, to England. How such an operation against England over sea should be conducted can of course not be described in this place.

"If the weather be fair, the transport from our North Sea harbours should be effected in little more than thirty hours. The English coast offers extensive stretches which are suitable for landing troops. The country contains such great resources that the army of invasion could permanently live on these resources. On the other hand, the extent of the island is so small that the English would never succeed in vanquishing any army of invasion, once it had been victorious. It is unlikely that such a war would be long drawn out, or that considerable reserves would be required. The material is largely renewable in the country itself. Therefore we may without hesitation maintain that it will be unnecessary to keep open communications with our own country.

"The first object to be aimed at in invading England would be the English field army; the second would be London. However, in all probability both objects would be attained simultaneously, as in view of the small value of the volunteers the whole field army would be required for the defence of the fortifications of London. It would obviously be impossible to let the capital fall into the hands of an invader, especially in view of the pressure of public opinion. But if London is taken by an army of invasion, one or the other naval harbours will also have to be occupied in order to create a base for supplies and for further

operations which we are justified to think will lead to the conquest of England.

Operations against the United States

"Operations against the United States of North America would have to be conducted in a different manner. During the last years political friction with that State, especially friction arising from commercial causes, has not been lacking, and the difficulties that have arisen have mostly been settled by our giving way. As this obliging attitude has its limits, we have to ask ourselves what force we can possibly bring to bear in order to meet the attacks of the United States against our interests and to impose our will. Our fleet will probably be able to defeat the naval forces of the United States, which are distributed over two oceans and over long distances. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the defeat of their fleet will force the United States with its immense resources into concluding peace.

"In view of the small number of American merchant-men, in view of the small value of the American colonies which are not even pacified, in view of the excellent fortifications with which the great American seaports are provided, and which cannot be taken except with very heavy losses, and in view of the large number of American seaports, all of which we cannot blockade at the same time, our fleet has no means to force that opponent through successful maritime operations to conclude a peace on our terms.

"The possibility must be taken into account that the fleet of the United States will at first not venture into battle, but that it will withdraw into fortified harbours, in order to wait for a favourable opportunity

of achieving minor successes. Therefore it is clear that naval action alone will not be decisive against the United States, but that combined action of navy and army will be required. Considering the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace.

"If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our harbours, we may conclude that operations on American soil can begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army equivalent to our own.

"At present the regular army of the United States amounts to 65,000 men, of whom only about 30,000 could be disposed of. Of these at least 10,000 are required for watching the Indian territories and for guarding the fortifications on the sea coast. Therefore only about 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come up when they were called out during the last war. Lastly, the militia is not efficient; it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its training is worse than its armament.

"As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account of the length of time during which the transports are on the way, only the landing can be affected by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion

will considerably facilitate victory against the United States, owing to the absence of methodical preparation for mobilisation, owing to the inexperience of the *personnel*, and owing to the weakness of the regular army.

"In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United States and to protect our lines of operation so as to enable us to fight successfully against all forces which that country, in the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces would be required. Such an operation would be greatly hampered by the fact that it would require a second passage of the transport fleet in order to ship the necessary troops that long distance. However, it seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great stretch of country for a considerable time. The Americans will not feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous material losses which the whole country will suffer if the Atlantic harbour towns, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the United States are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other.

"Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of large landing operations, through which we are able to take several of these important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. By interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving the State, commerce, and the defence, by taking away all material for war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the United States.

"For such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice. Nevertheless, the American defence will find it difficult to undertake a successful enterprise against that kind of warfare. Though an extremely well-

developed railway system enables them to concentrate troops within a short time on the different points on the coast, the concentration of the troops and the time which is lost until it is recognised which of the many threatened points of landing will really be utilised will, as a rule, make it possible for the army of invasion to carry out its operation with success under the co-operation of the fleet at the point chosen. The corps landed can either take the offensive against gathering hostile forces or withdraw to the transports in order to land at another place.

"It should be pointed out that Germany is the only Great Power which is able to tackle the United States single-handed. England could be victorious on sea, but would not be able to protect Canada, where the Americans could find consolation for their defeats on sea. Of the other Great Powers, none possess a fleet of transports required for such an operation."

CHAPTER XVI

THE GERMAN EMPEROR AS A POLITICAL FACTOR

THE Emperor is no doubt the most potent factor in German foreign and domestic politics, whether he rules personally like William II., or impersonally, through a powerful statesman, like William I. The political influence of the Emperor, whether direct or indirect, is always very great. Hence it is worth while to study the character and influence of the present occupant of the German throne.

William II. is, perhaps, the most picturesque and the most talked about figure on the stage of the world, and, if a computation should be made, it would very likely be found that more columns of the international press are daily filled with accounts of his doings and sayings than with those of all other sovereigns taken together. We have seen William II. not only as an emperor and a king, but also as a statesman and a politician, a general and an admiral, a painter and a composer, a stage-manager, a conductor of an orchestra, and a sportsman. We have heard him preach sermons, and give lectures on naval matters and on commerce, on yachting and on socialism, on agriculture and on new art, on archæology and on boat-building, on education, and on countless other subjects. In consequence of his numerous accomplishments and his feverish activity, he has come to be considered either as a genius of infinite range and wonderful intelligence, or as a

restless, many-sided, over-ambitious, and over-enthusiastic amateur.

However, whilst people are always discussing every one of the Emperor's minor acts, they usually omit to take a more comprehensive view, and to consider him in his most interesting aspect as a political factor by weighing his importance for his own and other countries by the general trend and character of his actions during the whole time of his reign. By summing up the net results of his restless activity during his long rule, an appreciation of his political weight and tendencies may be possible, and an opinion may be formed as to his future influence, for good or for evil, upon the history of his own country and of the world.

In order to understand the Emperor as a political factor, it is necessary to study his personality, character, and surroundings, as well as his rule, his ambitions, and his achievements.

William II. is distinctly a talented man, endowed by nature with a very active brain, rapid comprehension, a retentive memory, and a fertile imagination. These characteristics showed themselves already in his earliest childhood. For instance, once, when his governess, before inflicting bodily chastisement, solemnly assured the little prince that his punishment would hurt her more than it would hurt him, little William at once inquired naïvely whether it would hurt her in the same place where it would hurt him.

The German Emperor is very highly strung, nervous, and irritable ; impetuous to rashness, swayed by sudden impulses, possessed of unbounded self-confidence, and imbued with that fervent belief in himself, in his divine mission, and in the special

protection of Providence, which is usually found in great men of the first order, such as Alexander and Cæsar, Cromwell and Napoleon. Having a considerable gift of speech, it is only natural that his utterances are never commonplace, but highly dramatic, strenuous and emphatic, testifying to the rich mind from which they have sprung, and to the peculiarities of his character and views just described. The Emperor possesses a rare energy, considerable moral and physical courage, and much tenacity of purpose. Though he is able to form deep political plans and pursue them for years in close secrecy, he has been known to commit an indiscretion in a moment of weakness, and to shatter his deeply laid plans by a sudden ebullition.

William II. is well aware of his talent and ability, which are no doubt greater than that of any of his predecessors, excepting, perhaps, Frederick the Great. As Frederick the Great treated the "Unterthanen-Verstand" with sublime contempt, administered at the same time all the great offices of State in peace, commanded the armies in war, and whiled away his spare time with his flute and philosophy, with writing poetry and sketching, thinking himself great in all these subjects, to the amusement of Voltaire, even so William II. feels capable not only of ruling the empire, so to say, single-handed, but also of directing its commerce and education, its music and art—in short, the whole fabric of the empire, and the whole intelligence and activity of the nation. Frederick the Great is the Emperor's ideal and model, and, in fact, there is much resemblance between William II. and his great ancestor. Bismarck already remarked of the then Prince William: "In him there is something of Frederick the Great, and he is also able to

become as despotic as Frederick the Great. What a blessing that we have a parliamentary government!"

The self-will and self-assertion of William II. spring from the same cause as the despotism of Frederick the Great, namely, from the very full knowledge of his own ability and an insufficient knowledge of the ability of other people. These characteristics of William II. were known to the initiated before he ascended the throne. Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his own Chancellor, but, nevertheless, he was unwise enough not to resign when the old Emperor died. Hence his fall. Moltke was wiser. He resigned six weeks after the death of the Emperor Frederick.

Frederick the Great was a poet, an administrator, a philosopher, and an author, but he was essentially a soldier. In him the ambition to enlarge his dominions which is characteristic of all the Hohenzollerns, was particularly strongly developed, and he succeeded in nearly doubling the territory under his sway, and in elevating Prussia to the rank of a Great Power. William II., whose interests and pursuits are far more multifarious than even those of Frederick the Great, is also principally a soldier, and his desire to increase the territory of his country is more than an ambition with him; it is a violent passion, just as it was with Frederick the Great.

The Emperor is a soldier by nature. Nowhere does he feel more at home than amongst the officers of his army and navy, and he visits their mess-rooms very frequently, not as an Emperor, but as a comrade, and stays for hours with them, talking, jesting, and laughing; on the other hand, he has not been known to mix with civilians in a similarly cordial and unceremonious way. His military education, as well

as his inborn military inclinations, together with his love for Frederickian traditions, have not only coloured his political views and ambitions, and influenced his ideas of government, but they have also tinged his public utterances, which therefore usually take the form of Imperial commands. Consequently, his frequent pronouncements on art and education, religion, socialism, &c., are not only of startling originality, but of a still more startling vigour, especially as the Emperor has never hesitated to fling the whole weight of his Imperial authority into the balance in order to enforce his private views upon an unwilling section of the community, or upon the whole nation.

The former rulers of Germany stood, on principle, above the parties. William II. has descended into the arena, and has joined the fray with the greatest vigour, and, sometimes, with very unfortunate results. Utterances such as the following are typical for his Majesty :—

"For me, every Social Democrat is synonymous with enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland."

This was addressed to the largest German party in his speech of the 14th May 1889.

"Suprema lex regis voluntas," written as a demonstration to parliamentary and popular opposition in the Golden Book at Munich.

"Sic volo sic jubeo," written under his portrait given to the Minister of Public Worship and Education.

"Only one is master in the country. That am I. Who opposes me I shall crush to pieces."

These sayings sound especially strange if we remember that Germany is not an absolute, but a

constitutional, monarchy, and that, for instance, the "crushing to pieces" of German subjects can only be effected by means of properly constituted and independent law courts. These utterances, and many more of similar purport, which have caused much speculation in other countries, and consternation in Germany, do not so much spring from the sudden impulse of a passionate mind as from the Emperor's deep-rooted conviction of his own ability, and from a mystical belief in the absolute monarchical power by Divine right, vested by Providence in the German Emperor.

Under the Imperial Constitution of 1871 the powers of the German Emperor are extremely great. The Constitution says:—

". . . . The Emperor can declare war and conclude peace, make alliances, and other treaties, and nominate and receive ambassadors. (Art. 11.)

"The Emperor can call, open, adjourn, and dissolve the Federal Council and the Imperial Diet. (Art. 12.)

"The Emperor can issue and promulgate laws, and supervises their execution. The Imperial enactments . . . require the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who thereby assumes the responsibility for them. (Art. 17.)

"The Emperor nominates officials . . . and orders their dismissal." (Art. 18).

Besides appointing all Imperial officials, the Emperor appoints all officers of the German navy and of the Prussian army, as well as the highest officers of the armies belonging to the other German States included in the Empire.

Compared with the power of the British monarch, the power of the German Emperor with regard to foreign and home politics seems almost boundless. Nevertheless, William II. has not been satisfied with

this power, but has increased it at the cost of his Cabinet and of the Imperial Diet. Similar struggles for power may be found in nearly all constitutional monarchies, and at all times. I may recall the gentle struggle for power between Parliament and Crown under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, and the violent ones under James I. and Charles I. Imperial decrees have been issued by the Emperor without the counter-signature of the Chancellor, required by Article 17 of the Constitution. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the counter-signature of the German Chancellor, who by counter-signing assumes the responsibility for the Emperor's acts, becomes a mere formality when the Chancellor is not an independent official, but simply an obedient tool whose duty it is to put the Imperial will on paper.

In Bismarck's time the actual administration of the country was in the hands of a Cabinet composed of responsible experts, and, what is more important for other countries, German policy was directed by the wise foresight, unrivalled experience, calm deliberation, and firmness of purpose, of a great statesman. Though Bismarck was generally believed to be all-powerful, if not tyrannical, a belief that stood him in good stead, his position, as a matter-of-fact, was much less commanding than is generally known. His plans had to be submitted to the Emperor, who, in his turn, used to talk the matter over with his wife. The old Emperor was the soul of honour, conservative, cautious, and somewhat slow to move. The Empress was pious and peace-loving, with a distinct leaning towards Liberalism. Consequently, Bismarck's boldness and dash in foreign affairs were often tempered by the Emperor's wisdom and caution, and the influence of the Empress over her husband

made for moderation in home affairs. In effect, the old Emperor acted as a brake upon Bismarck, and the Empress us a brake upon her husband. Thus William I. was to Bismarck what the House of Lords is to a Liberal House of Commons, and the combination of Bismarck, the Emperor, and his wife was an ideal one for foreign policy, insuring the even continuance of a vigorous, wise, discreet, and successful policy.

Whilst Bismarck was in office German foreign and domestic policy ran an even course, German policy was understandable abroad, and Bismarck did not embark upon many risky enterprises at once, but concentrated his master-mind upon a few really important questions. His policy was at the same time great and simple, as was his character. The present Emperor appears not to have the commanding talent of a Bismarck for foreign policy, nor is he subject to the restraining influences which moderated the more adventurous plans of the great Chancellor. Furthermore, William II. takes, apparently, as much interest in the direction of the army and navy, of shipping and commerce, of education, art, sport, and countless other matters, as he does in the direction of foreign politics. Consequently, he has not sufficient leisure to concentrate his mind upon foreign policy. Hence German foreign policy has become fitful, enigmatic, and unstable, a replica of the Emperor's impulsive character.

During Bismarck's Chancellorship, the Triple Alliance was a solid combination, a healthy business partnership, with a unity of purpose, whose reliability in case of war was not doubted even by its enemies. At present the Triple Alliance exists still in name, but its solidarity has been impaired; it has latterly

come dangerously near breaking up, and protestations as to its strength are becoming suspiciously frequent and painfully emphatic—especially on the part of Germany. However, notwithstanding the loudly assured impregnability of the Alliance, Austria and Italy have thought it wise, if not necessary, to enter into various engagements with France and Russia, in order to provide against certain contingencies, and Germany also is casting about for other possible partners. The Triple Alliance seems, in fact, to have become a paper fiction, a result which may be laid directly at the door of the German Emperor's restless and impulsive policy.

Bismarck's diplomatic activity after the Franco-German War was chiefly directed towards two great objects: the maintenance of the Triple Alliance, and the prevention of an alliance between France and Russia. As long as Bismarck was in office, France and Russia were kept asunder, and Germany could feel absolutely safe from foreign aggression. Therefore she was the strongest and most respected power on the Continent, and its arbiter. Soon after Bismarck's dismissal Germany ceased to be the first power on the Continent, and her place was taken by Russia, which for the time being, but possibly not for long, has been eclipsed by her defeat in the Far East. Through Russia's downfall, which must have been exceedingly welcome to German diplomacy, Germany has again become the leading power on the Continent. Whether she will keep that position will depend on Russia's recuperative power and the action of Germany's and of Russia's diplomacy.

Russia, who had been a reliable friend to Germany until William II. came to the throne, was estranged by the Emperor, and the traditional good relations

between Russia and Germany, which had proved so valuable to her in 1870, came to an end. Only fifteen months after Bismarck's dismissal, in July 1891, the rejoicings occasioned by the visit of the French fleet at Cronstadt proclaimed to the world, what politicians had known for some time, that William II. had not only been unable to continue the skilful isolation of France and to enjoy the friendship of Russia, but that the Emperor had even driven these powers into one another's arms, by sheer bad diplomacy. The work of which Bismarck was even more proud than of the fashioning of the Triple Alliance, the keeping apart of France and Russia, had thus been rapidly destroyed by his successor.

Since Bismarck has left, the German as well as the Prussian Cabinet have been filled not with independent Ministers whose activity is supervised by the Sovereign, but with figureheads whose power is extremely circumscribed. From a powerful, impersonal, and therefore national, ministerial policy by experienced men, tempered by the moderation of a wise and cautious ruler, German foreign and domestic policy has become the personal uncontrolled policy of a talented, vigorous, impulsive, and highly self-conscious monarch, and is tinged by accidents of his health, and by his personal feelings and prejudices.

The Emperor considers his Ministers not as experienced and independent chiefs of the Departments of State, entitled to opinions of their own, but as the executors of his will, and he removes them as soon as they do not succeed in fulfilling his wishes. Consequently his Ministers of State have been changed with surprising rapidity, a continuity of policy in foreign and home affairs has become impossible, pro-

jects of great importance are brought forward in an immature state, and dropped in nervous haste, and the suddenness with which the highest officials are being replaced has taught them that it is not safe for them to oppose or to criticise the wishes of the Emperor, and that it is wisest for them to execute his wishes without question.

Only in money matters has the German Parliament any weight with the Imperial will as represented by the Cabinet. The German Parliament was already in Bismarck's time little more than a money-voting and law-assenting machine, plus a general talking-shop, possessed of hardly any influence, and of no control whatever, over the administration and policy of the Government. However, it would not have happened in Bismarck's time that a costly expedition like the German China expedition would have been undertaken, and that fresh regiments would have been raised without the assent of Parliament.

The phenomenon of powerful and constant interference from an exalted quarter is to be found in Germany not only in matters of State, but is becoming more and more frequent in minor matters, for which the following anecdote, told by a prominent German architect, may serve as an illustration: Drawings for a new church in Berlin were submitted to the Emperor for assent or correction. His Majesty, intending to make a marginal remark with regard to the cross on the top of the steeple, put a letter for reference above the cross, and drew a straight line from the letter down to the cross. Then he changed his mind, and crossed the letter vigorously through. When the architect received back his plans he studied carefully all the Emperor's corrections, but mistook the crossed-through letter for a star. Knowing

better than to ask questions, he built the church, and put a big star on a huge iron pole high above the top of the cross. This strange excrescence was in existence a few years ago, and is probably still visible. For similar reasons many monuments and public buildings in Berlin and other parts of Germany are of astonishing ugliness.

Blind obedience has become the watchword in official circles throughout the Empire, and even in professorial appointments by the independent universities and in judicial decisions by independent judges a desire to please his Majesty and to nominate professors and to shape judgments in accordance with the Imperial wishes is becoming painfully apparent. As the Emperor, apart from the powers already cited, can influence those whom he wishes to influence by bestowing titles and decorations, and by social preferment, abject flattery has become rife in his surroundings and throughout the empire. Examples of such flattery by the highest dignitaries of the empire, described in Germany under the name of "Byzantinism," are on record.

The domestic policy of the Emperor has been an unfortunate one. His anti-Polish policy has infuriated the Poles, not only in Germany, but also in Austria, Germany's ally, where their number is very great, and where their influence upon the Government is very considerable.

The lack of toleration which has become characteristic of German home policy has driven the Liberal elements of Germany into the ranks of the Social Democratic Party, which is no more exclusively a party of malcontents, recruited from the labouring classes, but which now includes numerous manufacturers, merchants, bankers, professional men, &c.,

a proof of the discontent of the middle class. Social Democracy being the strongest party in Germany, people who wish for reforms begin to think it useless to support any of the numerous small and unimportant factions in the Reichstag, and vote for Social Democracy.

During the reign of William II. Social Democracy has become by far the strongest party in the empire. The following figures, showing the numbers of Social Democratic votes polled at the various general elections, are highly significant regarding the home policy of Germany under the government of the present Emperor, and prove the growth of popular discontent :—

	Total of Votes.	Social Democratic Votes.	Percentage of Social Democratic Votes.
1887	7,540,900	763,100	10.11 per cent.
1888	(Accession of William II.)		
1890	7,228,500	1,427,300	19.74 „
1893	7,674,000	1,786,700	23.30 „
1898	7,757,700	2,107,076	27.18 „
1903	9,495,586	3,010,771	31.71 „
1907	11,262,800	3,259,000	28.94 „
1912	12,206,808	4,250,329	34.82 „

Is it to be wondered at that Social Democracy is growing by leaps and bounds, trebling its votes in ten years, when the Emperor began his reign as the "Arbeiter-Kaiser," called an international congress for the benefit of the German workers, and received their deputation, then turned round and proclaimed, "For me every Social Democrat is synonymous with enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland," and, lastly, had a Bill brought before the Reichstag, upon his personal initiative, making incitement to strikes a felony punishable with penal servitude, from three to five years? If anything was calculated to shake the confidence of the German workers in their Kaiser, and to increase, not to repress, Social Democracy, it

was the Emperor's untimely, impulsive, and ill-advised vigour and the "Penal Servitude Bill."

As there are more than a dozen weak and disunited parties, or rather factions, in the German Imperial Diet, and as Social Democratic teachings are fast spreading towards the country parts of Germany, the Social Democratic Party promises to acquire an overwhelming strength, and may in time become a dangerous opponent to the Cabinet policy at present prevailing in Germany, as will be shown in another place.

If we overlook the results of the Emperor's reign with regard to foreign politics, we find that up to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War Germany had to cede the first place in Europe to Russia, that the Triple Alliance has become little more than a name, that the Dual Alliance has become a potent and dangerous factor to Germany, that Great Britain has been estranged by the Emperor's desperate attempts to gain a footing in South Africa and on the Yangtse, and that the United States have become suspicious of German designs after the well-known Manila incident, the Venezuela expedition, and various other occurrences due to the Emperor's initiative. In consequence of these and numerous other *faux pas*, Germany has estranged her former friends, and has created for herself many potential enemies.

As the Emperor has not succeeded in increasing his territories by the peaceful arts and stratagems of diplomacy, he has turned towards his armed forces, and has immensely strengthened his army and navy —a precaution which became absolutely necessary in view of his venturesome foreign policy, and the wavering attitude of his allies. A comparison of Germany's armed strength in 1888, the year of the

Emperor's accession, and its present strength will therefore be interesting :—

PEACE STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY

1888 . . .	491,726 men	84,091 horses	1,374 guns
1911 . . .	626,732 ,,	118,246 ,,	3,444 ,,
Increase	+135,006 men	+34,155 horses	+2,070 guns

This great increase of the peace army is, however, small if compared with the increase in its war strength. Since 1893 the three years' service with the infantry has been shortened to two years, and consequently the yearly enrolment of men for the army has risen from 185,224 men in 1888 to 282,554 men in 1909. As the mobilised German army consists of at least twelve of these yearly levies, it appears that the war strength of the German army has been increased under William II. by more than 1,000,000 soldiers.

The following was the strength of the German navy at the beginning of the Emperor's reign and in 1910 :—

1888 . .	189,136 tons	182,470 horse-power	15,573 men
1911 . .	789,720 ,,	1,294,580 ,, ,,	60,804 ,,
Increase	+600,584 tons	+1,112,110 horse-power	+45,231 men

From these figures it appears that the strength of the German navy has been enormously increased under the Emperor's reign. However, it should be added that the incomparably larger German navy of the future, for which the Reichstag has voted credits, amounting together to more than £250,000,000, is at present only beginning to take shape.

The financial results which these greatly increased armaments have brought about are very interesting. The ordinary recurring expenditure alone for the

army has risen from 364,301,000 marks in 1888 to 714,496,000 marks in 1910, an increase of 95 per cent.; the navy estimates have risen from 48,675,000 marks in 1888 to 458,033,700 marks in 1911, a rise of 940 per cent. Furthermore, the debt of the young empire, exclusive of paper money, has risen from 486,201,000 marks in 1887 to 4,896,633,500 marks in 1909, or has grown more than tenfold, and the total Imperial expenditure has mounted from 876,934,000 marks in 1888 to no less than 2,924,790,100 marks in 1911.

Germany has, fortunately, gone through a period of great industrial prosperity during the Emperor's reign, and these very heavy burdens have consequently been easily borne by the population. At the same time it cannot be doubted that the present burdens might prove extremely onerous to the people in a period of economic adversity, and that the rapid increase of the Imperial expenditure cannot go on indefinitely at the present rate without ruining the country in the end.

If we survey the result of the Emperor's home policy, we find that the differences between the various religions, races, and classes within the empire have been sharply accentuated of late, largely owing to the policy of discrimination practised by the Government. To attain to the position of an officer, judge, magistrate, civil servant, university professor, or a school teacher, is easy for a Protestant, difficult for a Roman Catholic, and next to impossible for a Jew or a Pole. From the Government intolerance has spread to the public, and advertisements for clerks, apprentices, domestic servants, &c., stipulating their religion, can daily be found in the German press.

The result of the Emperor's Polish policy of

coercion is well known, and has been contrary to his expectation. Similarly his violent antagonism to the Social Democratic Party has given it an excellent advertisement, and has made it a powerful factor in Germany, and all the thundering anathemas lately launched against it have made it still stronger, as will be seen in another chapter of this book. With these and various extreme measures the German Emperor has created among his adherents the belief in the omnipotence of "Machtpolitik," the policy of force; but, so far, the results of that policy, which is the natural policy of the soldier, but not of the politician, have been singularly disappointing. Strange to say, in the recent agitation for an enormous increase of the fleet, and for the acquisition of colonies in temperate zones, the use of "Machtpolitik" was recommended by all the orators who, in the same breath, passionately condemned the policy of force and the rapacity of Anglo-Saxon nations, which crush weaker nations, as evidenced in the Boer War of Great Britain and in the Spanish War of the United States, and yet recommended the crushing of the Poles under the heel of Germany.

If we sum up, the net result of the Emperor's unceasing activity during all the long years of his reign seems to be that Germany has lost ground and prestige in foreign politics. At the same time, the Emperor has communicated his own nervous restlessness to the political atmosphere of the entire world. As regards home politics, dissatisfaction within the Empire has greatly increased, notwithstanding the great prosperity of the country, which usually tends to weaken the Radical parties, or at least to stop their progress. The friction between the classes has become more acute, the "State-subverting" parties,

as they are called in Germany, have become enormously strong, and none of the Emperor's great measures have materialised.

It is true, Germany has grown much richer during the Emperor's reign, and the number of her inhabitants has increased by nearly twenty millions, but these facts, for which he is not responsible, can offer him little consolation for his disappointments and foiled ambitions in the political field. On the other hand, William II. has certainly succeeded not only in strengthening his fleet and in increasing his army by more than a million soldiers, but he has also maintained it at a high degree of efficiency as far as outward appearances go. At the same time, it is believed that the German army no longer possesses its old pre-eminence.

Being more a soldier than a diplomat, and being aware that the greatness of Germany was won on the field of battle, William II. has naturally turned in his political disappointments towards the *ultima ratio regis*. When his campaign against the Social Democrats had failed, he addressed the officers of the Berlin garrison, and admonished them to stand by him and to shoot the malcontents in case he commanded them to do so, as the Prussian soldiers shot the Berlin revolutionaries in 1848. Again, when his attempts at colonisation in the Philippines and his pro-Kruger campaign had failed, he turned towards his fleet. On the 9th October 1899, the Boers issued their ultimatum; nine days later, on the 18th October, the Emperor made the celebrated speech in Hamburg containing the winged words, "Bitter not ist uns eine starke Deutsche Flotte." German colonial aspirations in Africa had been foiled by British diplomacy, and the speech mentioned was

the starting-point of the violent anti-British agitation in Germany which culminated in the passing of a Bill authorising the expenditure of altogether about £200,000,000 for a fleet, intended, according to its preamble, to be so strong as to be able to oppose successfully the most powerful enemy on the seas.

Whilst the German Emperor is showering the most assiduous attentions upon England and America, as well as upon France and Russia, and while peace is in his mouth, his huge fleet is being built with the greatest possible despatch. Naturally enough, people have indulged in surmises against which power this enormous fleet is intended to be used. However, such speculations appear to be utterly vain, for it seems unlikely that either the huge German army of the present, or the proportionately equally huge German navy of the near future, are intended for some clearly defined purpose. It would seem far more probable that the Emperor has arrived at the conviction that it will be impossible for him to acquire new territories in Europe or colonies abroad by peaceful means, and therefore he wishes to be absolutely ready to strike with both his army and navy, should a suitable opportunity offer for the acquisition of new territories in or out of Europe. Circumstances alone will determine against which power the German army and fleet will be used.

The German Emperor possesses a considerable versatility and flexibility of mind, which is sometimes described with a different name. First he sat at Bismarck's feet as his admiring disciple, then he dismissed his great master without ceremony, and completely changed the Bismarckian foreign and domestic policy of Germany. First he gave Caprivi

a free hand, then he ruled alone; first he took up the cause of the working men, and then he threw them over; first he was anti-colonial, and gave away the best German colonies in exchange for the then valueless rock of Heligoland, now he strains every nerve to acquire colonies; first he provoked France, and then he flattered her; first he flirted with the Poles, and now he forbids Polish school-children to say even their prayers in their own language.

In view of the Emperor's rapid and alarmingly frequent changes of mood, and the equally rapid and kaleidoscopic changes of his policy, in view of the bitterness which must have been engendered in his mind by the failure of his attempts at territorial aggrandisement and domestic legislation, and in view of the nearly absolute control which the German Emperor exercises, perhaps not *de jure* but certainly *de facto*, over the foreign policy of Germany and over her army and navy, it appears not unlikely that William II. may some day act against some "friendly" power with the same startling rapidity with which his great ancestor, Frederick the Great, acted against Austria, when he flung his armies into Silesia without any warning and without any cause.

It has been said that Great Britain has nothing to fear from Germany, because of the family ties which connect the Emperor with the British dynasty. Those who believe that sentimental considerations of a purely personal kind will be allowed to stand in the way of the Emperor's policy can hardly be acquainted with the diplomatic steps which William II. took against Great Britain when he despatched his telegram to Mr. Kruger. They should also remember that the German Emperor placed himself unreservedly on the side of the Turks in the Greco-Turkish War,

notwithstanding the fact that his own sister was the wife of the heir to the Greek throne.

In view of the character of the German Emperor, his well-known ambitions and his enormous power, it would seem that those nations at the cost of which Germany could possibly increase her territory should ever be watchful, and should ever be prepared against sudden surprises. They would do well to study the pan-Germanic manifestoes, which, though they are, of course, disavowed and discredited in official circles, give certainly some indication of Germany's political aspirations. We find in them recommendations for the "alliance or absorption" of "Germanic" Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, for the incorporation of the western half of Austria-Hungary, creating a German Empire stretching across Europe from the Baltic down to Trieste, and for the acquisition of colonies in a temperate zone in Asia Minor, South Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, or "wherever else opportunity should offer." How many of these projects will be accomplished within the Emperor's lifetime?

The theory has often been advanced that the time of the personal policy of kings and emperors is gone never to return. The future may disprove that theory, and may prove the German Emperor a political factor of the greatest magnitude, and of unexpected influence upon the history of Europe and of the world. Since the storm which followed the publication of the *Daily Telegraph* interview in winter 1908 the German Emperor has stepped back from the world's stage. Has he done so for good? It must be doubted. Men, and especially kings, do not easily change their character at a mature age.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

ALMOST every country possesses a more or less turbulent party which is considered to be a party of subversion: Great Britain has the Irish Nationalists, France the Nationalists, Germany the Social Democrats. That subversive party represents either unruly or unhappy men of limited numbers who are united by a common grievance, such as the Irish Nationalists; or it is composed of a moderate number of malcontents of every kind, class, and description, who are loosely held together by their common desire to fish in troubled waters, such as the French Nationalists; or it consists of vast multitudes of all sorts and conditions of men, such as the Social Democrats in Germany, and is then the unmistakable symptom of deep-seated, wide-spread, and almost universal popular discontent. In Germany alone, of all countries in and out of Europe, it has happened that by far the strongest political party has received neither sympathy nor consideration at the hands of the Government. Instead, it has again and again, officially and semi-officially, been branded as the enemy of society and of the country, "Die Umsturzpartei," the party of subversion. For instance, at the Sedan banquet on the 2nd of September 1895, the Emperor William declared in a speech that the members of that vast party which had polled 1,786,000 votes in 1893 were "a band of fellows not

worthy to bear the name of Germans," and on the 8th of September in a letter to his Chancellor his Majesty called the Social Democrats "enemies to the divine order of things, without a fatherland."

It can hardly be doubted that in the future, and perhaps earlier than is generally expected, the Social Democrats will be called upon to play a great part in German politics, and possibly also in international politics, though their influence upon foreign policy would be indirect and unintentional. It would therefore seem worth while to look into the history, views, composition, and aims of that interesting party, which may be said to be in many respects unique. As the full history of the Social Democratic Party in Germany would be as bulky as that of the British Liberal Party, it will, of course, be impossible to give more than a mere sketch of it in these pages. It may, however, be found that a sketch brings out the essential points and light and shade more clearly and more strongly than would a lengthy and detailed account.

The creation of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, like the inauguration of many other political movements in that country, is not due to the practical politician but to the bookish doctrinaire. Roughly speaking, it may be said that that party has been created by the writings of the well-known Socialist authors, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Ferdinand Lassalle. It suffices to mention these names in order to understand that German Social Democracy was at first animated by the spirit of the learned and well-meaning, but somewhat nebulous and very unpractical, idealists who had read many books, and who sincerely wished to lead democracy from its misery and suffering straight into a millennium of

their own creation, without delay and without any intermediate stations.

The fate of the followers of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle varied greatly. Some of them dissented and founded comparatively unimportant political schools and groups of their own, some became anarchists like Johann Most, some lost themselves in theoretical speculations and became respectable professors; but the vast majority of Lassalle's followers developed into the Social Democratic Party in Germany, and that party became, by gradual evolution, the level-headed political representative of German labour under the able guidance of talented working men. Its great leader was the turner, August Bebel, and among the most prominent members of the party were workmen such as Mr. Grillenberger, a locksmith; Mr. Auer, a saddler; Messrs. Molkenbuhr and Meister, cigar-workers; Mr. Bernstein, the son of an engine-driver; Mr. von Vollmar, formerly a post-office official. Working men such as those mentioned manage, lead, and control the party, which may be said to embrace more than 4,000,000 men, and maintain perfect order and absolute discipline amongst that vast number.

From its small beginnings up to the time of its present greatness, German Social Democracy has been democratic in the fullest sense of the word. Some working men of a similar stamp to those mentioned, together with Wilhelm Liebknecht, a poor journalist, created the party, organised it, and led it. These leaders were always under the constant and strict control of the members of the party. Individual members often inquired, sometimes in an uncomfortably democratic spirit, not only into the expenditure of the meagre party fund, which for a long

time did not run into three figures, and of which every halfpennny had to be accounted for, but even cross-examined the party leader, the aged Liebknecht, as to his household expenses, and censured him for taking a salary as editor-in-chief of the *Vorwärts*, the great Social Democratic Party organ, and keeping a servant, instead of living like an ordinary working man.

The idea of absolute equality, which is often found in small democratic societies, but which is usually lost when the society expands into a party, especially if that party is of enormous size, has been strictly preserved by the Social Democrats in Germany. This conservation of its original character was all the easier as the party had neither a great nobleman nor a distinguished professor for a figure-head, nor even wealthy brewers and bankers for contributors to the party fund, who might have influenced the party policy as they do in other countries. Thus the Social Democratic Party was, and has remained, essentially a Labour Party ; it has preserved its truly democratic, one might almost say its proletarian, character. However, it has been sensible enough not to write consistency on its banners, and has quietly dropped one by one the Utopian views and doctrines which it had taken over from the bookish doctrinaires who were its originators.

The Constitution of the German Empire gave universal suffrage to its citizens, and the number of Social Democratic votes, which had amounted to only 124,700 in 1871, rose rapidly to 342,000 in 1874, and to 493,300 in 1877. Bismarck had been watching the rapid development of Social Democracy with growing uneasiness and dislike, and was casting about for a convenient pretext to strike at it when, on the

11th of May, 1878, Hödel, an individual of illegitimate birth, besotted by drink, and degraded by vice, and consequent disease, fired a pistol at the Emperor William.

Long before his attempt on the Emperor, Hödel had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party, to which he had once belonged, on account of his personal character and his anarchist leanings, and he had joined the "Christian Socialist Working Men's Party" of Mr. Stöcker, the court preacher. Consequently it was not possible, by any stretch of imagination, to lay the responsibility for his attempt at the doors of the Social Democratic Party. Nevertheless, Bismarck endeavoured to turn this attempt to account in the same way in which, in 1874, he had laid the moral responsibility for Kullmann's murderous attempt on himself upon the Clerical Party, against which he was then fighting. He at once brought forward a Bill for the suppression of Social Democracy, but that Bill was rejected by 251 votes against 57.

By one of those fortunate coincidences which have always played so conspicuous a part in Bismarck's career, a second attempt on the Emperor's life was made by Nobiling, only three weeks after that of Hödel, and this time the aged monarch was very seriously wounded. At one moment the doctors feared for his life, but in the end the copious bleeding was a blessing in disguise, for it rejuvenated the Emperor in mind and body.

The two murderous attempts, following one another so closely, naturally infuriated the population of Germany, and, though Nobiling also was not a Social Democrat, Bismarck succeeded this time in turning the feelings of the people against Social Democracy. He immediately dissolved the Reichstag and fanned

the universal indignation at the crime to fever heat by his powerful press organisation; in the numerous journals throughout the land which were influenced from the Chancellory in Berlin, it was constantly declared that these repeated outrages were the dastardly work of Social Democracy. At the same time a reign of terrorism against Social Democracy was initiated by the German police authorities. Countless political meetings of the Social Democrats were forbidden, a large number of Social Democratic newspapers were suppressed, and the law courts inflicted in one month no less than 500 years of imprisonment for *lèse-majesté*.

During the enormous excitement prevailing and in the seething turmoil caused by those two attempts, by the critical state of the Emperor, by the passionate campaign of the semi-official press against the Social Democratic Party, and by the relentless persecutions waged against the members of that party by the police, the new elections took place, and, naturally enough, their result was that a majority in favour of exceptional legislation against Social Democracy was returned into the Reichstag. Bismarck brought the famous Socialist Law before Parliament without delay, and it was quickly passed, and was published on the 21st October in the *Reichsanzeiger*.

Then the reign of terror, of which the Social Democrats had already received a foretaste, began in earnest for that unhappy party. Within eight months the authorities dissolved 222 working men's unions and other associations, and suppressed 127 periodical publications and 278 other publications, by virtue of the discretionary powers given to them by the Socialist Law. Innumerable *bona fide* co-operative societies were compelled by the police to

close their doors without any trial and without the possibility of appeal, and numerous Social Democrats were equally summarily expelled from Germany at a few days' notice, through the discretion which the new Act had vested in the police. Many were placed under police supervision, others were not allowed to change their domicile. Thousands of Social Democrats were thus reduced to beggary, many being thrown into prison, and many fleeing to Switzerland, England, or the United States.

The first effect of the new law upon Social Democracy was staggering. The entire party organisation, the entire party press, and the right of the members of the party to free speech, had been destroyed by the Government, and for the moment the party had become a disorganised and terrified mob. Everywhere in Germany scenes of tyranny were enacted by the police. In Frankfort-on-the-Main, a Social Democrat was buried, and, for some trifling reason, the police attacked the mourners in the very churchyard with drawn swords, and thirty to forty of the men were wounded. In 1886 a collision took place between some Social Democrats and some policemen in plain clothes, who, according to Social Democratic evidence, were not known to be policemen. With incredible severity, eleven of the Social Democrats were punished for sedition, some with no less than ten and a half years' penal servitude, some with twelve and a half years of imprisonment. For the moment the Social Democratic Party was staggered by the rapidly succeeding blows. The election of 1878 reduced the number of Social Democratic votes from 493,300 to 437,100, and in the next election, that of 1881, it sank even as low as 312,000.

Prosecutions were not brought merely against such Social Democrats as were considered lawbreakers by the local authorities and the police. On the contrary, the German Government directed the law with particular severity against the intellectual leaders of the party in Parliament, in the vain hope of thus extirpating it. Bebel and Liebknecht, the heads of the party and its leaders in the Reichstag, were dragged again and again before the law courts by the public prosecutor, often only in the attempt to construct, by diligent cross-examination, a punishable offence out of some inoffensive words which they had said, and time after time the prosecution collapsed ignominiously, and both men were found not guilty; time after time they were condemned to lengthy terms of imprisonment for *lèse-majesté*, high treason, and intended high treason.

Liebknecht received his last conviction of four months of imprisonment, for *lèse-majesté*, as a broken man of nearly seventy years, and even his burial in August 1900 was marked by that petty and annoying police interference under which he had suffered so much during his life. No less than 2000 wreaths and other floral tributes had been sent by Liebknecht's admirers, yet, in the immense funeral procession, in which about 45,000 people took part, not one wreath, not one banner was to be seen, for the police had forbidden their inclusion in the procession. Though hundreds of thousands of Social Democrats attended the funeral in the procession and in the streets of Berlin, and in spite of the provocative orders of the police, no breach of the peace occurred, no arrest took place, an eloquent testimonial to the orderliness and discipline of the party of subversion.

Bismarck soon recognised that his policy of force

and violence promised to be unsuccessful. Therefore he tried not only to vanquish Social Democracy by breaking up the party organisation, confiscating its books and documents, by destroying the party press, and by taking from Social Democrats the right of free speech, but he tried at the same time to reconcile the German working men with the Government which persecuted them by a law instituting State Insurance for workmen against old age and disablement, in order to entice them away from their leaders, and to make them look to the State for help. However, his Workmen's Insurance Laws failed to fulfil the chief object which they were to serve.

According to the Social Democratic leaders the Imperial Insurance scheme kept not one vote from Social Democracy, especially as the Insurance Law did not satisfy the workers by its performance. German workmen complain that the benefits which they derive under the Insurance scheme are purely nominal, that the premiums paid come chiefly out of their own pockets, that the contributions made by the employers are insufficient, and that the cost of the management is excessive. Consequently it is only natural that this law has failed to appease outraged German democracy, and that it is scorned by it as a bribe.

Gradually the terror of prosecution wore off and became familiar to Social Democrats, political meetings were held in secret, party literature printed in Switzerland was smuggled over the frontier and surreptitiously distributed. By-and-by the party pulled itself together, and found that determination and perseverance which are only born from adversity, and which are bound to lead individuals and parties possessing these qualities to greatness. The campaign

of oppression and the creation of martyrs had done its work. As Bismarck had created the greatness of the Clerical Party by the "Kulturkampf," with its prosecution of Roman Catholicism, even so he created the greatness of the Social Democratic Party. Social Democracy began again to take heart, and, from 1881 onwards, we find a marvellous increase in the Social Democratic votes recorded, notwithstanding, or rather because of, all the measures taken against it by the Government. Since 1881 the Social Democratic vote has increased more than fourfold. The astonishing progress of the party since 1881 is apparent from the following table :—

Election.	Social Democratic Votes polled.	Total Votes polled.	Percentage of Social Democratic Votes.
1881	312,000	5,097,800	6.12 per cent.
1884	550,000	5,663,000	9.68 ,,
1887	763,100	7,540,900	10.11 ,,
1890	1,427,300	7,228,500	19.74 ,,
1893	1,786,700	7,674,000	23.30 ,,
1898	2,107,076	7,752,700	27.18 ,,
1903	3,010,771	9,495,586	31.71 ,,
1907	3,259,000	11,262,800	28.94 ,,
1912	4,250,329	12,206,808	34.82 ,,

When Bismarck saw Social Democracy increasing, notwithstanding all his efforts at repression, he tried another method. It happens very frequently in Germany that three, four, or more candidates, representing as many parties, stand for one seat. If in such a case none of the candidates obtains a majority over the combined votes given to all the other candidates, a second poll has to take place between the two candidates who have received the largest number of votes, whilst the other candidates have to withdraw. In the elections of 1898, for

instance, a second poll took place for no less than 48 per cent. of the seats. In order to destroy the chances of Social Democratic candidates in the very frequent second polls, Bismarck and his press used to constantly brand the Social Democratic Party as the State-subverting Party, and to enjoin "the parties of law and order," as he called the other parties, to stand shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy of Society and of the Fatherland.

Many years have passed since Bismarck's dismissal, but official Germany has not yet discovered a new method for the treatment of Social Democracy, and therefore it merely copies Bismarck's example. The Social Democratic Party is still loudly denounced to every good patriot as the party of subversion, which has to be shunned and combated, and thus the election managers of the numerous parties and factions, which number more than a dozen, have, up to now, in case of a second poll, preferred giving the votes of their party to the candidate of any other party to incurring the odium in official circles of having helped a Social Democrat into the Reichstag. But voices of protest begin to be heard all over Germany against the official fiction which brands Social Democracy as a pest, the enemy of the Country, of Society, of Monarchy, of Family, and of the Church. In December 1902, Professor Mommsen, the greatest German historian, wrote in the *Nation*:—

"There must be an end of the superstition, as false as it is perfidious, that the nation is divided into parties of law and order on the one hand, and a party of revolution on the other, and that it is the prime political duty of citizens belonging to the former categories to shun the Labour Party as if it were in quarantine for the plague, and to combat it as the enemy of the State."

In March 1890 Bismarck was dismissed by the Emperor William, and a few months later the exceptional law against Social Democracy disappeared. The net result of that law had been that 1500 Social Democrats had been condemned to about 1000 years of imprisonment, and that the Social Democratic vote had risen from 437,158 to 1,427,298. The effect of the Socialist Law, with all its persecution, was the reverse of what Bismarck had expected, for it has made that party great. If less drastic means had been employed by Bismarck, if less contempt and contumely had been showered upon Social Democracy by the official classes and society, and if instead consideration for the legitimate wishes and confidence in the common sense of the working men's party had been shown by the Government, Social Democracy would not have attained its present formidable strength.

Among the various causes which led to the rupture between the present Emperor and Prince Bismarck, a prominent place may be assigned to the difference in their views with regard to the treatment of Social Democrats. When William the Second came to the throne he clearly saw the failure of Bismarck's policy of oppression, and, probably influenced by the liberal views of his English mother, resolved to kill Social Democracy with kindness. This idea dictated his well-known retort to Bismarck, "Leave the Social Democrats to me; I can manage them quite alone!" Even before Bismarck's dismissal William the Second demonstrated to the world his extremely liberal view regarding the German workmen with that astonishing impetuousness and with that complete disregard of the views of his experienced official advisers to which the world has since become accustomed. On

the 4th of February 1890 an Imperial rescript was published which lacked the necessary counter-signature of the Imperial Chancellor, whereby the responsibility for that document would have been fixed upon the Government. This Imperial pronouncement declared it to be the duty of the State ". . . to regulate the time, the hours, and the nature of labour in such a way as to insure the preservation of health, to fulfil the demands of morality, and to secure the economic requirements of the workers, to establish their equality before the law, and to facilitate the free and peaceful expression of their wishes and grievances." A second rescript called together an International Conference for the Protection of Workers.

These Imperial manifestations, which emanated directly from the throne, were greeted with jubilation by German democracy; but the extremely liberal spirit which these documents breathed vanished as suddenly as it had appeared, and gave way to more autocratic and directly anti-democratic pronouncements, with that surprising rapidity of change which has become the only permanent and calculable factor in German politics. Whilst the words of the Imperial rescripts were still fresh in every mind, and whilst German democracy still hoped to receive greater consideration at the hands of the Government than heretofore, and looked for a more liberal and more enlightened régime, messages like the following, addressed to democracy, fell from the Imperial lips :—

We Hohenzollerns take Our crown from God alone, and to God alone We are responsible in the fulfilment of Our duties.

The soldier and the army, not Parliamentary majorities and resolutions, have welded together the German Empire.

Suprema lex regis voluntas.

Only One is master in the country. That am I. Who opposes Me I shall crush to pieces.

Sic volo, sic jubeo.

All of you shall have only one will, and that is My will; there is only one law, and that is My law.

Parliamentary opposition of Prussian nobility to their King is a monstrosity.

For Me every Social Democrat is synonymous with enemy of the nation, and of the Fatherland.

On to the battle, for Religion, Morality, and Order, and against the parties of subversion. Forward with God! Dishonourable is he who forsakes his King!

The Emperor did not confine himself to making in public pronouncements highly offensive and hostile to German democracy such as those mentioned, but set himself the task of actively combating Social Democracy. Consciously or unconsciously, he gradually dropped into Bismarck's ways, which he had formerly condemned, and copied, to some extent, Bismarck's methods, Bismarck's tactics, and Bismarck's mistakes. When, on the 13th of October 1895, a manufacturer named Schwartz was murdered in Mülhausen by a workman who had been repeatedly convicted of theft, William the Second telegraphed to his widow, "Again a sacrifice to the revolutionary movement engendered by the Socialists," imitating Bismarck's attempt at foisting the guilt for an individual crime upon a Parliamentary party which then comprised 2,000,000 members.

The Socialistic Law of 1878 had been a complete failure, as has already been shown. Nevertheless, the Government tried not exactly to revive it but to introduce, under a different title, a near relative of that law of exception, which breathed the same spirit of intolerance and violence; for in 1894 a Bill which is known under the name "Umsturz Vorlage" (Sub-

version Bill) was brought out by the Government. This Bill made it punishable "to attack publicly by insulting utterances Religion, the Monarchy, Family, or Property in a matter conducive to provoke a breach of the peace, or to bring the institutions of the State into contempt." That Bill, which, with its flexible provisions, would have allowed of the most arbitrary interpretations, and would have virtually given a free hand to the police and to public prosecutors and judges anxious to show their zeal and patriotism in the relentless persecution of Social Democracy, was thrown out in the Imperial Reichstag. Notwithstanding the failure of that Bill another Bill, of similar character, but intended for Prussia alone, was laid before the Prussian Diet on the 10th of May 1897, empowering the police to dissolve all meetings "which do not conform with the law, or endanger public security, especially the security of the State or of the public peace." This Bill also was rejected by the Prussian Diet.

Shortly after this second failure, William the Second made another and still more startling attempt to suppress Social Democracy. On the 5th of September 1898, he declared at a banquet in Oeynhausen, ". . . A Bill is in preparation, and will be submitted to Parliament, by which every one who tries to hinder a German worker who is willing to work from doing his work, or who incites him to strike, will be punished with penal servitude." Naturally this announcement, which promised that strikers and strike-agitators would in future be treated as felons, created an enormous sensation throughout the country. After a delay of nine months, which betrayed its evident hesitation, the Government brought out a Bill, which, however, had been con-

siderably toned down with regard to its promised provisions. Still it was draconic enough, for it made threats against non-strikers, inducing to strike, and picketing punishable with imprisonment up to one year. Its *pièce de résistance* was the following paragraph :—

"If, through a strike, the security of the Empire or of one of the single States has been endangered, or if the danger of loss of human lives or of property has been brought about, penal servitude up to three years is to be inflicted on the men, and penal servitude up to five years on the leaders."

This Bill, like that of 1894, possessed an unpleasant elasticity which could make it an instrument of tyranny in the hands of judges anxious to please in an exalted quarter, and the "Penal Servitude Bill," which had so rashly and so loudly been announced *urbi et orbi* by his Majesty, shared the ignominious fate of the two Bills before mentioned.

The attempt to pass a Bill of repression directed against Social Democracy through either the Reichstag or the Prussian Diet will probably not be so soon renewed by the Emperor; but those who know William the Second can hardly doubt that his Majesty deeply resents his repeated failure to crush Social Democracy by legislation, notwithstanding the repeated "solemn promises" which he has made in public that he would initiate such legislation. Therefore the question is often raised among the people, "Will the impetuous Emperor continue to tamely give way to Social Democracy and to the Reichstag, or what will he do to enforce his will ?"

The Conservative parties and the National Liberal Party, which cultivates chiefly that kind of Liberalism which is pleasing to the Government, have already loudly recommended a solution of that difficulty. I

give the views of some of the most prominent members of the Conservative Party. Count Mirbach stated at the meeting of his party, on the 1st of January 1895, that universal suffrage was a derision of all authority, and recommended the abolition of the secret ballot. The same gentleman stated in the Prussian Upper House, on the 28th of March 1895, "The country would greet with jubilation a decision of the German Princes to create a new Reichstag on the basis of the new Election Law." In the same place Count Frankenberg stated two days later, "We hope to obtain a new Election Law for the German Empire, for with the present Election Law it is impossible to exist." Freiherr von Zedlitz, Freiherr von Stumm, and Von Kardorff uttered similar sentiments. At the meeting of the Conservative Party on the 8th of March 1897, Freiherr von Stumm said, "The right to vote should be taken away from the Social Democrats, and no Social Democrat should be permitted to sit in the Diet," and Count Limburg-Stirum likewise advocated their exclusion. The official handbook of the Conservative Party, most Conservative and many Liberal papers, have warmly applauded these views, whereby a *coup d'état* by the Government is cordially invited.

Will the Emperor listen to these sinister suggestions when the difficulties in German home politics become acute, for their chief importance lies in the fact that they have largely been made in the confident assumption that they would please William the Second. Will he act rashly on the impulse of the moment, or will he act with statesmanlike prudence? Or will he allow a chance majority of Conservatives and National Liberals to alter the Constitution and to disfranchise democracy? So much is certain, that

the Emperor's personal influence for good or for evil will be enormous when the Social Democratic question comes up for settlement. Will he use his vast power with the recklessness of the soldier or with the caution of the politician ?

The aims of the Social Democrats in Germany, generally speaking, are similar to those of the workers in all other countries—they wish to better themselves politically, economically, and socially.

Politically, German democracy is not free. Though universal suffrage exists for the Imperial Reichstag, it little helps German democracy, for the German Parliament has far less power over the Government than had the English Parliament under Charles the First. The facts that the Emperor can, at will, dissolve Parliament, according to Article 12 of the Constitution ; that he nominates and dismisses officials, according to Article 18 ; and that the Cabinet is responsible only to the Emperor, prove, if any proof is needed, the helplessness of the German Parliament before the Emperor and his officials, who are nominated and dismissed, promoted and decorated by him, and by him alone. Parliament in Germany has no control whatever over, and hardly any influence upon, the policy of the Empire and upon its administration. Its sole duty is to vote funds and laws.

In the single States, German democracy fares still worse. The election for the Prussian Diet, to give an instance, takes place upon the following system. The whole body of the electors is divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid, each class contributing an equal amount and having the same voting power. The practical working of this curious system may be illustrated by the case of Berlin. The

voters of Berlin belonging to those three classes were in 1895 distributed in the following way :—

Voters of the first class	1,469
„ „ second class	9,372
„ „ third class	289,973
Total of voters in Berlin .	300,814

The figures given prove that the three classes system is the capitalistic system *par excellence*, for each of the rich men voting in the first class in Berlin possesses two hundred votes, each of the well-to-do men in the second class has thirty votes, and the combined first and second classes, or 3½ per cent. of the electorate in the case of Berlin, form a solid two-thirds majority over the remaining 96½ per cent. of the electorate. There are, besides, some further complications in that intricate system which it would lead too far to enumerate. At any rate, it is clear that that kind of franchise is worthless to democracy. A similar kind of franchise prevails in other German States.

Socially also, German democracy has much to complain of. Except in the large centres, the position of the German working man is a very humble one. There are two words for employer in German, which are frequently heard in Germany, "brodgeber" and "brodherr," which translated into English mean "breadgiver" and "breadmaster." These two words may be considered illustrative of the German worker's position toward his employer in the largest part of the country. Further grievances of German Social Democracy are the all-pervading militarism, the exceptional and unassailable position of the official classes, the prerogatives of the privileged classes, and the widespread immorality which has undermined and debased

the position of woman in Germany. Nothing can better illustrate the latter grievance of Social Democracy, which is not much known abroad, than reference to the daily papers. For instance, in a number of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* under my notice, there are to be found the following advertisements :—

Seventy-four marriage advertisements (some doubtful).
Forty-nine advertisements of lady masseuses (all doubtful).
Nine demands for small loans, usually of £5, by "modest widows" and other single ladies (all doubtful).
Six acquaintances desired by ladies (all doubtful).
Five widows' balls, "gentlemen invited, admission free" (all doubtful).
Thirty apartments and rooms "without restrictions" by the day (all doubtful).
Forty-seven maternity homes, "discretion assured; no report home" (all doubtful).
Sixteen babies to be adopted.
Sixteen specialists for contagious disease.

These advertisements, found in one daily journal of a similar standing to that of the *Daily Telegraph*, and similar in kind and extent of circulation, explain better the state of morality in Germany, and the consequent attitude of the German Social Democratic working man towards morality, than would a lengthy dissertation illustrated with voluminous statistics. This state of affairs explains the importance with which the question of morality and of the position of women is treated in the political programme of Social Democracy, and redounds to the credit of the German working man.

In order to become acquainted, not only with the actual wishes of Social Democracy, but also with the tone in which those wishes are expressed, and with the manner in which they are formulated, we cannot do better than turn to the *Official Handbook for Social*

Democratic Voters of 1898. The passages selected are such as prove in the eyes of German officialdom that Social Democracy is the enemy of the Country, of Society, of Monarchy, of the Family, and of the Church. At the same time, they clearly show the fundamental ideas of that party, and clearly reveal the spirit by which it is animated. The *Handbook* says :—

"The aim of Social Democracy is not to divide all property, but to combine it and use it for the development and improvement of mankind, in order to give to all a life worthy of man. Work shall become a duty for all men able to work. The word of the Bible, 'He that does not work neither shall he eat,' shall become a true word.

"Marriage, in contradiction to religious teachings, is in innumerable cases a financial transaction pure and simple. Woman has value in the eyes of men only when she has a fortune, and the more money she has the higher rises her value. Therefore marriage has become a business, and thousands meet in the marriage market, for instance, by advertisements in newspapers, in which a husband or a wife is sought in the same way in which a house or a pig is offered for sale. Consequently unhappy marriages have never been more numerous than at the present time, a state of affairs which is in contradiction to the real nature of marriage. Social Democracy desires that marriages be concluded solely from mutual love and esteem, which is only possible if man and woman are free and independent, if each has a free existence and an individual personality, and is therefore not compelled to buy the other or to be bought. This state of freedom and equality is only possible in the socialistic society.

"Who desires to belong to a Church shall not be hindered, but he shall pay only for the expenses of his Church together with his co-religionists.

"The schools and the whole educational system shall be separated from the Church and religious societies, because education is a civil matter.

"The God of Christians is not a German, French, Russian, or English god, but a God of all men, an international God. God is the God of love and of peace, and therefore it borders upon blasphemy that the priests of different Christian nations

invoke this God of love to give victory to their nation in the general slaughter. It is equally blasphemous if the priest of one nation prays the God of all nations for a victory over another nation. In striving to found a brotherhood of nations and the peaceful co-operation of nations in the service of civilisation, Social Democracy acts in a most Christian spirit, and tries to realise what the Christian priests of all nations, together with the Christian monarchs, hitherto would not, or could not, realise. By combining the workers of all nations, Social Democracy tries to effect a federation of nations in which every State enjoys equal rights, and in which the peculiarities of the inner character of every nation may peacefully develop."

In reading through the lines quoted, or indeed through the whole book, or the whole Social Democratic literature available, one cannot help being struck with respect for this huge party of working men and its powerful aspirations towards a higher level, notwithstanding a certain crudity of thought, and a certain amateurishness of manner which occasionally betrays itself, but which time and experience will easily rectify.

Ideas such as those quoted have been instrumental in framing the programme of the party, which is idealistic as well as utilitarian. The ten demands of the programme are given in abstract :—

(1) One vote for every adult man and woman; a holiday to be election day; payment of members.
(2) The Government to be responsible to Parliament; local self-government; referendum.
(3) Introduction of the militia system.
(4) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
(5) Equality of man and woman before the law.
(6) Disestablishment of the Churches.
(7) Undenominational schools, with compulsory attendance and gratuitous tuition.

(8) Gratuitousness of legal proceeding.

(9) Gratuitous medical attendance and burial.

(10) Progressive Income Tax and Succession Duty.

Were the Social Democrats as black as they have been painted, the leaders could not have kept the millions of their followers in such perfect order. Again, if the Social Democratic politicians were selfish or mercenary, as has been asserted, they would not die poor men. Liebknecht once said, and his case is typical for the leaders of Social Democracy, "I have never sought my personal advantage. If I am poor after unprecedented persecutions, I do not account it a disgrace. I am proud of it, for it is an eloquent testimony to my political honour." The *Kölnische Zeitung*, commenting on these words, justly observed, "It would be unjust to deny Social Democracy the recognition of the high personal integrity of its leaders." While the gravest scandals have discredited more than one German party and its leaders, the Social Democratic Party has, so far, stood immaculate—an eloquent vindication of the moral force of democracy, which force has been so thoroughly misunderstood in Germany.

The lack of understanding and of sympathy with Social Democracy and its aims is not restricted to official circles in Germany, which are entirely out of touch with democracy. Typical of these views on Social Democracy is the following pronouncement by Professor H. Delbrück, the distinguished historian, which appeared in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for December 1895 :—

"The duty of the Government is not to educate Social Democracy to decent behaviour, but to suppress it, or, if that should be impossible, at least to repress it, or, if that be impossible, at least to hinder its further growth. . . . What is

necessary is that the sentiment should be awakened among all classes of the population that Social Democracy is a poison which can be resisted only by the strongest and united moral opposition."

German democracy in the shape of the Social Democratic Party can not only raise the claim of moral force and numerical strength, of discipline and integrity, but can also be proud of the consummate political ability of its leaders and of the spirited support which these leaders have received from all the members of the party. No better and no juster testimonial, with regard to these qualities, can be given than the recent pronouncement of the great German historian, Professor Mommsen :—

"It is unfortunately true that at the present time the Social Democracy is the only great party which has any claim to political respect. It is not necessary to refer to talent. Everybody in Germany knows that with brains like those of Bebel it would be possible to furnish forth a dozen noblemen from east of the Elbe in a fashion that would make them shine among their peers.

"The devotion, the self-sacrificing spirit of the Social Democratic masses, impresses even those who are far from sharing their aims. Our Liberals might well take a lesson from the discipline of the party."

Whilst other German parties have split into factions or have decayed, owing to the unruliness of their undisciplined members or to the apathetic support given by the voters, or to the skilful action of the Government which brought about disintegration, the Social Democratic Party alone in Germany has, since its creation, constantly been strong and undivided, notwithstanding the many and serious difficulties which it has encountered. It is, no doubt, by far the best-led, the best-managed, and the most

homogeneous party in Germany, and is, indeed, the only party which, from an English point of view, can be considered a party. Similarly, there is in Germany no journal more ably conducted, for the purpose which it is meant to serve, than the Social Democratic Party organ the *Vorwärts*.

The Social Democratic Party does not possess in the Reichstag that numerical strength which one might expect from the numerical strength of its supporters, for it is greatly under-represented in that assembly. This great under-representation springs partly from the fact that, in the frequently occurring second polls, the other parties have usually combined to oust the Social Democratic candidate as before related; partly it is due to the fact that German towns are still represented by the same number of deputies as they were in 1871, notwithstanding the immense increase in the German town population since that year. No redistribution has been effected or seems likely to be effected, because the German Government does not wish to strengthen the Liberal and Social Democratic parties which, so far, have had their chief hold on the towns, and Parliament has no means of enforcing redistribution. Owing to the rapid growth of the towns, they are greatly under-represented, whilst the country is correspondingly over-represented. In 1893 the voters in the Parliamentary country divisions of the Empire numbered on an average 22,537, whilst the voters in the town divisions numbered on an average 41,098, and that disproportion has been still further increased since 1893. In that year there were seventy-five Parliamentary country divisions with less than 20,000 voters, whilst there were twenty-nine town divisions with more than 40,000 voters; and in consequence

of this state of affairs it happens that Schaumburg, with only 10,000 voters, and the district Berlin VI., with no less than 200,000 voters, are each represented in the Imperial Diet by one deputy. Berlin is entitled to twenty deputies, yet it is represented in the Reichstag by only six deputies.

How enormous is the disproportion between votes and representatives in the Reichstag, and how this disproportion works in favour of the two Conservative parties and of the Conservative Clerical Party, and to the disadvantage of the Liberal Parties and the Social Democratic Party, may be seen from the following table :—

Result of the General Election of 1907.

	Votes.	Members in Imperial Diet.	Average Number of Votes per Member.
Social Democrats .	3,259,000	43	75,790
Centre (Roman Catholic Party) .	2,179,800	104	20,959
National Liberals .	1,637,000	55	29,764
Conservatives . .	1,060,200	62	17,132
Freisinnige(People's) Party	736,000	27	27,259
Free Conservatives .	471,900	24	19,662
Poles	453,900	20	22,695
Seven parties and factions	1,465,000	61	24,016
Total	11,262,800	396	28,441

The consequence of this disproportion of votes to members in the different parties is that the Social Democrats, who commanded 28.94 per cent. of the votes, had only 10.9 per cent. of the seats in the Reichstag, whilst the Conservative Party, with only

9.4 per cent. of the votes, had 18.24 per cent. of the seats, and the conservatively-inclined Centre Party, with 19.33 per cent. of the votes, had no less than 26.26 per cent. of the seats. Based upon the same proportion of votes to members which obtains with the Centre Party and with the two Conservative Parties, the representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Imperial Diet should have numbered more than 150, and not 43.

Whilst Social Democracy has been flourishing and increasing, the various Liberal parties in Germany have been decaying for many years. The reason for that phenomenon is that the Liberal Party has striven to represent only such Liberalism as was approved of by the Government. Therefore Liberalism shunned the Social Democratic Party and its leaders, in Parliament and out of it, like poison, in accordance with the official *mot d'ordre*. Consequently the liberally-inclined German workman, small trader, clerk, teacher, &c., whom that approved Court Liberalism—which in reality was Conservatism in disguise—did not suit, dropped Liberalism and gave his vote to the Social Democratic candidate. But the German Liberal Party leaders were blind and obstinate, and thus the disintegration of their following is proceeding further. Now the well-to-do Liberal citizens also are beginning to turn away from the Liberal parties in large numbers, disgusted with the servile attitude which these parties have adopted, and are joining Social Democracy, hoping for reforms from that party, which is the strongest party in the country, and which, at least, has the merit of being straightforward. It appears that an incredibly large number of bankers, merchants, and professional men of Liberal views have of late years given their vote for Social Democracy.

In view of the disintegration of the old Liberal parties, many Liberals are strongly recommending the co-operation of the Liberal parties with Social Democracy. Whether such co-operation will take place in the near future remains to be seen. So far the middle-class Liberals have been fighting shy of associating themselves and identifying themselves with the working men, but there are strong reasons for believing that the Liberal parties are being democratised and that the Social Democratic Party is being liberalised. We may see a fusion of the Liberal Party with the Workmen's Party. Such a party would be of irresistible strength, for the majority of the German people incline towards Liberalism and Democracy.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE TRIUMPH OF IMPERIALISM OVER SOCIAL DEMOCRACY—THE LESSONS OF THE GERMAN ELECTION OF 1907

A SURVEY and careful examination of the Reichstag Election of 1907 make it appear that that Election has been a political event of first-rate importance, and that it is likely to have a very far-reaching influence not only upon German, but also upon British affairs. Therefore, it behoves us carefully to consider the lessons which it teaches.

The old Reichstag was dissolved, not because "a conflict arose," as we have been told, but because the Government, wishing to dissolve the Reichstag, caused a conflict to arise. The German Imperial Government deliberately and quite unnecessarily quarrelled, at the end of 1906, with the Centre Party over the paltry sum of £400,000 demanded for the South-West African colony, and then appealed to the people. On the day after the dissolution, the North-German *Gazette,* the leading semi-official organ in Germany, proclaimed to the world that the impending General Election was to decide whether Germany was to remain a European Great Power, or whether she was to become a World-Power. The people were told that Germany stood at the parting of the ways, and they were asked to choose between an uneventful, cheap, and safe policy of natural development in

Germany's European sphere, and an adventuresome, very expensive, and risky policy of trans-maritime expansion, and they chose the latter, as the result of the election has shown.

At the time of the dissolution the outlook seemed most unfavourable for the German Government and its world-political aims. The difference between the Government and the Centre Party had arisen through a long series of disgraceful colonial scandals which that party had brought to light. All Germany knew that the rising in South-West Africa had been caused by sheer bad management on the part of the officers and officials sent out; that, as the former Governor, Major-General Leutwein, has repeatedly shown, the cruelty and rapacity of the civil and military administrators, and their connivance at the heartless exploitation of the blacks by German traders, had driven them into despair and rebellion. The war in South-West Africa, a worthless colony, had cost Germany two thousand lives and more than £20,000,000; and that war, after having been a traders' war, had become an army contractors' war. The German army contractors in South West Africa, and the firm of Tippelskirch in Berlin, who provided the troops with all necessaries, made immense profits whilst the war lasted, and they had an interest in keeping it alive. It was discovered that a very influential Prussian Secretary of State participated, through his wife, to a large extent in the profits realised by the firm of Tippelskirch, which had been given the monopoly of fitting out the troops; and the Secretary of State in question had to resign. Germany was disgusted, not only with her South-West African colony and the scandals connected with the war, but with all her colonies, which, since 1884, had swallowed up about £75,000,000,

but which had failed to benefit the country in an appreciable manner.

During a long time before the dissolution of the Reichstag the newspapers of Germany had been full of complaints not only about the colonial scandals and the great waste of money spent in the South-West African War, but also about the dearness of food of every kind. Not only had the import duties of foreign food-stuffs been greatly increased, but the same Minister who had participated in the monopoly profits made by the firm of Tippelskirch had practically closed the frontiers against foreign meat and cattle by vexatious regulations, which were ostensibly made in order to prevent diseased meat and animals being imported. In consequence of these steps the cost of living had greatly increased in Germany. Day after day the newspapers of the Opposition brought lengthy accounts of the meat famine. Indignation meetings were held all over the country, numerous establishments had to increase the wages paid to their employees. The politicians of the Opposition constantly worked upon the masses with that most convincing and most effective of all arguments and cries — the stomach argument and the cheap-food cry.

As the masses had been inflamed against the Government during many months by countless articles and speeches about dear food and colonial waste and scandals, and as, furthermore, the Reichstag had been frivolously dissolved because the Centre Party had very properly insisted upon exercising some control over the limitless expenditure in South-West Africa, it was generally expected, both in Germany and abroad, that an Anti-Expansionist majority would be returned, that the Social Democrats would make

an end to Germany's ambitions, and enter the Reichstag more than a hundred strong.

The fact that the German Government dissolved the Reichstag upon the worst case of political mismanagement known in recent German history, the fact that it appealed to the people at the most inopportune moment, seems so strange that it is worth while inquiring into the causes of that sudden dissolution.

Since William II. has come to the throne, he has striven to elevate Germany to the rank of a World-Power, and he has given utterance to his hopes and ambitions in innumerable speeches with which all readers of this book are acquainted. The Emperor clearly recognised that Germany could not acquire by peaceful means colonies fit for the settlement of white men, as the world has been divided up; that Germany could obtain territories over sea suitable for the foundation of a Greater Germany only by conquest; and that transmaritime conquest required the support of a navy strong enough to overawe the mightiest Sea Power with which Germany might conceivably come into conflict in her intended career of forceful colonisation. Therefore the preamble to the German Navy Bill of 1900 stated: "Germany must possess a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." That phrase has been the watchword and the guiding principle of official Germany which has deliberately formulated and uttered it.

By the Navy Bill of 1900 about £200,000,000 were voted for naval purposes, but that immense sum seemed by no means sufficient to those who desired to challenge the naval supremacy of Great Britain. Therefore the German Navy League began,

towards the end of 1905, vigorously to agitate for the doubling of the German fleet. However, the country was not prepared to make the immense sacrifices needed, and the Government had to be satisfied with about £50,000,000 in 1906 voted by the late Reichstag. In consequence of this additional sum voted Germany will in a few years possess some twenty ships, each of which is to be larger and more powerful than the British *Dreadnought*.

As soon as these £50,000,000 were obtained the agitation for the doubling of the fleet recommenced, but as the old Reichstag seemed unwilling to vote the enormous sums required it was only logical to dissolve it and to make an attempt at obtaining a set of men in that assembly willing to extend Germany's naval armaments to the utmost.

During many months the German Navy League, which has a million members, and which is ostentatiously patronised by the Emperor and the Princes of Germany, had agitated for the doubling of the German Navy, and the leaders of that agitation had not hesitated to recommend to the Government, in speeches and lectures addressed to the masses, that, if the Reichstag was not willing to vote the credits necessary for doubling the fleet, a *coup d'état* should be effected by the Government; that the Government should levy the taxes necessary for the doubling of the fleet with or without the consent of the Reichstag; that, in case of need, it should govern against the will of Parliament or without Parliament.

The Government had dissolved the Reichstag, apparently in a fit of temper, at the most unpropitious moment. In the highest circles it was evidently believed that an anti-expansionist majority would very probably be returned. If that should be the

case, the doubling of the fleet could be effected only against the will of Parliament. Parliamentary Government might have to be temporarily suspended or modified or definitely abolished in Germany, and absolute government in some veiled form or other be reintroduced in order to obtain "a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." The possibility of a *coup d'état* was in everybody's mind between the time of the dissolution and the General Election. It was universally discussed. Many Conservative politicians and many prominent Conservative journals, such as the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, the *Post*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, the *Hamburger Nachrichten* demanded an Imperial *coup d'état* disguised in the phrase "Reform of the Franchise," and Prince Bülow seemed to contemplate the possibility of abolishing or at least modifying, Parliamentary Government in Germany by force of arms if an anti-expansionist Reichstag should be elected, for in his election Manifesto he threatened the anti-expansionist part of the German community in no uncertain tone with "the sword of Buonaparte." Before the German Election the words *coup d'état*, Restriction of the Franchise, Government without Reichstag, Revolution were on everybody's lips. The Social Democratic Party informed its adherents that Parliamentary Government was at stake, and adjured the people to vote against the Government for the defence of the franchise. Bebel and other leaders threatened to retaliate against a *coup d'état* by a general strike throughout Germany.

Whilst the leaders of the Opposition Parties appealed to the people to vote for cheap food, low taxation, for a policy of social improvement and

civic ideals, and for the defence of the franchise, the Governmental parties appealed to the people to vote for "Ships, Colonies and Empire," and notwithstanding dear food, notwithstanding high taxation, and notwithstanding the threats of abolishing, or at least modifying, Parliamentary Government, Prince Bülow obtained an Expansionist majority, and the Social Democratic Party, the party which had been loudest in its denunciations of "bread-usury" and "meat-usury," of capitalism and of high protective duties, of the colonial scandals and of the contemplated "theft of the franchise," was reduced from power to insignificance. Its parliamentary strength shrank from eighty-one to forty-three members. The triumph of militant Imperialism was most remarkable, for it showed that the German people were determined to follow the lead of the Emperor and his Navy League, and that they were determined to compete with Great Britain for the rule of the sea, for colonies and empire, regardless of cost.

Before the Election of 1907 there were about twenty parties and political groups in the Reichstag, but at the Election there were but two parties among the people, an imperialist party and an anti-imperialist party, and the imperialist party proved victorious. It is most significant, and perhaps ominous, that when at the last General Elections in Great Britain the contest was also between an imperialist and a non-imperialist party, the nation decided in favour of parochialism. Whilst Germany is striving after Empire and world-wide greatness with all her might, Great Britain is apparently tiring of Empire and world-wide greatness. We can therefore not wonder that many Germans begin to think that Germany may become heir to the British Empire when the colonies are slipping from Great Britain's ageing hands.

Although the German Government avoided as much as possible to awaken the militant enthusiasm of the German masses in order not to draw the attention of foreign countries, and especially of Great Britain and the United States, to the great issue at stake in the Election, an issue which is most interesting to the Anglo-Saxon nations in both hemispheres, and although the Government hardly mentioned the great question upon which the Election was fought, the people, informed by a few newspapers and pamphlets, clearly understood the immense importance of their decision for the whole future of Germany. Therefore they voted in unprecedented numbers and with unprecedented eagerness—11,262,800 people voted in 1907 whilst only 9,495,600 people voted in 1903—and the result of the elections was greeted with an enthusiasm which has its only parallel in the enthusiasm which was aroused by the declaration of war against France in 1870. The Emperor himself seems to have been completely carried away by the prevailing sentiment. At midnight he addressed the cheering crowds which thronged round his palace, and his words, which seem to have come spontaneously from the bottom of his heart, throw a flood of light upon his aims and ambitions and upon Germany's future policy. The Emperor said: "Gentlemen, I thank you for your ovation. To-day all of you have put your hands to the work and have proved the word of the Imperial Chancellor, 'Germany can ride if she cares to.' I hope this will be true not only to-day but also in future. If men of all ranks and faiths stand together, we can ride down all those who block our path."

The spectacle of an Emperor enthusiastically addressing a miscellaneous election crowd at midnight

from the windows of his palace, like some successful politician, is a new one in German history, and it seems unlikely that his Majesty's enthusiasm was caused by the fact that a Reichstag had been elected which would vote the £400,000 for South-West Africa which the late Reichstag had refused. The Emperor's unusual action shows clearly that he saw in the result of the Election an event of the greatest political importance, that he expected great things from the new Reichstag; and if we ask ourselves what was in the Emperor's mind when he said: "If men of all ranks and faiths stand together we can 'ride down' all those who block our path," we are irresistibly reminded of the preamble to the German Navy Bill of 1900 which has been quoted in the foregoing. Apparently the German Emperor intended to make soon a more energetic bid for the rule of the sea than he had done hitherto, and he hoped that the new Reichstag would vote the enormous sums which he required for challenging Great Britain's naval supremacy.

Most people in this country believe that Germany cannot possibly compete with Great Britain for the rule of the sea, and many say that for every ship laid down by Germany, Great Britain will lay down two ships. Great Britain could certainly easily outbuild Germany in the past, but whether she will be able to continue outbuilding her in the future appears somewhat doubtful. Let us not forget that the struggle for maritime supremacy is in the first place a financial struggle, and that the time when Great Britain was the richest nation in the world is past. At present Germany is undoubtedly richer than Great Britain, and Great Britain may be defeated in the financial duel for naval supremacy in which she is engaged.

It is true that the exports and imports of Great Britain are larger than those of Germany, but the export and import trade is only one of the resources of a nation, and by no means the most important one. The wealth of a nation does not consist in its "commodities" and "securities," dead things which occupy an unduly large space in the text-books of political economy. National wealth consists, in the first place, in the number of people employed in active production who create commodities and securities by their labour. Germany has 66,000,000 people, Great Britain has 45,000,000 people, and whilst the population of Germany increases at present by about 900,000 a year, the population of Great Britain increases by only about 400,000 a year. In Germany man-power, which is after all the most important national asset, is not only 50 per cent. larger than it is in this country, but it increases almost three times faster than it does over here.

If we compare the position of the industries in Germany and Great Britain we find that all the German industries are flourishing whilst most British industries are stagnant or decadent, only a few being really prosperous. Hence from 200,000 to 300,000 people have to emigrate from this country every year from lack of work, whilst in Germany, whence only from 20,000 to 30,000 people yearly emigrate, immigration is actually from three to four times larger than emigration. Whilst the British workers suffer from lack of work the German industries suffer from lack of labour. Unemployment in Germany among all the workers in the country amounts, as a rule, only to about 1 per cent., and the German statistics are very reliable. Unemployment in Great Britain among the Trade Unionists, our best employed workers, amounts

as a rule to about 5 per cent. The number of unemployed non-Unionists in Great Britain, of whom no statistics exist, should be much greater and should amount to from 8 to 10 per cent. Germany has an exceedingly prosperous agriculture. Since 1879 her production of corn, other crops, and meat has doubled, the number of cattle has grown by more than 3,500,000, and the number of pigs by more than 10,000,000, whilst, during the same period, agriculture in Great Britain has been shrinking, and the number of animals kept has been practically stationary. Germany's manufacturing industries are progressing by leaps and bounds. She produces already much more iron and steel than does Great Britain, which formerly was the forge of the world, and she raises, inclusive of lignite, almost as much coal as Great Britain. In a few years Great Britain will occupy the third rank in the world, not only as a producer of iron, but also as a producer of coal.

The marvellous prosperity of Germany is visible to all who periodically visit that country, but those who have not seen the progress of Germany during the last two or three decades can easily realise it from a few figures which should convince the most sceptical that Germany is richer than Great Britain, that, in a struggle for naval supremacy, Germany may financially defeat Great Britain. Between 1892 and 1905 the income subject to Income Tax in Prussia has increased by about 75 per cent., whilst the income subject to Income Tax in Great Britain has increased only by about 15 per cent. The deposits in the British Savings Banks amounted in 1907 to £210,000,000, the deposits in the German Savings Banks amounted in 1907 to £650,000,000. From 1900 to 1907 the British Savings Banks deposits have increased by

£17,000,000, whilst during the same period the German Savings Banks deposits have increased by no less than £170,000,000. The foregoing facts and figures show that in the struggle for naval supremacy the chances are apparently all in favour of Germany. It seems that industries, men, and capital are migrating from Great Britain, and facts such as that exports and imports are large and increasing, or that certain quantities of paper wealth—in the shape of bills of exchange, cheques, or investments—change hands, cannot make up for the fact that the solid wealth of Great Britain, men and industries, is deserting the country, and that incomes and savings are apparently stagnant. It seems clear that, unless this drain of wealth is stopped, unless Great Britain recreates her industries by a wise and energetic policy, and becomes again richer than Germany, she will not long be able to lay down two ships for every German ship. Germany may defeat Great Britain without a war. Great Britain may prove not wealthy enough to compete with Germany in ship-building, although her latent resources—such as geographical position, climate, soil, coast-line, harbours, coal, colonies, &c. —are infinitely superior to those of Germany.

At first sight it may seem curious that the cheap-food cry, which has proved so very effective in Great Britain, has proved utterly ineffective at the German Election. The cause of this strange difference can easily be explained. Whilst the ideal of the working population of Great Britain, which chronically suffers from unemployment and consequent distress and hunger, is cheap food, the ideal of the fully-employed working population of Germany is plenty of work, constant employment, good wages, and "ships, colonies and empire," which stimulate production, and therefore

increase work and wages. To the German working-man, the pauper argument of the "cheap loaf" does not appeal. In Great Britain wages may be high, on paper, and food may be cheap, on paper, but the evidence of great and widespread distress, consequent upon unemployment or insufficient and precarious employment, is to be seen everywhere. In Germany wages may be low, on paper, and food may be dear, on paper, but the evidence of general prosperity is to be seen everywhere; and a comparison of the emigration statistics and the Savings Bank statistics of both countries shows clearly that the working-men of Germany are far better off than are those of Great Britain. The German working-man is exceedingly prosperous, and he knows it; and, therefore, the cheap-food cry has, in 1907, fallen upon deaf ears, notwithstanding the frantic agitation of the Social Democrats.

Great Britain has followed an economic policy which benefits the consumer and the middleman, and which starves the producer and drives him out of the country. Germany has followed an economic policy which benefits the producer, but does not hurt either the consumer or the middleman. In the Election of 1907 the German working masses have emphatically and deliberately endorsed the economic policy of their country, notwithstanding the loud clamour of their leaders about "bread-usury" and "meat-usury." The German workmen in the towns know quite well that unduly cheap food would ruin the rural industries, depopulate the country districts, and destroy the manhood of Germany and half her home market.

The imperial instinct is stronger in Germany than in Great Britain. Germany is becoming an imperial nation—a nation with imperial instincts and aspira-

tions, as Great Britain was in the olden days; and we can hardly wonder that the thought of Empire is becoming stronger in Germany at a time when it is weakening in this country. Germany follows a policy of imperialism and energy born of success, whilst Great Britain seems to follow a policy of parochialism and lassitude born of weariness and non-success.

The German Election of 1907 teaches us a few lessons, and the importance of these lessons can hardly be exaggerated. It teaches us:

(1) That the ambition to make Germany a great Colonial Empire, and to conquer for her the rule of the sea, is no longer restricted to the Emperor and to the naval enthusiasts, but that that ambition has powerfully taken hold of the whole nation.

(2) That Germany is richer than Great Britain, and that she can afford to outbuild our fleet.

(3) That the German working population is far more prosperous than the British working population, and that the German working masses have deliberately and emphatically endorsed the economic policy of Germany which benefits the producer.

(4) That Social Democracy in Germany will not provide the hoped-for antidote to the necessarily anti-British expansionist and naval policy of Germany.

(5) That, unless Great Britain recreates her industries by a policy which benefits the producer and stimulates the production of solid wealth, Great Britain is bound to lose the rule of the sea, and with the rule of the sea her Colonies and much of her trade, her shipping, and her remaining wealth.

Will Great Britain learn the lessons of the German Election of 1907?

CHAPTER XIX

THE TRIUMPH OF LIBERALISM OVER REACTION—THE LESSONS OF THE GERMAN ELECTION OF 1912

THE German Reichstag Election which took place on the 12th January 1912 is likely to have a far-reaching influence upon Germany's foreign and domestic policy and upon Germany's future. Its full significance will be clear to us only after a short preliminary survey of the previous Election and its result.

According to the German Constitution and to the law of the 19th March 1898, which amended it, the German Reichstag is elected for a period of five years. The last Election took place in 1907, and a few days before that Election the Government appealed to the people to elect a patriotic Reichstag. The *North German Gazette*, the principal semi-official organ of Germany, proclaimed on behalf of the Government that the General Election of 1907 was to decide whether Germany was to remain a European Great Power or whether she was to become a World Power. The people were told that Germany stood at the parting of the ways, and were asked to choose between an uneventful, cheap, and safe policy of natural development in Germany's European sphere, and an adventurous and expensive policy of transmaritime expansion, and they chose the latter. The Social Democrats had previously opposed the Imperialist policy of Germany, and the electors had been enjoined by the Government to vote against them, and to smash

Social Democracy. In consequence of this appeal to the patriotism of the nation, the Social Democratic Party suffered severely. They saw the number of their representatives in the Reichstag reduced from 81, who had been elected in 1903, to 43. Patriotic Germans were delighted with that defeat. The Emperor himself could not restrain his exuberant enthusiasm; and at midnight, when the results of the day's poll had become known, he addressed, like a successful Party politician, the cheering crowd which had gathered around his palace. He stepped to a window and said to the masses below: "Gentlemen, I thank you for your ovation. To-day all of you have put your hands to the work, and have proved the word of the Imperial Chancellor, 'Germany can ride if she cares to.' I hope this will be true not only to-day, but also in the future. If men of all ranks and faiths stand together we can ride down all those who block our path."

Who were those who in 1907 blocked Germany's path and were to be ridden down with the help of a patriotic Reichstag? The record of its activity supplies the answer. The German Navy Bill of 1900 had laid down a gigantic and irreducible shipbuilding programme up to the year 1917, and in the memorandum introductory to that Bill the German Government had proclaimed: "Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." Germany's interference in Morocco in 1905 had had an unsatisfactory result, because Great Britain had stepped in and taken the part of France. The recollection of that failure rankled still in 1907. The new Reichstag was from its beginning considered to be an Imperialist Reichstag. Soon a

violent anti-British campaign for the extension of the German navy far beyond the limits laid down by the great Navy Bill of 1900 was begun, and although the shipbuilding programme provided by the Navy Bill of 1900 had already been greatly increased by the amendment of 1905, it was still further enlarged by the new Reichstag by the amendment of 1908, which provided for the building of five Dreadnoughts of the largest type. The enormous increase of Germany's naval expenditure from less than £4,000,000 in 1891 to considerably more than £20,000,000 in 1908, and a simultaneous great increase in the expenditure on the army and on various other services, had temporarily been financed by free recourse to loans. A great increase in taxation was necessary, and the new Reichstag provided a number of new taxes which were to produce an additional revenue of £25,000,000 per year. Thus the principal patriotic achievements of the Reichstag elected in 1907 were a considerable increase of the German navy, and the provision of about £25,000,000 per year in additional taxation. It should here be noted that the then chancellor, Prince Bülow, had proposed to the majority of the old Reichstag on which he relied, to the old Bloc, which was composed of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, to distribute the new taxes fairly between the classes and the masses. But the large Conservative landowners objected to certain taxes, especially to the Death Duties. They threw over their Liberal allies, and with the help of the Roman Catholic Centre Party, with which they had hitherto usually co-operated, introduced hastily another but ill-devised scheme of taxation, which placed the bulk of the new taxes upon the shoulders of the masses of the people. In consequence of this step Prince Bülow retired. Herr von

Bethmann Hollweg succeeded him, and he governed with a Reichstag majority composed of the Conservative and Clerical Centre Parties, the so-called Blue-black Bloc.

The Reichstag period 1907–12 has not fulfilled the high hopes of the German patriots. The five years' period has been barren of notable achievements. It has not increased Germany's power, prestige, and possessions, and it has not made Germany a World Power, but it has led to great disappointments. In 1911 the German Government raised the Morocco question for a second time, and for the second time the result of Germany's interference was very gratifying to France and extremely disappointing to Germany. Notwithstanding the assistance of a patriotic Reichstag majority, the German Government has not secured the triumph of German world policy which the *North German Gazette* had promised before the Election of 1907. Instead of riding down all those who blocked her path, as the Emperor had promised in his midnight speech, Germany has suffered a severe defeat in the domain of foreign policy through the lack of foresight and capacity of her own leaders. Hence the significance of the legislative period of 1907–12, which was ushered in with such high hopes and promises, lies in the failure of Germany's world-policy, lies in Germany's failure to threaten Great Britain's naval supremacy, for which purpose the great Navy Bill of 1900 and the supplementary Bills of 1905 and 1908 were introduced, lies in her failure to become a great transmaritime Power in opposition to Great Britain.

Patriotism and patience are the two great characteristics of the German people. In the past the German people have always cheerfully borne a severe and autocratic rule, and high and even crushing

taxation, for they felt that they were being governed and taxed for the good of their country, that they were ruled by able men who were increasing the greatness and renown of their fatherland. To them the German Government officials were men endowed with almost supernatural ability, who stood high above the criticism of the ordinary citizens. But whilst the old German policy, the Continental policy, which Frederick the Great and Bismarck had created, was a universal success, the "new course" which the Emperor William II. had inaugurated with so many rousing speeches and dramatic pronouncements and actions has been a universal and unmitigated failure. That is now generally recognised in Germany. Hence the broad masses of the people and the business section of the community, who are asked to provide heavier and ever heavier taxes for the glory of the country, are loudly and ever more loudly complaining that untold millions are squandered by an incapable but ambitious Government, whilst many members of the Prussian aristocracy, and many high Government officials, officers of the army and navy, university professors, clergymen, lawyers, doctors, writers, &c., who used to be the most enthusiastic defenders of the throne and the existing institutions, have become exasperated with an Emperor and a Government who, during a long period of years, and at an enormous expenditure of energy and of money, have not increased the country's power and prestige, but have created to Germany enemies everywhere, have lost to Germany that preponderant position in Europe which she used to occupy, have almost isolated Germany in the world, and are now threatening Germany with defeat and ruin. Whilst the German people went to the poll in 1907 in a spirit of joyous and patriotic enthusiasm and hope, they went to the poll on the 12th

January 1912 in a spirit of disappointment, of resentment, and of general dissatisfaction with the Government and with the Parties which had lately supported it. The prevalence of that spirit has, of course, affected the Election results.

In consequence of the Election of 1912, the strength of the seven principal Parties has changed as follows :—

Votes cast for.	Election of 1907.	Election of 1912.
Conservative Party	1,060,209	1,129,916
Conservative Reichs Partei	471,863	370,387
Roman Catholic Centre Party	2,179,743	2,035,290
Poles	453,858	441,736
Total	4,165,673	3,977,329
Loss of Conservative and Centre Parties which supported the Government	−188,344 votes	
National Liberal Party	1,637,048	1,672,619
Radical Forschrittliche Volkspartei	1,233,935	1,558,330
Social Democratic Party	3,259,020	4,250,329
Total	6,130,003	7,481,278
Gain of Liberal, Radical and Social Democratic Parties	+1,351,275 votes	

Although the German Government enumerates in its Election statistics no less than twenty-three separate political Parties and Groups, only the figures relating to the seven principal Parties have been given in the foregoing. The sixteen remaining small Parties and Groups received between them only about 750,000 votes. They affect very little the general result, and as their enumeration might be confusing, statistics relating to them have been omitted.

In 1907 11,262,775 voters went to the poll, whilst in 1912 12,206,808 voters went to the poll. In view of the fact that the number of votes cast increased by

almost a million, the loss of 188,344 votes by the Government-supporting Parties, the combined Conservative and Centre Parties, was very heavy. It was particularly heavy when we contrast it with the gain of 1,351,275 votes by the Liberal, Radical, and Social Democratic Parties which opposed the Government. The result of the German Elections was therefore a defeat of the Government-supporting Parties, and at least a moral defeat of the Government itself.

The feature of the German Election of 1912 has been the enormous increase of the Social Democratic vote. The unjust distribution of the £25,000,000 of new taxes mentioned in the foregoing, which pressed particularly heavily upon the masses, naturally brought about a great increase of the Social Democratic vote. According to the figures published by the Government, the Social Democratic candidates polled no less than 4,250,329 votes, as compared with 3,259,020 votes in 1907. In five years the Social Democrats have gained practically a million votes. The rapid growth of the Social Democratic Party will be seen from the following table :—

Social Democratic Votes polled.

1871	101,927
1874	351,670
1877	493,447
1878	437,158
1881	311,961
1884	549,990
1887	763,128
1890	1,427,098
1893	1,786,738
1898	2,107,076
1903	3,010,771
1907	3,259,020
1912	4,250,329

In the course of the last forty years the Social Democratic Party has grown more than forty-fold, increasing from 101,927 to 4,250,329. Nothing seems able to arrest its progress. It is now by far the largest Party in Germany. It has polled far more votes than the Conservative and Central Parties combined. At the 1912 Election Germany had an electorate of 14,236,722 voters, of whom 12,206,808, or 85.6 per cent., went to the poll. Consequently it appears that considerably more than one-third of the male population of Germany are supporters of the Social Democratic Party.

Three phenomena in German politics seem almost inexplicable to the average Englishman—the fact that Germany should possess not two large Parties, but a large number of comparatively small and independent political Parties and Groups; the fact that Germany, which is essentially a liberal-minded country, should lack a powerful Liberal Party; the fact that more than one-third of the German citizens, who are very prosperous, who receive the advantages of a paternal Government, such as State Insurance against sickness, accident, invalidity and old age, and who enjoy universal manhood suffrage, should be found in the Socialist camp in a country which is supposed to be a model to all other countries as regards education and efficient administration. These three phenomena deserve inquiring into.

Germany is a democratic country only in outward appearance. It is true that she possesses universal manhood suffrage, that plural voting is practically unknown, and that the principle of one man one vote is strictly carried out. As far as the voting goes, Germany is the most democratic country in the world. But here the democratic character of Germany's political institutions ends. Germany's Constitution

was neither gradually evolved by a people struggling to be free and to govern itself as was the British Constitution, nor was it devised in free discussion by a number of eminent democratic statesmen and politicians of different views as was the Constitution of the United States. Germany is an enlarged Prussia. The German Constitution was drawn up by a single man, by Prince Bismarck, a Prussian, and he aimed at creating an instrument which, though democratic in appearance, would not be an efficient obstacle to the absolutistic rule traditional in Prussia. Before all he desired to have a Constitution for Germany which would make it easy and convenient for him to administer the country according to his will. Whilst giving to the people universal manhood suffrage, he took good care that their representatives in the Reichstag should be powerless to influence the national government and administration, which were to remain in the hands of an all-powerful bureaucracy.

Bismarck came to power at a moment when the internal position of Prussia had become so desperate, when the conflict between the King and his Parliament had become so hopeless, that William I., who then was only King of Prussia, could no longer find a ministry willing to carry on the government of the country. The King had become so hopeless that he had actually drawn up an Act of Abdication, and was about to retire into private life. Bismarck induced William I. to entrust him with the government of the country, and to tear up the Act of Abdication. Having been given full power, Bismarck governed Prussia with a hand of iron. He collected illegally the taxes in opposition to a hostile and protesting Parliament, and he conducted three successful wars which made little Prussia the most powerful State

in Europe, and which made William I. Emperor of a united Germany. William I. was loyalty personified. He, who had been about to abdicate and leave the country, owed his great position to Bismarck. His gratitude to Prince Bismarck was great. Bismarck felt certain that he could absolutely rely upon the Emperor, that the Emperor was likely to act always in accordance with his own views. Therefore, in drawing up the German Constitution, Bismarck could most easily secure all influence and authority to himself by placing all power nominally into the old Emperor's hands.

According to the Bismarckian Constitution, Germany has no responsible ministers, but only one responsible minister, the Imperial Chancellor, to whom all the Secretaries of State are responsible. The Chancellor, who thus undertakes the responsibility for the conduct of all the departments of State, is responsible not to Parliament, but only to the Emperor. In Germany, ministers and other high dignitaries are taken not from the parliamentary Parties, as they are in other parliamentary countries, but from the ranks of the bureaucracy, the army, and the courtiers. Hence Government and Parliament, and Government and people, are out of touch. The ministers are the Emperor's servants. They are appointed and dismissed by the Emperor, and they stand outside and above the Reichstag and the Parties. No vote of lack of confidence will, therefore, shake the position of a minister as long as he continues to enjoy the support of the monarch. When Emperor and Chancellor agree, Parliament is practically powerless, especially as it is doubtful whether the German Reichstag is, according to the Constitution, entitled to withhold supplies by refusing the granting of taxes which had previously been established for an indefinite number

of years. In Germany, in Prussia, and in all the minor German states, the ministers are chosen and dismissed by the sovereign, and they are responsible not to Parliament, but only to the sovereign. Therefore the people represented in Parliament cannot rid themselves of an incapable or unpopular minister by voting against him, by withholding supplies, or by not voting his salary. On the other hand, a Reichstag which has become obnoxious to the Emperor or to his Chancellor can be dissolved by the Government, for, according to the Constitution, the Emperor is entitled to dissolve it. An inconvenient Reichstag is simply sent home in the hope that the next Reichstag will be of a different character, and in that case the powerful Government apparatus is set in motion to influence the people at Election time in the desired way. Hence in Germany, and also in the individual States composing it, all real power is in the hands of the hereditary ruler, who is often far more strongly influenced by the views of his courtiers and his aristocratic entourage than by the views of the people, especially as the views of the people are only too often distorted by a venal press. In Germany parliamentarism is merely a form. The people are practically powerless to interfere in matters of Government and administration or to influence appointments which, especially if the ruler is incapable and headstrong, often go rather by favour than by merit. The *Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Wähler* wrote quite correctly:—

"A Constitution was given by Bismarck to Germany which provided for a democratic parliament based on universal manhood suffrage, but which, owing to the fact that it left unclear the question whether the Reichstag is entitled to withhold supplies, placed all actual power into the hands of the Federal Government, or rather into those of the Prussian

Government which serves as its centre. The King of Prussia and the Prime Minister of the Prussian Cabinet, who acts at the same time as Chancellor of the German Empire, hold in their hands all real power. Bismarck made a Constitution which would suit himself.

"Prussia rules in Germany, and Germany is ruled by the aristocrats and plutocrats who are all powerful in the undemocratic and non-representative Prussian parliament who possess a decisive influence upon the Court and the army. . . . Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of withholding supplies. However, so much is certain that taxes and other sources of the national income which have once been voted cannot be discontinued in consequence of the veto of the Reichstag."

The new Constitution had laid down the principle that there was to be one member of the Reichstag for every 100,000 inhabitants. Germany had then a little less than 40,000,000 inhabitants, and in accordance with the population of the time the new Imperial Reichstag was composed of 397 members. The Germans are constitutionally a liberal-minded people. The middle classes in the towns had agitated during many decades for democratic and parliamentary government, and they received with delight the gift of universal manhood suffrage, which seemed to promise the advent of parliamentary government in Germany. Liberalism was *in excelsis*, and not unnaturally it became the controlling element in the new Reichstag. At the first Election in the German Empire, that of 1871, the Liberal Groups elected 203 members, and had therefore the absolute majority in the House. At the second Election, that of 1874, they were represented by 212 members, and commanded an increased majority. Bismarck had meant to give to Germany only the semblance of parliamentary government. He did not wish to see his policy circumscribed by a Party which possessed the majority in the Reichstag.

Therefore he endeavoured to break up the great Liberal Party, and he succeeded. Through Bismarck's activity the great Liberal Party was divided and subdivided into a number of quarrelling and powerless factions.

In all countries Liberalism has found its adherents chiefly in the large towns, and especially among the working men in shop and factory. The German Liberal Party, the Party which strove for real parliamentary government, and which, therefore, was dangerous to the Government, could be rendered impotent by separating the middle class of the towns, which furnished the leaders, from the working men in the towns, who were their natural followers. When the Social Democratic Party arose, Bismarck saw his opportunity of crippling German Liberalism. Two attempts on the life of the Emperor William I. gave him the opportunity of accusing the Social Democrats of that crime, and of branding them as a Party of traitors, of assassins, and of enemies to the established order. He instituted a campaign of persecution against the Social Democrats. He raised the red spectre. He declared that the Socia Democrats were the enemies of religion, the nation, and the fatherland, and that it was the duty of all good citizens to combine in fighting "the Party of revolution and of subversion."

Germany has a considerable number of parties and political groups, and these are apt to undergo kaleidoscopic changes—between 1871 and 1912 there have been 11 Conservative Parties, 14 Liberal Parties, 2 Clerical Parties, 9 Nationalist and Particularist Parties, and 5 Socialist Parties—but in reality Germany, like every other country, has only two great Parties, a Conservative Party and a Liberal Party. Each of

these two great Parties is, through the lack of Party discipline and through Governmental machinations, subdivided into a number of Groups. The Clerical Centre Party, which represents chiefly the Roman Catholic country districts of Germany, is naturally Conservative in character. The Conservative and the Centre Parties would probably form one great Party had not Bismarck divided them by his persecution of Roman Catholicism, the Kulturkampf, which made the Roman Catholic section a close union for mutual defence, and which divided the Conservative Party into a Roman Catholic and into a Protestant Group, which at one time fought one another. The old Liberal Party of Germany has been broken up into a number of more and of less advanced sections, and the Social Democratic Party is, rightly considered, not a revolutionary Party, and not even a Socialist Party, but only the most advanced and the most dissatisfied wing of the old Liberal Party of Germany. Formerly the German working men voted for the Liberal candidates, and they would probably do so still had it not been for Bismarck's policy.

The Social Democratic Party was created by a number of enthusiastic working men and of friends of the working men. It was in the beginning merely a small working-men's Party, which was led by working men and by a few unpractical political enthusiasts, doctrinaires, and philanthropists. Bismarck's persecution of the Social Democrats had a threefold effect. In the first place it converted the workmen leaders of the Party into martyrs, and caused the workmen to join in thousands the Social Democratic Party. In the second place, it embittered the Social Democratic leaders, drove them to extreme views, caused them to make violent speeches, and

gave colour to their doctrine of the Class War. In the third place, it caused the Liberal leaders and the Liberal Party to become suspicious of working men inclined towards Socialism, and of every measure which might be interpreted and denounced by the Government as helpful to Social Democracy; and thus a gulf was dug between Liberalism and Labour. Labour was driven out of the Liberal Party through the Government's policy. The German Social Democratic Party is in reality a Liberal Party which is largely recruited from the working men, and which is led by Social Democratic spokesmen who propound out-of-date doctrines and Party programmes.

Germany is still, as she was in 1871, an absolutistically ruled country with a democratic franchise. A German comic paper, the *Simplicissimus*, printed just before the Election a cartoon in which a gentleman of aristocratic appearance was addressing a number of people. Underneath were the words: "Gentlemen, you have now to fulfil that most important duty of German citizens of voting for the Reichstag. When you have done so, it will again be the Emperor's turn during the next five years." The absolute supremacy of the Emperor, the bureaucracy, and the aristocracy is as great as ever, but it can continue only as long as the Government need not fear a strong hostile majority in the Reichstag. The German Government, which is Prussian Conservative in character, can practically always count upon the support of the Conservative Party, which represents the privileges of aristocracy, and upon that of the Centre Party, which represents the most conservative institution in the world, the Roman Catholic Church. The German Government need fear the Centre Party only if it should antagonise the Roman Catholic Church, and

this it cannot afford to do. As at present constituted, the German Government need fear only the Liberal Parties.

At the General Election of 1912 the Conservative Parties polled together 4,500,000 votes, whilst the Liberal and Socialist Parties polled together no less than 7,500,000 votes. One may therefore say that there is a majority of 3,000,000 votes against the Government, that the Conservative Parties which support the Government are in a small minority. These figures make it clear that it is of the utmost importance to the German Government to prevent the proportional representation of the people in the Reichstag, and to prevent the representatives of the 7,500,000 voters, who are opposed to Conservatism, acting in union. It is of the utmost importance for the Government that the Liberal Party should remain irreconcilably divided against itself, that there should continue to be a capitalistic section and a Socialistic section of the Liberal Party, and that these two sections should make war upon one another in accordance with Bismarck's policy. Bismarck has had four successors, but every one of them has seen the danger which threatens Germany's present form of uncontrolled and pseudo-popular Government from a reunion of the great Liberal Party of 1871 through a reconciliation of the Liberal sections with the Social Democratic section. Hence every one of Bismarck's successors has entreated all good citizens to combine against "the Party of subversion and of revolution." Before the General Election of 1907 it was Prince Bülow, and before that of 1912 it was Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who painted to the electors in lurid colours the danger of the "Red Peril."

Germany has a peculiar form of election. A candi-

date is elected only when he receives an absolute majority of all the votes given in his district. If, owing to the number of candidates standing for the Reichstag, none of them receives an absolute majority of all the votes, a second poll is held between those two candidates who have received the largest number of votes and therefore head the poll. If, as is frequently the case, there are three candidates—let us say a Conservative, a Liberal, and a Social Democratic candidate—who fairly evenly divide the poll between them, a second poll has to take place. If now the "State-supporting Parties" can be induced to vote against the Social Democrat and for the Conservative candidate, the Liberal Party to its own harm will strengthen the Conservative Party and the Government. Therefore the Government has found it particularly important at Election times to bring out the Red Peril, and especially at the moment when the arrangements for the second polls have to be made. That has always been the time when the German Government found it most desirable to keep wide open the division between the capitalistic and the Social Democratic wing of the Liberal Party by persuading all good citizens to vote against the Red Peril. The importance of the second poll may be gauged from the fact that out of the 397 members of the Reichstag only 206 were elected at the first poll in 1912. It is, therefore, not unnatural that on the 13th January 1912, the day following the first poll, which had shown a great decrease in the votes given to the Conservative Parties and an enormous increase in those given to the Liberal Parties, the *North German Gazette* published a Government appeal in which we read :—

"At the second polls Social Democracy cannot conquer by its own strength. Every mandate which it wins it will owe

to the non-Socialist citizens of Germany. The non-Socialist Parties themselves will have to bear the blame if the red flood rises still higher. . . . What non-Socialist Party can make common cause with an enemy who proudly shrieks his furious hatred in the face of them all and of the whole existing order of the State? And what is the attitude of Social Democracy to our national demands and tasks? At home the Socialists strive to isolate the working classes from all the other classes of the people. The Class War is the element in which they live. Social Revolution, with the abolition of private property, is their goal. Whilst they foment hatred and practise terrorism at home, they worship the phantom of universal brotherhood among nations abroad. Therefore they are the hope of the foreign nations which envy and oppose the German Empire.

"Our peace and prosperity can be preserved only if we maintain ourselves as a strong and united nation able to face the world. Among the immediate tasks of the new Reichstag will be the task of increasing our armed strength. A Party which calls itself international and which dares to entertain the thought of a general strike in case of a mobilisation is by its very nature incapable of fulfilling these important tasks."

Hypocritical and hysterical appeals against the Social Democrats such as the foregoing emanate not only from German officials and from the politicians belonging to the Conservative Parties. The Emperor himself has branded the Social Democrats in various speeches as "a band of fellows not worthy to bear the name of Germans," "enemies to the Divine order of things without a fatherland," &c. It is of course ridiculous to describe a Party which embraces more than 4,250,000 grown-up men and considerably more than one-third of the German population as "not worthy to bear the name of Germans," "enemies to the Divine order of things without a fatherland." It is, however, equally ridiculous to believe that the 4,250,329 people who in 1912 gave their votes to Social

Democratic candidates would subscribe to the orthodox Socialist doctrines. As a matter of fact, the Socialist Party had in 1911 only 837,000 members, of whom 108,000 were women. Deducting these, we find that of the 4,250,329 Social Democratic voters only 729,000, or about one-sixth, were avowed Socialists. We may therefore, perhaps, conclude that the remaining five-sixths were men who voted for Social Democratic candidates without being Socialists.

The reason that millions of Germans who belong to all classes of society—bankers, merchants, doctors, school teachers, and a very large number of Government officials—vote for Social Democratic candidates lies in this, that the Social Democrats are the only Party which determinedly and unceasingly opposes the German Government as at present constituted, and fights continually for real parliamentary government. All the other Parties, the capitalistic Liberal Parties included, oppose the Government only here and there in the hope of becoming the Government Party and benefiting by the Government's bounty. The German Government is not averse from rewarding political services with official positions, rapid promotion in the Government service, titles, decorations, and even with financial favours. Therefore all opponents to the Government are meek and mild in their criticism of the Government's policy and of the existing German institutions, and they accept uncomplainingly the subordinate position given to the people and its representatives. I give one example out of many. The German Emperor's indiscretion in publishing in the *Daily Telegraph* in 1908, without the Chancellor's consent, an interview which was very damaging to Germany's foreign policy, created enormous excitement throughout the country, and led to what was

called a " constitutional crisis." All the Party leaders made violent speeches against the Emperor's usurpation of political action in violation of the German Constitution, which expressly lays down that every political act of the Emperor must be approved of and countersigned by the Imperial Chancellor. However, only the Social Democrats took political action devised to make the German Government responsible to Parliament by moving various amendments to the German Constitution, the principal of which ran as follows: " The Imperial Chancellor is responsible for his official actions. His responsibility covers all political actions of the Emperor. The Imperial Chancellor must be dismissed if the Reichstag demands it." It is scarcely necessary to say that the other Parties opposed the Social Democratic proposals, which would have introduced the beginning of parliamentary government—which, by the way, is very unsympathetic to many, perhaps most, Prussian Conservatives.

The German Government has tried to prevent the Liberal Party becoming too powerful in the Reichstag, not only by endeavouring unceasingly to keep it divided against itself, but also by securing the over-representation in the Reichstag of the Conservative and the under-representation of the Liberal section of the community. Since 1871, and especially since 1879, when Protection was introduced into Germany, the population of the industrial and commercial centres has grown enormously, whilst that of the country districts has remained almost stationary. The towns in Germany, as the towns in all countries, are the stronghold of Liberalism, Radicalism, and Socialism. Now, although the population of the German towns has grown enormously, no redistribution of the electoral districts has been effected. The Reichstag has

still 397 members as in 1871. Berlin has still only six representatives in the Reichstag, although, according to its population, it should have more than twenty. However, by giving Berlin fourteen additional representatives, the Government would merely add fourteen members to the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties in the Reichstag. Therefore Berlin has to be satisfied with six members. A similar state of affairs prevails in all the large towns of Germany. How glaringly electoral districts differ in town and country, in consequence of the tremendous growth of the German towns during the last forty years, may be seen from this, that in 1907 the electoral district of Teltow, near Berlin, had 248,000 voters, whilst that of Schaumburg-Lippe had only 10,000 voters; that the electoral district of Berlin (VI.) had 195,000 voters, whilst that of Lauenburg had only 13,000 voters; that the district of Bochum-Gelsenkirchen had 144,000 voters, whilst that of Waldeck had 13,000 voters; that the district of Hamburg (III.) had 137,000 voters, whilst that of Rappoltsweiler had only 13,000 voters; that Berlin (IV.) had 134,000 voters, whilst that of Löwenberg had only 14,000 voters; that the district of Duisburg-Mülheim had 108,000 voters, whilst that of Deutsch Krone had 13,000 voters. The foregoing list of anòmalies could be very greatly extended, but the few examples given suffice to show the injustice of the system. In numerous instances from 10,000 to 14,000 voters in the country districts send one representative to the Reichstag, and from 100,000 to 250,000 town voters send also but one representative to the Reichstag. How these startling differences between the size of the electoral districts in town and country and the Governmental policy of inducing the Liberal voters to vote rather for the Conservative or the Centre

candidate than for the Social Democratic candidate at the second polls, affect the general results of the German Elections will be seen from the following figures relating to the General Election of 1907 :—

	Votes Polled	Reichstag Members Elected
Social Democratic Party . .	3,259,000	43
Conservative Party . . .	1,100,000	63
Centre Party	2,159,000	104

In 1907 the Conservative and the Centre Parties received together 3,259,000 votes, or exactly the same number of votes as that given to the Social Democratic Party. However, whilst the 3,259,000 Conservative and Centre voters sent 167 members to the Reichstag, the 3,259,000 Social Democratic voters sent only 43 members to the Reichstag. The National Liberals, who likewise represent chiefly the population of the towns, polled in 1907 1,737,000 votes, or nearly 60 per cent. more than the Conservatives. Nevertheless the 1,737,000 Liberal voters sent only 56 members to the Reichstag, whilst the 1,100,000 Conservative voters were represented by 63 members. Year in and year out the German Reichstag is controlled by the representatives of a minority of the German people. At the 1912 Election the Liberal, Radical, and Socialist Parties received 7,500,000, and the Conservative and Centre Parties only 4,500,000 votes. Nevertheless, the Blue-Black B oc, the combined Conservative and Centre Parties, reckon upon having again a majority in the 1912 Reichstag; and if the Liberal members of the Reichstag can once more be induced by the Government to vote with the Conservative Parties and for the Government, their calculation may prove correct. German parliamentary government—if one

can speak of parliamentary government in Germany—is based on minority rule. By refusing the readjustment of electoral districts, the German Government tries to establish minority rule in permanence and to secure the predominance of the Conservative and reactionary Parties.

Parliamentary misrepresentation of the people is the ideal of the Prussian aristocrats and bureaucrats, who hate popular government, and who have had experience of the advantages which the Prussian franchise gives to the privileged classes. According to the Prussian franchise, the electors in every district are divided into three classes. Each class represents the same amount of wealth measured by taxation, and each class has the same voting power. The first class is composed of the richest men, the second of men of medium weal h, and the third of the poorer voters. According to the official statistics, the voters of Prussia were in 1908 divided as follows :—

First class	293,402	electors
Second class	1,065,240	,,
Third class	6,324,079	,,
Total	7,682,721	,,

As each of the three classes possesses equal voting power, it follows that the 6,324,079 citizens in the third class, or 82.32 per cent. of the people, are practically disfranchised. Consequently there sat in 1908 in the Prussian Diet 316 representatives of the Conservative and Centre Parties, 101 Liberals and Radicals, 19 Poles, Danes, &c., and only 7 Social Democrats. The representative system of Prussia is a travesty of parliamentarism, and the refusal of the Prussian Government to enfranchise the people suffices to show that the German Government, which is merely the

Prussian Government writ large, has no particular liking for parliamentarism, and may be expected to do everything in its power to hinder its development. The humiliating way in which the payment of the Reichstag members has been arranged is characteristic of the Government's attitude towards them. Since 1906 every member of the Reichstag is paid £150 per year, but from this sum £1 is deducted for every day on which the member has either not attended at all or has not attended a division. In order to prove that he has actually attended the sitting, every member must, like an office boy, put down his name in an attendance book provided for the purpose of control.

From year to year it is becoming more difficult for the Government to continue governing the country with a Reichstag elected under a manhood franchise and with a Reichstag majority representing not a majority but only a small minority of the people. The German population is increasing by about 900,000 per year, and that increase takes place practically exclusively in the towns, the strongholds of Liberalism and of Social Democracy. Through this natural growth of the population the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties receive every year an accession of about 200,000 voters. At the 1912 Election the Liberal and the Social Democratic Parties obtained already 61.5 per cent., or almost two-thirds, of all the votes given. Within a few years the proportion of Liberal and Social Democratic voters may rise to 70 per cent. of the electorate, and perhaps higher. Year by year the injustice of not effecting a redistribution of seats becomes more glaring and more intolerable. Year by year the present minority rule becomes more absurd and indefensible.

Whilst the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties

draw their strength chiefly from the towns, the Conservative and Centre Parties draw theirs chiefly from the country. The German towns are the seats of Germany's wealth, industry, and intelligence, and the German townspeople are getting more and more impatient of being ruled and taxed by the country, or rather by the country squires, the "Junkers" and their Clerical allies. They are getting more and more impatient of being governed and shepherded and ordered about by bureaucrats over whom they have no control. They are getting more and more impatient of the constant and irksome restraints which are imposed upon them by a paternal, honest, and hard-working, but clumsily and constantly interfering, police and officialdom. They have at last discovered that, however they may vote at Election time, they cannot influence in the slightest Germany's legislation and administration. They have discovered that they cannot, with their votes, give effective expression to their desire for the redress of their grievances or compel the institution of those reforms which they desire. The people have discovered that parliamentary government under the present German Constitution is a sham.

As the Liberals and the Social Democrats are equally opposed to reactionary Conservatism and to Roman Catholic Clericalism, and are equally strongly in favour of parliamentary government, and as, furthermore, Social Democracy becomes every year more moderate and Liberalism less narrow, the entire co-operation of German Liberals and Social Democrats seems only a question of time. With the growth of the anti-absolutistic movement among the German masses, it becomes, therefore, from year to year more difficult for the German Government to rule the country with the support of a constantly shrinking

minority of the people, and a crisis may be close at hand. Before long the Government may have to make up its mind whether it will give to the people the real parliamentary and representative government which the people demand, or whether it will try to maintain the unchecked supremacy of the Government, the aristocracy, and the officials by a restriction of the franchise.

During several years many of the leading Conservative politicians and newspapers have urged the Government to "reform" the German franchise and to remodel it on the Prussian franchise, whilst others have urged the disfranchisement of the Social Democrats as enemies of the nation. Only a short time ago a Mr. Tille published a book, *Die Berufsstandspolitik des Gewerbe und Handelsstandes*, in which he proved scientifically the necessity of Prussianising the German franchise. Although the army and the police may be relied upon, such a suffrage reform will not be an easy matter. The organisation of the German working men is not an ephemeral one. Apart from the great Social Democratic Party, which has 837,000 members and which possesses no less than eighty-one daily papers, there are the German trade unions to be reckoned with, with 4,040,000 members, and the German co-operative societies with 4,580,000 members. If the Government wishes to crush the Social Democratic organisation, it must also crush the gigantic trade unions and co-operative societies and bring about a position of affairs resembling civil war, conditions which may be fatal to Germany's economic condition and prosperity.

Possibly the Government may try to escape from the critical domestic position towards which it is drifting by engaging in a great war, which, if it be

victorious, would give new prestige and a fresh lease of power to the German autocracy. However, heroic measures, such as a *coup d'etat*, involving the disfranchisement of millions of people, or a foreign war which, owing to Germany's isolated position, would be extremely risky, requires an emperor or a chancellor of genius and determination, and it seems extremely doubtful whether Germany will produce another Bismarck at the psychological moment. It is perhaps more likely that the new Reichstag will establish the failure of Germany's domestic policy as the Reichstag of 1907–12 established that of Germany's foreign policy.

CHAPTER XX

EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION IN GERMANY

THE battles of Sadowa and Sedan caused us to model our military machine upon that of Germany; the "Generalstabswerk" became as authoritative to our officers as the Bible is to our clergy. Moltke, Verdy du Vernois, Boguslawski, Von der Goltz, dictated to us our strategy and our tactics, and, having carefully copied the German army, we thought that we had an excellent fighting machine until our defeats in South Africa disillusioned us and taught us that German tactics, though possibly well adapted to German circumstances, are quite unsuitable to British requirements. During more than thirty years the Emperor Frederick's winged word, "The Prussian schoolmaster has won the battle of Sadowa," has been dinned into our ears, and we have so often been told that Germany owes her great political, and especially her still greater economic success, to her excellent education, that we have set about to copy closely the educational system of Germany, although it is probably as unsuitable to British requirements as German military tactics have proved themselves to be. England and America have been flooded with a constantly-flowing stream of books in praise of German education, but I have failed to discover a single book on the failure of German education, although such a book seems to be very urgently required. It is to

be hoped that a book pointing out the grave defects of German education from the English point of view will soon be written. Meanwhile, I intend in the following pages to point out some of the shortcomings as well as some of the very important characteristics and factors of German education which have hitherto escaped observation, and I hope that this chapter will cause a more critical investigation and appreciation of German education, which at present enjoys an admiration and a prestige which the practical results achieved by it do not seem to justify.

According to the latest statistics, Germany has some 60,000 elementary State schools, with about 150,000 teachers, who instruct some 10,000,000 children; she has more than 1000 higher schools, where about 20,000 teachers instruct more than 300,000 pupils, whilst at the numerous universities, polytechnics, and other technical high schools, about 6000 professors and lecturers instruct some 95,000 students. If we include the professional private tutors we find that the army of German educationalists number about 300,000. These figures are truly astounding in their magnitude, and if "most educated" be synonymous with "best educated," the Germans are undoubtedly the best educated nation in the world. In fact, there are practically no uneducated people in Germany. Of the 260,000 recruits who in 1905 joined the German army, only 82 men coming from the frontier districts, where, for obvious reasons, control is sometimes impossible, were unable to read and write. It may therefore be asserted that in Germany proper no uneducated people exist.

The genesis of the national educational system and of the educational policy of Germany is a curious one. The German school is by its history not a social but

a purely political institution. To make the revolution against the Roman Catholic Church successful, Luther found it necessary to oppose the powerful organisation of the Church which directed the mind of the German masses and which held the people in a grip of iron with a national and popular organisation powerful enough to oppose the Almighty Church, and able to agitate among the masses and to propagate the Protestant idea far and wide. The spiritual guidance and direction of the Church of Rome and its world-embracing organisation could be opposed only by a machine able to control the national mind of Germany in the Protestant interest, and to deprive the Roman Church of its supporters in the country. Hence Luther strenuously advocated the introduction of a national and Protestant education in Germany. Education was not to benefit the few, but to embrace all. Thus, through the revolt of Luther, and the necessity of strengthening struggling Protestantism against the Roman Catholic Church, the idea of a national, democratic, and compulsory education arose, and was taken up by the Protestant princes of Germany, who as a rule had become Protestant in order to spoliate the wealthy Roman Catholic Church. The assertion that a wave of idealistic sentiment and of religious zeal created Protestantism in Germany, that it was a pure and purely democratic movement, and that the spirit of benevolence and of democracy created the German school, is a fable, for schools and serfdom existed side by side in Germany up to the nineteenth century. In fact, in Germany, and especially in Prussia, school and serfdom, education and tyranny, went hand in hand, and education was used by the Government as a means for keeping the people in a state of subjection and of mental servitude.

Up to the thirteenth century, Prussia was inhabited by heathen savages, the ancient Prussians, who were completely extirpated by the knights of the Teutonic Order, to whom that savage country had been granted, and when they had desolated it by fire and sword, Prussia was colonised not only from all parts of Germany but from all parts of Europe. Germans, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Swiss, Poles, &c., were attracted by the early rulers of Prussia to that country; partly to people the desolate land, partly to work for their feudal masters, and some sort of compulsory national education was evidently necessary to unify all these incongruous elements, and to obviate the danger of the country falling to pieces. Besides, a common language was absolutely necessary in matters of administration. However, matters educational remained in a very chaotic state, until Frederick William I., one of the greatest rulers, and certainly the ablest and the most energetic administrator, of Prussia, resolved to convert the loosely-jointed, ill-organised, and promiscuously-peopled provinces of Prussia into a thoroughly unified, firmly-welded, and absolutely centralised State. Therefore he meant to Germanise the people. Frederick William was a ruler who did not brook delay. In 1713, the very year in which he came to the throne, he issued an edict which aimed at compulsory education in Prussia, and as rapidly as the scanty funds at his disposal allowed it, schools were built, teachers procured or trained, and education extended. In Lithuania alone, 1105 new schools were erected, in order to convert the Slav inhabitants of that country into German-speaking Prussians, industrious, useful, and loyal citizens and obedient soldiers.

Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great,

vastly enlarged the territory of Prussia, adding by his conquests to the country large districts inhabited by Austrians, and by the division of Poland, of which Prussia received a considerable part, extensive provinces peopled with Poles. Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, is a country which has sprung by conquest from the smallest beginning from which ever a great State has arisen, and the different nationalities which had been conquered and joined together could not be kneaded into a homogeneous mass, and into a nation, except by compulsory education. Germany would bear an aspect similar to that borne at present by Austria-Hungary, with its numerous unassimilating nationalities, which fight among themselves, had not the rulers of Prussia vigorously Germanised their country by means of the schools and of compulsory education. The first twenty-three years of Frederick the Great's rule were years of war, but in 1763, the year in which the Seven Years' War, the struggle with Austria and the great Prussian War period ended, he introduced the celebrated "Generallandschulrecht," the law of compulsory and general education for the whole of his dominions and all the multifarious nationalities dwelling in them. Whilst compulsory and general education exists nominally in this country, since some thirty years—in practice, British education is even now neither general nor compulsory, whatever it may be in theory—Prussia has had compulsory and general education during almost a century and a half.

The educational organisation of Germany was, and is still, an absolutist machine, though at first sight it bears a strongly democratic appearance. In the character of Frederick the Great, the will of the autocrat and the mind of the philosopher and democrat were

curiously mingled. Though he treated his subjects like beasts of burden, he frequently declared that a king should be the first servant of the State; in 1739 he proclaimed to the world in his "Anti-Machiavel" that he was a lover of peace, that his ideal was Mark Aurelius, and in 1740 he attacked Austria in a time of profound peace. In matters educational we find the same curious contradictions in that great ruler. Whilst some of the edicts on education issued by the philosopher-king breathed the most enlightened Liberalism—an example will be given in the course of this paper—a "Cabinet's Ordre" of the 7th September, 1779, issued by the king-autocrat, laid down that "The people in the country are only to learn a little reading and writing, for if they are taught too much they will run to the towns in order to become clerks, &c." Frederick the Great and his successors did not wish to spread enlightenment among the masses by means of the schools, but intended to educate the people to be dutiful subjects to their king, hard-working peasants and labourers satisfied with their station, and reliable and patriotic soldiers, ready to sacrifice their lives for their country. For these reasons, the Prusso-German educational establishment has always borne a distinctly military character, in its direction and organisation, and its first and principal object has been to teach and to enforce discipline, to nationalise the people, and to create a strong sense of patriotism among them. That the elementary schools of Germany with their 10,000,000 children are still a most powerful, perhaps the most powerful, tool in the hands of the German Government, may be seen from the guiding regulations laid down in 1872 by Dr. Falk, the Prussian Minister of Education, for in these regulations we read :—

"The object of the Prussian elementary school has always been to educate the growing generation to become pious, patriotic men and women who are able by means of the general education and training they receive to fill an honourable position in civil society. In whatever way the relations of Church and State have been conceived, and whatever theological tendency was paramount at any period, the religious and moral education of youth has at all times been considered the foremost purpose of the schools, and never have the administrative authorities of the State wavered in pursuing the high ideal to sow the seeds of patriotic, religious, and moral sentiment in the children, so that they will become citizens whose inner worth can secure the welfare and preservation of the State.

"But side by side with this exalted ideal, the requirements of practical life have not been left out of sight. Children must learn at school how to perform duties, they are to be habituated to work, to take pleasure in their work, so as to become efficient workers. This has been the aim of popular education in Prussia since the earliest times, and to this day it is plainly understood by all administrative officers and teachers, and by the majority of parents, that it is the business of the elementary school not merely to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, but to teach the citizens cheerfully to serve their God, their native country, and themselves."

The Sunday schools in Great Britain have some 8,000,000 scholars, the Sunday schools of Germany have only some 800,000 scholars. These two figures indicate at a glance the fundamental difference between English and German education. Whilst the leading feature in English schools is piety, the teaching of religion and the training of the character of the young, the leading feature of the German elementary schools is militant patriotism and militarism, whilst moral and religious education is treated as a matter of secondary importance. Singing plays a very large part in German education, and especially in elementary education, because singing assists splendidly in march-

ing, and battles may be won by outmarching the enemy. Hence the very first songs which a German child learns are military songs, such as :—

I had a faithful comrade once,
No better could there be,
The drum was beat, the charge was led,
Together to the strife we sped,
And he kept step with me.

A bullet came, &c., &c.

Dawn of day, dawn of day!
To death thou showest me the way,
For when the bugles loudly blow,
Full soon shall I be lying low,
With many a comrade true.
&c., &c.

I have given all I am and have,
My heart, my head, my hand,
To you for which I like and love,
My dear old Fatherland.
&c., &c.

The Chinese child learns spelling from the Confucian classics, the German child from tales illustrating German military valour. Whilst the English schools strive to elevate the child's character by installing the civic virtues, the German schools strive almost exclusively to teach discipline and to arouse and to develop the military inclinations, or rather the spirit of Jingoism, giving little consideration to the training of character and practically none to the development of the civic virtues. The birthday of the Emperor and the anniversary of the battle of Sedan are the two great school festivals, not only in the elementary schools but in the higher schools as well, and they are celebrated with patriotic songs, recita-

tions, speeches, &c. The "Hereditary Enemy" plays a very large part in the elementary history books of Germany. No wonder, then, that the principal and almost the only game of German school-children consists in playing at soldiers or as Frenchmen and Germans, which lately has been superseded by playing at Boers and Englishmen. In Bismarck's words, "The mighty influence which the schools exercise in the education of the nation consists in this, that the German child, when handed over to the teacher, is like a blank sheet of paper, and all that is written upon it during the course of elementary education is written with indelible ink, and will last through life. The soul of a child is like wax. Therefore he who directs the school directs the country's future." From the earliest time to the present day, the Prussian Government has educated the young to an aggressive military patriotism, and therefore it may be said that the German elementary school is a branch establishment of the German barracks.

In view of the rapid growth of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, particular stress has, during the last few decades, constantly been laid upon the duty of the schools to combat the Social Democratic movement, by pointing out its wickedness to the children. In an order of the 1st of May, 1889, William II. said: "I have for a long time been occupied with the thought of making use of the schools in their various grades for combating the spread of Socialistic and Communist ideas. . . . The school must endeavour to create in the young the conviction that the teachings of Social Democracy contravene not only the Divine command and Christian morals, but are moreover impracticable." However, the strenuous exertions of all the German schools to fight Socialism by de-

picting it as being wicked, unpatriotic, and opposed to the Divine command, have been perfectly fruitless. The fact that the Social Democrats, who are not merely a party of opposition, but a party which opposes the German Government root and branch in all its works and all its ways, polled more than 3,000,000 votes in 1907, that almost one-third of the highly-educated German electorate is composed of "fellows without a Fatherland, and enemies of their nation," as they have been called by a most august personage in Germany, shows that the German elementary schools have glaringly failed in fulfilling the first and principal aim and purpose for which they have been created and for which they are strenuously working.

The aim of the German elementary schools is, according to Dr. Falk, firstly, to promote patriotism; secondly, to foster religion and morality; thirdly, to fit the young for practical life. The tree is known by its fruit, and education by its results. We have seen that the German elementary schools have largely failed in their first and principal aim. Let us now investigate the results of their religious, moral, and practical education.

There are but two great religions in Germany. The Roman Catholics, who form one-third of the population, are religious and pious, but their religiousness is not due to the influence of the State schools but to that of their Church, as may be seen from the fact that the Protestants of Germany, who form two-thirds of the population, are not at all religious. Protestantism is the State religion of Prussia, but all the endeavours of the Government to make the people religious have been in vain. Church-going is not even a social obligation in the Protestant parts of Germany,

where churches are few, and Berlin is, according to the complaint of the Emperor William, that capital of the world which is worst provided with churches. Besides, the few Protestant churches in existence stand almost empty if we deduct the soldiers and officers who have compulsorily to attend Divine service.

Religiousness and morality ought to manifest themselves in action, not merely in church-going. The fact that there are on an average every year about 180,000 illegitimate births in Germany, whilst there are only about 50,000 illegitimate births in Great Britain, and the fact that there are every year about 12,000 suicides in Germany, as compared with only 3000 suicides in Great Britain, seem conclusively to prove that the German schools have ill succeeded in fulfilling their second aim and object. Both Christianity and morality preach toleration, yet toleration is in Germany conspicuous by its absence. Roman Catholics are ill-treated by the German Protestants, and Jews are ill-treated by both. It is difficult for Roman Catholics to follow an official career, for all Government posts are preferably given to Protestants, and for a Jew it is almost impossible to become a State official or military officer. In German advertisements for clerks, commercial travellers, domestic servants, &c., stipulations as to religion are frequent. From the foregoing it will be seen that as regards religious and moral education, the German schools can hardly be said to have achieved a pronounced success.

The third aim of the elementary schools of Germany is to prepare the young for practical life. As regards teaching, the German elementary schools compare favourably with the British elementary schools, not in their completeness, but in the wise

limitation of their programmes. The German elementary schools teach chiefly homely and necessary subjects, the elements of knowledge, whilst the English elementary schools, having more ambitious aims, strive to give to the child of the people a knowledge more for show than for practical use, a smattering of everything, but often not a sufficient knowledge of the most necessary things, such as writing and spelling. The German child learns a few necessary things fairly well, the English child learns many things ill, of which most are not only unnecessary, but positively harmful. The German elementary schools educate the young to be successful workers in their station, the English elementary schools endeavour to convert the children of the poor into ladies and gentlemen able to discuss all the ologies. Whilst German peasant children are satisfied to follow the occupation of their fathers, English country children hate the country, sneer at the rural occupations, and desert the country for town, largely in consequence of the townified and totally unsuitable primary education which they have received. It is a misfortune when the town legislates for the country and determines its education.

The German child learns in the primary school to obey, perhaps too slavishly to obey; English Board School education, erring in the opposite direction, gives the child too much liberty, often allows it to disobey, to be unruly. German school children are made to be orderly, punctual, courteous, clean; English Board School children are only too often allowed to be dirty, untidy, and rude to their teachers, and their teachers have hardly sufficient power to correct them when admonition has failed. The German teacher is an autocrat with a stick, who, it must be admitted, occasionally abuses his authority

and ill-treats the children; the English teacher is only too often a meek man or woman of sorrows, who is ill-treated by the children. Discipline is the characteristic of the German school, lawlessness that of the English school. As regards order, discipline, and the sane limitation of learning, I think that the German elementary schools compare favourably with the English schools, but the German masses are quite as ignorant and as narrow-minded as the English masses, perhaps more so, because they are naturally less curious. Germans read less than Englishmen. A navvy reading a newspaper during the dinner-hour is a sight almost unknown in Germany. The German workman is often content to obtain his political information from gossip with his comrades, whilst drinking his beer in the Wirtshaus, where he spends as a rule several hours a day.

Unfortunately, English Board Schools are assuming more and more the character of charity schools, where charity is somewhat indiscriminately distributed to all applicants. Hence most parents who can afford to do so send their children to private schools, and the Board Schools have become preserves for the children of the poor, and centres and breeding-places of social dissatisfaction and revolt. In Germany, on the other hand, the children of the rich and poor mingle in all the schools as freely as they mingle in the army. The cause of this difference between the English and the German educational system is obvious. In Great Britain the children of the well-to-do used in the pre-Board School times to go to private schools, and the children of the poor to charity schools. As the Board Schools were unfortunately evolved out of the old charity schools, the elementary schools of the English nation were born with the pauper stigma

branded upon them. Hence they are charity schools, schools for paupers, in the eyes of the people, and it is to be feared that a too open-handed, and therefore unwise, philanthropy is strengthening the impression of the nation that the Board School is a branch of the workhouse. In Germany, on the other hand, where compulsory education for all was suddenly introduced, so to say on the same day, all children had from the first to go to the schools which the Government had provided, especially as the German Government have never encouraged, but have distinctly discountenanced, the creation of private schools which would have infringed upon the education monopoly of the State. Numerous large private schools and church and chapel schools similar to those existing in England, are unknown in Germany. Whilst there are in Germany 60,000 elementary State schools with 10,000,000 children, there are only 643 private elementary schools, with 41,000 children. In other words, in Germany only one child out of every 250 goes to a private school. England has class schools and mass schools, Germany has practically one kind of school—national schools. In England education of a class type, or, rather, education differentiating absolutely between classes and masses, tends to keep classes and masses asunder and to set them against each other; in Germany education of a democratic type causes classes and masses to commingle and to appreciate and to understand each other.

The English Board School child receives his tuition, his books, and, if necessary, his meals, his boots, and his clothes gratis, and the child is thus encouraged to become a clamorous, rapacious, and unblushing pauper, relying on charity, not on work, for a living. Besides, things which one can get for nothing are

not appreciated because they are considered to be worth nothing. Consequently, English parents accept gratuitous education grumblingly, as they would accept doles, and they take on the whole little interest in the training of their children. The German parents, on the other hand, have, as a rule, to pay small sums for the tuition of their children, to pay for their books, &c., and the free gift of meals, boots, and clothes to school-children is very little known in that country. Consequently, the thrifty German parents who have to pay for the training of their children mean to get full value for their money, and take an interest in their children's education. An English child can easily avoid going to school by the flimsiest of excuses, and parents often connive at the avoidance of school. Therefore school attendance is very irregular in England, and little work is done. In Germany, a rigorous supervision and drastic and immediate punishment of parents, masters, and others responsible for lack of attendance, causes avoidance of school attendance to be rare.

Education, as service in the army, is democratic in Germany in so far as it is compulsory and equal for all. The children of rich and poor sit on the same bench. The present Emperor was educated at the ordinary intermediate school of Cassel, sitting in the same room with the sons of the people, children of professional men, petty tradesmen, and the like. Whilst this indiscriminate mixing of the classes and masses in the elementary and intermediate schools may, and probably does, lower the tone in the upper ranks of German society, it certainly tends to elevate the tone in the lower sphere, and to lift up the submerged millions. The unwashed sons of German artisans feel uncomfortable in their grime when look-

ing at their better-cared-for schoolfellows, and learn to wash themselves even without compulsion, for example is better than precept, whilst dirty Board School children feel quite comfortable, being exclusively surrounded by their more or less uncleanly mates of the slums. Besides, this mingling of the classes urges the children of the poor to become better off by hard work and thrift, and kindles ambition in them at their most important period of life, while the English School Board child is only too apt to herd with the herd, to learn to be improvident, and to rely more on the bounty of the rich and of the local authorities, who generously provide for all, than on his own exertions. The ideal of the English middle-class thus is to become gentlemen—that is, to live a life of ease without work, and the ideal of the poor to live a life of ease at the cost of the community, whilst the ideal of the German middle-class and lower-class is to become rich by work. Thus German education provides a powerful direct stimulus for national activity in Germany, whilst class education in England acts as an incentive to work as little as possible.

The ambition of the children of the German poor often causes them to be the best scholars, and the spirit of emulation compels the children of the rich, who otherwise would be lazy, relying on their fathers' wealth and their assured prospects, to work much more energetically than they would do in schools where they need compete only with their social equals. Owing to the great educational opportunities given to the German poor and to the ambition awakened in them to get on, many of the leading scientists, medical men, lawyers, Government officials, &c., of Germany, have risen from the very lowest social stratum, whilst in Great Britain hardly any except the children of

the middle-class are to be found in scientific and professional circles.

The mingling of the classes in the lower and the higher schools of Germany is due partly to the influence of Luther already referred to, but chiefly to that of Napoleon I. When both the professional army and the caste system of Prussia were defeated on the fields of Jena and Auerstädt, it became clear to Prussian patriots that the era of national armies and of a national organisation of the State had arrived, that the time of class rule, of the "Klassenstaat," had gone by. The "Tugendbund," the Moral and Scientific League of Virtue, which was created after the disasters of 1806, strove to regenerate and to lift up the humiliated country by elevating the masses. Stein, Hardenberg, Fichte, Niebuhr, and the two Humboldts wished to bind rich and poor, classes and masses together, into a harmonious co-operating whole for the defence of the country. With this object in view, they strove to give equal educational opportunities to all, and to give to all citizens an equal intellectual and educational stake in the country. Napoleon's motto, "La carrière ouverte aux talents," was adopted by Prussia. Notwithstanding the reactionary tendencies of later times, equality in education, which had sprung from the disastrous war of 1806–7, remained a characteristic of the Prusso-German schools. Hence we do not find in Germany a strong desire, based on social prejudices, to prevent the children of the lower classes from enjoying a liberal education.

The secondary schools of Germany are in the main cramming establishments of the worst type, and they are treated by parents and children as a great but unavoidable evil. Professional careers require, as a rule, nine years' preparatory study at the Gymnasium

which German boys enter when nine years old, and between the ninth and the eighteenth year German boys studying at the Gymnasia are exclusively occupied with cramming. The Gymnasium is the classical school of Germany, in which Latin and Greek form the nucleus of tuition, and in those schools the dead languages as well as the modern ones are taught in the most pitiful manner. Nothing in literature is more beautiful, and nothing can be more elevating and more beneficial for the development of the intellect and of taste than the reading of the Greek and Latin classics either in the original or in translation; but the Greek and Latin classics are not read but "translated," slowly dissected, and every fragment carefully examined under the microscope, by the unfortunate scholar under the direction of dry-as-dust philologists. A brilliant speech of Cicero or Demosthenes, which requires to be read in a few hours in order to be appreciated, is slowly chewed, re-chewed, and again re-chewed during three months. The modern languages are taught in the same idiotic fashion, and even the masterpieces of German literature are not read and enjoyed, but pedantically pulled to pieces line by line and word by word, as if it were the aim of the German intermediate schools to convert the German nation into a race of philologists, of authors of grammars, and compilers of dictionaries. Other subjects are similarly treated. History, for instance, is learned from handbooks which, in the smallest possible compass, give the maximum of facts and dates, and in these no attempt is made to show the organic development of states and the causes and consequences of historical events. Therefore, the German school-books of history are merely compendia of facts and dates, and are about as interesting as is a railway time-table. During

nine years, the unfortunate German boys are compelled to commit to memory an immense quantity of unconnected, unpalatable, and mostly useless information presented in the most repelling form.

It may be that nine years of continual cramming is useful in this, that it improves the memory of the pupils, but it seems more likely that the memory suffers by being overtaxed. On the other hand the harm done by constant cramming, which is merely undertaken for the object of passing an examination, is incalculable. Since no attempt is made to develop the independent thinking power of the scholar, the unfortunate pupils become learned automatons, and though they have some knowledge of Latin and Greek and French and various sciences, they are usually not able to write German correctly. The German newspapers and modern German books are atrociously written. Since the examination with which the nine years' torture ends has to be passed to enable the scholar to attend the university and to become a professional man, the insane tyranny of the Gymnasium has to be borne. When at last freedom dawns for the martyr, the first act of those who after nine years' weary and almost useless labour have passed the concluding examination, often is to make a bonfire of their books. A German who has passed the Arbiturienten Examen endeavours, as a rule, to forget as rapidly as possible all the useless stuff which he had to learn during nine years mis-spent.

In order to show that the foregoing statements are not exaggerated I would give two German opinions in support of them. In the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of the 14th December 1906, an article entitled "Education to Manliness" was published in which we read :—

"Our schools do not form the character. That is the complaint which, more or less clearly formulated, may be found in all the books which advocate the reform of our education. Our German schools turn men into machines, educate them to submissiveness, to cowardice, to pettiness and pedantry, to much that is unlovely and pernicious, and they fail to form strong-minded, self-conscious men. And the State requires nothing more than men, manly men. In short our German schools spoil the character of the child and his intelligence by systematically shackling his mind, by cramming his brain, and by filling it with dead matter. Thus the thinking power is killed, individuality is destroyed, and the mental horizon and the development of moral sentiment are narrowed and repressed."

In his recently published book, *Deutsche Schulerziehung*, Professor W. Rein, one of the leading educational authorities of Germany, said in the preface:—

"It cannot be denied that our schools have achieved much. However it was thought that the principal object of schools was to distribute knowledge so as to prepare youth for the labour of active life. Our schools were and are still in the main devoted to instilling knowledge, and in that they have done much, but they have neglected the formation of character.

"In this respect the good English schools are no doubt ahead of the German schools, because the former strive not only to increase knowledge but also to raise men of character, firmness, and energy; and the history of England shows clearly to all those who have eyes to see what strong and energetic men who know what they are doing are able to achieve. Only a few German schools exist where workshops, playing-fields, school-gardens, common walks, and excursions break the monotony of the study of dead books.

"We require educators not merely teachers. A teacher requires nothing but knowledge. An educator requires more."

The authorities responsible for the programme of the German Gymnasium probably think that that institution is most admirably adapted for preparing

the young intelligence for successful professional or administrative careers, but they might be enlightened as to the proper character of intermediate education by the broad-minded instructions of Frederick the Great, delivered to the professors of the Civil and Military Academy for Young Gentlemen, in which the King said:—

"The masters shall studiously endeavour not only to store the memories of the pupils with useful knowledge, but above all to create in them a certain agility of mind, which shall render them capable of applying themselves not to one study alone but to any that may be found expedient, in particular to the cultivation of their reason and to the forming of their judgment. To this end, it is necessary that the masters should accustom their pupils to form just and clear ideas of things."

Besides, Frederick the Great wished the young intelligence of the nation to be fully and liberally instructed in political matters, for he wrote in the same Memoire:—

"The preceptor will confine himself to giving his pupils an idea of the rights of citizens, the rights of the people, the rights of the monarch, and of that which is called Law. He will not fail to impress upon their minds that Law, being destitute of any actual sanctity for enforcing its observance, is a vain phantom that sovereigns do not fail to display in their instructions and manifestoes, though they often violate its principles in their own conduct."

The broad-minded precepts of Frederick the Great have been utterly forgotten in Germany. A highly-educated young German, who has spent twelve years at school, has as a rule not sufficient knowledge of the political affairs of his country to be able to read the newspaper with profit, and he has, as a rule, no knowledge whatever of his rights.

On the 4th of December, 1890, William II. made

a very long speech on the reform of intermediate education in Germany, which is all the more interesting as the Emperor, through his own experience in Cassel, was practically acquainted with the tyranny of the Gymnasium and its worthlessness. In that speech he bitterly complained :—

" . . . The cause of the mis-education given is this, that the philologists have been the *beati possidentes* of the Gymnasium, and that these have laid all stress upon the matters to be learned but not upon the forming of character and upon the requirements of practical life. They think that the chief thing is that the young man should " know " as much as possible. Whether their knowledge be useful or useless to them in after life, is treated as a matter of secondary importance. We ought to educate young Germans sons of the nation, not young Greeks and Romans. We ought to desert the programme received from the ancient monasteries. We cannot go on in this manner."

Many years have passed since this speech was made, but the passive resistance of the German philologists has proved stronger than the Emperor's reforming zeal. The German intermediate schools are still torture houses for the mind, where the memory is overloaded and the intelligence stunted and destroyed. The education given at the intermediate schools of Germany should be a warning example to England, the admiration and eulogy of English philologists notwithstanding. After all, we are not all philologists.

In his speech of the 4th of December, 1890, the Emperor also mentioned that, owing to over-study, often three-quarters of the scholars in the upper classes are short-sighted, that in his own class at Cassel eighteen young men out of twenty-one had to wear glasses. No doubt over-study is largely responsible for the prevalence of short-sightedness in Germany,

but the evil effect of constant cramming of the mind is aggravated by the utter neglect of the body of the German pupil. According to the ideas of the mediæval Churchmen, who are responsible for the programme of the German Gymnasium, the body was vile matter and was to be neglected, and to be chastised when the flesh, the devil, rebelled against the soul, whilst mind and soul were to be cherished and cultivated. Already St. Paul had taught "Bodily exercise profiteth little," and bodily exercise was, until lately, considered by German thinkers not only to be unprofitable, but also to be little in accordance with that dignified bearing which a devotee of science ought to manifest in his deportment and in his every action.

Germany is by nature a gameless country. Whilst the sporting history of Great Britain can be traced back at least a thousand years, sport, in the English sense, was until lately unknown among the masses of Germany. Prussia's defeat by Napoleon I. in 1806 created a kind of sport, Turnen, German gymnastics. Jahn, an enthusiastic patriot, wished to raise in Prussia a race of warriors similar to the ancient Germans described by Tacitus. He introduced not only modern gymnastics, but strove at the same time to arouse the fighting spirit and the sense of independence among the people. By his agitation he made himself and his gymnasts obnoxious to the reactionary Government which ruled Prussia after the defeat of Napoleon, and the result was that the Government imprisoned Jahn and dissolved the gymnastic society as dangerous to the State. After a time gymnastics were again encouraged by the State, and now every intermediate school possesses a gymnasium similar to the English gymnasia. The

gymnastic exercises with bars, ladders, &c., are excellent, but only two hours a week were allotted to them up to 1891, when, through the Emperor's action, a third hour was added. As the number of apparatus is limited, the German schoolboy has on an average hardly more than fifteen or twenty minutes of gymnastic exercise during the week. Games such as football and cricket being unknown in Germany, the Government tried to add "regulated play" in homœopathic doses to regulated gymnastics. Even at the universities organised sport, a little fencing excepted, is practically non-existent. Playfulness is neither a characteristic of the German people nor of German life, and as regards physical education, the German schools are worthless.

Germany has no less than 23 universities, at which almost 3000 professors and lecturers teach about 66,000 students, and the number of the university students in Germany is increasing at a most remarkable rate. In 1870–1, there were 12,256 university students in Germany; in 1911, 66,358 were counted in that country. In the short space of forty years the number of students in the German universities has more than quintupled, and it is still growing by leaps and bounds. However, it may be doubted whether it is a matter for congratulation that the German universities are turning out an ever-growing army of unemployed doctors, lawyers, theologians, and teachers, who, by the pressure of their competition, lower the status of all professions and form a huge learned, and therefore the more dangerous, proletariat. Although the German universities are still leading in various departments of abstract science, they do not appear to be superior to the high schools of Great Britain in direct national utility. In fact, I venture to affirm

that the average British doctor, lawyer, clergyman, and schoolmaster is distinctly superior to his German colleague. The superiority of the German universities, which was very great in the time when university teaching in Great Britain was at its lowest ebb, is a thing of the past. The chief effect of the activity of the German universities in creating a huge proletariat of unemployed professional men is this, that the output of books, mostly worthless, has enormously increased in Germany. During the last thirty years the number of new books published in that country has in round figures increased from about 10,000 to about 30,000 per year.

Although Germany is no longer a model to Great Britain in elementary, intermediate, and practical university education, she is no doubt far ahead of this country in technical education. Therefore the German technical high schools are far more popular with foreign students than are the German universities. Of the students at the polytechnica, 20 per cent. are foreigners; of the students at the forestry academies, 30 per cent. are foreigners; of the students at the mining academies, almost 40 per cent. are foreigners; of the students at the universities only 8 per cent. are foreigners. The efficiency and the benefit of technical education in Germany have been very much exaggerated in Great Britain. German technical education, like German general education, is more extensive than intensive, more showy than practical and thorough, and in not a few instances its efforts are misdirected. For instance, enormous exertions have been made to advance architecture and the building trade, and no expenses have been spared, but the results achieved are the reverse of satisfactory. The design of the public and private

buildings which during the last decade have been erected is as a rule laboured, unpleasing, or ugly, and the inner arrangements are unpractical. The new House of Parliament is a case in point. The numerous pretentious but ugly monuments lately erected in Berlin and elsewhere also testify to the fact that schools may give knowledge but cannot give ability. There is a German proverb, "Je gelehrter desto verkehrter," "The greatest fool is a learned fool." There is much truth in that proverb.

Germany has a huge number of technical schools of every grade. There are technical schools for apprentices, for artisans, for foremen, for managers, for directors of industrial establishments, for merchants and bankers, &c., and every day additional technical schools are created. Besides, itinerant instructors visit the villages, which are too small to have technical schools of their own. In many instances technical education is compulsory. The thing is being overdone. Felisch wrote: "We pay for our greater theoretical knowledge with diminished practical ability," and Von Steinbeis lately complained, "Theoretical education has been given such a preponderance that even in our smallest workshops the pedantic spirit of the school penetrates the air, a spirit which is not exactly conducive to quick and efficient work, and which is absent in countries which have arrived at a higher stage of industrial development than Germany." Carl Roscher, speaking of the learned proletariat issuing from the Technical High Schools, complained about the insufficient supply of practical workers of the better class, and is of opinion that, "compared with England and the United States, the education of our young engineers at the Technical High Schools costs too much money and too much

time." In a lengthy report on German technical education, published in 1902 by the United States Commissioner of Labour, we read with regard to the Technical High Schools, "The education here received often exceeds the real needs of many branches of industry. Hence there may result a loss of time which could have been devoted to obtaining practical skill."

Many similar opinions given by high authorities on technical education could be quoted, which show that Charlottenburg and the other Technical High Schools of Germany, at which an army of more than 12,000 students are trained, are not an unmixed blessing, and it is not without cause that the best engineers in the world are the practically trained English engineers, although their theoretical knowledge is small, if compared with that of their inferior German competitors. It can also not be admitted that the industrial success of Germany is due to the general education of the masses of industrial workers. The fact that practically every man in Germany can read and write has little if anything to do with that country's prosperity and the flourishing state of its industries. The Belgian industries are comparatively far more flourishing than are those of Germany; yet in Belgium 128 out of every 1000 recruits are unable to write. It should also not be forgotten that Great Britain had the best workmen in the world at the time, when her workers were practically uneducated.

The foregoing sketch, which, for want of space, is necessarily incomplete, should suffice to show that German education, although it has not a few excellent points, is in many respects exceedingly unsatisfactory. The chief practical value of the German schools consists, in my opinion, not in the knowledge dissemi-

nated, but in the discipline instilled, but that part of German education has not been copied by the educational authorities of Great Britain who have merely looked at the programme of the German schools, and who have taken the shadow of German education for its substance. English education, and especially English primary education, is apt to make men lazy and women flighty. It teaches them the way of getting a living without labour, it teaches them self-indulgence and selfishness. Individualism in the worst sense, every one for himself, is the motto of the English school, and the result is that the people endeavour to make a living rather by exploiting others than by working themselves. Even costermongers and crossing-sweepers endeavour to be "employers of labour," and to live by other people's work. German education, on the other hand, teaches the young to work, to obey, and before all to obey the authorities, and that lesson is still further driven into every German man after he has left school by the most powerful educational agency of Germany, the German Army. German education, both civil and military, has, by its teaching of discipline, created a docile population of willing workers, who are easily led by a conscientious, able, and well-intentioned administration; it has created a population which, more readily than the British population, places the interests of the country above personal and pecuniary interests. Bagehot wrote: "The natural impulse of the English people is to resist authority," and he might have added, "to resist each other." That spirit is a national misfortune. In Germany no similar spirit of instinctive and unreasoning resistance to the authorities and no similar spirit of mutual distrust among the citizens, which is the natural corollary

of individualism and of free, unlimited and mutually destructive competition of all with all—the *bellum omnium contra omnes* of Hobbes—is noticeable. Therefore national organisation and national co-operation in matters political and economical, which have made Germany great, could easily be established in that country. It cannot too often and too loudly be asserted that Germany has become great and powerful not through her education, as synonymous with knowledge, but through her discipline. National co-operation, the co-ordination of all the national forces, which is developed to a higher extent in Germany than in any other country, has proved stronger than individualism which squanders the national forces in constant internecine warfare. But co-ordination is impossible without subordination. Unfortunately the spirit of subordination seems to be incompatible with the spirit of Democracy. According to a great philosopher, the spirit of Democracy is the spirit of jealousy and distrust. German administration, with its highly-developed centralisation and its vast discretionary powers, is based on the confidence of the ruled in their rulers; British administration, with its minute subdivision of power, and its countless checks and counter-checks, which serve rather to obstruct than to regulate, is based upon distrust.

Germany owes her political and economic success certainly not to the book knowledge which her citizens receive in her schools, for the German schools, like all other schools, merely turn out a mob of semi-educated mediocrities possessed of an overworked and tortured memory and of an under-developed or an undeveloped intelligence. Indeed, I venture emphatically to affirm that Germany, with all her schools and universities, and with her army of 300,000 teachers, is a far less

intelligent and far less cultured nation than is the British nation. The general intelligence and culture of a nation may be measured by the Press, which appeals to all, and which reflects the national mind as in a mirror, and I think that no educated German will contradict me if I state that the whole Press of Germany—dailies, weeklies, monthlies—is not only vastly inferior to the British Press, but is quite unworthy of the intelligence of a cultured nation. The German newspapers and periodicals, generally speaking, are filled not with facts but with trash, and the leading dailies, such as the *Kölnische Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Vossische Zeitung*, which contain very little positive information even if compared with a minor provincial English paper, are read only by a few, having on an average a circulation of only about 30,000. A comparison of the *Times* with the *Kölnische Zeitung*, of the *Daily Mail* with the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger*, or *Der Tag*, of *Punch* with *Kladderadatsch*, of the *Deutsche Rundschau* and the *Deutsche Revue* with the great English monthlies, will show that the reading matter presented to all ranks and classes of German society is of a deplorable type. The German Press is a century behind the English Press, and the low standard of the whole German Press shows that the German nation is not a nation of thinkers. On the contrary.

Schopenhauer wrote: "Few learned men have as much common-sense as is frequently found in the quite unlearned." Most great men have either lacked school training or have been amateurs. Our greatest engineering geniuses were working men devoid of technical education. Arkwright, originally a barber, was never at school, Josiah Wedgwood started work when eleven years old, Alfred Krupp was a smith,

Edison was a newsvendor, and a hundred similar examples could easily be quoted. The greatest men not only in industry, but in all ranks of life, were self-taught. After all a teacher cannot teach more than he knows, and teachers, being usually mediocrities, turn out mediocrities. Art, industry, and science flourished most in Great Britain when education was at its lowest ebb. Education will give us neither political nor industrial leaders, for these must educate themselves. At the same time it should not be forgotten that leaders without followers are almost useless, and the utility of the German schools lies in this that they turn out a huge rank and file of educated mediocrities. The hosts of mediocre German chemists have established the most flourishing industry in the world by making use of the inventions of the great chemical geniuses of England and France who, lacking an adequate rank and file, were unable to utilise their inventions in their own country.

The foregoing pages show that German education has in Great Britain been much overvalued and much misunderstood, and it seems to be a dangerous experiment to model British education on the more unsatisfactory part of German education, the dissemination of knowledge, which is by no means the strong point of the German educational system, except from the philologist's point of view. After all, great national institutions, such as Parliament, civil service, army, and schools, cannot mechanically be copied from other nations, because such institutions are not dead things, but living organisms which have slowly grown up from a deep historical and national foundation. National education and national armies must before all be national, they must be in accordance not only with the peculiar requirements of the country, but

also with the peculiar character and spirit of its inhabitants. If we wish to introduce the German educational system into Great Britain, and to make it a success, we must begin by turning Englishmen into Germans.

CHAPTER XXI

THE RURAL INDUSTRIES OF GERMANY

DURING about forty years British agriculture has steadily been losing ground, and the consequence to agriculturists and to those whose means are invested in agricultural property have been disastrous. The total loss of capital invested in agriculture which has taken place since 1874, owing to the decay of the rural industries, has been estimated to amount to the colossal sum of about £1,000,000,000; but it seems likely that that estimate is too low, and that the total loss is about twice larger than the whole amount of our National Debt.[1] Some people are of opinion that the further decay of our agriculture may be stopped by cheap freights, co-operation, &c.; but others, and they are the vast majority, frankly despair of our rural industries. In fact, most British statesmen, politicians, political economists, and publicists declare that the destruction of our rural industries was inevitable; and the axiom has been laid down that a European State cannot possibly, on its limited and overcrowded territory, pursue agriculture at a profit, because it cannot compete with the United States, Argentina, &c., where good land is cheap and plentiful.

It has become a conviction with most Englishmen that a European State cannot possess at the same time flourishing manufacturing and prosperous rural

[1] Sir Inglis Palgrave, in a lecture held on the 22nd February 1905, estimated that the agricultural loss during the last thirty years amounted to £1,700,000,000.

industries, and the industrial backwardness of France, Holland, Denmark, countries where agriculture is prosperous, appears to confirm this theory. But, as Belgium and Germany possess, side by side, both highly developed manufacturing industries and a flourishing agriculture, that theory appears to be untenable. Therefore, it is worth while to investigate whether the agricultural prosperity of Germany, our chief industrial competitor, is real or apparent, ephemeral or likely to last, harmful or helpful to her manufacturing efficiency; and it is clear that, if Germany can make her rural industries pay, Great Britain, which is far more favoured by Nature for the successful pursuit of agriculture, should certainly be able to do better than Germany.

Compared with Great Britain, Germany possesses a poor soil, an unfavourable geographical position and structure, and an unfavourable climate, her winter being long and very severe. Her transport facilities for agricultural produce by land and water, were formerly quite insufficient, and even now her agricultural produce has to be carried for hundreds of miles inland to the markets, whilst British fields are everywhere in easy reach of the sea and of cheap transport. Even to-day, German agriculture has to battle with long distances. In East Prussia and Pomerania, for instance, there are agricultural districts which lie twenty miles from the nearest railway station. The rural labour of Germany also was, and probably is still, inferior to that of Great Britain. A century ago, the German peasants were serfs—serfdom lingered in places until the middle of the nineteenth century; and even now the independence of the peasantry is, in many parts of Germany, more theoretical than real. Therefore Germany's rural

population was, and in certain parts of Germany is still, obstinately and stupidly conservative. When Frederick the Great distributed clover seed to the peasantry, they refused to sow it. When ordered to sow the seed, the peasants boiled it first in order to prevent it sprouting; when given seed potatoes, they boiled the seed potatoes before putting them in the ground.

Owing to the poverty of the soil, the inclemency of the climate, long distances, the difficulties of transport, and the backwardness and poverty of her rural population, agriculture in Germany was extremely primitive when it was highly successful and prosperous in this country. Some decades ago, prices for corn and meat were exceedingly low in Germany, cattle were kept chiefly for ploughing and for manure, and were largely fed on straw. Agricultural Germany used to bear an aspect similar to that of agricultural Russia of to-day. However, during forty or fifty years, the rural industries of Germany have continually progressed, and they have even progressed during the last decades, when Great Britain suffered from an unparalleled agricultural depression.

Between 1875 and 1908, 3,200,000 acres which were under cereals, and 1,000,000 acres which were under green crops, have in Great Britain gone out of cultivation, and nothing but grass grows now where the plough used to work. But, notwithstanding the great increase of pastures, the number of live stock in Great Britain has, during that time, increased by only 10 per cent. If we now turn from this dismal picture of decay to Germany, we find that during the most trying period of our agriculture, the rural industries of Germany show the following record:—

AGRICULTURAL AREA OF GERMANY

Hectares (1 hectare is equal to 2½ acres)

	Corn crops	*Green crops*	*Gardens*	*Grass lands*
1883	15,723,970	6,700,600	415,950	3,336,830
1893	15,992,120	7,018,120	472,620	2,760,350
1900	16,050,990	7,437,790	482,790	2,285,740

From the foregoing figures we see that, during a period when, in Great Britain, an enormous area which was under the plough was abandoned to grass, the area under grass in Germany has shrunk by no less than one-third, because that portion has been taken under the plough and has been converted into fields. But not only has the acreage of fields on which cereals and vegetables are grown been considerably increased in Germany, at the same time agricultural processes have so greatly been improved that each acre of agricultural land produces now very much more than it used to produce in former times. This appears from the following table :—

YIELD PER HECTARE OF GROUND IN KILOGRAMMES

	Wheat	*Rye*	*Barley*	*Oats*	*Potatoes*	*Hay*
1893	1670	1490	1480	1070	13,410	2230
1894	1690	1340	1780	1680	11,110	3830
1895	1640	1320	1680	1550	12,390	3700
1896	1770	1430	1650	1500	10,590	3900
1897	1700	1370	1560	1430	11,010	4280
1898	1840	1520	1730	1690	11,920	4380
1899	1910	1480	1820	1720	12,290	4040
1900	1870	1440	1800	1720	12,610	3910
1901	1580	1400	1790	1600	14,670	3760
1902	2040	1540	1890	1800	13,410	4370
1903	1970	1650	1950	1840	13,250	4450
1905	1920	1560	1790	1570	14,570	4410
1907	1990	1610	2060	2090	13,810	4170
1909	2050	1850	2120	2120	14,050	3710
1910	1990	1700	1850	1840	13,190	4740

From the foregoing tables it appears that the

agricultural area of Germany has been considerably extended, and that the produce per acre has been universally and enormously increased. At the same time the live stock of Germany has astonishingly multiplied notwithstanding the great shrinkage of grass lands. The following figures give a record of the fluctuation in the numbers of live stock since 1873 :—

LIVE STOCK OF GERMANY

	Horses	*Cattle*	*Sheep*	*Pigs*
1873	3,352,231	15,776,702	24,999,406	7,124,088
1883	3,522,525	15,786,764	19,189,715	9,206,195
1892	3,836,256	13,555,694	13,589,612	12,174,288
1897	4,038,485	18,490,772	10,866,772	14,274,557
1900	4,184,099	19,001,106	9,672,143	16,758,436
1907	4,337,263	20,589,856	7,681,072	22,080,008

From the foregoing table we see that, whilst British live stock, owing to the enormous increase of the area under grass, has increased by only about 10 per cent., the horses of Germany have increased by about 33 per cent., the cattle by about 31 per cent., and the pigs by no less than 215 per cent., notwithstanding the decrease of pasture land in Germany. It is true that at the same time the number of sheep has declined by more than 17,000,000, largely owing to the shrinkage of pasture land which was turned into fields ; but this shrinkage is not so serious as it seems. In Germany two pigs represent about the same value as do five sheep. Consequently, the 15,000,000 pigs which have been added represent more than double the value of the 17,000,000 sheep which have been lost.

During the Live Stock Census of 1873, the animals kept in Germany were not valued, but when we compare the years 1883 and 1900, we find that the

value of the live stock has, during these seventeen years, risen from £278,845,000 in 1883, to £384,920,000 in 1900. During that short period, the value of the German live stock has therefore increased by £106,075,000, or by about 40 per cent., an amount which is equal to about one-sixth of our National Debt; and which would buy an overwhelming fleet of first-class battleships.

The total area of Germany is about 70 per cent. greater than that of Great Britain, and as the population of Germany is about 50 per cent. larger than is that of this country, Great Britain is not much more densely populated than is Germany, and both countries may fairly be compared by size and population with regard to agriculture. We find that, both per square mile of territory and per thousand of population, there are more horses and more cattle in Germany than in Great Britain. Besides, there are five times more pigs in that country than there are in Great Britain. Only in sheep Great Britain has a great advantage over Germany, but this is not an advantage for which German agriculturists will be envious. Sheep require to be kept in the open —that is, on grass land. Hence, only waste lands in the interior of Australia and of Argentina, but not valuable agricultural land in populous parts of Europe and in the immediate vicinity of their natural markets, are considered in Germany proper for rearing sheep. The soil of Germany is thought to be too valuable to serve as prairie land.

How severely the value of agricultural land has fallen in Great Britain, and how ruinously low is the price of land, is too well known to require description. In Germany agricultural land has not fallen, but has considerably increased in value with the increase in its productive power.

The *Schlesische Volkszeitung* wrote in December 1909: "The Quirren Estate of 625 acres was bought in 1891 for 70,000 marks, it was re-sold in the same year for 120,000 marks, it was sold in 1895 for 160,000 marks, it was sold in 1907 for 196,000 marks, and it was re-sold in 1908 for 240,000 marks." In the Prussian Diet Mr. Meyenschein, a Conservative, stated: "During the last few years the price of land in Hessen has increased, and for that increase the following results are representative. A property bought for 45,000 marks was sold for 63,372 marks, with a profit of 40 per cent. Another one was bought for 32,500 marks and was sold for 45,283 marks, with a profit of 51½ per cent. A third, which was bought for 12,000 marks, realised 20,000 marks, the profit being 68 per cent. A fourth bought for 19,000 marks was sold for 30,000 marks with a profit of 74 per cent. A fifth bought for 40,026 marks was sold for 76,000 marks with a profit of 90 per cent." Everywhere in Germany agricultural land has been rising in value.

If we now look into the remuneration of rural labour in Germany, we find that, between 1873 and 1892, agricultural wages have changed as follows:—

AVERAGE OF AGRICULTURAL WAGES IN GERMANY, PER DAY

	1873		1892	
Saxony	1.61	marks	2.30	marks
Rhine Province . .	1.78	„	2.00	„
Westphalia	1.72	„	1.86	„
Pomerania	1.62	„	1.83	„
East Prussia	1.14	„	1.50	„

In examining the foregoing table, it should be remembered that agricultural labourers receive almost universally, in addition to their money wages, a participation in the harvest, and other payments in

the shape of agricultural produce, &c. On an average, agricultural wages have risen by about 25 per cent. between 1873 and 1892, and they have risen by another 25 per cent. since the latter year. Consequently, it is clear that the prosperity of Germany's agriculture is not due, as some assert, to the stationariness of rural wages.

If a German agriculturist fails, his lands are sold by public auction. Consequently, the statistics of such forced sales give a good indication of the real position of Germany's agriculture. The number of forced sales has, since 1886, declined as follows, in Prussia :—

FORCED SALES IN PRUSSIA

1886–7	2979	holdings
1889–90	2014	„
1892–3	2299	„
1895–6	1834	„
1898–9	1210	„
1903	1047	„
1907	737	„
1909	668	„

On an average not one holding out of every two thousand is yearly sold by public auction, and it should be noted that, on an average, nine-tenths of these sales take place in Eastern Germany, where peculiar agricultural conditions prevail, which will be described in the course of this chapter, and that the larger part of the holdings sold consists of large farms and estates from one hundred and twenty-five acres upwards. Forced sales are exceedingly rare in the middle and west of Germany, and especially in the case of small and medium-sized farms.

How exceedingly profitable agriculture is in Germany may be seen by comparing it with that of Great Britain. If we make such a comparison, we

find not only that there is proportionately more live stock in Germany than in this country, but also that the area under corn-crops, potatoes, &c., is six times greater in that country than in Great Britain, and that the rural industries of Germany afford a very good livelihood to a rural population which is many times greater than that of this country.

We shall now proceed to inquire why Germany, with a poor soil, an unfavourable climate, bad geographical conditions, and a somewhat intractable peasantry, possesses a prosperous and vigorously expanding agriculture, whilst the agriculture of Great Britain, which possesses a better soil, better climate, a better geographical position, a more open-minded and progressive rural population, better markets, and which had a far better start, and far more capital, is rapidly, and, it is said, irretrievably decaying.

If a man takes a railway trip through the British Islands, and looks frequently out of the window, he will notice chiefly grass fields, which cover 60 per cent. of the agricultural area of the United Kingdom, but he will rarely see cereals growing. If he takes a railway journey through Germany, he will see chiefly cereals, which, in that country, take up more than 60 per cent. of the agricultural ground. The proportion of grass lands in Germany is no greater than is the proportion of oat-fields in Great Britain. In other words, pastures are met with as rarely in Germany as oat-fields are in this country.

The following most important table shows how agricultural land is owned in Germany, and therefore gives a bird's-eye view of the distribution of agricultural land in that country.

AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS IN GERMANY IN 1907.

Size of Holdings.	Number of Holdings.	Acreage Hectares (1 Hectare = 2½ Acres).	Percentage of Agricultural Area.
Less than 5 acres .	3,378,509	1,731,317	5.4
5 to 12½ acres . .	1,006,277	3,304,872	10.4
12½ to 50 acres . .	1,065,539	10,421,565	32.7
50 to 125 acres . .	225,697	6,821,301	21.4
125 to 250 acres .	36,494	2,500,805	7.9
250 to 1250 acres .	20,068	4,503,159	14.2
1250 and more acres	3,498	2,551,854	8.0
Total	5,736,082	31,834,873	100.0

In the whole of Germany there were in 1907, 5,736,082 agricultural properties, and the average size of the properties was about fifteen acres of agricultural land. It is remarkable that there were no less than 3,378,509 individual holdings of average size of three acres and under. On the other hand, it should be observed that by far the greater part of the agricultural soil of Germany, namely, 84 per cent. of the total, was owned by agriculturists who cultivated more than 12½ acres. Consequently, it is apparent that German agricultural land is chiefly exploited, not by small peasants, as is so often asserted in this country, but by well-to-do farmer-peasants, who possess substantial properties.

The difference in the size of the individual holdings appears to bring with it a striking difference in the way in which these are cultivated, as will be seen in the following :—

Germany may be divided into two agricultural spheres, the Eastern part and the Central and Western part. The east of Germany is flat, sandy, and some-

what thinly populated. It is insufficiently opened by waterways and railways, and land is chiefly in the hands of aristocratic owners, who possess large, and sometimes huge, estates. In the middle and the west of Germany the country is broken, the soil is more fruitful, the population is denser, manufactures prevail, markets are near at hand, waterways and railways are plentiful, and land is chiefly held by small farmers and peasants who, as a rule, work on freehold land.

In Prussia of the properties below five acres, 73.4 per cent. are freehold; of those from five acres to fifty acres, 87.3 per cent. are freehold; of those from fifty to two hundred and fifty acres, 93 per cent. are freehold; of those above two hundred and fifty acres, 81.8 per cent. are freehold. It therefore appears that the proportion of freeholders is smallest among the very small and among the very large proprietors. Of the properties of medium size which cover the greater part of agricultural Germany, the proportion of freehold land is largest, and more than 90 per cent. of the ground of medium-sized agricultural establishments consists of freehold properties.

The small agriculturists of Germany produce, on the whole, larger harvests per acre than do the large landowners, who cultivate their fields with hired labour. Largely owing to this difference, the middle and the west of Germany are chiefly devoted to high culture. In the east of Germany, where the large landowners sit, we find poor fields, less thorough cultivation, and smaller crops. East Germany thus resembles Great Britain not only in this, that the land is in the hands of a few large owners, who like to enjoy themselves in town, and who leave the

supervision of their estates to their paid underlings; but a further resemblance to this country may be found in the fact that, in those districts, the raising of live stock is more developed than is the cultivation of the soil. Nevertheless, we discover the surprising fact that the small landowners in the middle and the west of Germany are not only more efficient in agriculture, but also in stock-raising, for the small agriculturists raise on their holdings far more horses, cattle, and pigs per acre than do the large proprietors in the east. Some years ago the German live stock was distributed as follows between large and small agriculturists :—

AVERAGE QUANTITY OF LIVE STOCK KEPT ON 250 ACRES OF GROUND

On properties from 5 to 50 acres	*On properties from 50 acres and more*
16 horses	11 horses
147 cattle	37 cattle
242 pigs	20 pigs

In Germany one head of cattle is considered to be equal in value to two-thirds of a horse, or to four pigs. If we now reduce the live stock kept on the farms of the two types given, to "pig-units," if such a word may be coined, we find that the owners of fifty and more acres raise only 227 pig-units on the same quantity of ground on which smaller farmers raise 915 pig-units. In other words, on an area of the same size small agriculturists raise a little more than four times more live stock than is raised by the bigger landowners.

The following somewhat more detailed figures give a most interesting picture of the greatly varying density of the live stock population on farms of different sizes. They show that small holdings are most favourable for raising pigs, that middle-sized

properties are most suitable for raising cattle and horses, and that large properties are least suitable for raising live stock, excepting the comparatively valueless sheep. In Germany one pig is estimated to be equal in value to two and a half sheep, as has already been mentioned.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANIMALS PER 250 ACRES ON PROPERTIES OF VARIOUS SIZES IN 1907

Size of Holding	*Horses*	*Cattle*	*Pigs*	*Sheep*
Below 1½ acres . . .	1.5	31.7	319.0	29.0
1½ to 5 acres . . .	3.3	59.7	128.6	12.6
5 to 12½ acres . . .	5.6	73.2	71.3	8.3
12½ to 50 acres . . .	9.6	57.2	47.5	10.5
50 to 250 acres . . .	9.5	42.0	29.0	18.4
250 to 500 acres . .	6.6	17.3	14.0	44.0
500 and more acres . .	6.4	22.0	13.3	50.3

From the foregoing tables it appears that the large holdings of Germany are unfavourable to the thorough pursuit of agriculture and to efficiency in cattle-raising as well. But here, as in other things, *les extrêmes se touchent.* If holdings become too small, animals can neither be raised nor be employed in the fields, spade work becomes necessary, and human labour has to take the place of animal labour or machine labour.

ANIMALS KEPT IN JUNE 1907 ON AGRICULTURAL PROPERTIES ONLY

On Properties of	*Horses*	*Cattle*	*Pigs*	*Sheep and Lambs*
Less than 5 acres .	71,369	1,315,572	4,383,244	415,750
5 to 12½ acres . .	241,636	3,155,323	3,107,008	359,943
12½ to 50 acres . .	1,323,290	7,873,092	6,334,238	1,448,535
50 to 250 acres . .	1,202,176	5,305,871	3,655,156	2,326,268
250 acres and more	652,536	2,327,291	1,386,272	4,371,103
Total	3,491,007	19,977,149	18,865,918	8,921,599

In 1907 the peasants who farmed less than fifty acres possessed one-half of all the horses, two-thirds of all the cattle and three-fourths of all the pigs.

Evidently the very small peasant cannot always avail himself of animal labour on his tiny holding, owing to poverty, lack of accommodation, or lack of fodder. Therefore we find that the men who own less than five acres use, on an average, one-third of the horse power which is employed on properties of larger size. The very small cultivator makes, however, a greater use of cattle for pulling his plough than does the owner of a medium-sized farm, and his only cow has not infrequently to labour in the fields. The large landowner, on the other hand, appears not to make the fullest use of animal power, for we find that he employs a smaller number of horses and cattle for work than does the smaller cultivator.

It might be expected that the large German landowners, who use less animal power for cultivation than do the small farmers, would be easily first in the use of labour-saving, steam-driven machinery. This appears not to be the case, for we find that the smallest number of steam-driven agricultural machines is used in the province of East Prussia, where huge estates are common, whilst the largest number of machines is employed in the province of Saxony, where middle-sized and small holdings prevail. The fact that labour-saving machinery is more used on medium-sized than on large properties is clearly brought out in the following figures, which relate to those two provinces :—

AGRICULTURAL STEAM MACHINERY USED IN 1907

	Steam Ploughs	Drills	Seed-casting Machines	Steam Threshing Machines
Saxony . . .	439	46,898	46,898	17,569
East Prussia .	80	4,639	4,639	3,928

The difference in the quantity of machinery used in purely agricultural East Prussia, with its huge estates, and in chiefly industrial Saxony, with its small agriculturists and independent peasants, is startling; and this difference in the manner of cultivation goes far to explain why the German agrarians east of the Elbe loudly complain about agricultural depression, whilst the peasants west of the Elbe appear to be doing very well, and to be, on the whole, prosperous and contented.

If we now look into the indebtedness of the agricultural soil in Germany, we find the following astonishing variations in the various districts :—

ESTIMATED INDEBTEDNESS OF THE AGRICULTURAL SOIL

	East Germany	
District	Königsberg	50.90 per cent.
„	Gumbinnen	48.58 „
„	Dantzig	55.11 „
„	Marienwerder	55.68 „
	Central Germany	
„	Magdeburg	22.82 „
„	Merseburg	27.82 „
„	Erfurt	23.40 „
	West Germany	
„	Cologne	17.94 „
„	Treves	15.83 „
„	Aix-la-Chapelle	13.32 „

The foregoing table is based on carefully compiled official estimates, and the thoroughly representative figures used are taken from the official hand-book of the Agrarian Party. From this table it appears that the agricultural indebtedness of the soil is dangerously large in the east of Germany, medium-sized in the centre of the country, and small in the

west of Germany. This curious difference arises from the fact that in the east of Germany huge estates preponderate, whilst in the centre of Germany middle-sized properties and in the west small holdings prevail. The large German landowner in Pomerania and East Prussia, who bears a well-known name, can easily borrow from banks and other institutions at a reasonable rate of interest, and he does so freely and somewhat indiscreetly. Hence, his estates are encumbered with debts up to the hilt. The medium-sized and somewhat obscure agriculturist in Middle Germany cannot so easily raise money on his land. Lastly, the small cultivators who prevail in the Rhenish Province, where, owing to the use of the Code Napoleon and the French law of succession, the land has been divided and subdivided in equal parts among the children so often that individual holdings have become very small, find it often absolutely impossible to raise money on their freehold properties at any price.

In Great Britain such small landowners and peasants would find no difficulty in raising money on their land, for local usurers would prosper on the ignorance, the improvidence, or the inexperience of the small cultivators to whom they would lend money at 30, 50, or more per cent. But the paternal Government of Germany is sensible enough not to allow usurers to prey upon the ignorant or foolish producers. Usury is as good as non-existent in Germany, owing to most stringent usury laws. Consequently, if the German cultivator cannot raise money at low rates (up to 6 per cent.) and on fair security, he cannot borrow money at all. This disability is, no doubt, very inconvenient to some improvident individuals, but from the point of view of truly national economy it seems a

lesser evil to suppress the usurers altogether than to allow them to become prosperous by relentlessly exploiting the poor, the weak, and the foolish.

From the facts and figures which have so far been given, it is clear that the rural industries of Germany are highly prosperous, but it is equally clear that the prosperity of the German agriculturists is variable, and that it stands in a somewhat close relation to the size of their holdings. The larger properties appear to be somewhat unproductive, and to be uneconomically exploited, largely because their owners are not qualified, or not willing, to manage their estates themselves. That large estates should yield disappointing results is only natural. Hired labourers will work as little as possible for their wages, and managers and overseers will act in a similar manner. But even if these paid agents are conscientious, their supervision will, in any case, cause a considerable extra expense which burdens the land.

Many large landowners in Germany wish to shine in Parliament or in society, or simply to enjoy themselves, finding the country too dull. Such men—and they are very numerous among the large landed proprietors—desire to spend much money, which they can easily raise on their estates. Hence, the large estates of Germany are not only the most wastefully exploited rural properties, but they are at the same time those which are most heavily burdened with mortgages.

Whilst the large estates suffer from the superfluity of land and the extravagance of their owners, who, in their turn, suffer from superfluity of leisure, the very small peasants' properties suffer from lack of capital and from lack of labour-saving animal and machine power. For these reasons, inefficient culti-

vation is common on both the largest and the smallest agricultural properties. Therefore land passes from the hands of very small peasants and of very large landowners into the hands of townsmen, and in the end the former freeholders are replaced by agricultural leaseholders and labourers. For these reasons, we find that men who work less than five acres have only 73.4 per cent. of freehold land, and that the men who cultivate more than two hundred and fifty acres have only 81.8 per cent. of the whole land, whilst the agriculturists who possess medium properties have more than 90 per cent. of freehold land.

On properties measuring from five to two hundred and fifty acres are found the substantial peasants and peasant-farmers who are the backbone of Germany's agriculture. Nine-tenths of their fields are freehold land. Their land belongs to them and to their descendants for ever. These peasant proprietors usually cultivate their holdings with the assistance of their families. The men do the hard work in the fields, the women look after the cattle and the children, help at harvest-time, when the rural schools close in order to enable the small peasants to get assistance of their youngsters in picking up potatoes, gathering sheaves, picking fruit, &c. Each member of the peasant's family works with love and earnestness, not for a daily wage, but for himself, with the sense and pride of property, and of absolute ownership. Where holdings are so large that outside assistance is required, farm servants or labourers are hired who, as a rule, live with the peasants. They form part of the peasant's family, and work under the constant supervision of the owner. Consequently, an agricultural labourer is certain to do far more work on a peasant's farm in Westphalia, under the eye of the

master and owner of the farm, than on a big estate in Pomerania under the supervision of paid stewards and inspectors, who strut or ride about in a leisurely fashion, who become lazy in their comfortable and easy posts, and who half the time think of their private affairs. The well-to-do peasant is thrifty, robust, healthy, and contented, whilst the small peasant, who has but a few acres, works himself to death, owing to lack of land, lack of capital, and lack of labour-saving animal and machine power.

Some distinguished British politicians and statesmen have recommended dividing the agricultural land of Great Britain, which policy has been summed up in the cry "Three acres and a cow." Three acres and a cow may perhaps be a good electioneering cry, but it is not a good policy. Although life with three acres and a cow may appear most idyllic to the townsman, who takes his armchair as a coign of vantage, it is the reverse of idyllic from the countryman's point of view. If the policy of "three acres and a cow" should ever be carried out in Great Britain, it would lead, no doubt, to a resettlement of the people on the land. But it seems hardly desirable that the proletariat of the slums of our congested towns should, by an ill-considered but well-meant policy, at a huge cost to the nation, be dumped into the country and be transformed into an equally wretched and miserable proletariat of the country. Besides, such an artificially created proletariat could not be made to stop. A cloud of usurers would descend on the country, and the British stage-peasants, after having eaten their cow, would as rapidly as possible raise enough money on their three acres to buy a ticket for the United States or for Canada, and the British country districts would be left more desolate and

more unproductive than before. Such an experiment would certainly end in failure.

What Great Britain requires for the salvation of her agriculture is, in the first place, the gradual creation of a substantial peasant class, who work with their own hands on freehold agricultural properties of moderate size, as I have shown in my book *Great and Greater Britain*, 2nd edition.

In every business a certain fixity of conditions is required in order to make it attractive to men who are willing to work. Where that fixity of conditions is lacking, a calculation of risks and chances is impossible, and business is turned into speculation. If the peasant has no land of his own, but has to pay rent, his heart is not in his work, and cannot be in his work. The improvements which he undertakes may eventually benefit the landlord. His rent will, in bad seasons, be so unbearably high as to ruin him; in good seasons it will be so low as to allow him to sublet his land at a profit. Hence agriculture, under a tenant system, lacks stability and security. The peasant or farmer will be turned into a speculator, but not into a cultivator.

Politicians who are insufficiently acquainted with the real conditions of agriculture may, of course, devise an elaborate system for the fair and automatic adjustment of rents, and for securing to the cultivators at the end of their tenure the fruit of their labour, by making enactments which are to insure these ends. But such a system, which may look very excellent on paper, would hardly work in practice. In the first place, such a system would be too complicated to make it understandable and attractive to the average countryman. In the second place, a huge and costly official machinery would have to be created,

and the peasant would, in the end, have to pay for that mediating and adjusting service which would be chiefly productive of dissatisfaction and much costly litigation. Therefore a freehold peasantry must be created, and it could be created out of our so greatly reduced army of rural labourers. Only then will Great Britain have again a sturdy, prosperous, and contented yeomanry as of old.

The creation of peasant freeholders should be accompanied by legislation abolishing the necessity of enclosing agricultural properties with hedges, fences, &c. Our hedges give, no doubt, a peculiar charm to the landscape, and are therefore dear to the town-dweller, but they constitute a very onerous burden for all agriculturists. The expense of planting a hedge, and of keeping it in order year in year out, is very great. Besides, the agricultural ground which is wasted through hedges is not only the strip on which the hedge grows; for, as it is difficult to go close to the hedge with plough and harrow, two huge additional strips on both sides of every hedge around every enclosed field remain unproductive. Thus hedges and fences cause an enormous unnecessary expense and waste, which would be much increased if, through the creation of small holdings, hedges would have to be multiplied. Surely, in Great Britain, as in most other European countries, boundary stones at the corners of every field, together with carefully-kept local registers of rural properties, should suffice to show the limits of individual holdings, and should make our wasteful and primitive methods of enclosing unnecessary. No doubt the fall of the hedges would diminish the picturesqueness of the country, but their fall would immediately enhance the value of our agricultural soil by many millions of pounds, and the

army of men who now every year clip the hedges may turn their hands from useless to productive labour.

In most countries of Europe the peasants were formerly landless serfs, who had to be liberated and to be enabled to acquire land of their own by gradual payments spread over a number of years. Germany did so a century ago, and Great Britain will have to do likewise for the continuance of the impossible tenant system means the extinction of our agriculture. If we wish to possess again flourishing rural industries, we must begin at the base, and must first of all abolish the present system of land tenure, and replace it by a system of freehold property. We must begin by giving to our agriculture a stable, safe, and permanent basis. If the cultivator has ground of his own, he will love and cherish it. Otherwise, he will desert the country without a regret, and either emigrate or come to reside in the slums. Landowners will find it in their interests to sell gradually their land, instead of letting it to cultivators under a system which greatly benefits a host of unproductive and useless middlemen, such as solicitors, stewards, managers, rent-collectors, bailiffs, &c., whom landlords and tenants have to keep at a large expense to themselves.

British farmers complain loudly of the insufficient number of rural labourers, and the lack of agricultural workers is so great in this country that at harvest time swarms of town loafers, of casual labourers, and of out-of-works migrate from the slums to the country, and these men are employed by the farmers, notwithstanding their utter unsuitability. In Germany, the army of agricultural labourers has not been shrinking, but it has greatly increased, partly by the immigration of Russians, Austrians, Poles, &c. At the census of 1882 there were 5,763,970 rural labourers, male and

female, in Germany. At the census of 1895, 5,445,924 agricultural hands were counted. At the census of 1907, 7,054,900 rural labourers of both sexes were counted. Of these almost a million are foreigners who come into Germany for the harvest and go back to their homes across the frontier when winter comes.

The increase in the number of rural labourers in Germany, in spite of the fact that machine power has largely supplanted men power and animal power in agriculture, is very remarkable. In Prussia alone, the power of machinery used in agriculture has risen from 24,000 horse-power in 1879 to 133,000 horse-power in 1897, and at present the horse-power available for agriculture in Germany should amount at least to 350,000. At first sight it seems almost incredible that an army of seven million men and women should be available as farm hands in Germany, in view of the fact that the manufacturing industries are most flourishing in that country, that town wages are far higher than country wages, that the attractions of town are as enticing in Germany as they are over here, and that all farm labourers make a lengthy acquaintance with town life when serving as soldiers in garrison towns. Consequently, it is worth noting why the country population remains almost stationary in industrial Germany.

Two classes of agricultural workers have to be considered, viz. farm servants, who are engaged for a lengthy term, and day labourers. The huge army of farm servants, male and female, is composed of the sons and daughters of small peasants, who send their children into service, partly in order that they should earn a living, partly in order that they should learn improved methods on the larger farms. The male farm servants expect to come, in course of time,

into the freehold property of their parents, and therefore refuse to sacrifice a certain livelihood in the country to an uncertain one in the towns; whilst the female farm servants naturally wish to work near their home and their friends. The day labourers also are partly the children of small peasants, and they refuse to leave the country in which they have a substantial stake; partly are they small peasant proprietors, with properties of their own, which are so small that they have to accept some outside work in order to make a living. The following most interesting table gives a clear picture of the different status of agricultural day labourers in the east and in the west of Germany.

	Agricultural day labourers with land	Agricultural day labourers without land
Eastern Germany		
East Prussia	12,935	154,777
Westphalia	13,578	117,927
Pomerania	14,475	111,457
Western Germany		
Rhenish Province	28,866	38,411
Hesse-Nassau	12,172	15,744
Westphalia	15,828	16,425

From the foregoing figures we see that the landless labourers, the agricultural proletariat, form in the east of Germany, as they do in Great Britain, the overwhelming majority of agricultural hands, for in that part of Germany hardly one labourer out of ten has land of his own. On the other hand, in the Western Provinces, the day labourers who own land, and those who do not own land are about equal in numbers. In the Eastern Provinces, where huge estates owned by noblemen are to be found, the day

labourers are considered by the lord of the manor merely as two-legged cattle, and they are only too often treated as such. Therefore the whole interest of these landless labourers lies in their daily wages, exactly as it does with British rural labourers, and they leave the country for the town in order "to better themselves," without hesitation and without regret, as do our own agricultural hands. Therefore, it comes that in the east of Germany, where agriculture bears some resemblance to that of this country, the cry of lack of labour on the part of the farmers is just as loud and as bitter as it is in Great Britain, and there also the owners of the big estates complain that the labourers take no interest in their work. The lack of rural labour both in east of Germany and Great Britain springs evidently from the same cause—the landlessness of the rural labourer.

Many British landowners have been wise enough to give to their day labourers a stake in the country in the shape of a cottage and a plot of ground, and their labourers stay in consequence; but the great proprietors in the east of Germany, instead of acting likewise and thus settling their men on the land, have had the incredible heartlessness and hardihood to propose and to clamour for legislation restricting the freedom of migration for rural labourers. In the west of Germany, where middle-sized, small, and very small farms are mixed, the scarcity of rural labour appears to be much less in evidence. Happily for the employers of agricultural labour in Germany, the rural wages paid in Austria-Hungary and Russia are so low that every year an army of from 200,000 to 400,000 rural labourers flock from Poland and Galicia into Germany. These temporary immigrants supply the needful labour at the most critical time of

the year, exactly as do the Italian labourers, who yearly migrate for a time in hundred thousands into France, Switzerland, the United States, and Argentina. It would seem dangerous for Germany's agriculture to rely to too large an extent on such temporary assistance, and Germany will do well to make the acquisition of land as easy as possible for those of her rural labourers who at present are without land.

British agriculture has the alternative either of creating a large number of peasant proprietors and peasant labourers, or of employing in constantly growing numbers our slum-dwellers, who, of course, may be reinforced by immigrants from abroad. As foreign agricultural labourers will probably prove more suitable, it seems very possible that our rural districts will, in future, be populated only by rich men, their servants, tradesmen, &c., and that the work which has to be done will be done by foreign temporary immigrants, unless we create a huge number of freeholders. If British freeholders should not be created in large numbers as rapidly as possible, our agricultural work will have to be done by foreigners; the British population, the rich men excluded, will almost exclusively live in town; and the national physique will still further deteriorate.

The foregoing shows that the possession of freehold land is not only most important to the farmer as an inducement to do his best, but that it is also of great importance inasmuch as it attaches rural labour to the soil.

In the manufacturing industries and in trade, young men are chiefly wanted, and in advertisements for labour it is frequently stated that men above forty or fifty years need not apply. Old men are almost useless for manual labour in towns, and they

easily become paupers there, whilst they could find plenty of work in the country. According to a census which was taken on the 14th June 1895, the proportion of agricultural labourers above fifty years in Germany was 15.80 per cent., while the proportion of industrial labourers above fifty years was only 9.30 per cent.; the proportion of agricultural labourers above sixty years was 7.31 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial labourers above sixty years was only 2.93 per cent.; the proportion of agricultural labourers above seventy years was 1.94 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial labourers above seventy years was only 0.53. From these figures it appears that the chance for old men to find employment in agriculture is in Germany from two to four times greater than is their chance to find occupation in trade and in the manufacturing industries. In Great Britain, where town life and town work is more of a rush and scramble than in Germany, the chance of finding occupation for men above forty or fifty years should be from three to six times greater in agriculture than in the manufacturing industries and in trade. From three to six times more old men could earn a living in agriculture than they can in industrial pursuits; and if our agriculture should again become prosperous, the nation might usefully employ many thousands of old men in the fields and the farms who live now in the workhouse, and millions which are yearly spent in poor relief might be saved.

In the beginning of this chapter it has been explained that Germany's agriculture was very poor and most primitive at a time when the rural industries of Great Britain were most advanced and most flourishing. When British agriculture was at the height of its success, and when our farmers made money, the

spirit of scientific inquiry and experiment arose, and the ambition to make improvements of every kind was very strong in this country. Hence, French and German agriculturists and economists flocked to this country to study and to copy our then so highly advanced agricultural methods, which served as a model to all nations.

On the model of British agriculture the present prosperity of the agriculture of Germany and France was founded, incredible as it may seem if we compare the agricultural position of those countries with ours at the present day. Between 1798 and 1804, Albrecht Thaer published his celebrated work, "Introduction to the Knowledge of English Agriculture," in three volumes, which was followed by a work in four volumes, entitled "The Fundamental Principles of Agriculture," which was also based on his study of our rural industries. These books became the German agriculturist's Bible, honours were showered upon Thaer during his lifetime, and life-sized statues in marble and in bronze of the man who introduced British agricultural methods into Germany may now be found in Celle, in Leipzig, and in Berlin. The grateful agriculturists of Germany would act more justly if they erected in the country statues representing British Agriculture. Later on, Wilhelm Hamm's book, "The Agricultural Implements and Machines of England," which was published in 1845 in Brunswick, exerted almost as great an influence as did Thaer's writings in Anglicising German agricultural methods.

Great Britain was the pioneer not only in empiric methods of cultivation, and in the introduction of improved machinery, but also in making scientific experiments in matters agricultural. Through the

munificence of Sir John Lawes, the experimental station of Rothamsted was founded in 1840, and only eleven years later Germany followed our example by opening an experimental station in Möckern, near Leipzig. But whilst Great Britain opened her second experimental station more than thirty years after the creation of the Rothamsted establishment, Germany opened station after station in rapid succession. In 1856, two experimental stations were opened at Bonn and at Breslau; in 1857, three experimental stations arose in Göttingen, Dahme, and Munich; in 1858, another institution was created in Insterburg; and at the present moment there exist no less than seventy experimental stations, all over Germany, where, by constant research and practical investigation scientific agriculture is advanced, seeds and manures are tested, &c., &c.

Great Britain, after having been the first and the foremost nation in applying science to agriculture, has now become the last. Private enterprise, which was the pioneer, has done wonders in this country here and there, but the isolated efforts which have been made by some munificent, unselfish, and patriotic individuals have, on the whole, proved as ineffective to the multitude as isolated efforts at making improvements are always apt to prove. On the other side of the Channel, the German Governments have taken up the ideas which they received from England. They have exploited and have applied our discoveries not here and there, but throughout Germany, by disseminating knowledge all over the country by means of the Government machinery, and by encouraging scientific agricultural investigation with liberal grants. At the present moment, even Japan is far ahead of England in applying science to agri-

culture, although agricultural science was, until lately, unknown in that country.

Whilst Germany imitated this country in many respects, she struck out a line of her own by the work of Justus von Liebig. That great chemist published in 1840 his celebrated work, "Organic Chemistry applied to Agriculture and Physiology," which has proved revolutionary in Germany's agriculture. If Liebig had lived in Great Britain, his work would have benefited only the far-seeing few, because our officials would have remained indifferent to his discoveries, even if they had understood their value. They would have left their exploitation and fruition to unaided private initiative. But the German Government took care that the brilliant discoveries of Von Liebig should prove beneficial to the whole nation. Chemical investigation and tuition was promoted and spread by the liberal aid of the Governments which opened chemical laboratories and created chairs of Chemistry throughout Germany. Thus the chemical industry of Germany has become the foremost in the world, and it has proved of incalculable help to Germany's agriculture. The greatest chemists were, and are still, Frenchmen and Englishmen. Nevertheless, Germany has the foremost chemical industry, not because she possesses the greatest chemists, but because she has an enormous number of working chemists, and an organisation which favours the exploitation of chemical and other inventions throughout the whole of the empire.

When the German chemists produced sugar from beetroots, the West Indian planters laughed at the chemical sugar; but at present the German sugar industry stands supreme in the world, perhaps less because of the bounties which the Government grant

it than because of the improvements which the German chemists have gradually effected both in agriculture and in the utilisation of the roots. How marvellously the German sugar industry has improved with the assistance of the chemist may be seen from the substantial increase in the percentual yield of sugar, which has gradually been effected. How great and how continuous this improvement has been, and how greatly the production of sugar has increased at the same time, may be seen from the following figures :—

	Percentage of Raw Sugar extracted from Beet	Production of Sugar in Germany
1875–6 . . .	8.60 per cent.	358,048 tons.
1880–1 . . .	9.04 „	573,030 „
1885–6 . . .	11.85 „	838,105 „
1890–1 . . .	12.54 „	1,336,221 „
1895–6 . . .	14.02 „	1,637,057 „
1900–1 . . .	14.93 „	1,979,000 „
1905–6 . . .	15.27 „	2,400,771 „
1908–9 . . .	17.60 „	2,079,221 „
1909–10 . . .	15.80 „	2,037,397 „

Without the marvellous improvements in the percentage of sugar extracted, the sugar production of Germany would certainly not have grown sixfold since the year 1875–6 and be now by far the largest in the world. At present, the German raw sugar factories employ about 100,000 men during part of the year, whilst about 650,000 men are occupied with growing the roots, which represent a value of about £12,500,000. The sugar extracted is worth about £20,000,000 per annum, of which half is exported, and probably about £15,000,000 per annum are spent in wages in the sugar industry. The tops of the roots are locally used for fodder, and the residue of the roots, from which the sugar has been extracted, is dried and sold for fodder which can be preserved through the whole year, and which represent a value of about £2,000,000. Thus the German chemists have, with the liberal assistance

of the Government, artificially created this enormous and most valuable additional crop.

Evidently the policy of non-interference in business matters is not without its disadvantages, but discretion and knowledge is needed on the part of the Government which wishes to interfere in matters of business. If Great Britain wishes to apply science to industry, and make it more than a fashionable and popular cry, our higher education must be reformed root and branch, and State aid must be forthcoming without stint. But not only must money be spent like water, it must be spent in the right direction, for this country has frightfully fallen behind-hand in the organised pursuit, and especially in the organised application, of science. The cleverest chemists are of little service to this country if, for lack of rank and file, their inventions are exploited abroad. Our great chemists, who are the foremost in the world, are of little use to our chemical industries. They might just as well live in Germany or the United States, for in those countries their inventions are universally appreciated and exploited.

British education is, unfortunately, more ornamental than useful. Therefore the most valuable schools of practical agriculture are sadly lacking in this country, whilst Greek is still compulsory at the Universities. In Prussia alone there are seven agricultural High Schools, where about 2500 pupils are trained by 200 teachers. According to the latest return, these High Schools were attended by 1889 German students, and by no less than 524 foreigners. Evidently, these courses are very popular not only with German agriculturists, who, by-the-bye, are very foolish not to keep their knowledge for themselves. The State aids these High Schools with grants of

£37,000 per annum. Besides there are 200 ambulant lecturers provided by the State, who teach scientific agriculture. Furthermore, there are in Prussia 350 other agricultural schools, with 2000 teachers and 25,000 pupils, and facilities are provided in every direction for spreading the scientific knowledge of agriculture far and wide. Many teachers in rural elementary schools voluntarily study agriculture in the High Schools, in order to be able to teach some useful and valuable things to the country children and their parents. The Prussian Ministry of Agriculture spends yearly about £200,000 on agricultural education in all its branches, and the sum total spent by all the German Governments and local authorities in this direction should at present amount to about £500,000.

The general education in the rural districts of Great Britain is unfortunately too townified, and the little boys and girls are taught subjects at the schools which not only are useless, but which unfit the children for rural life. The boy who leaves the elementary schools has only too often been estranged from the country, and has been taught to turn up his nose at agriculture; the girl aspires to a situation in Kensington, and the possession of a piano; and if she marries a countryman she reads penny novelettes, and thinks it beneath her dignity to milk a cow or look after the chickens, for that would not be ladylike.

Unfortunately, the mistakes which are made in our primary education can never be rectified. The youthful minds which, by a totally unsuitable education, have been made to despise the country and the country occupations, will not easily take to country life and love it. Because of our misdirected primary

education, many farmers and many manufacturers also have become altogether hostile to the Board Schools, and they sigh for illiterate workers. In this they are wrong. Education in itself is not an evil. The right education is a blessing, the wrong one a curse. However, it would be a mistake to assume that German education is perfect, or even near perfection. It is good at the top and at the bottom. Her primary schools and her Universities are very good, but her intermediate schools, and especially the classical gymnasia, through which most University students have to pass, are bad, and are totally unsuitable for preparing young men for practical vocations. They develop only the memory, but train neither the character nor the mind, and the tuition received in them is, in nine cases out of ten, altogether useless. They are merely cramming establishments.

Co-operation for agricultural purposes first sprang up in this country, but owing to the indifference of the State co-operation among farmers has not spread in Great Britain. The lack of co-operation among British agriculturists is due not only to the indifference of the State and the insularity of our habits, but also to the fact that every rural property is enclosed by a fence or a hedge in England and by stone walls in Ireland and Scotland. Not only are these hedges unnecessary and exceedingly wasteful, as has already been mentioned, but they form at the same time a most effective barrier to progress, inter-communication, and co-operation. A farmer does not like to look over another man's fence, and he does not like his neighbour to look into his fields.

In Germany, in France, in Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland, and in other countries matters are dif-

ferent. Boundary stones, deeply sunk into the ground, show the limits of individual properties, and farmers do not work each for himself behind the screen of a hedge. Cultivators in Germany and elsewhere constantly observe one another, freely talk to one another, and often take their meals together on the boundary between their fields. Observations are thus continually exchanged, and a community of interest is established. Thus, German agriculturists are drawn to one another through the absence of artificial obstructions, whilst British farmers shut one another out, and are apt to look on their neighbours with suspicion. For these reasons, the co-operative movement could more easily develop in Germany than it has done in this country, especially as the extension of the co-operative movement was actively assisted and promoted by the Government, which saw in it a powerful factor for the advancement of agriculture.

Aided by the State and by the communities, co-operation among the German agriculturists has developed with ever-increasing rapidity. In 1890 there were in Germany 3,000 co-operative agricultural societies. In 1908 there were no less than 22,000 societies of this kind in existence. Of these, 16,092 were credit societies, 1,845 were societies for co-operative buying and selling, 2,980 were co-operative dairy societies and societies which deal with milk, and more than 1,000 associations were devoted to various purposes. How vast the number of these societies is in Germany may be seen from the fact that there is now on an average one co-operative society for every three hundred individual holdings.

There are numerous associations for building dykes against floods, for developing irrigation, for draining fields, drying swamps, acquiring bulls and stallions

for breeding purposes, for milling and storing grain, for effecting insurance, &c., and in consequence small and poor farmers may have the use of steam ploughs, threshing machines, &c., at most moderate rates. Thus a comparatively small quantity of expensive agricultural machinery is made to do service to large numbers of peasants, much capital is saved, and small cultivators receive all the advantages which otherwise are only within the reach of wealthy landowners.

The State and local bodies assist in the forming of such associations, and often provide funds. Two or three small and poor local bodies agree to buy on joint account certain expensive machinery, and hire it out by the day, whilst the State or individual provinces undertake larger works for the benefit of agriculture, such as the draining of the extensive marshes near the coasts of the Baltic and of the North Sea.

Perhaps the most important co-operative enterprise created by the State is the Preussische Centralgenossenschaftskasse, the Central Bank of Co-operative Associations. This huge bank, which was created in 1895, is meant to be the banker of the co-operative societies. It accepts deposits, grants loans, &c., and the State started it on its career with a capital of £2,500,000 in cash. How great the service of that bank has been to the co-operative associations may be gauged from the fact that its turnover amounted to no less than £560,795,300 in 1908, and that it served as a bank to no less than 1,213,194 producers. The rate of interest charged by that institution is extremely low, and fluctuates, as a rule, between 3 per cent. and 4 per cent.

Whilst agricultural co-operation in Germany is a

powerful factor in the economic life of the nation, it figures in this country chiefly in the speeches of politicians, who very often have a somewhat hazy idea of the meaning of co-operation. Though not a few parliamentarians glibly recommend co-operation as a panacea for all the ills from which agriculture is suffering, they do nothing practically to further that movement. After all, it is easier to give good advice than to act. It is true that the co-operative movement has made some headway in Ireland; but whilst agricultural co-operative societies count by many thousands in Germany, they count only by a few hundreds in this country.

Apart from the co-operative associations, the rural industries of Germany possess numerous huge and powerful societies for improving the breed of horses and cattle, promoting the keeping of fowls, for growing hops and fruit, for keeping bees, &c.; and many of these societies receive considerable subventions from the State.

The whole of the agricultural population of Germany is organised in some enormous political associations, namely, Farmers' Associations and Peasants' Societies, which have about a million members. Through these enormous associations the agricultural interest of Germany exercises some considerable influence in the Imperial Parliament, and in the various local Parliaments of Germany, whilst in England, the classical land of political organisation, agriculture is politically inarticulate, and therefore neglected—an unknown factor, a plaything, and a victim to the political parties and to local authorities, without a friend, without an advocate, and without a champion, especially as "the man in the street" is unfortunately a townsman.

Had it not been for the powerful combination of all the agriculturists, and for the determined agitation of their representatives in Parliament, the rural industries of Germany would certainly not have obtained the strong fiscal protection which they enjoy under the German tariff. The moderate protective tariff on all agricultural products which has formerly prevailed in Germany has been a great blessing to Germany's agriculture, and it has done no harm to her manufacturing industries, which have marvellously developed at the same time. But whether the higher duties on agricultural products of the last tariff will be beneficial or harmful to industrial Germany remains to be seen.

The wholesale prices of wheat are higher in Germany than they are in Great Britain, but it does by no means follow that the retail prices of food in general, which alone are of importance to the consumer, are also higher in that country. In Germany the consumer buys agricultural produce directly from the producer. There are huge markets in all German towns, even in the very largest, and there the peasants from the surrounding districts will be found offering their produce for sale. The charges made for the use of these markets is either purely nominal or *nil*. In Great Britain, where similar markets are known only in out-of-the-way places, the working man cannot buy agricultural products from the farmer, but has to purchase them from a shopman, who, in turn, receives his goods from a wholesale dealer. Therefore it is not the British farmer only who has to maintain a host of unnecessary and unproductive middlemen, as has already been shown; the British consumer also has to maintain an army of middlemen, which does not exist in Germany, and which need

not exist in this country. In Germany, no thrifty housewife would dream of buying her vegetables, her fruit, her poultry, her eggs, her butter, &c., at a shop. She goes to the market for her supply. In this country she has to go to the shops, unless the shopman "calls for orders," and as the turnover of the average greengrocer is very small, and as the goods are easily perishable, the shopman has to charge two, three, or four times the price which the producer receives. Therefore, vegetables and fruit, which are a luxury in this country, are often the poor man's food in Germany.

In the biggest towns of Great Britain, and at the seaports where foreign agricultural produce arrives in huge quantities, and has to be sold quickly, food is cheap, and is often cheaper than it is in the country. In Germany, on the other hand, where duties on imported food are levied on arrival at the harbours, food is much cheaper in the country districts where it is raised. Hamburg, the German Liverpool, is the most expensive town in Germany. Families in reduced circumstances in Germany migrate to the country for cheapness, whilst people living in the country districts of Great Britain find it often cheaper to get their agricultural produce from London. Our towns have grown out of all proportion, not only because the chances of finding employment for labour and of relief for the destitute are greater in the towns, and because we have no peasant proprietors, but also because food is cheaper in town than it is in the country.

That agricultural products are cheaper in London than they are in the country is most unnatural and most unfortunate. This artificial cheapness is an additional cause of the ruin of our agriculture. If

we look at wholesale prices, food is so cheap in Great Britain that agriculture, which in selling its produce receives only the wholesale price, cannot be carried on with a profit; but if we look at the retail prices, we find the same products to be so dear, owing to the exactions of the middleman, that this country compares unfavourably with Germany with regard to the price of food. The hosts of middlemen have spoiled the market for our rural industries. Hence, the rural industries should strive to bring producers and consumers together, and to eliminate those crowds of unproductive and unnecessary middlemen, who flourish whilst our rural industries decay.

Our agriculture suffers not only from the exactions of the go-between, but also from outrageously high transport charges. In Germany agricultural produce has to travel enormous distances by rail, and it can be carried cheaply. In Great Britain, where, owing to the size and happy configuration of the country, agricultural products need travel only trifling distances over land in order to be brought to the large towns, railway carriage, even in bulk, is so dear as often to make it prohibitive to farmers. Our railways are even allowed to exact far more from the reduced British farmer than they charge to the State-protected and prosperous foreign agriculturists. Therefore it comes that American, Australian, and Continental fruit can be sold in London at a profit, whilst English fruit often rots on the trees not far from town, because our railways choose to charge freight rates which often make it impossible for the British farmer to sell his produce at a profit in the nearest and most natural market. Thus, foreign producers receive a greater bounty from the British railway companies in the shape of preferential railway rates

than they receive from their own Governments in the shape of fiscal protection. Such is the blessing of so-called Free Competition among our railways.

It is scandalous that our railways may thus help to foster foreign rural industries and to kill our own, and it is a disgrace that no British statesman has so far had the courage to abolish the crying abuse of differential rates favouring the foreigner which exist in no country except Great Britain. Whilst the German peasants travel fourth-class at about a farthing a mile, and are allowed to take into the carriages, which are specially built for that purpose, huge baskets full of produce which are carried free of charge, British railway charges are so high, even for carrying large quantities of farm produce, that every night long strings of carts may be seen carrying agricultural produce from the country into London and other big towns. Only in the country which was the pioneer in railway transport, the railways are allowed to extort from the countrymen freight charges which even now make the mediæval form of transport the cheaper one. In that country which, after Belgium, possesses the densest railway net in the world, droves of cattle and flocks of sheep may be seen walking from Scotland to London, whilst in Germany cattle transport by road is almost unknown.

In our congested towns, millions of poor are crying for cheap food, and in our deserted and reduced country districts hundreds of thousands of impoverished farmers are crying for town prices for their vegetables, their meat, their fruit, &c. Yet the bitter cry of country and town remains unheard. Consumers and producers cannot meet because our railway companies stand between the two and exact a ruinous

toll in the form of railway rates which are without a parallel in the world.

Englishmen who have travelled in France, Italy, or Spain have bitterly complained of the octroi duties which are charged on every basketful of food which is brought into the town, but no octroi duty charged abroad is as high, as arbitrary, as vexatious, and as pernicious as that exacted by our railway companies from British farm produce. Nowhere in Europe, Belgium excepted, is the natural distance between town and country smaller than in Great Britain, but nowhere in the world is the artificial distance between town and country greater than in the United Kingdom, owing to the selfish and openly anti-national policy of our railways, which have callously destroyed important industries, and have made it almost impossible for town and country to exchange their natural products in a natural manner.

We have of late heard much of the deterioration of the national physique, and it cannot be doubted that the sturdy English race of former times is becoming almost extinct, and is being replaced by a puny, stunted, sickly, sterile, narrow-chested, weak-boned, short-sighted, and rotten-toothed race. Our magnificent physique, which used to be the envy of all foreign nations, is rapidly disappearing, notwithstanding the fact that, according to the statistics, no nation in Europe consumes more meat per head of population than does Great Britain. But at the same time, no nation in Europe leads a more unnatural and a more artificial life. Out of one hundred Britons, no less than sixteen are Londoners, and almost four-fifths of our population live in towns. In Germany only three men out of one hundred live in Berlin, and only half of the population are town-

dwellers. In Prussia and Bavaria, which combined have as many inhabitants as Great Britain, only six million people live in towns of above a hundred thousand inhabitants, whilst in this country fifteen million people unhealthily live crowded together in towns of above a hundred thousand inhabitants.

But not only live four-fifths of the people in unnatural surroundings, they are also unnaturally fed. Town mothers rarely have a sufficiency of good milk; hence, the poor town babies are brought up on artificially coloured, chemically treated, impure, and often adulterated cows' milk, on patent food, &c., whilst country babies are usually brought up on their mothers' milk. Later on, the town children, who had never a proper start and a fair chance in life, are to a large extent fed on tinned, chilled, frozen, chemically prepared, and adulterated agricultural products, which are sent to this country from abroad. That a race which is brought up in such a manner is not a healthy one cannot be wondered at. On the other hand, in Ireland, where there is proportionately a huge agricultural population, by far the finest specimens of British manhood are to be found, although the Irish country population is poor and is chronically under-fed. The striking difference between the under-fed but country-bred Irishmen and over-fed, town-bred Englishmen should give food for reflection.

German economists, German statisticians, and German generals have from time to time drawn attention to the physical deterioration of the population in the large German towns, and have made comparisons by means of the statistics of births and deaths, the recruiting tables for town and country, &c., from which it is apparent that the birth rate in the German

towns is rapidly falling, and that townsmen in Germany are physically deteriorating and becoming sterile. Therefore Bismarck refused to allow Germany to become a purely industrial State like England, and he fostered the rural industries of Germany directly and indirectly, in every way, so as to preserve the physical strength and health of the nation, which, after all, is its most valuable asset. Whilst our birth rate is rapidly falling and is almost the lowest in Europe, the proportionate increase of the German population is becoming greater from year to year, and is now the greatest in Europe. Whilst the cry of physical degeneration is on everybody's lips in this country, no similar complaints are raised in Germany, and the fact that the rapid increase of the population is not accompanied by a falling-off of the national physique is attributed by German statesmen to her prosperous agriculture.

The foregoing short sketch shows why Germany, which has a poor soil, an unfavourable climate, and an unfortunate geographical position and structure, and a somewhat dull-minded country population, possesses a powerful, flourishing, and expanding agriculture, whilst Great Britain, which has the most fruitful soil in Northern Europe, a mild and equable climate, a most favourable geographical position and structure, an enterprising and energetic population, and a great agricultural past, has rural industries which have been decaying for four decades. This chapter shows that the ills from which our rural industries are suffering are not incurable, but they can only be cured by a man of action and of determination, who is backed by a Government which is willing to lead.

Before all, the powerful agricultural interest must strive to gain power by combination. It must form

a solid phalanx, and must assert its claims with energy in Parliament and before the local authorities, which only too often tax and worry agriculturists out of existence. If the agricultural interest remains politically formless, shapeless, voiceless, and inert, it will continue neglected. If it is united in mind and united in purpose, the great political leader will be forthcoming who will make the cause of agriculture his own, and who is prepared to create conditions which will make our rural industries powerful and prosperous. Our latent agricultural resources are probably unparalleled in Europe, and Great Britain may again become the envy and the model of all European nations by the unrivalled excellence and the unrivalled prosperity of her agriculture. But much hard work will have to be done to achieve such a result, which is worthy of a great statesman's ambition, for he who recreates our agriculture will regenerate Great Britain.

Detailed proposals for the re-creation of British agriculture will be found in the second edition of my book *Great and Greater Britain* (Smith, Elder & Co.).

CHAPTER XXII

WATERWAYS AND CANALS

OUR most active and most dangerous industrial rival, both as regards our home and our export trade, is Germany, and we have often been told by merchants and manufacturers that the German industries are so exceedingly and so uncomfortably successful in Great Britain and abroad, and are constantly ousting British manufacture, because they enjoy cheaper transport facilities. Therefore loud complaints have from time to time been raised in this country by manufacturers and traders against the exactions of our carrying trades, and the spokesmen of the carrying trades have again and again assured the public that their charges were exceedingly moderate; that they could not possibly accept freight at lower prices; that the conditions for economical transport in Great Britain were totally different from, and could not be compared with, the conditions existing in Germany, &c. The first two arguments appear incorrect, but the last argument is quite true. The natural conditions for cheap transport in Great Britain and Germany are indeed totally and absolutely different, but they are not by any means in favour of Germany. On the contrary, they are in favour of this country, and so much so that, if our transport system was properly arranged and managed, Germany would be utterly incapable to compete industrially with this country. A glance at a map of Europe will prove this assertion

to be true, and show the fundamental difference existing between the two countries as regards cheap transport.

The greatest industrial and exporting centres of Germany are the following :—The Rhenish-Westphalian centre, with the towns of Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Ruhrort, Barmen, Elberfeld, Essen, Bochum, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, &c.; the Alsatian centre, with Mülhausen, Gebweiler, Dornach, Colmar, &c.; the various centres situated in the Palatinate, Hesse, Baden, Würtemberg and Bavaria, with the towns of Höchst, Ludwigshafen, Carlsruhe, Mannheim, Offenbach, Frankfort, Reutlingen, Bamberg, Nuremberg, &c.; the centre in the Saxonies, with Chemnitz, Glauchau, Zwickau, Plauen, Greiz, Gera, Dresden, Leipzig, &c.; and the Berlin district. In the north of Germany, near the sea border, there are practically no industrial towns, and the country is almost exclusively devoted to agriculture. Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel, Lübeck, Stettin, Dantzig, Königsberg, do some manufacturing, as every town does, but they can hardly be called manufacturing towns. The manufacturing districts are to be found in Central Germany, and especially in Southern Germany, but not near the sea. If we draw a straight line from the Rhenish-Westphalian centre, which is chiefly devoted to the coal and iron industries, to its nearest harbour, Antwerp, the distance, according to the towns chosen, comes to 100 to 150 miles. Berlin is separated by 90 miles of land from the sea. All the other manufacturing towns belonging to the other centres are separated from their nearest harbour or from the sea border by a distance of from 200 to 350 miles, and it may be said, if we look at the German industries as a whole, that they are carried on at an

average distance of more than 200 miles from their harbours.

If we now look at a map of Great Britain, we find that our industrial towns are in most instances situated either on the sea, or but a few miles distance from the sea. Our industries are carried on as a rule not further than 10, 20, or 30 miles away from the sea border, and the maximum distance which need be considered for industrial inland transport, and which is altogether exceptional, is but 60 miles in a straight line. Consequently, it appears that the raw materials imported from abroad by sea which are used in the German manufacturing industries, such as cotton, wool, ores, metals, wood, &c., and the articles for the consumption of the industrial labourers, the prices of which indirectly affect the cost of manufacturing and therefore the welfare of the industries, such as wheat, flour, meat, petroleum, &c., have to travel a distance which in Germany is from eight to ten times longer than it is in Great Britain. The industrial products exported, also, have in Germany to be laboriously transported inland eight or ten times the distance which they have to travel in this country. Evidently the German industrial army has to fight far away from its base, and its lines of communication are exceedingly long.

Whilst Inverness, Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Greenock, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Sunderland, Middlesborough, Stockton-on-Tees, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, Manchester, Preston, Barrow-in-Furness, London, Belfast, &c., can manufacture on the very sea border, their German competitors, the shipbuilding industry of course excepted, have to labour more than 100 miles inland. But even the German shipbuilding industry is at a great disad-

vantage, compared with the shipbuilding industry of this country, for it also has to rely on the far-away industrial Hinterland, whence it draws a large part of its supplies, notably coal and iron. Therefore it is absolutely clear, and it is beyond all doubt or contradiction, that this country is, as regards manufacturing, infinitely more favourably situated than Germany, because it operates close to its sea base, and it may be asserted, and cannot be gainsaid, that the natural advantages of Great Britain are so immensely in our favour that the German industries would be absolutely incapable of competing with the industries of this country if the enormous advantages which our geographical position offers were fully utilised.

From the foregoing it is clear that Germany is very heavily handicapped by nature in the race for industrial success, and the position of most Continental countries, which wish to develop their industries, is similarly unfavourable. The manufacturing industries of France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, also, are carried on far inland. Lyons lies 160 miles from the sea; the distance between Milan and Genoa is 80 miles, but Italy has no coal; the manufacturing towns of Bohemia are 300 miles distant from their harbour, and Lodz in Russian Poland is separated by 170 miles from the coast. One might almost say that in Europe the industries are situated in the centre of the Continent, with the exception of Great Britain, where they are placed on, or close to, the sea border. Therefore Great Britain might again acquire and maintain the industrial monopoly, or at least industrial predominance, in Europe if she avails herself of her most favoured position. When Cobden prophesied with emphasis that this country "was and always would remain the workshop of the world,"

he probably based this proud and sweeping assertion, which time unfortunately has completely disproved, more on our magnificent and unique geographical position, and the peculiar structure of this country, into which the sea deeply penetrates from all sides, inviting us to pursue manufacture and foreign trade, than upon his fiscal panacea. Natural conditions are always in the end much stronger than any policy.

Industrial Germany is hampered in many ways. Her climate is very severe, her coal is of poor quality and is found only far inland, her inhabitants used to be engaged chiefly in agriculture, and had neither natural ability nor inclination for manufacturing and trade, and she used to possess little accumulated wealth. Consequently it was of vital importance for the industries of Germany that the enormous difficulties and obstacles which nature and custom had placed in the way of her industrial success should be overcome. Conditions *sine qua non* for giving vitality to the German industries were a practical, businesslike education, the application of science to industry, thrift, and, before all and most of all, a comprehensive and efficient system of cheap transport whereby to bridge over and shorten the long distances which separate the numerous interdependent industrial centres from one another and which part these centres from the sea.

Already in the Middle Ages the foreign trade of Germany relied chiefly on her waterways. The Valley of the Rhine was the highway over which for more than 1,000 years the commerce flowed between the Orient and Great Britain, going *viâ* Italy, Switzerland, and the towns of Flanders and Holland. Before the age of steam and of machinery, the German industries flourished in the towns on the Rhine, Elbe,

and Danube, and their tributary streams. Their prosperity was founded on cheap water transport. "Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse est," was the motto of Lübeck. Nature and tradition point to the waterways for Germany's prosperity, and modern Germany resolved to extend the use of her historic waterways to the utmost, notwithstanding the example of Great Britain, which at the time of Germany's industrial transition was still the foremost industrial country in the world and a model to all nations.

When the railways were introduced, Great Britain ceased to extend her system of waterways, which in past decades she had built up with the greatest energy. Her system of canals, which were the foremost in Europe, and which used to be the admiration and envy of all foreign nations, were declared to be useless by the promoters of railways and their friends, and the nation weakly and foolishly allowed its canals to fall into decay at the bidding of those interested in railways. One of the greatest German authorities on inland navigation speaks as follows of our canals in a most important book on "Inland Navigation in Europe and North America," which he compiled by order of the Minister of Public Works for the information of the Government, and which was published in 1899. His words are weighty and to the point, and we shall do well not only to read them, but also to heed them.

"The artificial waterways of England are the oldest in Europe. . . . Next to Sweden and Finland, Great Britain possesses the closest net of water-courses in Europe, and she is exceedingly favoured by nature for inland transport by water owing to the climatic conditions prevailing, the plenty and equal distribution of rain, and the mild winters usual in that

country, as well as owing to the formation of the coast with its numerous inlets of the sea, which deeply penetrates from all sides into the land.

"With the arrival of railways, the building of canals ceased almost completely in 1830. The railways were placed in a position in which they could easily destroy the canals. Through traffic on the most important canal routes had to pass through a number of different and independent canal systems. As soon as a railway succeeded in obtaining the control of an indispensable part of the canal route by purchase, lease, or traffic agreement, it took to destroying the traffic on the adjoining canals, either by enforcing maximum rates or by numerous other expedients. After having been damaged in this manner, canals were bought up cheaply by the railways, which used them for traffic which could not conveniently be handled by the railroads or which stopped the canal traffic altogether. The numerous independent canal companies possessed no central organisation, and when in 1844 an organisation for combined defensive action was created, important parts of the canal system were already in the possession or under the influence of the railways, and it was too late to oppose their further encroachments. In 1871 canal property had on an average fallen to one-third of its former value. Only in 1873 were the railways prohibited to close for traffic canals in their possession, or to allow them to fall into disrepair."

Germany has tried in the past to learn from us in order to become also a great industrial nation. She has copied Great Britain in many ways, but she has not by any means copied us blindly and in everything. She has refused to adopt Free Trade, notwithstanding the vigorous agitation of the Cobden

Club and its professorial sympathisers in Germany; she has declined to hand over the whole of her productive industries to the tender mercies of her transport industries, relying on the dogma of free competition which was preached by the same political economists who championed Free Trade; she has declined to let her agriculture be ruined on the strength of certain theories propounded by professors, manufacturers, and clergymen; and she has firmly refused to let her canal system decay and be partly destroyed in the interests and at the bidding of the railways. Germany has most successfully tried to develop all her industries harmoniously, and not to allow one or the other to become great and prosperous at the expense of another. In this country the lack of harmony and unity is ruining our industries. Agriculture has been ruined by our manufacturing industries, and our manufacturing industries are in their turn being ruined by our carrying trades. Great Britain has been an example to industrial Germany in many ways, but as regards her industrial policy Great Britain has been a warning example to Germany, and is cited as such.

Recognising the importance of cheap transport and of an alternative transport system, which would bring with it wholesome competition, Germany has steadily extended, enlarged, and improved her natural and artificial waterways, and keeps on extending and improving them year by year; and if a man would devote some years solely to the study of the German waterways, and make the necessary but very extensive and exceedingly laborious calculations, he would probably be able to prove that Germany's industrial success is due chiefly to cheap transport, and especially to the wise development of her waterways.

During the thirty years from 1871 to 1900 this country has done practically nothing as regards inland navigation, for the Manchester Ship Canal is a sea canal. During the same period, Germany has built 1091 kilometres of inland canals, she has immensely improved all her navigable rivers, and the German-Austrian canals lately proposed or begun have a length of 3657 kilometres, whilst their probable cost has been estimated at the gigantic sum of about £50,000,000. The Rhine-Elbe Canal Bill of 1901 proposed to spend £19,450,000 on this undertaking alone within fifteen years. Among these canals there are some very vast schemes, such as the Rhine-Elbe Canal, the Danube-Oder Canal, and the Danube-Elbe Canal, enterprises which on an average require an outlay of above £10,000,000 each. Some of these may perhaps not be constructed in the lifetime of the present generation, but it is worth while to take note of these gigantic projects which, after careful investigation, have deliberately been proposed because the fact of their being proposed or begun shows that canals have proved such an immense benefit to Germany that the very cautious and very thrifty Government of that country is willing to sink such immense sums in them notwithstanding the certainty that these canals will prove exceedingly able competitors to the State railways. Here we have the unusual spectacle of the State monopolist deliberately creating a most powerful competition to itself.

Germany possesses a number of big rivers, but these were, until a very recent period, in the same state of neglect in which the rivers of this country are at the present moment. They were natural watercourses with a natural, unevenly deep and partly shallow bed, which did not allow of the use of big

ships, and the soft natural banks of these rivers prevented ships from going at a considerable speed, because the heavy waves created by their rapid progress would have washed the river banks down into the river. For this reason ships had to travel at a very low speed in Germany exactly as they have to proceed on British rivers, and even on those which are emphatically industrial rivers.

The larger a ship or barge is, the cheaper is the cost of transport, for the same number of men who are required for looking after a small barge can handle a large one. Besides, the dead weight of the hull, the proportion of living room to stowage room, &c., is of course far greater in a small than in a large vessel. For the same reason for which ocean steamers are increasing in size from year to year, the ships and barges used in inland navigation are growing continually bigger in those countries where inland navigation is systematically fostered. Again, the quicker a cargo boat can travel, the more economical it is, for time is money. In order to make it possible to use large and swift cargo boats on her rivers, Germany set to work to regulate her natural rivers and to convert them into artificial water-courses of that type which has been found most fit for economical and rapid navigation.

With this object in view, the natural earthbanks of rivers and canals were replaced by solid masonry walls, the river beds were narrowed and deepened, so as to allow the use of large boats, the rocks which in many parts—for instance in the Rhine at Bingen—were a danger to navigation were blasted away, and provisions were made to prevent the ice forming during severe winters and closing streams and canals to navigation. Numerous well-equipped harbours and

quays were built by all towns within reach of inland navigation, and gradually all the more important German waterways were greatly perfected and improved as channels for commercial navigation. On the regulation of the river bed of the Rhine alone more than £1,000,000 were expended during the last thirty years; and, in consequence of the energetic measures which have been taken for the purpose of deepening the channel of that river, Cologne, which in a straight line is situated about 150 miles from the sea, has become a seaport, inasmuch as thirty-four steamers, which have been specially built for that purpose, trade now regularly between Cologne and various harbours in England, Scandinavia, and Russia. High up the Rhine and 300 miles inland lies Strasburg, which formerly could be reached only by the smallest river craft, but now boats carrying 600 tons are going to and from that town, and Strasburg has spent an enormous sum of money in creating the most modern facilities for loading and unloading, storing, &c., of merchandise.

The tributary streams of the Rhine also have been very greatly improved. The Main, for instance, was a shallow stream with a depth of only $2\frac{3}{4}$ feet which could not be used for shipping. This depth has gradually been increased to no less than $8\frac{1}{4}$ feet for a distance of twenty miles up stream, and at a cost of £400,000, in order to provide the industries of Frankfort with cheap transport by water. Up to Frankfort, the bed of the river Main is as deep as that of the Rhine, and the same steamers which can travel on the Rhine can now go up to Frankfort.

The towns at or near the Rhine are vying one another in tapping that stream exactly as Frankfort has done, and they do so regardless of cost. Crefeld

and Carlsruhe, which are situated some distance away from the Rhine, have dug canals to that stream in order to give the most economical outlet to their industries, and many old-world sleepy towns on the Rhine, which used to subsist on the wine-trade and on tourist traffic, have equipped the water's edge with the most perfect and most up-to-date installations for warehousing and for loading and unloading goods directly from train to steamer or barge, and from boat to train. Ten or fifteen years ago, sacks of wheat weighing 2 cwt. each, could be seen carried laboriously on the shoulder by sturdy men from the small grain boats to old-fashioned sheds, where they were stacked. Now huge ships filled with wheat in bulk are unloaded by suction in a few hours, and the grain is automatically weighed whilst being whisked from steamer to store, or is put into sacks at an incredibly high speed by machinery and dropped into railway trucks. Electricity is largely made use of for working the machinery of these harbours, and some of these are very likely the best equipped inland harbours in the world.

Formerly the greatest attraction for travellers on the Rhine was its romantic scenery and its ruined castles, and the stream appealed most of all to those who are poetically inclined. Now its character has completely changed, and its greatest interest lies in this, that it is perhaps the most perfect waterway in the world for the promotion of industry. Its shores are no longer so remarkable for their romantic views as they are for their countless smoking factory chimneys, and the beautiful scenery begins to be overhung by a pall of smoke which reminds of the Midlands. However, this bustling activity is not by any means restricted to the Rhine. Everywhere in

Germany water transport is being developed with the utmost vigour and energy. On all the rivers and all the canals commercial and industrial activity is marvellously developing, and the development of water transport is becoming almost a sport, if not a passion, with the German business community.

On the canals of this country, which in reality are only shallow ditches filled with water, and on the majority of its rivers, which are not much better, tiny barges loaded with from 30 to 50 tons may be seen which are laboriously moved either by the arms of men or which are hauled by horses at a speed of about three miles an hour. On the German rivers and canals, boats and trains of barges of 300, 500, or 1000 tons each, which are hauled by steamers, may at every hour and on every day be seen proceeding at a very considerable speed. The traveller who journeys by railway along the Rhine or the Elbe cannot fail to see strings of barges carrying several thousand tons of goods constantly passing by.

The great advantages which water transport possesses over transport by land, be it by road or rail, may be seen at a glance from the following facts and figures. A large iron barge of a loading capacity of 2000 tons, and of the type which is used on the Rhine, costs only about £5000, or about £2. 10s. per ton of load room. A German railway waggon of ten tons' capacity costs about £125, or £12. 10s. per ton of load room, and is therefore, as a vessel for carrying freight, five times more costly than is the barge. As regards the cost of moving freight by land and water, the following will show the immense advantage which water transport possesses over land transport. On a horizontal road, and at a speed of about three miles

per hour, a horse can pull about two tons; on a horizontal railway it can pull about 15 tons, and on a canal it can pull from 60 to 100 tons. Therefore, from four to six times the energy is required in hauling goods by rail, and thirty to fifty times more force is expended in hauling it by road, whatever the motive force may be. Therefore, the cost of propulsion by water, whether the motive force be horse traction, steam, or electricity, is only a fraction of the cost arising from propulsion by road or rail. Furthermore, the construction of railways is exceedingly costly. On an average at least £20,000 to £30,000 per mile are required to build a railway in a country such as Great Britain or Germany, whilst a canal can be built at considerably smaller cost. A further circumstance in favour of water traffic lies in this, that far more traffic can pass over a broad canal than can be sent over railway, as will be seen later on. It is therefore clear that transport by water is, and must always remain, owing to its very nature, so very much cheaper than land transport, be it by road or by rail, that railways cannot possibly compete with properly organised, properly managed, properly planned, and properly equipped waterways. Hence it is economically wasteful not to extend and develop the natural and artificial waterways which a country possesses, and it is absolutely suicidal and criminal to let them fall into neglect and decay.

Canals and rivers are most suitable for the transport of bulky goods which are not easily perishable, and which need not be delivered in the shortest possible time. Therefore canals and rivers are particularly suitable for transporting cotton, ore, metal, coal, wood, petroleum, grain, manure, chemicals,

fodder, wool, potatoes, cement, stone, leather, salt, sugar, vegetables, fruit, &c., and machinery, and those manufactured goods which are despatched in fairly big parcels or which are packed in strong boxes and bales.

If it were not for the existence of the German waterways, the German industries would certainly not be in the flourishing condition in which they are now. When ice closes the German rivers and canals, the export and import trades are at once very seriously affected, and if the German waterways should be blocked for a whole year, the whole of Germany would probably be ruined, for Germany cannot live without her waterways. Certain valuable products and by-products of the German mines and ironworks, and the more bulky products of the chemical industries of Germany can, according to Major Kurs, who is a leading authority on inland navigation in Germany, only be sold in Germany and abroad owing to the cheapness of transport by water, and in many cases the profit is cut so fine that an increase of the freight charges by about one-fiftieth of a penny per ton per mile would inevitably kill important industries which it seems are at present killing the industries of countries competing with Germany. Thus Germany's industrial success is no doubt due to a very large extent to the immense assistance which she receives from her waterways.

In consequence of the energetic steps which were taken for the purpose of improving the navigable channel of the Rhine, the volume of transport flowing over that river has, according to the official statistics published, increased in the following remarkable manner :—

THROUGH TRAFFIC OF GOODS PASSING EMMERICH (GERMAN-DUTCH FRONTIER)

	Up-stream	*Down-stream*
1889	2,799,800 tons	2,593,000 tons
1894	4,771,500 ,,	3,142,000 ,,
1897	6,929,100 ,,	3,480,200 ,,
1900	9,036,400 ,,	4,129,700 ,,
1903	10,027,900 ,,	7,211,900 ,,
1906	13,402,400 ,,	7,678,300 ,,
1909	14,881,300 ,,	9,964,700 ,,

An almost equally rapid increase in the traffic has taken place on all the other rivers and canals in Germany, and the quantity of goods transported by water has in consequence more than trebled in a short space of time. Owing to the marvellous expansion of traffic which had to be handled, the tonnage of the fleet of ships used in German inland navigation has increased in the following manner :—

TONNAGE OF THE GERMAN INLAND FLEET

	Number of Ships	*Tonnage*
1882	18,715	1,658,266 tons
1887	20,930	2,100,705 ,,
1892	22,848	2,760,553 ,,
1897	22,564	3,370,447 ,,
1902	24,839	4,873,502 ,,
1907	26,235	5,914,020 ,,

From the foregoing figures it appears that between 1882 and 1907 the tonnage of the German inland fleet has very nearly been quadrupled. We have often heard of the marvellous progress of the German merchant marine, but it would appear that the progress of the German inland fleet has been much more rapid, although it has not aroused such widespread attention. Whilst the German inland shipping has increased between 1882 and 1907 from 1,658,266 tons to 5,914,020 tons, the German merchant marine has between 1881 and 1910 only increased from 1,181,525 tons to 2,859,307 tons. The tonnage of German inland

shipping, which in the year 1882 was but 50 per cent. larger than the tonnage of German sea shipping, is now, notwithstanding the marvellous growth of the German merchant marine, 100 per cent. larger than the tonnage of German sea shipping. The full significance of this enormous increase in the tonnage of inland shipping is brought out only if we take note of the change in the character of Germany's inland fleet, which is apparent in the following table :—

CLASSIFICATION OF SHIPS OF THE GERMAN INLAND FLEET

	Ships of less than 100 *tons*	*Ships of* 100–150 *tons*	*Ships of* 150–250 *tons*	*Ships of* 250–600 *tons*	*Ships of* 600 *and more tons*
1887 . . .	11,281	5,460	1,757	1,271	220
1892 . . .	11,430	6,326	2,343	1,822	457
1897 . . .	10,390	4,405	3,754	2,746	650
1902 . . .	10,764	1,705	5,732	4,087	1,661
1907 . . .	10,930	1,859	6,301	4,987	2,112

The ships and barges of less than 150 tons have decreased in number during the last twenty years, and the whole of the immense increase in inland tonnage has taken place in ships of larger and of the largest size. Those above 150 tons have rapidly increased, and this increase is particularly striking in the case of ships of 600 tons and more, which have increased almost tenfold, whilst those measuring from 250 to 600 tons have increased fourfold in number. The decrease of the boats measuring less than 150 tons should be particularly interesting to Great Britain, inasmuch as a ship or a barge of 150 tons, which is too small for German inland transport, and is considered to be ripe for the shipbreaker, is a very large vessel in British inland navigation, in which ships of 30 or 50 tons abound. We are still relying for inland water transport upon our ancient water-ditches, miscalled canals, and on tiny vessels

which are being discarded by Germany as being antiquated, wasteful, and therefore useless.

How enormous the influence of the size of ships is on the cost of transport may be seen from the following table, which was supplied by one of the leading German authorities on inland navigation :—

COST OF TRANSPORT PER TON PER KILOMETRE ON CANALS, IN SHIPS OF VARIOUS SIZES, DURING A TEN MONTHS' SHIPPING SEASON

150	200	300	400	450	600	1000	1500	tons.
0.79	0.63	0.48	0.41	0.38	0.30	0.23	0.21	pfg.

One pfennig being about one-eighth of a penny, these rates are roughly equal to the incredibly low charge of from one-seventh to one-twentyfourth of a penny per ton per mile! If British industries would be able to secure rates approximating those given above for their transport requirements, a new era would dawn for our country, and German industrial competition, of which we now hear so much, would become a thing of the past.

From the foregoing table it is clear how exceedingly uneconomical the toy barges are which ply upon British canals and rivers. The cost of transport in boats of 150 tons is about four times as great as in boats of 1500 tons. Nevertheless, even boats of but 150 tons are hardly to be found on British canals and rivers, where barges of smaller size, such as 30 and 50 tons for instance, are still transporting goods at a leisurely speed and excessive costs, exactly as they did in the era of the mail coaches and turnpikes a hundred years ago.

The cost of transport per ton per kilometre for barges of a smaller size than 150 tons cannot be

given, for such barges are no longer of importance on the German waterways, and the rates for such small boats are not given by the German source from which the foregoing figures are taken.

Boats of a size which Germany considers beneath notice as being antediluvian and incredibly wasteful appear to be good enough for this country, which, in spite of these mediæval appliances for transport, aspires to be the first industrial country in the world. The average size of the large boats plying on the German waterways is from 200 to 400 tons on the minor waterways, on the Elbe it is 1000 tons and more, and on the Rhine barges from 2000 to 2350 tons may be seen. If we take the general average, the size of the average barge on the Rhine was 450 tons in 1896, and it should now be more than 500 tons.

The exceedingly low costs of transport given in the foregoing for ships of various sizes apply of course only to a new and perfectly-equipped water-course, such as the proposed Rhine-Elbe Canal, and presuppose a well-filled ship. But as the ideal state of the perfectly-equipped water-course and the well-filled ship is at present rather the exception than the rule in Germany, for there are still many ships about which can only be described as misfits, it is worth while to take note of the average cost of transport on the German rivers, and allow for the fact that a large portion of the tonnage is during part of the year only partly employed or even unemployed. One of the foremost German authorities has furnished the following table of the actual costs of water transport, which is most interesting in so far as it gives a fair idea of the real, not the ideal, business conditions at present prevailing.

COST OF TRANSPORT ON PRINCIPAL GERMAN RIVERS

Average Cost of Transport per Ton per Kilometre

On the Rhine.	
Full load during one-third of year. Three-quarter load during one-third of year. Half load during one-third of year.	0.46 pfennig.
On the Elbe.	
Full load during two-fifths of year. Three-quarter load during one-fifth of year. Half load during one-fifth of year. Quarter load during one-fifth of year.	0.60 pfennig.
On the Oder.	
Full load during one-quarter of year. Three-quarter load during one-quarter of year. Half load during one-quarter of year. Quarter load during one-quarter of year.	0.92 pfennig.
On the Weichsel.	
Full load during one-quarter of year. Three-quarter load during one-quarter of year. Half load during one-quarter of year. Quarter load during one-quarter of year.	1.38 pfennig.

The rivers Oder and Weichsel flow through the chiefly agricultural provinces in the east of Germany where freight is less plentiful and less regular, and where the equipment for economic transport is less advanced than it is in Central and West Germany. Therefore the cost of transport is comparatively high on these rivers, being equal to about one-sixth of a penny per ton per mile on the Oder, and one-fourth of a penny per ton per mile on the Weichsel. On the Elbe the cost of transport is about one-eighth of a penny per ton per mile, and on the Rhine it is as low as one-eleventh of a penny per ton per mile.

As in the foregoing table full allowance appears to have been made for slack time and for the time when navigation has to be stopped in consequence of frost, these figures should give a fair indication of the actual cost of transport on the rivers in Germany.

However, the costs of transport from place to place are not merely the costs of water carriage. Therefore we can obtain a real insight into the costs of transport by water only if we compare all the costs occasioned by water transport with all the costs of transport by railway. In the following table, three typical cases are given in which all the costs of water transport and of transport partly by water and partly by rail are compared with all the costs of transport by rail only. The costs of water transport are calculated on the basis of 600 ton vessels, a size which may be considered a fair average on the up-to-date waterways of Germany. The costs of railway carriage are those of the Prussian State railways, the transport costs and freight charges of which are exceedingly low, as is generally known.

ALL COSTS FOR SENDING COAL

	By Canal	*By Railway*
From Herne (Westphalia) to Hanover. Distance 260 kilometres . . .	3.43 Mks.	5.80 Mks.
From Herne to Schönebeck on the Elbe. Distance 444 kilometres, the mine lying 7 kilometres away from Herne Harbour .	7.00 Mks.	9.00 Mks.
From Herne to Mannheim on the Rhine. Distance 393 kilometres . . .	3.88 Mks.	8.30 Mks.

From the foregoing figures it appears that if all incidental expenses are duly considered, the costs of carrying coal between two of the places mentioned are roughly from 50 to 115 per cent. higher by railway than the costs of carrying coal between the

same points by canal only, by canal and river, or by railway and canal. In view of the fact that the transport costs on the Prussian State railways are exceedingly moderate—they are probably the lowest in Europe—this result is surely very remarkable.

Owing to the greater cheapness of transport by water, huge and increasing quantities of freight are naturally being diverted from the German railways to the waterways, especially as it has been found that well-equipped waterways of sufficient size can deal more satisfactorily and more rapidly with large quantities of goods than can the best-equipped railways. Railway stations are always apt to become congested owing to their very nature, and they cannot so easily be enlarged in order to keep pace with the growing traffic requirements of the time as quays along the banks of rivers and canals can be extended. Besides, the number of goods trains which can be despatched over a railway is naturally limited in consequence of the exigency of the general traffic, which must not be disturbed, whilst on a river or canal of sufficiently generous size a practically unlimited number of cargo boats can be sent at all times and in either direction. Lastly, a goods train can carry but a few hundred tons of goods—300 tons is an exceedingly satisfactory performance for a British goods train—whilst a train of barges can easily transport several thousand tons of freight. For these reasons a far larger quantity of goods can be sent over a fair-sized waterway than can be sent over a railway of similar length, and on a river or a well-equipped canal enormous masses of goods can easily, quickly, and without delay be forwarded, which would cause congestion, confusion, and ultimately a complete breakdown on the best-equipped and best-managed railway. The progressive use of

the waterways in Germany and their ability to handle considerably larger quantities of freight than are handled by the railways, may be seen from the following figures :—

TRANSPORT OF GOODS ON THE GERMAN WATERWAYS

	Arrivals	*Departures*
1875	11,000,000 tons	9,800,000 tons
1885	14,500,000 ,,	13,100,000 ,,
1895	25,800,000 ,,	20,900,000 ,,
1905	56,400,000 ,,	47,000,000 ,,

TRANSPORT OF GOODS ON THE GERMAN RAILWAYS

	Arrivals	*Departures*
1875	83,500,000 tons	83,500,000 tons
1885	100,000,000 ,,	100,000,000 ,,
1895	164,000,000 ,,	167,000,000 ,,
1905	291,000,000 ,,	297,700,000 ,,

These figures show that during the thirty years from 1875 to 1905 the quantity of freight handled by the German railways has increased by a little less than 250 per cent., whilst the quantity of freight despatched over the German waterways has increased by considerably more than 400 per cent.

If we now look at the record of ton kilometres, and at the quantity of freight carried per kilometre on both railways and waterways, we find the following figures :—

FREIGHT RECORD ON GERMAN RAILWAYS

	Ton kilometres	*Tons of freight despatched per kilometre*
1875	10,900,000,000	410,000 tons
1885	16,600,000,000	450,000 ,,
1895	26,500,000,000	590,000 ,,
1905	51,200,000,000	820,000 ,,

FREIGHT RECORD OF GERMAN WATERWAYS

	Ton kilometres	*Tons of freight despatched per kilometre*
1875	2,900,000,000	290,000 tons
1885	4,800,000,000	480,000 ,,
1895	7,500,000,000	750,000 ,,
1905	15,000,000,000	1,500,000 ,,

From the foregoing figures it appears that the quantity of goods which have been despatched over each kilometre of railway has increased during the thirty years under review from 410,000 to 820,000 tons, or by only 100 per cent., whilst during the same period the quantity of goods which have been despatched over each kilometre of waterway has increased from 290,000 tons to 1,500,000 tons, or by no less than 417 per cent. Therefore, rightly considered, water carriage in Germany has expanded a little more than four times more quickly than has railway carriage. In 1875 the goods traffic was 410,000 tons per kilometre of railway, and only 290,000 tons per kilometre of waterway. At that time the railways were still supreme. In 1905 this position had been completely reversed, for the railways dealt in that year with 820,000 tons of freight per kilometre, whilst the waterways handled no less than 1,500,000 tons per kilometre. Evidently the waterways are in the ascendant in Germany, and if later figures were available, it would probably be seen that the waterways have considerably improved upon their record of 1905.

The effect of the extension and improvement of the German waterways, both natural and artificial, may be gauged from the significant fact that the most prosperous industrial centres in Germany, though they lie far inland, are situated close to the waterways of which they make the most extensive use. The most prosperous part of industrial Germany is the Rhenish-Westphalian district, which might be called the German Midlands. A few years ago a statement was published according to which the two provinces of Rhenish Prussia and Westphalia, which cover but 15 per cent. of the German territory, and which possess 29 per cent. of the population of

Germany, consumed no less than 71 per cent. of the coal used in that country, they produced 81 per cent. of the iron, and 86 per cent. of the steel made in Germany, and they kept 83 per cent. of the German spindles running. How rapid the rise of the Rhenish-Westphalian district as an industrial centre has been may be gauged from the following figures :—

COAL RAISED IN THE DORTMUND DISTRICT

1870	12,219,432	tons
1880	22,364,311	,,
1890	35,577,083	,,
1895	41,145,744	,,
1900	59,618,900	,,
1907	94,658,769	,,

If we now remember that the coal raised in the Rhenish-Westphalian district is very inferior to British coal, that this manufacturing centre lies not, like the British manufacturing centres, close to the sea, but from 100 to 150 miles inland, according to the town chosen, and that a large part of the raw products used in manufacturing and part of the coal comes from German inland centres, which in many instances are hundreds of miles away, the rapid growth of the Rhenish-Westphalian district can only be called marvellous. If we wish to find an instance of similar expansion, we have to look to the United States, and even there the record of the Rhenish-Westphalian industries will very likely not be beaten. If we inquire why this district, which by nature is so little favoured compared with Great Britain, where harbours, excellent coal, iron and manufacturing towns are found in the closest proximity, is the most strenuous, the most successful, and the most dangerous competitor to those British industries which are so greatly favoured by nature, we find that the industrial success

of the Rhenish-Westphalian district would have been impossible had it not been for the cheap carriage of goods afforded by the Rhine. Therefore we may expect to find an indication of the use to which the Rhine is put by the Rhenish-Westphalian industries in the statistics of the port of Hochfeld-Duisburg-Ruhrort, which is the outlet of those industries towards the Rhine. The following figures clearly show what water traffic has meant for the chief industrial centre of Germany :—

WATER TRAFFIC OF HOCHFELD-DUISBURG-RUHRORT

1875	2,900,000	tons
1880	3,500,000	,,
1885	4,500,000	,,
1890	6,200,000	,,
1894	8,200,000	,,
1896	9,700,000	,,
1900	13,000,000	,,
1909	17,000,000	,,

The traffic of that most important inland harbour, which is unknown to most Englishmen, has more than quintupled since the year 1875. Hochfeld-Duisburg-Ruhrort stands now amongst the very foremost harbours of the world, and only those who have thoroughly examined that enormous inland harbour can form an idea of its vastness, the excellence of the harbour appliances, and its activity. The Port of London appears behind the times and asleep if compared with that German inland port, the name of which is hardly known outside that country.

The enormous activity of the German waterways has greatly benefited Holland, for three-quarters of the through trade of Holland is German water-borne trade. Holland lives largely on German trade, and Germany resents that the trade on her chief stream has to pass through a foreign country to which it

has to pay a heavy tribute. The unceasing agitation of the Pan-Germanic League against Holland, and its advocacy of the incorporation of Holland into Germany in some form or the other springs to a great extent from the resentment that the mouth of the Rhine is situated in a non-German country. This feeling of resentment is not confined to the Pan-Germans, for it was one of the principal causes which determined the Government to construct at immense expense the Rhine-Ems Canal with the object of giving to the Rhine an outlet at Emden, which was converted into a well-equipped port. It was intended to divert the export and import traffic of Germany on the Rhine from Rotterdam to Emden, impoverish Holland, and bring her on her knees by economic pressure. On the 11th of August 1899, the Dortmund-Ems Canal was opened, and the year book "Nauticus," which may be described as officially inspired, wrote in the same year :—

"In our time our dependence on foreign countries has frequently been felt by the circumstance *that the mouth of the Rhine is in the hands of a foreign country, and that that country in consequence draws away the chief profit of our export industry.* This state of dependence will be ended by the Dortmund-Ems Canal, which gives to the Rhine, at least *for the Province of Westphalia, a German outlet in Emden.*"[1]

Rotterdam has taken energetic measures to keep the German trade. It has deepened the waterway to the North Sea in the course of years from 15 feet to 29½ feet, it has increased its dock area from 96 acres to 309 acres, and it has spent more than £2,000,000 on improving the harbour. Whether the Dortmund-Ems Canal will in course of time succeed in diverting

[1] The italics are in the German original.

the Rhine trade from the Dutch harbours to Emden remains to be seen. It is possible that it will eventually have that effect, although it does, at present, not seem very likely. At any rate, the German Government has made enormous exertions to achieve that end by building a canal of record dimensions. The Dortmund-Ems Canal is 168 miles long, the water is 8¼ feet deep, or as deep as that of the Rhine up to Cologne, ships of about 1000 tons can use it, and it has twenty locks, of which the most important ones have the enormous length of 542 feet. About £4,000,000, or almost £25,000 per mile, have been spent on that canal, and the harbour dues at Emden have been fixed so low as to give inducement to traffic to desert the Dutch trade route for the purely German one. Evidently Rotterdam will have to look to its laurels.

Roads and canals are open to all. Hence, free competition will insure on both roads and canals a cheap and effective service on the part of the numerous carriers who make use of them. When our railways were in their infancy it was expected by many sagacious men that the iron road also would be common road for the use of all on which many competing carriers would travel with conveyance of their own; but their anticipations were not realised. The owners of the iron roads, unlike the owners of roads and canals, became the only carriers on them, and thus a monopoly arose somewhat unexpectedly, our productive industries were given over to the mercy of our railways, and these hastened to close as quickly as possible the only alternative inland trade routes, existing, by acquiring and obstructing our canals or by "repairing" them out of existence. If we regenerate our ancient canal system, re-open these

obstructed outlets, and bring them up to the highest standard of efficiency, we shall again have free competition among common carriers travelling on the same route, and, in view of our unrivalled position for industrial purposes, our declining industries should rapidly revive by the cheap transport rates which a good system of canals would insure.

It may be objected that the example of Germany cannot be followed by this country, because Great Britain possesses no natural rivers which are at all comparable to the Rhine and Elbe, that therefore Great Britain's position for developing her means of water transport is far less favourable than is that of Germany's. There is apparently much force in such an argument. In reality, however, it appears to be quite incorrect. The great and somewhat wild German rivers had to be made fit for commercial navigation, and at so enormous an expense, that a similar sum of money should almost suffice to give to our chief industrial centres, which after all lie only a few miles from the sea, canals of so much width and depth that they will be as useful to them as the Rhine and Elbe are to the German industrial centres which lie 100 and 200 miles inland. Besides, we have an enormous advantage over Germany, not only in our insular position and in the configuration of the country where industrial centres, coal, iron, and harbours lie in the closest proximity, but also in our climate. The Rhine may often be seen so low that ships and boats have to lie up for lack of water, and at the time when the snow melts in the Alps, that river is often so much swollen that it is like a raging torrent, and that navigation is impossible. Nearly every winter the Rhine and the Elbe are so full of floating blocks of ice that navigation has to be suspended.

The great rivers of Germany are no doubt magnificent arteries of trade, but they had to be regulated and tamed, and at enormous expense, before they could be utilised, and the great changes which occur every year in their depth of water, their strength of current, and their closing in consequence of the very severe winter usual in Germany, make them far less desirable as waterways than they appear at the first glance. Therefore, the advantages of Germany's magnificent natural waterways are far less great than it seems at the first glance, especially as these natural waterways had to be made navigable at enormous cost. The frequent and often lengthy interruptions in traffic which occur on the Rhine and Elbe would hardly happen in this country, where rain falls more regularly, where floods by the melting of snow in the mountains need not be reckoned with, and where streams and canals very rarely are frozen over.

Great Britain possesses no adequate waterways for her industries not because Nature has been unkind, but because men have been short-sighted and neglectful. Whilst Germany has vigorously developed her waterways hundreds of miles inland, Great Britain has not even adequately regulated the Thames. London, with its incomparable position, might become the finest *entrepôt* in the world by making a barrage east of London, and converting the stream for many miles below London into a gigantic lake of still water where undisturbed by the ebb and flow of the tides ships could load and unload on the quays from train to ship and from ship to train, and where they could store their goods in gigantic modern warehouses. Instead of such a harbour, we find a mediæval river with mediæval docks and mediæval warehouses and appliances, where goods have to be "lightered,"

exactly as in the time of Charles I., and even in the heart of industrial and commercial London, the Thames, which ought to be the best-equipped commercial river in the world, presents its ancient and unlovely mud banks at low tide exactly as it did 1000 years ago.

We may again possess ourselves of the foremost system of inland navigation in the world, which was ours 100 years ago, and it can be recreated easily and speedily at a moderate cost. During the last 20 years or so, Germany has spent about £30,000,000 on her waterways. Such an enormous sum would endow this country, where distances are small, with the most magnificent net of canals which the world has seen. At the extravagant cost of £25,000 per mile, 1200 miles of wide and deep waterways could be constructed over which the goods of our manufacturing industries would flow at a cost which now appears incredibly low, and in an unthought-of volume.

The policy of the German Government with regard to her waterways has been deliberately and clearly laid down in an official publication which appeared some time ago, and it is worth our while to carefully study and to bear in mind the principles which are guiding that industrially so exceedingly progressive country. We read :—

"Any means whereby the distances which separate the economic centres of the country from one another can be diminished, must be welcomed and be considered as a progress, for it increases our strength in our industrial competition with foreign countries. Every one who desires to send or to receive goods wishes for cheap freights. Hence the aim of a healthy transport policy should be to diminish as far as possible the economically unproductive costs of transport. A

country such as Germany, which is happy enough to produce on her own soil by far the larger part of the raw material and food which it requires, occupies the most independent and the most favourable position if, owing to cheap inland transportation, its economic centres are placed as near as possible to one another. When this has been achieved, Germany will be able to dispense with many foreign products, and it will occupy a position of superiority in comparison with all those States which do not possess similarly perfect means of transport.

"Many circumstances which in former times gave superiority to certain countries, such as the greater skill of their workmen, superior machinery, cheaper wages, greater natural fertility of the soil: all these advantages are gradually being levelled down by time and progress. *But what will remain is the advantage of a well-planned system of transportation which makes the best possible use of local resources and local advantages.*[1] It is to this that England owes to a large extent her unique position for commercial exchange with other countries."

These words are well worth reading, re-reading, and remembering. Our "unique position for commercial exchange," as the German document calls it, still remains, whilst our equally unique position for industrial pursuits has been spoilt and partly lost through the insufficiency, the inefficiency, and the expensiveness of British inland transport. It is for the nation and its Government to decide whether they will allow Great Britain's industrial supremacy, which nature has put into her reach, which she once possessed, which she has lost, and which is still within her grasp, to be finally lost or to be regained.

[1] The italics are in the German original.

Germany owes, no doubt, much of her industrial success, to her wise policy of protection. But with her protection is not merely a fiscal policy, but a general and comprehensive policy. Industrial protection is extended in that country to all productive interests alike, and harmonious co-operation, not ruthless and mutually destructive competition, which unfortunately means not only the destruction of competitors, but also the destruction of national resources, is her watch-word. Germany protects her population, not only against the tariff attacks of foreign nations from without, but also against the far more dangerous attacks upon their prosperity from within. Hence Germany protects and fosters her industries, not only by her tariff, but also by a practical national education, by equitable and cheap laws, and before all by the provision of adequate, efficient, and cheap means of transport.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE RAILWAYS AND THE RAILWAY POLICY OF GERMANY

AT the beginning of the railway era, Great Britain pursued a vigorous national policy, whilst the Governments of divided Germany were cosmopolitan in theory and parochial in practice; Great Britain was Protectionist, but Germany followed hazy ideas of Free Trade and Individualism; Great Britain was truly a United Kingdom, in Germany Particularism was *in excelsis*, and German unity existed only in the minds of some German idealists; Great Britain was progressive, active and hustling, whilst Germany was backward, conservative, impractical, and indolent. Industry in Germany was incredibly behindhand. The country was peopled by peasants and professors. Berlin had but 200,000 inhabitants, and large towns did not exist.

When in 1825 Great Britain opened the celebrated Stockton-Darlington Railway, and started railway building with the greatest energy, Germany philosophised, gazed, and wondered at the sudden outbreak of British industrial activity. Only ten years later, Germany timidly followed England's lead by opening, on the 7th December 1835, the Nuremberg-Fürth Railway, which, incredible as it may sound, was less than four miles in length. Only in 1838, when in this country already 540 miles of railway were opened to traffic, Prussia opened her first line

from Potsdam to Zehlendorf, which was about thirteen miles long, or exactly one-fortieth the length of the then existing British railways.

But in the same year which saw the birth of her first railway, Prussia passed a wise and far-seeing law, the law of the 3rd November 1838, by which the State gave the greatest liberty to enterprising individuals to construct railways, but which at the same time reserved to the State powers which insured an adequate control over the construction and the management of the railways and over the determination of fares, freight rates, &c. Furthermore, this law laid down the principle that the State should be entitled to take over private railways after thirty years at an exceedingly fair valuation based on the actual capital outlay, and provided that fares and freights had to be proportionately lowered whenever the net profit of railway companies should exceed 10 per cent. on the capital actually invested. Evidently great care was taken to safeguard Prussia's national interests and to protect them against being exploited by the railway companies. Although this law was exceedingly wise and marvellously far-seeing, it remained for a long time a dead letter, inasmuch as the State did not expropriate private railways with that energy that might have been expected; and the reason why the Government did, in the sixties, not act on those views on which the railway legislation of 1838 was based is not difficult to understand.

In the beginning of the railway era, the economic views of the German Government and of their officials were tinged by philosophy, philanthropy, and romanticising cosmopolitanism. They were guided rather by lofty, abstract principles, beautiful theories, and sentimental reasons than by practical, cold-blooded

business considerations. One hundred and fifty years ago, Voltaire had coined the witty phrase, "England rules the sea, France the land, Germany the clouds," and that saying still applied to Germany of eighty years ago. Germany was then a land of dreamers and visionaries. Hence the voice of that great economic reformer, Friedrich List, who so eloquently and so passionately pleaded for a "national" economic policy, was a voice crying in the wilderness. He was hounded out of Germany by the official advocates of official indolence and indifference, scientifically called "Non-interference," and, disappointed, abused, persecuted, and impoverished, he shot himself in 1846. Truly, no prophet is honoured in his own country during his lifetime; but now the nation has erected a monument to the man who is the intellectual originator of Bismarck's protective policy and of his railway policy.

List's *magnum opus*, "The National System of Political Economy," appeared only in 1840; but already in 1833, two years before the miniature railway from Nuremberg to Fürth was opened, that far-seeing man wrote, "On a Saxon Railway System as the basis of a German Railway System," and in 1838, the year when Prussia built her first railway, he published "The National Transport System." Evidently, List was greatly in advance of his time. Although his strenuous recommendations to organise railway transport and to develop industries in Germany on a national basis with the assistance of the State were little heeded by the doctrinaire politicians of his time, List had at least the satisfaction that, owing to his agitation, the Saxon Government assisted the building of the first Saxon railway from Leipzig to Dresden, which had the respectable length of

almost seventy miles, by a strange expedient. It allowed the railway to issue 500,000 thalers, or about £75,000, in bank-notes.

Railways were to Germany a British invention, and Germany imported with the invention not only British railway materials, locomotives, &c., but also the British idea that the State must by no means interfere with industrial freedom or engage in business pursuits of any kind. Guided by the axioms which were suggested to British professors of political economy by the late Mr. Cobden and his satellites, Brunswick, which in 1838 built the first State railway in Germany, the line Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, sold that line in 1869 to a private company, from which it was purchased by the Prussian State in 1880.

The railway systems of Great Britain and of Germany are fundamentally different. Whilst in this country all the railways are private companies and are privately managed and directed, with hardly any supervision on the part of the State, more than nine-tenths of the German railways are owned, managed, and directed by the various German Governments. Out of a total extent of 58,215 kilometres (the figures are those for 1909), 54,611 kilometres are State railways and only 3604 kilometres, or almost exactly one-sixteenth of the total mileage, are private railways. In Germany, as in this country, the railway interest, the majority of the professors of political economy, the Liberal Party, and a large proportion of the responsible officials were in favour of unrestricted private ownership, and to them Great Britain served as an ideal and a model. Hence it is worth while to take note of the weighty considerations which caused the German States to buy, at a gigantic figure and at more than their then market value, practically the

whole of the country's railways and to incur the enormous and onerous responsibilities of managing and extending them.

Up to the seventies the German States had not pursued a settled and well-planned railway policy, but had acted in accordance with the requirements of the moment. When private enterprise came forward, railways were built by limited companies; but in cases when important strategical or commercial railway lines were not undertaken by private builders, the government either assisted private companies or built the lines itself. In consequence of the different policies which had been followed in the different German States as regards railways, the organisation of Railway Germany was as confused as was the organisation of Political Germany. Consequently there was muddle, disorder, wastefulness, sloth, and injustice in matters of transport. Side by side existed independent private companies on the model of the English railways, private companies over which the State had some control, and railways which were run and completely controlled by the State. Freights were dear, rates were uncertain, railway business was exceedingly complicated and involved, and in many instances railway charges were fixed on the principle, "Charge what the traffic will bear." Where there was competition, freights were cheap; where there was no competition, the unfortunate people had to suffer at the hands of the railway tyrant, who demanded the uttermost farthing; where there were wars, or competition, between railway companies, direct travel and the speedy despatch of goods were often impeded by the trickery of the contending railways. Owing to the arbitrariness and the exactions of the railways, and the uncertainty of the constantly fluctuating

rates, which were capriciously fixed, business suffered as severely in Germany in the seventies as it does at present in Great Britain.

The year 1879 is a memorable one for Germany, inasmuch as it witnessed both the birth of Protection and the rise of the magnificent system of the German State Railways. Already in 1876 Bismarck had tried to initiate both these measures for developing the foreign trade of the country and for regulating its railway traffic. In the same year in which Prince Bismarck penned the sentence "*Nothing but reprisals*[1] against their products will avail against those States which increase their duties to the harm of German exports," and took steps to introduce a protective tariff against unfair or overpowerful foreign competition, he also tried to protect the German producer against the exactions of the German railway companies by proposing to transfer the railways of Germany from the hands of private owners and of the individual States to the hands of the German Empire. However, in 1876 both attempts failed. Germany was not yet ripe for Protection, and several of the minor States of Germany were naturally enough unwilling to hand over their railways to the Empire. When recommending the transfer of the railways of Germany to the Imperial Government, Bismarck said on the 26th of April 1876 :—

". . . Germany is divided into sixty-three railway provinces, or rather territories, which are endowed with all territorial and feudal rights and privileges, including the right of making war; and the railway boards avail themselves of these privileges, and even make war against one another, which cost much money, for the sake of power and as a kind of sport.

[1] The italics are in the German original.

"After my opinion, the railways are intended rather to serve the requirements of trade than to earn a profit for their owners. The profits which the individual States derive from the railways owned by them, or which are distributed to shareholders in the shape of dividends in the case of private companies, are rightly considered a national taxation which the State would be entitled to impose, but which is paid not to the State but to the shareholders in private concerns. It should be our aim to see that that taxation is not oppressive, but that it stands in due relation to the requirements and the means of the railway users, that it is financially just. . . ."

On the 1st of January Bismarck issued the following interesting opinion as to the right of the State to withdraw the privileges which it had previously granted to the private railway companies. In regard to this question, Bismarck wrote :—

"Railways were meant to be, and are, instruments for conveying the national traffic, and they were given their far-reaching privileges and they were constructed in order to serve the public and general interest. Therefore their character as profit-earning instruments may be taken into consideration only in so far as that character is compatible with the general welfare, which has to be considered first and foremost. Hence the right of constructing and exploiting railways can be considered only as temporary, and their eventual purchase by the Government is a matter of course."

In the same year Bismarck issued an interesting document in which he summed up the evils caused by the private ownership of railways, as follows :—

1. Unnecessarily high working expenses and correspondingly high charges in consequence of the multi-

plicity of railway boards, managers, offices, and the unnecessary duplication of lines, stations, material, rolling stock, &c.

2. Chaos of freight charges, there being 1400 different tariffs which are constantly changing, which are unclear, and which make trade an uncertain and speculative venture.

3. Because direct travel of passengers and goods over the whole railway system of the country is often impeded with the object of harming competing railway systems, and consequently much damage is done to trade and industry.

The steps which Bismarck took in 1876 in order to introduce Protection and to bring the German railways under the direct and absolute control of the Imperial Government were somewhat half-hearted, and they were probably meant to be merely preparatory; but in 1879 Bismarck opened his campaign in favour of Protection and for the acquisition of the Prussian railways by the Prussian State in real earnest and with his usual skill and energy. But his was not an easy fight. It was a very difficult matter to make these two enormous measures acceptable to the Governments of the individual States and to a majority in the German Parliament, but his powerful arguments proved convincing both to the high officials of the allied States and to the elected representatives of the people. Therefore it is worth while to take note of Bismarck's principal arguments in favour of his anti-individualistic policy; for in that year Germany broke for good with British traditions, refused to follow any longer the example of England, and resolved to seek salvation in an economic policy which was diametrically opposed to that which had been pursued by this country, and which was extolled to the skies

by the German professors and the German Liberal Party.

Bismarck opened his railway campaign by writing on the 3rd of January the following letter to Messrs. Hofmann, Friedenthal, and Maybach, who were the Prussian Ministers for trade, home affairs, and railways :—

"I intend to raise the question whether it be not necessary to regulate the railway tariffs by imperial law. . . . The fact that such far-reaching public interests as the transport business of railways is left to private companies and to individual railway boards which are free from any supervision by the State, and the fact that these companies are entitled to make their own interest their sole guide, finds no analogy in the economic history of modern times except in the way in which formerly a country's finances were farmed out to certain individuals. In view of this fact, I intend, after due investigation, to bring forward the question whether it is not possible to introduce, by means of imperial legislation, a uniform tariff on all the railways of Germany."

After having thus prepared his colleagues, he addressed a very long letter to the German States, represented by the German Federal Council, of which the following abstract gives the chief points of interest to the English reader :—

"The regulation of freights on railways, which are public roads, is of far-reaching importance for the economic interests of the nation, and nobody must be damaged or be artificially limited in their use. The Government will no longer be able to abstain from promoting the public interest by creating those conditions which are necessary for the requirements of our national industries. The railways are public roads

for traffic, but can be used only by one corporation. By granting to these corporations certain privileges, such as that of expropriation, of police and of raising capital, the State has ceded to the railways part of its power. This part of its power was ceded to the railways not in the interest of the proprietors of the railways, but in that of the general public. Therefore it follows that the management of a railway cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the railway companies themselves. Their management must be regulated in accordance with the requirements of the public and with an eye to the public welfare.

"Therefore it follows that railway charges must not be fixed solely in order to obtain the largest possible profit. The State must not only consider the interest of the shareholders in determining railway freights, but it has also to see that the well-being of the population as a whole is fostered and promoted, and that thus the vitality of the nation will be strengthened.

"At any rate it means a damage to the interest of the community if a railway corporation takes no notice of these larger considerations. Hence the arguments which can be raised against the system of private railways as such are strengthened. Railways must not be allowed, by arbitrarily fixed tariffs, to develop industries in certain parts and to destroy other industries in other parts of the country. Even the most far-seeing railway directors cannot realise the consequences which a policy of discriminating tariffs may have later on, although such a policy may prove beneficial in the immediate future, and several railway boards have already begun to understand that it is not their vocation to act the part of Providence, to alter the natural conditions of demand and

supply, and to dominate trade and industry, but that it is their duty to serve them.

"Starting from these considerations, it is clear that railway tariffs should correspond with the requirements of production and consumption, and should not be subject to violent fluctuation. They should, therefore—

1. Be clear, and be drawn up in such a manner as to enable everybody to easily calculate the freight for goods sent.

2. They should secure to all citizens in all parts of the country equality of railway charges.

3. They should eliminate the disadvantages which at present weigh down the small producers.

4. They should secure the abolishment of unnecessary, and therefore wasteful, services, and insure the honesty of railway officials.

"These requirements are not fulfilled by the present tariff system."

After describing in detail the vast number of different tariffs and the confusion and injustice resulting from them, as well as the impossibility for traders to make a clear business calculation of railway charges, Prince Bismarck continues :—

"Preferential tariffs are an injustice by the damage they do to those who are not preferentially treated, and the tendency of railways to differentiate not only locally but also to give cheaper freight to senders of large quantities may damage the national prosperity to a very great extent. In order to secure large masses of goods, railways will go down below their normal rates, and will even work without a profit, and will thus favour the foreign producer at the cost of our home industries.

"The railways which have received from the State the monopoly of public transportation have the duty

to treat all railway users alike; but differential tariffs of this kind destroy the equal rights which all citizens should enjoy. Through the changes effected by the tariffs, the economic interests of the country become dependent upon the railway companies, and our home industries, and the possibilities which they have for selling their products, are subjected to constant changes which cannot take place without inflicting great damage upon individual interests.

"Those who argue that competition among railways cheapens freights overlook the fact that railways recoup themselves for their loss on competitive traffic by charging proportionately higher rates on non-competitive traffic; and as railway competition brings cheap freights principally to the largest towns, railway competition leads to an unhealthy centralisation of trade and industry which economically and politically gives cause for concern.

"In order to avoid mutually ruinous competition, railways frequently combine and agree to direct the flow of traffic in certain fixed proportions over the various lines belonging to the combine. Hence goods are diverted from the shortest and most natural route and travel over artificially arranged roundabout routes, a proceeding which is opposed to the rational and economical despatch of goods, and which increases the costs of transport.

"These unnatural conditions would be abolished if the railways were obliged to charge standard rates and to send freight on normal routes, if unnecessary competition was abolished, and if the artificially diverted streams of traffic would again be brought back to their natural routes.

"The foregoing statement shows that an improvement can only be effected by insisting upon the prin-

ciple that the railways are meant for the service of the nation. In railway matters changes are taking place which have already been observed in the general development of nations. New economic factors have arisen, and have grown up without State interference, but soon the interest in these institutions has become so great and so general that their further direction can no longer safely be left to the egotism and arbitrariness of irresponsible individuals, but must be brought into harmony with the general interests of the country."

Addressing Parliament, Prince Bismarck said :—

". . . Did formerly anybody trouble whether the introduction of railways ruined the coaching industry and the innkeeper? The railway monopoly is to my mind far more unjust than was that of the coaching industry, for the railway monopoly actually means the farming out of a province to a railway company. This monopoly arose naturally when all other means of transport had been killed by the railways. Every one who had goods to send or to receive fell into the hands of the railways, and these acted in exactly the same manner as did the Fermiers Généraux who impoverished France before the Revolution, for they also were given a large part of the country, and were allowed to exploit it at their will. The object of the railways is to squeeze out of the country the largest possible dividends. This is an extraordinary abuse of the tax-paying and traffic-requiring community which favours those capitalists who were given the traffic monopoly that accrued to the railways. . . ."

Following the lead given by his great chief, the Minister of Railways, Maybach, declared on the 8th of November 1879, before Parliament :—

". . . As regards the tariff policy of railways, I am

of opinion that railway charges should be fixed in accordance with the requirements of the country; and if it be necessary to give the second place either to the national interest or to the railway interest, I am inclined to give the second place to the railway interest. The system of private railways has been imported from England, but it does not suit Prussia. Prussia requires State railways. It is our aim to take the railways out of the hands of speculators, and to make them truly national for the defence of the country and for the development of its prosperity."

Privately Bismarck remarked, in 1879, that it would be his ideal that all goods imported from abroad should be transported over the German railways at somewhat higher rates than those of home production; for he could not allow that the moderate fiscal Protection which he had introduced in 1879 should be neutralised by preferential freight rates given to the foreigner. As a matter-of-fact, he expected that the preferential tariffs given on the German railways for German industrial and agricultural products would be more effective in protecting the home industries, and increasing their strength and prosperity, than would be the moderate fiscal Protection which he had introduced.

When the foregoing weighty arguments had prepared the ground, a Bill for taking over the railways possessed by private companies was brought out on the 29th of October 1879, and the Mémoire accompanying it laid down the following general principles, which may, in time, be adopted by the whole world, including individualistic Great Britain and the United States, unless indeed railways should be superseded by some superior means of transport and locomotion:—

"Among the various forms in which railways have been developed in civilised countries, the system of State railways pure and simple is the only one which is able to fulfil in the most satisfactory manner all the tasks of a national railway policy, by creating uniformity throughout the country and equality for all, and by promoting equally the welfare of all interested in railways. Only in the case of State railways is it possible to utilise to the full and in the most thorough manner the enormous capital invested in railways; only in the case of State railways is it possible to give direct and effective protection to the public interest which is the Government's duty; lastly only in the case of State railways is it possible to establish a simple, cheap, and rational railway tariff, to effectually suppress harmful differentiation, and to create a just, diligent, and able administration which is solely guided by considerations of the general good. Therefore the State railway system must be considered as the final development in the evolution of the railway system."

Most people think that Bismarck's greatest work was political; but although the elevation of Prussia and the unification of Germany were marvellous achievements, they were, after all, only of a circumscribed importance, and were devoid of originality in their essential points. But, in his economic policy, he left altogether the traditional course which statesmen had followed hitherto. With marvellous boldness he broke with the doctrines of Free Trade, non-Interference, and Individualism, which were almost universally accepted in his time; deliberately returned to the economic policy of Oliver Cromwell and Colbert; and revived, or rather re-created, the mercantile system, to the horror of all professors of political

economy. It may sound incredible, but it is nevertheless true, that the world is gradually going back to the Mercantile system, owing to Bismarck's economic reform of 1879, notwithstanding the fact that the professors of political economy have not yet discovered this curious but most important phenomenon. Otherwise, they would study that much calumniated and much maligned system, under which the political and mercantile greatness of England was built up, instead of continuing to spin out unprofitable theories.

According to the economic theories which still enjoy the greatest prestige in this country, State interference in economics is sheer heresy, and a sure road to national ruin, and the text-books prove that a State or municipal corporation is, *per se*, not fit to engage in industrial pursuits. However, it does not necessarily follow that all governmental and municipal enterprise in matters economic is found to be a failure, because our Government departments and municipalities which engage in industrial pursuits are usually red-tape bound, amateurish, ignorant of business, wasteful, improvident, and incapable. If we look carefully into the record of the German State Railways, and see what they have done for Germany's trade, industries, and finance, and for the people at large, and then look into the records of our own private railways, in which individual initiative has had almost unlimited scope, we shall see an astonishing difference, which appears not to be in favour of our own railways, as the following will prove.

Immediately after 1879, Prussia rapidly bought up all the more important lines, and within a few years the State more than trebled its railway property, as is apparent from the ensuing table.

MILEAGE OF RAILWAYS OF PRUSSIA

	State Railways	*Private Railways*	*Total*
1879 . .	6,323.6 kils.	13,650.1 kils.	19,973.7 kils.
1880 . .	11,455.3 „	8,893.1 „	20,348.4 „
1881 . .	11,584.6 „	9,159.2 „	20,743.8 „
1882 . .	14,825.6 „	6,329.8 „	21,155.4 „
1883 . .	15,301.1 „	6,604.2 „	21,905.3 „
1884 . .	19,766.9 „	3,002.6 „	22,769.5 „
1885 . .	21,138.4 „	2,496.6 „	23,635.0 „

From the foregoing figures we see that the State turned in five years from a small railway manager and owner to a railway monopolist. As a rule, the State as a monopolist is unprogressive and unenterprising—*vide* our own Post-Office. But the Prussian Government did not go to sleep once it had acquired the railways. On the contrary, it extended them most energetically, as the following figures prove :—

MILEAGE OF PRUSSIAN STATE RAILWAYS

1885	21,138 kils.
1895–96	25,214 „
1900	27,513 „
1909	33,217 „

If we now compare the growth of all the German railways since 1886, when the State possessed, practically, the railway monopoly, with the growth of the British railways during the same time, we arrive at the following remarkable results :—

	German Railways		*British Railways*
1880 . . .	33,411 kilometres		17,933 miles
1908 . . .	57,125 „		23,205 „
Increase	23,714 kilometres	Increase	5272 miles
„	70 per cent.	„	29 per cent.

These figures show that the German railways have, under State ownership, grown more than twice as quickly as have those of Great Britain under private ownership. It might, of course, be objected that in densely populated Great Britain there was no more room for the extension of railways. But that argument should be used with caution, for we find that Germany has now about six thousand miles more railways than has Great Britain, and, according to the German statistics, there are now 9.9 kilometres of railway per ten thousand inhabitants in Germany, whilst there are only 9.0 kilometres of railway per ten thousand inhabitants in this country. Measured in proportion to the population, the railway net of Germany is now 10 per cent. denser than that of Great Britain.

This country possesses also no longer the densest railway net in proportion to its size, as it did during the time when Great Britain was the first industrial country, as the following figures prove. They are taken from the *Archiv. für Eisenbahnwesen*, a publication which is issued by the Prussian Ministry for Public Works (Railways), and which can be relied upon for accuracy. According to this periodical, the railways of almost purely industrial Great Britain compared [1] as follows with the railways of Belgium and of the industrial States of Germany in 1909 :—

Belgium . . .	28.1 kils.	of railway	per 100 sq. kils.
Saxony . . .	21.0	,,	,,	,,
Baden . . .	14.7	,,	,,	,,
Alsace-Lorraine .	14.1	,,	,,	,,
Great Britain .	11.9	,,	,,	,,

[1] A comparison of Great Britain with Belgium, Saxony, Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine may appear at first sight unfair, because of the sterile highlands of Scotland and the bogs of Ireland. But the proportion of waste land in Great Britain is almost exactly the same as that of forests in those countries.

The activity and progressiveness of a railway system is apparent not only in its length and extension, but also in its equipment. The magnificent palatial railway stations of Germany, which form such a strange contrast with the mean, dirty, and cramped railway stations of this country, are well known. But it is not so well known how rapidly the rolling-stock on these lines has increased since the year when almost the whole of them were brought into the possession of the State. Therefore the following Prussian Railway figures may be of interest :—

	Locomotives	*Passenger Cars*	*Freight and Luggage Cars*
1879	7,152	10,828	148,491
1884–5 . . .	8,367	13,063	174,157
1889–90 . . .	9,425	15,177	194,705
1894–5 . . .	10,991	18,391	231,266
1900–1 . . .	13,267	24,225	303,364
1907	17,177	32,755	377,549
1909	19,171	37,243	411,945

During the thirty years following the creation of the State railways, the rolling-stock of the country has practically trebled. Improved material has been introduced everywhere; travelling has become infinitely more safe, more comfortable, and more rapid on the State railways than it ever was on the old private lines, and owing to the introduction of more powerful engines, larger freight cars, &c., haulage has become far more economical and efficient. Goods trains in Germany convey, as a rule, more than twice the weight which they carry in this country; but an exact comparison cannot be made, because our railways do not publish ton-mile statistics, which would glaringly show up their inefficiency. Whilst the most common truck in Great Britain holds about eight tons, that

In Belgium 17.7 per cent. of the whole territory is covered with forests, in Saxony 25.8 per cent., in Baden 37.7 per cent., and in Alsace-Lorraine 30.3 per cent. Besides Belgium, Saxony, Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine are on an average more mountainous than is Great Britain.

mostly used in Germany carries fifteen tons. Therefore the German goods trains haul a smaller dead-weight, and are therefore much more economical than are English toy trains pulled by toy engines, and composed of insufficiently loaded toy trucks.

How marvellously the freight and passenger business on the German railways has expanded since they came into the possession of the State may be seen from the following statistics, which show that, whilst the mileage of the Prussian State railways has grown since 1879 by 70 per cent., and whilst the rolling-stock has been almost trebled, passenger and freight traffics have quadrupled and quintupled :—

	Passenger, Kilometres	*Ton, Kilometres*
1879 . . .	3,797,172,000	8,644,625,000
1884–5 . .	5,083,700,000	12,414,712,000
1889–90 . .	6,903,526,000	16,142,648,000
1894–5 . .	8,763,723,000	18,162,727,000
1900 . . .	14,310,204,000	27,434,536,000
1908 . . .	21,331,413,729	38,187,612,343

Although the wages of the German railway servants have considerably risen all round, and although, at the same time, freight and passenger charges have been lowered all round, as will be seen in the course of this chapter, the financial result of the State railways has become more satisfactory from year to year, largely owing to good management. The following have been the profits earned on the total capital of all the railways of Prussia :—

1869	6.5	per cent.
1874	4.4	,,
1879	4.9	,,
1884–5	4.9	,,
1889–90	6.2	,,
1894–5	5.6	,,
1900	7.0	,,
1905	7.4	,,
1908	6.3	,,

Under private management the railway profits were stagnant, or rather retrogressive, but they became rapidly progressive after the railways had in 1879 been taken over by the State. A profit of 6 to 7 per cent. on the whole railway capital is a result of which an English railway director might perhaps dream, but would not think, for the net receipts of all the British railways have fluctuated for so many years between 3 and 4 per cent. that 4 per cent. appears now an ideally high return on the total British railway capital. As Prussia borrowed the money with which she bought the railways by means of loans, returning about $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the State makes every year on its railways an immense profit, which flows into its exchequer. Prussia has a State debt of £438,507,000, and the net earnings of the State railways for 1908 not only sufficed for making the necessary provisions for the interest on the whole of the National Debt, and for its redemption, but left over and above that sum a clear balance to the State of £13,500,000, which went to the relief of taxation.

The railway-using public, in the whole world, desires chiefly that the conveyance of passengers and goods should be quick, convenient, punctual, equitable, and cheap. These five requirements are well fulfilled by the German State railways. Although a few show trains on British lines are still faster than are the show trains on German lines, the average speed of passenger trains is, according to a high German authority, considerably greater in Germany than it is in Great Britain. The German lines are no doubt more convenient than our own lines, owing to the unity and uniformity of their traffic arrangements, trains, time-tables, &c. Tickets issued from one town to another are, as a rule, available on the different

lines connecting the two towns, and if a traveller should choose another way, he will not be told "Your ticket is not available on this line," for the German railways are, for all practical purposes, one line.

In Great Britain it requires years of travel and of careful observation to learn one's way across the country, and its numerous lines, and to avoid the many pitfalls which are everywhere placed in the way of the inexperienced traveller. In Germany, such pitfalls do not exist, and the greatest simpleton will travel as cheaply, as comfortably, and as rapidly all over the country as will the most cunning commercial traveller. On many British lines, and especially on those south of London, trains appear to be late on principle. In Germany, railway trains arrive, in nineteen times out of twenty, to the minute, because the Government punishes severely those who are responsible for delay.

On British railways people are not equitably and not equally treated. Those individuals who can "influence freight," such as buyers for wholesale firms, &c., are often able to extort free tickets and even free passes over certain railways, and the amount of freight charged is largely a matter of negotiation and of influence. The British merchant cannot tell beforehand what the freight will come to unless he inquires previously at the railway. The British railways charge on freight "what the traffic will bear"—that is to say, they put on the screw till the victim shrieks or goes bankrupt. Our railways are, no doubt, to a great extent guilty of the ruin of our agriculture and the decay of our manufactures and industries, owing to the freight policy which they pursue. A reliable guide to the freight charges does not exist in this country, and it could not be compiled, for the

freight charges per mile, for the identical goods and even on the same line, vary in almost every town. Therefore a complete freight tariff for Great Britain would probably be bulkier than the "Encyclopædia Britannica." Besides, freights fluctuate constantly. Consequently, the British trader who has to send goods by railway works in absolute uncertainty, and when he sends his goods, carriage forward, the chance is that the railway company levies an extortionate toll at the other end, and the trader loses his customer. This is particularly often the case when goods are sent abroad, for the foreign customer believes himself to be swindled when seeing the high railway charge, or he feels at least aggrieved, and feels inclined to give his business to a German exporter, whose freight charge is moderate and not a matter of speculation.

In practice the British railways squeeze out their charges on a system, but it is an atrocious system, which nobody, railway managers included, knows or can understand. The nearest analogy to the "system" on which railway charges are made in Great Britain may be found in the system of Likin charges which are imposed in China by the local mandarins on goods passing through territory under their jurisdiction. Likin also is levied on the mediæval principle "Charge what the traffic will bear." The British Government has pressed energetically and repeatedly for a uniform Likin charge on transit throughout China. It has represented to the Chinese Government that the advantages of such an enlightened measure would be enormous for the whole country. But the same British Government has not yet tried to enforce a uniform railway freight tariff in Great Britain. As regards China, votes need not be considered, whilst the British railway interest, unfortunately for the

country, sends some sixty directors into Parliament. Therefore, the *Railway News* wrote, after a General Election, on the 20th October 1900, of the sixty-six railway directors and five railway contractors, who were returned, that "these might be expected to support proposals beneficial and to oppose those detrimental to railway enterprise." This result is, no doubt, very satisfactory from the railway point of view; but it is, unfortunately, deplorable from the national point of view. This is one of the reasons why, in this country, trade and industries are subservient and in vassalage to the railways, and why agriculture is groaning under railway tyranny, whilst in Germany the railways have to be subservient to the productive interests of the nation.

The German State railways have largely contributed to the prosperity of the German industries, the British railways have largely contributed to the decay of the British industries. In Germany trade policy is made by the trade; in Great Britain it is made by the railways, which, without consulting the trade, prescribes its course, stimulating it here and stifling it there. But the greatest injustice under which the British producer suffers is that the British railways are allowed to convey foreign produce more cheaply than they carry British produce, whereby they directly subsidise the foreigner to the harm of the native producer. They purposely support foreign industries on the broad principle, "On British produce we charge what we can, on foreign produce what we may; British produce has to come to us, foreign produce has to be attracted." Unfortunately, redress for those who are injured by this nefarious policy is very difficult, very costly, and almost impossible, in view of the secrecy of railway charges.

In Germany such outrageous conduct would be impossible, even on the part of the few private railways still existing.

The German freight tariff is of beautiful simplicity. The freight charges are uniform throughout the country, and are fixed at an invariable amount per ton per mile. There are only a few classes of goods, and every trader possesses a little book by means of which the office-boy can calculate in a moment the exact amount of the freight charges for any weight between any two stations. Freight charges in Germany are as uniform, as generally known, and as simple as are our own postal charges on letters, post-cards, and printed matter. Freight charges in Germany are not determined by negotiation, or by influence, and the goods of the foreigner which compete with German goods are not carried at a lower, but at a higher, rate than the native produce. But foreign raw material is carried cheaply, and thus Bismarck's ideal, which was mentioned in the foregoing, is fulfilled.

Whilst in this country the railways raise fares and freights at every opportunity, the fares and freight charges of the German State railways are steadily going down, as the following figures show:—

RECEIPTS OF THE GERMAN RAILWAYS (per ton, kilometre)

	Goods by fast train	*Goods by ordinary train*
	pfennigs	*pfennigs*
1893 . . .	24.47	3.79
1896 . . .	24.09	3.79
1899 . . .	21.75	3.57
1902 . . .	17.01	3.52
1909 . . .	16.52	3.51

If we now look into the earnings of the German

railways on their passenger traffic, we find the following figures, which also show a decrease of charges :—

RECEIPTS OF THE GERMAN RAILWAYS (per passenger, kilometre)

	1st Class	2nd Class	3rd Class	4th Class
	pfennigs	*pfennigs*	*pfennigs*	*pfennigs*
1893 . . .	7.87	4.96	2.94	1.99
1896 . . .	7.94	4.71	2.76	1.98
1899 . . .	7.75	4.66	2.69	1.96
1902 . . .	7.33	4.48	2.67	1.89
1909 . . .	7.48	4.06	2.54	1.85

In Great Britain the maximum charge for third class travelling is 1d. per mile, and a glance at any railway guide, such as the A, B, C Guide, will show that the British railways charge, in nine cases out of ten, the full maximum rate. In Germany, the lowest class is the fourth class, where the average charge is ⅜d. per mile, whilst the charge for third class is about ½d. per mile. It is also worth noting that in Germany, travelling first class is comparatively very much dearer than it is in England. On an average, it costs in that country about three times more to travel first class than third class, and about four times more than it costs to travel fourth class. But in Great Britain, travelling first class usually is only about twice as dear as it is to travel third class. In Germany, the poor man travels cheaply, whilst in England the rich man travels cheaply.

Unfortunately, the German statistics of passenger charges and freight charges per mile cannot be compared with similar British statistics, because comprehensive British statistics are not issued by the British railway companies, for reasons best known to themselves. The British railways publish neither these statistics, nor their freight charges, which are

of the greatest interest to the public, exactly as the Chinese mandarins are not so stupid as to publish their Likin charges in the seaports. They also do not care to frighten customers away by publishing their extortionate charges, and they dread, besides, exposure and impeachment in Pekin by the Board of Censors. More than twenty years ago, in 1884, Sir Henry Calcraft and Sir Robert Giffen, who were then assistant secretaries for the Railway and Statistical Departments, regretted that "It is impossible to show what is the receipt per ton per mile." And in 1886 Mr. J. S. Jeans read a paper on Railway Traffic before the Statistical Society, in which he said :—

"The average transport charges may be ascertained for every European country except our own, as regards both goods and passenger traffic. In Great Britain the railways, whether by accident or by design, have hitherto contrived to make it impossible for the public to discover the average charges for the transport of either the one or the other, for any one railway or for the country as a whole."

Since then the demand has frequently been raised by the public that the railways should publish their charges and their earnings per mile per ton, and per mile per passenger, &c. But although our railways have, through their various advocates in the press, written and argued a great deal, they continue to work in that congenial obscurity which they find, apparently, most conducive to the conduct of their business.

The German States pursue a truly national railway policy. Railways are built where they are wanted by the population or by the State, even if they do not pay; for the German State monopolist considers himself as the servant of the nation and as the trustee of its interests, and not the nation as the

milch-cow of the railway department. Hence, the German States have encouraged the building of canals in every way, and the tolls charged for their use are so low that the Government loses about a million pounds per annum on its canals. Again the German Government has in no way interfered with the building of electrical trams, whilst the railways in the classical country of Freedom and Non-interference have nefariously closed the canals and obstructed the building of electrical tramways, in order to deprive trade which wished to escape strangulation of an alternative outlet. For exactly the same reasons the Likin-imposing mandarins of China offer the most determined opposition to the building of railways, although they pretend that this opposition springs from the fear that the ashes of their ancestors might be disturbed.

The hostility of our railways to the canals is largely responsible for the fact that Germany has an excellent net of canals, whilst the canals of this country are beneath contempt, and that Germany had, in 1899, more than 2000 miles of electric tramways, whilst Great Britain had only about 500 miles. In the beginning of the railway era, Germany began to experiment in railways after they had been established ten years in this country. Now the position has been reversed. Great Britain began to experiment with electrical traction ten years after it had been established in Germany, to the great amusement of German engineers. Incidentally, it might be mentioned that the first electrical locomotive was exhibited in Berlin as early as 1879, and that on the Government subsidised experimental railway, Berlin-Zossen, an electrical railway train achieved a speed of about 130 miles per hour.

Although the British railways are no longer leading in enterprise, they are in another respect still absolutely paramount. With the same energy and perseverance with which Germany has increased and improved her railways, the British railways have piled up indebtedness in their capital account. Therefore they are, as regards so-called capital cost, the foremost in the world, as the following figures show, which are taken from the *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*.

CAPITAL COST OF RAILWAYS (end of 1907)

1. Great Britain	Marks	696,100	per kilometre
2. Belgium	,,	456,400	,,
3. France	,,	357,100	,,
4. Germany	,,	297,500	,,
5. Austria	,,	264,000	,,
6. Switzerland	,,	263,100	,,
7. Hungary	,,	258,700	,,
8. Norway	,,	194,000	,,

If we compare the capital of the German and the British railways, we find that the British railway capital per mile is almost two-and-a-half times as large as is the German railway capital. Consequently, if efficiency and expenses be equally great on German and on British railways, our railways must earn two-and-a-half times more on their traffic than do the German railways, in order to pay the same dividend on their capital. The inflated capital of the British railways hangs like a millstone round their necks, and here we have one of the chief reasons why fares and freights are high in this country and low in Germany, and why railway profits are large in Germany and small in Great Britain.

British railway capital was not always as un-

wieldy as it is now, but has gradually become so, as the following figures prove :—

CAPITAL OF BRITISH RAILWAYS

	Miles of Railway Open	*Total Capital*	*Capital per Mile*
1861 . . .	10,865	£362,327,000	£33,335
1871 . . .	15,367	552,680,000	35,944
1881 . . .	18,175	745,528,000	41,019
1891 . . .	20,191	919,425,000	45,542
1901 . . .	22,078	1,195,564,000	54,152
1910 . . .	23,387	1,318,500,000	56,377

The British railways have been, and are still, piling up capital indebtedness merrily until the day of reckoning, which assuredly will come, and then lost capital may have to be written off by hundreds of millions. No doubt a large part of this colossal sum of now about £60,000 per mile has been spent properly, but perhaps an equally large part represents promoter's plunder, water, and, before all, "improvements." Our railways make it a rule when effecting necessary renewals, repairs, improvements, &c., to charge these whenever possible to capital account, and thus increase their indebtedness, instead of paying for these out of current earnings. In other words, they declare their property improved in value by the amounts spent on necessary repairs, renewals, and improvements. On the same principle, a man might claim that his boots are worth sixty shillings because he originally paid thirty shillings for them, and paid since then another thirty shillings on repairs. Unfortunately, there are some political economists and politicians in this country who consider it a matter of congratulation that the railways owe more than £1,300,000,000 to the public, although they are worth, probably, only half that sum, especially as nothing lasts for ever, even British railways. Mail coaches

have been superseded by railways, and railways may be superseded by some other form of locomotion and transport.

The German State railways have pursued a more conservative financial policy than our own railways, especially since they came under State control, as the following table clearly shows. When they were in private hands, they also increased their capital year by year, though their financial excesses were comparatively small.

CAPITAL OF GERMAN RAILWAYS

1871 . . .	Marks 220,300	per kilometre
1873 . . .	,, 242,300	,,
1875 . . .	,, 249,200	,,
1877–8 . .	,, 265,000	,,
1882–3 . .	,, 265,400	,,
1887–8 . .	,, 255,100	,,
1892–3 . .	,, 253,200	,,
1902 . . .	,, 258,800	,,
1909 . . .	,, 288,700	,,

Up to 1878 the German railway capital per kilometre increased rapidly, but since 1877–78 it has kept almost unchanged, notwithstanding the enormous extensions and far-reaching improvements which have been effected since then. During the same period, when the capital of the German railways per kilometre has scarcely changed, the capital of the British railways has been increased by about £15,000 per mile, or by an amount approaching the total cost of the German railways. Comment on these figures seems superfluous. The British railways claim that their capital per mile has so enormously been increased during the last twenty years on account of the vast improvements and extensions which they have effected; but similar improvements and

extensions have been made by the German State railways, but they have chiefly been paid for out of earnings. The German railways were anxious to keep their capital within reasonable bounds, and not to put on their railway property a fictitious, inflated value, especially in view of the possibility that railways may become superseded or may become unremunerative.

The British railways were heavily handicapped from the beginning by the extortions of the landowner, the promoter, and the lawyer. The German railways also suffered at the promoter's hands, but they got their ground cheaply. Of the Prussian railway capital only 9.87 per cent. was spent on account of land. Hence, land accounts on an average for a capital outlay of only about £2000 per mile on the German railways, whilst the British railways bought land at fancy prices. The law expenses also were low in Germany, whilst they were extortionate in this country. The law costs in respect of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway are said to have come to £4806 per mile, and those of the Manchester-Birmingham Railway to £5190 per mile. Apparently, it has often cost British railways much more money to acquire their title than it has cost German railways to acquire their land. These are some of the disadvantages of unrestrained individualism, which is favoured by the policy of *laissez-faire*. *Laissez-faire* means, unfortunately, only too often, *laissez-méfaire*.

The foregoing facts and figures clearly prove the wisdom of Bismarck's policy and the immense superiority of the German State-owned railways over the British private railways. But it would be rash to conclude from the marvellous success of Bismarck's

gigantic experiment in State Socialism that State railways would prove a blessing to this country as well. Germany has in its officials a splendid instrument for administration, and in that country bureaucracy works on business lines, especially with regard to railways, the post-office, telegraph, and telephones. A similarly efficient instrument of administration, unhappily, does not exist in this country, where the art of administration has as yet hardly been discovered, and where administrative organisation is rudimentary and centuries behind the times.

A British Government department consists of a host of irresponsible officials, without authority, directed by a nominally responsible amateur, without experience. And this responsible ignoramus is given the highest post in the administration, not because of his proved ability or latent talent as an administrator, but either because of his skill as a debater or because of his social influence and wealth. That bureaucratic irresponsibility presided over by well-meaning, responsible ignorance, does not make for administrative efficiency, can hardly be wondered at. For these reasons, our Government departments will continue inefficient, improvident, unbusinesslike, and wasteful in all matters of administration, until the whole administrative machinery of the country is put on a totally different basis. For these reasons State purchase of the British railways is out of the question, for they would, no doubt, be worse managed by the State than they are by the companies.

What the State can do, and what the State ought to do, is far simpler and far easier to effect than taking over and managing our railways. The State should, in the first place, restrict further capital issues for improvements, renewals, and repairs on the part of

the railway companies. Then, it should insist on a clear tariff for the conveyance of goods and passengers, based on uniform charges per mile throughout the country, and should make discrimination in freight rates by any means whatsoever an offence punishable with so enormous a fine (say, £1000 in each case), of which one half should go to the informant, that preferential treatment meted out to a favoured few or to the foreigner would be extinguished for all time. Tickets on different lines should be made interchangeable. The publication of the statistical and other information, which can be obtained from the railways of all civilised countries excepting Great Britain, should be made compulsory. Lastly, a Government department should be created for the supreme control of all traffic by rail, canal, and sea, and legal arrangements should be made in order to facilitate and to cheapen the prosecution of railway companies by aggrieved railway users. At present, it is almost impossible to hold a railway company liable for the damage which they do in forwarding goods, &c.

Such a policy should be immensely popular with the whole nation, including railway stockholders, for they also are railway users. Besides, with fair rates and no favour, the prosperity of our declining industries should rapidly return, and the industrial revival which may be expected should more than recoup the railway companies for any temporary loss which may arise to them when they are compelled to abandon their present unfair and anti-national policy. Nevertheless, they will raise an outcry, protest against coercion, and will speak of their rights; but then they will have to be told that an intolerable wrong, which has gradually grown up, and which has been borne for a long time, does not become a right, that

the railways exist for the benefit of the country, and not the country for the benefit of the railways.

However, the State should not only restrain and punish, but also encourage and assist, the railway companies, and it can do so at small expense. If there was a compact permanent commission, composed of practical business men and engineers, presided over by a junior statesman, enormous savings might be effected on our wasteful railways by the suggestions and mediation of such a body. British railways can, in view of their bloated capital, find salvation only in combination and economy. If a combined effort was made by the British railways and real, not apparent, unity of purpose was secured among them by means of a connecting and impartial central body, a huge number of duplicate stations, receiving offices, warehouses, bureaus, &c., might be abandoned, a vast number of competitive trains might be dropped, technical improvements could be introduced more easily, the science of economic transport could be better developed, and purchases could more cheaply be effected by "The United Railways of Great Britain" than by individual companies. Lastly, improvements and inventions, &c., made by one road might be made to benefit all the rest, and all the railways of Great Britain might be made to assist one another, whereas, now they only hamper one another and damage one another, though outwardly they appear to be on good terms.

During the last few decades, British statesmen have frequently uttered beautiful sentiments with regard to our railways and our industries, but they have done nothing practical, in order to open new outlets to our trade or to improve the old ones.

Three hundred years ago, Lord Bacon wrote:

"There are three things which make a nation great and prosperous: a fertile soil, busy workshops, and easy conveyance for men and commodities from one place to another." Great Britain possesses, perhaps, the most fertile soil in Northern Europe, yet her agriculture has decayed; she has the most industrious and the most energetic working men, yet our manufacturing industries are visibly declining. Unless the avenues of trade are again opened wide, neither our fertile soil, nor our willing population, nor our vast natural resources, nor our unique geographical position, nor our wealthy colonies, nor our accumulated wealth, nor our great industrial past will save us from poverty, misery, and decay. Statesmen must act—*gouverner c'est prévoir*. The policy of Non-interference is the policy of incapacity; individual but isolated effort is inefficient; what is wanted is combination and a Government which leads the nation.

Colbert, the father of the Mercantile System, has left a beautiful saying, which should be the watchword of the British statesman of all parties. "The most precious thing which a State possesses is the labour of its people." All parties should combine to protect the labour of the British people, and to promote actively the industrial welfare of the nation. The policy of Non-interference has had its day. Let us frankly recognise it, and let us not use the labour of the people as a pawn in the Party game, for the people live by their labour. Who restricts labour kills life, who creates labour makes a nation great and prosperous. That is the lesson of the German railways and of Bismarck's railway policy.

When, on the 24th of February 1881, Prince Bismarck was told by the leader of the Radical party that his economic policy was unsound, unscientific,

opposed to economic principles and traditions, the Prince did not quote political economists to support his policy, but retorted: "For me there has always been one single aim and one single principle by which I have been guided: *Salus publica.*" May that also be the guiding-star of all those politicians who have the economic regeneration of Great Britain honestly at heart.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING INDUSTRIES OF GERMANY

THE fact that Germany has an exceedingly prosperous shipping and shipbuilding industry must appear exceedingly strange and almost inexplicable to those who are convinced that a prosperous shipping trade can be erected only on the broad basis of Free Trade, and that industrial protection necessarily creates trusts, brings about high prices of the various materials used in shipbuilding, and thereby causes ships to become so expensive that the shipping and shipbuilding industries decay as they have done in the case of the United States and France. Therefore it is of the greatest interest and of considerable importance to investigate why Germany, the classical land of protected industries, of trusts, rings, and other industrial combinations, forms an exception to the general rule, and why she possesses a very powerful and most flourishing mercantile marine, and a shipbuilding industry which need not fear comparison with the enormous shipbuilding industry of this country, although German shipbuilding is hampered by most unfavourable natural conditions, conditions which would prove absolutely ruinous to our own shipbuilders.

Coal and iron, which are the principal materials used in shipbuilding, are found in Germany not close to the sea coast, as in this country, but far away

inland in the middle and in the south of Germany. How enormous is the distance between the principal coal and iron centres of Germany and the most important shipbuilding towns may be seen at a glance from the following comprehensive figures which have been furnished by Messrs. von Halle and Schwarz, the well-known authorities on German shipbuilding:—

Distances between—

	Essen. Miles.	Aix la Chapelle. Miles.	Saarbrücken. Miles.	Kattowitz. Miles.
Wilhelmshaven . .	198	258	417	647
Bremen	165	237	402	581
Geestemünde . . .	204	277	437	620
Hamburg	243	318	482	534
Kiel	318	390	555	568
Lübeck	283	357	523	514
Danzig	640	716	798	380
Memel	872	950	1028	568

From the foregoing table it appears that the average distance which the heavy German raw material has to travel overland before being worked into ships is approximately 400 miles, a distance which is greater than that which separates London and Glasgow. It should be added that by far the largest part of the German iron ore comes from Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg. Consequently the column giving the distances between Saarbrücken and the various shipbuilding towns, distances which range from 400 to 1000 miles, is the most important. In a recent report, Mr. Warner, the United States Consul at Leipzig, correctly said, "Germany, of all World Powers, with the exception of Russia and Austria, is the one with the poorest natural means of communication by sea with the outside world. However, in spite of this fact she holds to-day an enviable position in the

world's carrying trade. She is advancing in the science of traffic upon the high seas, under difficulties of no small proportions, faster and more effectively than any other Power."

How great are Germany's difficulties owing to her unfavourable geographical position may be seen from the fact that when in the year 1878 a Government investigation was made into the German iron industry, it was found that from 20 to 30 per cent. of the cost of production of German iron was accounted for by the cost of transport over long distances, whilst the cost of transport in respect of English iron was said to amount only to from 8 to 10 per cent. of the cost. According to Schrödter and other German authorities who have given their views when the new Customs Tariff was prepared and when the state of the shipbuilding industry was investigated, these high percentages prevailed still then as they did in 1879. These official figures confirm that this country possesses an enormous natural advantage over Germany with regard to industrial competition, and if Germany and Great Britain ever should work under identical conditions Germany could not possibly industrially compete with this country owing to the unfavourable geographical condition by which she is hampered.

From the foregoing table of the distances which separate the German shipbuilding industry from the centres where coal and iron are raised we can form an idea of the difficulties under which the German shipbuilder has to work, and we can easiest realise these difficulties by imagining that our shipbuilders on the Clyde would have to draw their raw material from Portsmouth, Land's End, or London, overland through the whole length of England instead of either drawing it from the immediate neighbourhood of the Clyde or

obtaining it cheaply oversea. These facts and figures show that Great Britain is wonderfully favoured by Nature, by her geographical position and structure, and by the fact that coal, iron, populous towns and harbours lie in immediate proximity of each other, not only for the pursuit of shipbuilding but of all other manufacturing industries if compared with Germany, or, indeed, any other country. It should be added that most of the material used in German shipbuilding is of German origin, that the German iron travels almost exclusively by rail over hundreds of miles to the shipbuilding yards, and that the State railways wisely concede very low freights to the raw material thus despatched in order to foster the national shipbuilding industry. One of the most potent arguments in favour of the construction of the Dortmund-Ems Canal, which cost no less than £4,000,000, and which was opened a few years ago, was that it would cheapen the transportation of iron and steel used in shipbuilding from the interior of Westphalia, the most important centre of the German iron industry, to the shipyards on the North Sea and on the Baltic.

During the middle of the last century German shipbuilding was rather flourishing. Numerous shipyards on the Elbe, the Weser, and along the North Sea coast, were then engaged in building wooden sailing ships for which the raw material was cheap and near at hand. In those days Germany supplied this country with much of the shipbuilding timber used in our own ships. Prussia, always desirous to foster private industry by judicious official encouragement, opened in 1836 a technical high school of shipbuilding near Stettin, and the numerous fine fast clippers, which between 1850 and 1860 carried vast numbers of German emigrants to the United States,

owed their excellence to that pioneer institution, which rather benefited Prussia's neighbours than Prussia herself.

When in the 'sixties iron-built steamships began to displace wooden sailing ships, the German shipyards on the sea coast declined, Great Britain, who was then practically the only industrial country in the world, easily obtained the monopoly in iron shipbuilding and easily maintained her position with the German buyers of ships for a long time. During the 'sixties and 'seventies practically all the German merchant steamships were built in this country. Competition in shipbuilding with this country seemed altogether out of the question on account of Germany's most unfavourable geographical position. Private enterprise in Germany shrunk from undertaking an apparently hopeless task, and Germany would have remained an inland power had not the Government again shown the way to private enterprise and encouraged the creation of a shipbuilding industry by a deliberate fostering policy upon which no British Government of modern times would have dared to embark, and for which no British House of Commons would have voted the funds. In 1870, a little before the outbreak of the Franco-German war, the Prussian Government established at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven repairing yards for the few British-built warships which Prussia then possessed. The victorious war and the unification of Germany encouraged the Prusso-German Government to go a step further, and it resolved experimentally to build an armoured cruiser, the *Preussen*, without looking too closely into the expenditure. The ship was a success, and although it was far more expensive than it would have been if it had been ordered in this country, which then was the

cheapest market for ships of war, the German Government decided to continue building its own warships without over much regard to economy, firmly expecting that eventually a powerful and economically profitable German shipbuilding industry might arise out of these small, very costly, and apparently hopeless beginnings.

On the 1st of January, 1872, General von Stosch became the head of the German Admiralty. Although he was not a naval man he proved a most capable and far-seeing organiser and administrator of the German navy, and he resolved that everything that could be done should be done in order to create a powerful shipbuilding industry in Germany. Although no premiums were granted for encouraging the building of iron ships, the creation of the German navy proved a mighty stimulus to the German shipyards and to the German iron industry, especially as Von Stosch laid down the principle that all German warships should be built in German yards, and that they should be constructed exclusively of German material in order to make Germany independent of the foreigner as regards the building of men-of-war. With this object in view he made it his motto, "Without German shipbuilding we cannot get an efficient German fleet."

When in 1879 Bismarck resolved to abandon the policy of Free Trade and introduced Protection into Germany, he found that the German shipyards situated on the sea coast had since 1853 been able to import all raw material used in shipbuilding free from all duties, whilst the shipyards situated on the great rivers inland were not similarly favoured. The latter found the prices of foreign raw material used in shipbuilding too high owing to the duties charged on the

frontier, and they could also not furnish river steamers built of German iron at a sufficiently low price because the cheaper English iron was worked up into river ships in England and Holland, and these ships penetrated duty free into Germany *vid* the Rhine. Thus the important shipbuilding industry on the rivers of Germany had decayed, and the very large river traffic on the Rhine was not in German but in Dutch hands. In introducing his comprehensive system of general agricultural and industrial protection in Germany, Bismarck wisely made an exception to the general rule in favour of the shipbuilding industry which, under unmitigated protection, would have been crippled. With this object in view the German shipyards were exempted from all duties payable on the various raw and manufactured materials used in shipbuilding. In other words, Bismarck gave complete Free Trade to the German shipbuilding industry which, from a fiscal point of view, is carried on outside the German frontier. Therefore the German shipbuilding industry is treated like a foreign country by the German iron industry, and the latter relieves itself of unduly large stocks by dumping iron and steel not only in England but in the German shipyards as well in order to avoid having to sell its produce at a loss in the German market, and thus depressing prices in its most valuable and most potent market, the home market.

After having given protection to all the German industries with the exception of the shipbuilding industry, Bismarck converted the private railways of Prussia into State railways and arranged that the heavy raw material used in German shipbuilding, such as steel, iron, timber, &c., should be hauled over the State railways at rates barely covering the cost of handling and transportation. Thus Bismarck bridged

the huge distance which separated the German seaports from their industrial base, and he created conditions which made it possible for the German shipbuilding industries to grow and to expand. Though the shipbuilding industry was not protected by fiscal measures it was no less fostered by these preferential traffic arrangements, and by further measures taken by the Government which will be described in the course of this chapter.

Although the State had created a private shipbuilding industry by ordering warships from private German builders and had enabled the few German shipbuilders who then were in existence to work cheaply by giving them Free Trade in foreign materials used in shipbuilding, and by granting to them cheap transportation over Government railways for material of German origin, the German shipping companies, for some considerable time, did not feel inclined to desert the British shipbuilders, who had hitherto furnished them with excellent ships. The German shipowners did not trust the German shipbuilders, whose ability at building merchant ships was questioned and doubted. The principle of General Von Stosch, the Minister of the Navy, "without German shipbuilding we cannot get an efficient German fleet," was not applied by the German shipowners to the shipping trade. The business connections which the German shipowners had formed with the leading English shipyards had, by a long and a satisfactory intercourse, become so firmly rooted as not to admit of new building orders being voluntarily given to German builders, especially as the German yards had so far not achieved a sufficient success in the building of merchant vessels. Up to 1879 the German yards had not been in a position to compete on equal terms with English

shipbuilders as regards both price and rapidity of delivery. German materials were far more costly and the working plant of the German shipyards was quite inadequate for quick and efficient shipbuilding. Only when in 1879 the import duties on shipbuilding materials had been abolished, and when at the same time the German iron and steel industries had been so much strengthened as to allow of their creating branch industries devoted to shipbuilding, could the building of merchant vessels on an adequate scale be inaugurated in Germany.

At a time when, through their constantly increasing output of cargo steamers and fast passenger boats, British shipbuilders had left behind them the stage of infancy in steamship building, Germany hesitatingly commenced experimenting with high pressure boilers, and replaced the boilers of the old Lloyd steamers with triple expansion engines of German make. As these new boilers proved to be unsatisfactory, German steamship owners not unnaturally felt disinclined to order new steamers in Germany. Only gradually were the difficulties and obstacles overcome which at one time threatened to overwhelm the German shipbuilding industry, and only in 1882 the Hamburg-American Line began to show some little confidence in the ability of German shipbuilders by ordering the *Rugia* from the Vulcan Company in Stettin, and the *Rhaetia* from the Reiherstieg yard in Hamburg. Thus the building of large vessels in Germany made a very modest start a very short time ago.

Only fifteen years after the launch of the *Preussen* and five years after Free Trade in respect of foreign shipbuilding material and preferential railway rates for German shipbuilding material had been granted to

smooth the way of the German shipbuilders, the German shipowners began to order their ships more freely from German builders, and they did so not from choice, but because they were induced, one might almost say compelled, to order their ships in Germany by an Act of the German Parliament. In 1884 Bismarck introduced a Bill by which subsidies were to be given to the North German Lloyd for a line of mail steamers, but these subsidies were to be accorded under the express stipulation that the new ships to be built were to receive the subsidy under the Act only if they were constructed in German shipyards by German workmen and, as far as was possible, of German material. That action, coupled with the subsidies granted to the German liners, proved at the same time the salvation and the foundation of the great German shipbuilding industry, and therefore of the German shipping trade, which, rightly considered, was founded only in 1884. Mr. Mason, the United States Consul in Berlin, was quite right in reporting to his Government, "It can safely be said that the great lines which now connect the two principal ports of Germany with Asia, Australasia, and the German colonies in East Africa, would not, and could not, have been established and maintained during the earlier years of struggle and uncertainty had they not received the direct, liberal, and assured support of the Government through fixed annual subsidies." Thus events have fully vindicated Bismarck's far-seeing policy, which at the time was loudly condemned in British and in German Free Trade circles as well as unbusinesslike, wasteful, and unpractical.

The Government-subsidised North German Lloyd gave the first important order to German builders of

merchant steamers by ordering, under the Act of 1884, six liners from the Vulcan Shipbuilding Company. These vessels, when completed, were found satisfactory in every respect by the North German Lloyd, but the Vulcan Company had to buy dearly, though not too dearly, its experience in building large steamers, for it lost upon this pioneer transaction between one and one-and-a-half million marks. This loss was largely caused by the fact that the building plant of the Vulcan had to be considerably extended and remodelled at the very time when these ships were building, and thus work was interrupted and impeded. Still in the long run the Vulcan Shipbuilding Company was greatly benefited by the great prestige which it gained by having secured and satisfactorily executed this very important order. With praiseworthy energy and perseverance the Vulcan Company continued to compete for the construction of fast steamers without over much regard to the financial risks which it had to run, and thus the Vulcan succeeded in 1888 in securing the contract for the first fast steamer *Augusta Victoria* from the Hamburg-American Line notwithstanding the severe competition from British yards. With the construction of that steamer the great German shipbuilding yard struck out a line of its own by introducing twin-screw propulsion for transatlantic liners. Two years later the Vulcan built the twin-screw steamer *Fürst Bismarck*, and the success achieved by these two twin-screw ocean flyers, which at the time were the fastest liners afloat, led in 1895 to the building of the celebrated fast liner *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. That enormous vessel was built within eighteen months, a shorter time than that required by any English yard, and its speed exceeded that of any ship afloat. The *Kaiser*

Wilhelm der Grosse was followed by the three great liners, *Deutschland*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Kaiser Wilhelm II.*, all of which left far behind them the foremost British liners. Thus the Vulcan had brilliantly outstripped English competition in shipbuilding, which, until then, had been considered invincible, and since German shipbuilding has proved its excellence to the whole world by the building of these four ships, the reputation of the German shipbuilding industry has become of the highest.

The following figures show the astonishing development of the German shipbuilding industry since 1879, the year when Protection was introduced into Germany, and when the German shipbuilding industry was placed in a favoured position by being granted free imports of shipbuilding material and very low freight rates on the German railway, and since 1884, the year in which the Steamships' Subsidies Bill was passed:—

IRON AND STEEL SHIPPING BUILT IN GERMANY

1880	23,986	register	tons
1885	24,554	,,	,,
1890	100,597	,,	,,
1895	122,712	,,	,,
1900	235,171	,,	,,
1909	326,318	,,	,,

The foregoing figures show that the yearly output of the German shipbuilding yards has grown no less than tenfold during the fifteen years between 1885 and 1900. Thirty years ago German shipbuilding was practically non-existent. In the year 1906 Sir Charles Maclaren, M.P., presiding at the yearly meeting of Palmer's Shipbuilding and Iron Company held at Newcastle, said that Germany was now building

a greater tonnage than all the other Continental countries put together, and that her output during the current year would be a record. The foregoing facts and figures show that Germany's progress in shipbuilding is truly marvellous. It is doubly marvellous in view of her most disadvantageous geographical position, her comparatively poor natural resources, and her lack of experience in shipbuilding.

It is frequently asserted that Germany owes her industrial success to the fact that German business men are so anxious to obtain orders that they are willing to work for nothing or almost for nothing, that Germany obtains only those industrial orders which Englishmen find unprofitable or not sufficiently profitable. This view, which is very widely held in this country, is quite unjustified. In fact, as money is dearer in Germany than it is in this country, industrial profits, generally speaking, have to be much larger in Germany than here. As regards the German shipbuilding industry the following figures will tell their own tale:—

CAPITAL OF IRON SHIPBUILDING YARDS

	Marks.
1870	4,800,000
1880	15,300,000
1890	36,100,000
1900	66,000,000
1910	105,890,000

From the foregoing statement it appears that the capital invested in the German shipbuilding yards has grown at an almost incredible rate of speed during the thirty years under review. Now let us look into the earnings of the so rapidly increased capital.

TOTAL AND AVERAGE DIVIDENDS EARNED BY ALL SHIPBUILDING YARDS ON ORDINARY STOCK

	Marks.	
1880	450,000	7.94 per cent.
1882	1,035,056	9.93 „
1884	1,266,100	12.15 „
1886	145,800	1.15 „
1888	858,150	6.57 „
1890	1,757,500	8.15 „
1892	1,831,100	6.08 „
1894	1,514,900	4.98 „
1896	1,914,500	5.55 „
1898	2,958,080	7.89 „
1900	4,503,500	10.05 „

The foregoing table shows that the profit of the German shipbuilding yards is very large and rapidly growing, notwithstanding the great increase of the capital invested in that industry. The percentage earned on the whole capital of the shipbuilding industry is particularly satisfactory if we remember that some over-capitalised, badly managed or unfortunate yards have naturally severely lowered the average rate of profit. How greatly the development of the German shipbuilding industry has benefited labour may be seen from the following figures which give the number of hands in the four principal shipbuilding yards:—

HANDS EMPLOYED IN PRINCIPAL GERMAN SHIPBUILDING YARDS

	1880.	1890.	1899.	1910.
Schichau	1200	3,000	5,820	7,100
Vulcan	2200	4,507	6,628	7,600
Howaldt	400	1,304	2,370	2,350
Blohm and Voss	450	2,051	4,649	5,100
Total	4250	10,862	19,467	22,150

These figures show that some of the most powerful German shipbuilding yards of the present time were

quite insignificant a short time ago, and that the number of men employed in the four principal yards increased almost fivefold within twenty years.

By the wise, far-seeing, determined, and appropriate action of the State, which has been described in the foregoing, has the German shipbuilding and shipping industry been artificially established, fostered, and developed until it has grown from a weak and artificial industry—Adam Smith would have contemptuously called it a hot-house industry—into a powerful, healthy, and natural industry which is now able to maintain itself in free competition without State support against all comers. The astonishing success of the German shipbuilding industry is due partly to its excellent management and organisation, partly to the application of science and experience to industry, partly to the courage and perseverance of the directors of the Vulcan and of other undertakings, partly to the harmonious co-ordination and co-operation of the various economic factors which in more individualistic countries, such as Great Britain, are not co-ordinated, and often serve rather to obstruct and to retard progress by unnecessary friction than to provide it by harmonious action.

In the *Jahrbuch für Deutschland's See Interessen für* 1905 we read:—

"Our shipbuilders have executed large orders for foreign countries and mean to compete in the future still more energetically with British builders for foreign orders. Our shipping industry means to compete not only in the protected coastal trade of Germany and in German harbours, but on foreign routes also and with all nations. But that can be done only if our shipbuilders are able to build cheaply. If Germany should try to build up her shipping trade by means of

State bounties and subsidies Germany would benefit little, and an international struggle of the purse, ruinous to all people alike, would begin between the various States until the struggle would at last be ended by a mutual agreement to abolish such bounties and subsidies as was the case with the Sugar Bounties."

" For the shipping trade and for shipbuilding Great Britain is Germany's chief competitor, but, although Great Britain is in many respects, especially by the proximity of coal and iron to the shipyards, more favourably situated than is Germany, we neutralise these natural advantages by a more thorough technical training, by a better organisation, and by co-operation both in the shipping trade and in shipbuilding."

The foregoing extract is in the first place most instructive and most valuable because it shows that the German shipping and shipbuilding industries mean to stand on their own feet. Secondly and principally, this extract should be most interesting to all Englishmen because it shows that the Germans feel confident that the superior organisation of their industries and their co-operation will prove stronger in the struggle for success than the unparalleled advantages for shipbuilding and shipping which this country enjoys. For these reasons the passage which affirms that organisation and co-operation are more valuable than are Great Britain's most favourable geographical position and structure and her incomparable latent resources might fitly be written in letters of gold on the walls of our House of Parliament, and of the offices of our manufacturers and merchants.

Let us now see what industrial organisation and industrial co-operation has done for the German shipbuilding industry, for such an investigation will convey an invaluable lesson to this country.

The strong man can stand alone; the weak must stand together to protect themselves against the strong. The industrial weakness of Germany has proved the cause of the strength of present Germany, for the weakness of the individual German industries competing hopelessly and helplessly against this country twenty and thirty years ago led to the formation first of combinations for mutual support, and eventually to the formation of those gigantic German trusts which have been formed not so much in order to rob the German consumer, as is often rashly asserted, as in order to protect the German producer and to kill the non-German producer. For these reasons her trusts have on the whole been a blessing to Germany.

American trusts and British combinations, such as the American meat ring, the British railway ring, the British shipping ring, and certain of our large limited companies, are unfortunately mostly formed with the object of either levying extortionate charges from the public or of depriving ignorant investors of their money by means of a financial coup. In Germany the leading idea in the formation of industrial trusts and combinations is not to secure an undue advantage to a few wirepullers by the unscrupulous use of force grown out of monopoly, but to secure a legitimate advantage to a number of domestic producers by a wise combination of the productive forces.

The German trusts and limited companies devote themselves rather to promoting industries than to exploiting the public, not because German business men are more virtuous than are British or American business men, but because the State keeps a very sharp eye on company promoters, directors, and managers, and unsparingly applies hard labour to those who contravene the very strict German Com-

pany Law which has been devised to shelter the public and to teach the promoter that honesty is the best policy. Our company laws have, unfortunately, the opposite effect. They shelter the swindling promoters and directors, and leave the ignorant public an easy prey to unscrupulous exploiters. Hence many people with brains in this country prefer making money by swindling to honest industry, whilst similar individuals in Germany find it more profitable and less risky to adopt an honest and useful productive occupation.

The introduction of Protection in 1879 immediately led to the formation of numerous large combinations in the German iron industry. The various works gradually formed co-operating groups in order to eliminate unnecessary and mutually destructive competition, to regulate prices, to buy and sell collectively, to eliminate unnecessary middlemen, &c. According to Dr. Voelcker there were in 1903 forty-four conventions, trusts, and syndicates in the German iron industry. However, the multitude of these combinations deprived co-operation in the German iron industry of much of its usefulness. The contrast between these numerous combinations in the iron industry and the gigantic German coal trust which embraces practically the whole coal-mining industry of Germany was too glaring to be allowed to remain, and in the beginning of 1904 a gigantic steel trust, embracing all Germany, was founded.

At the time when the huge German steel trust was formed, the German shipbuilders had already been in the habit of buying their material, not from the individual makers in retail fashion, but through the representatives of the various combinations. Therefore the central management of these combinations

was able to effect very great economies in the production of metal wares used in shipbuilding by introducing a wisely organised specialisation and division of labour among the numerous works belonging to the combine. For instance, the different plates used in German shipbuilding, about 150 in number, require special rollers, and in endeavouring to produce every kind, or at least many kinds, of steel plates, the various rolling-mills had not only to incur an enormous capital expenditure in laying down a huge plant, but the working expenses of the rolling-mills were necessarily made unduly heavy because a large part of their plant was unoccupied during part of the year. This unnecessary and exceedingly wasteful multiplication of plant was done away with by specialisation based on mutual agreement which gave to every work a proportionate number of specialities, and thus individual mills were enabled to produce with a smaller and constantly occupied plant larger quantities of uniform ship steel at a cheaper price than hitherto and at a larger profit to themselves. In this way judicious industrial combination may benefit both consumers and producers, and trusts are by no means an unmixed evil as so many believe.

Not only the German steel producers, but the German shipbuilders also have formed a large combination. The Society of German Shipyards at Berlin comprises no less than forty-two individual yards, and thus the whole of the German shipbuilding industry is in a position to meet the whole of the German steel industry in one room, and the two combinations can, through their representatives, amicably arrange matters between themselves to their mutual satisfaction. Both combinations wish to prosper and both are interested in the prosperity of the other. Thus,

instead of suicidal petty rivalry and endless wrangling between innumerable small concerns and a host of agents and other useless but expensive middlemen, we find in Germany the curious spectacle that two of the most powerful industries are united and meet one another in a spirit not of commercial rivalry, of envy, and of secret or open hostility, but in friendly and loyal co-operation.

Owing to this co-operation and this systematic specialisation and division of labour, the saving of unnecessary labour could still further be developed. The shipyards have been taught by the steel-makers how they can save trouble and expense to the steel industry by adapting their requirements to the condition of the steel-works and making work easy for them. On the other hand the steel-makers have learned from the shipbuilders how best to cater for the shipyards, and how best to adapt themselves most effectively to the requirements of the German shipbuilding industry. Thus the two great industries work hand in hand like a single concern, and friction, expense, and correspondence between buyer and seller have been reduced to a minimum by a wonderful simplification of business. A shipbuilder who requires steel plates or columns of a certain kind had formerly to make inquiries at a large number of works before being able to place his order, and when he had made the most careful inquiry and studied the market, he could not be quite sure that he would receive exactly what he wanted at the cheapest price and in the shortest time from the work which he had selected. Now his task has been made easier. The shipbuilder can obtain all the information which he requires at the central office of the steel combination, which distributes all orders in such a way as to ensure that

they are most economically and most rapidly executed according to the standard specification. Through this arrangement the "science of buying" is no longer a science, and the convenience of being able to place orders rapidly on the most favourable terms and without much inquiry, and of being absolutely certain that the articles ordered will be exactly in accordance with the shipbuilder's requirements, and that they will be delivered at the right time, has caused German shipbuilders to order their material in Germany, even if they are offered the identical goods at a lower price by a well-known British maker. This is one of the chief reasons why during the last few years British steel has almost ceased to be used in German shipbuilding, as appears from the following table:—

STEEL USED IN GERMAN SHIPBUILDING

	Ships' Plates.		Other Ships' Steel.	
	Of German Origin. Tons.	Of Foreign Origin. Tons.	Of German Origin. Tons.	Of Foreign Origin. Tons.
1899 . . .	71,948	26,928	36,515	12,766
1900 . . .	70,806	21,734	31,418	11,076
1901 . . .	94,478	8,397	49,325	4,530
1902 . . .	98,776	6,428	48,381	2,653
1903 . . .	92,521	1,631	43,492	1,107

The foregoing figures show that the German shipbuilding industry has almost completely eliminated foreign steel largely owing to the highly developed organisation and co-operation of the German steelworks described in the foregoing. This elimination of foreign steel, which means British steel, from the German shipbuilding industry is all the more remarkable as the German shipbuilding industries work for all practical purposes under Free Trade conditions.

At the same time it must not be thought that British steel cannot compete with German steel on equal terms, for the terms of competition are not equal in Germany. Firstly, much of the steel consumed by the German shipbuilders is "dumped" steel, sold at, or under, cost price by German makers who do not wish to depress prices in the home market; secondly, the German steel which is sold at natural prices is carried at a merely nominal charge, possibly at a loss, by the German railway companies to the sea coast. Thus the German shipbuilding industry secures the advantages of both Protection and Free Trade.

Since the creation of the German Empire the fleet of German merchant steamships has increased nearly thirty-fold, as the following figures show—

1871	81,994	tons
1881	215,758	,,
1891	723,652	,,
1901	1,347,875	,,
1910	2,349,557	,,

The foregoing figures do not by any means give the whole tale of the progress of Germany's mercantile marine. In former times, when Germany was poor, she possessed chiefly second-hand and second-rate ships, but at present Germany boasts of some of the largest and swiftest liners afloat, and she has besides proportionately by far the largest number of very large and new ships among maritime nations. The German mercantile marine is at present more up to date than is the shipping of this country. The strength of the shipping of Great Britain lies in its "tramp" steamers, which one might describe as the costermongers and pedlars of the sea; the strength of the shipping of Germany lies in its huge passenger and cargo boats. In this country small shipping com-

panies are most conspicuous; in Germany huge shipping companies are most noticeable. The gross tonnage of the two largest German shipping companies is rapidly approaching 2,000,000 tons, and the individual German ships possessed by the Nord Deutsche-Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft are among the finest in the world. Germany can be proud of her great shipping companies.

Bismarck's policy of fostering and promoting the German shipping trade has energetically been continued by the present Emperor, who unceasingly aids the shipbuilding and shipping companies, partly by personal encouragement, partly by legislative and administrative action. Not only has the German Government done all in its power to assist the German shipping and shipbuilding industries, but it has, at the same time, done all that could be done in order to damage their foreign competitors. An example will show how assiduously, or one might perhaps say how unscrupulously, Germany aids her shipping industry. The German shipping companies do an enormous business in shipping emigrants. The two leading German companies, for instance, carry every year between 200,000 and 300,000 passengers, of whom the majority are emigrants. Germany herself has practically no emigration, as only about 20,000 emigrants leave Germany every year. Consequently the German shipping companies endeavour to attract emigrants from Austria-Hungary and Russia to the German ports. In order to "induce" Austrian and Russian emigrants to patronise the German steamship lines, arrangements devised to secure that end were made by the German Government at the Austrian and Russian frontiers. So-called control stations for

emigrants were erected in Germany through which all foreign emigrants had to pass ostensibly in order to be medically examined, but if these emigrants were not in the possession of tickets issued by one of the German steamship lines they were told that they were not allowed to proceed to the German harbour of embarkation. Emigrants who were in the possession of a railway ticket to Bremen and of a ticket issued by the Cunard Company or some other British line were ruthlessly turned back unless they bought a ticket for passage on one of the German lines from an agent at the control station. By this high-handed proceeding the German companies secured practically the whole emigrant traffic from Austria-Hungary and Russia, because it became known in those countries among intending emigrants that they could not emigrate *viâ* Germany unless they went by a German line of steamships. This arbitrary treatment of intending emigrants was one of the reasons, and I think the principal reason, why during 1904 a rate war broke out between the Cunard Company and the great German lines. Evidently the German Government uses every means in its power to assist its shipping industry,

If we now sum up the contents of the foregoing pages it is perfectly clear that Germany seems to be destined by nature "to be, and always to remain, a land power," as Mr. Cobden might have said, owing to the fact that her coal and iron mines and her manufacturing industies lie hundreds of miles inland in the centre and in the South of Germany and that her coast is almost harbourless. However, notwithstanding the most disadvantageous natural conditions for shipbuilding and shipping which can be imagined, and notwithstanding the former disinclination of German

business men to embark upon shipbuilding and shipping, the German Government has succeeded, at a comparatively trifling cost to the nation, in overcoming all the apparently insurmountable obstacles and in artificially creating a powerful, successful, and wealth-creating new industry which is now the pride of Germany and the envy of many nations.

Individualism unaided is often powerless to develop new industries against a mighty and experienced foreign competitor, and Government aid is wasted unless Governmental initiative is backed by strenuous individual exertion. Clearly recognising the disadvantages of weak and unaided individualism, and of unsupported Governmental initiative and indiscriminate Governmental aid, the German Government has known how to stimulate private enterprise into action without making it effete and teaching it to rely entirely on the State as private enterprise so often does when it is aided by the State in an injudicious manner. The German Government has known how to combine successfully the two most powerful factors, Governmentalism and Individualism.

The foregoing pages also show that the German Government shapes its economic policy not in accordance with the rigid views of professors of political economy and of other more or less scientific doctrinaires. It follows neither a rigid policy of Protection nor an uncompromising doctrine of Free Trade, but applies Protection and Free Trade in varying doses according to the requirements of the individual case. It does not condemn trusts as being bad in themselves, and does not try to oppose them by a Conspiracy Bill as is done in the United States, nor does it unconditionally support them. Its economic

policy is not "scientific," but is deliberately unscientific and empirical.

German statesmen do not believe that bookish professors in their study have the capacity to guide the practical business interests of the nation. Therefore German statesmen adapt their action to circumstances, and they are guided in their action not by German economic scientists, but by practical business men whom they consult. These are the reasons which have brought it about that Germany has succeeded in developing a great, prosperous, and successful shipping and shipbuilding industry, notwithstanding the greatest obstacles. Both a "popular" policy and a "thoroughly scientific" policy are, as a rule, inferior to a practical, an empiric policy, although the latter is as a rule condemned by its professorial opponents as unscientific and although it has often the misfortune of being unpopular.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

THE chemical industry is perhaps the youngest, but certainly the most vigorous and the most successful, industry of Germany. Whilst all other German industries have been fostered by the most scientific and the most skilfully-framed protective tariff which the world has known, and have marvellously developed, largely owing to that protective tariff, the German chemical industry has achieved its commanding and world-wide success practically without any fiscal aid. Consequently it is most interesting to follow the triumphant progress of this industry, to investigate the causes owing to which it has so wonderfully prospered, and to consider the economic consequences which the commanding position of the German chemical industry has for Germany and for other countries.

Every one knows nowadays that the German chemical industry has been extremely successful, but few people are aware that Germany has obtained almost the world-monopoly in some of the most important branches of chemical production. Many chemical preparations which are universally used are exclusively of German manufacture, and about four-fifths of the dyes consumed in the world are made in Germany.

How very important the chemical industry is to Germany may be seen from the fact that the yearly output of that industry amounted in 1897, according

to a most careful official investigation, to £47,895,000. At present the production of the German chemical industry should represent a value of about £60,000,000, whilst the export of all chemical products amounts to considerably more than £20,000,000 per annum. The chemical industry is therefore one of Germany's most important industries. It takes the fifth place among the great exporting industries of that country, and it supplies exactly 9 per cent. of the German exports.

The meteoric development of the German chemical industry during the last twenty-five years may be seen from the fact that the production of soda rose from 42,000 tons in 1878 to about 400,000 tons at the present time, whilst the production of sulphuric acid increased from 112,000 tons in 1878 to 1,402,400 tons in 1907. The foregoing figures may be considered representative of the progress of the German chemical industry. This enormous progress has not been effected spasmodically, but by a gradual, continuous, and natural, though rapid, growth of production for the home market and for export, as may be seen from the following table :—

IMPORTS INTO AND EXPORTS FROM GERMANY OF MANUFACTURED CHEMICAL PRODUCTS

	Imports	Exports	Excess of Exports over Imports
1889 . . .	£5,330,000	£11,335,000	£6,005,000
1890 . . .	5,595,000	12,155,000	6,560,000
1891 . . .	4,980,000	12,285,000	7,305,000
1892 . . .	5,485,000	12,745,000	7,260,000
1893 . . .	5,465,000	13,260,000	7,795,000
1894 . . .	5,345,000	13,440,000	8,095,000
1895 . . .	5,545,000	15,850,000	10,305,000
1896 . . .	5,760,000	16,220,000	10,460,000
1897 . . .	5,485,000	16,750,000	11,265,000
1898 . . .	5,230,000	16,960,000	11,730,000
1899 . . .	5,440,000	18,270,000	12,830,000
1900 . . .	5,650,000	18,620,000	12,970,000
1901 . . .	5,535,000	18,115,000	12,580,000
1902 . . .	5,560,000	19,300,000	13,840,000

If we look through the foregoing table, we find that during the last fourteen years the imports of chemical manufactures into Germany have remained stationary, whilst the exports of chemical manufactures from that country have almost doubled during that time. The excess of exports over imports has considerably more than doubled during the period under review. The manufactured chemicals imported consisted largely of exotic products, such as natural indigo, extract of meat, camphor, &c. A table showing the imports and exports of chemical raw products will be given later on.

In order to show the direction in which the German chemical industry has developed, so as to give a view of its scope and character, it is worth while to look at the exports of some of the more important chemical manufactures in detail.

EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL CHEMICAL MANUFACTURES

	Alizarine	Aniline and other Dyes made from Coal Tar
1895	£580,000	£3,160,000
1896	535,000	3,245,000
1897	620,000	3,350,000
1898	845,000	3,600,000
1899	565,000	3,745,000
1900	560,000	3,865,000
1905	776,000	5,033,000
1909	1,144,000	5,884,000

	Cyanide of Potassium	Indigo	Chlorate of Potash
1895	£180,000	£410,000	£565,000
1896	80,000	320,000	615,000
1897	105,000	240,000	570,000
1898	195,000	380,000	675,000
1899	165,000	390,000	730,000
1900	130,000	465,000	816,000
1905	260,000	1,286,000	1,160,000
1909	408,000	1,974,000	1,568,000

In passing, it might be mentioned that Germany produces more than 20,000 tons of alizarine, and more than 60,000 tons of other dyes per annum, and that she has no competitors in the production of alizarine.

The chemical industry is for various reasons of national importance to Germany. Though it employs much unskilled labour, the industry is so prosperous that it pays very good wages considering the character of the work done. Hence strikes are of extremely rare occurrence in the prosperous chemical works. At present about 220,000 workmen and women are employed in that industry, and they receive in wages more than twelve million pounds sterling per annum. The following table conveys a clear idea of the interest of German labour in the chemical industry :—

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

	Hands employed	Total wages	Wages per head per annum
1882	71,777	?	?
1894	110,348	£4,981,000	£44.5
1895	114,587	5,173,000	44.14
1896	124,219	5,686,000	45.8
1897	129,827	6,045,000	46.2
1898	135,350	6,482,000	47.8
1899	143,119	6,978,000	48.15
1900	153,011	7,746,000	50.12
1902	165,889	7,983,000	48.12
1906	202,177	10,545,000	52.20
1909	219,601	12,688,000	57.80

The constant growth of the German chemical industry has allowed not only of a yearly and considerable increase of the labour employed, but also of a yearly increase of the average wages. Only the acute depression of 1902 has caused a temporary set-back in wages. Thus certain and satisfactory employment at, on the whole constantly, rising wages has been provided for a very large number of workers.

The national importance of the German chemical industry lies not only in the employment which it gives to the wage-earning masses engaged in it, but also in the great direct and indirect benefits which other industries derive from it. Chemical research is no longer confined to purely chemical ends in Germany, for the chemist has most successfully applied his science to agriculture and to the manufacturing industries, and many German industries owe their greatness to the assistance which they have received from trained chemists. The beneficial effect of chemical research applied to other industries is most clearly visible in German agriculture, and the result of the studies and experiments which the chemist has carried on in his laboratory is also universally applied in practice by the peasants and the landed proprietors. This may be seen from the fact that Germany produced only 9500 tons of manure salts in 1884, and in 1901 she produced no less than 147,169 tons of manure salts, and nearly the whole was consumed in the country. How rapidly and enormously the use of potash salts (K_2O) has increased in German agriculture may be seen from the following table, which will also show the use which other nations make of these salts :—

POTASH SALTS USED IN AGRICULTURE PER SQUARE KILOMETRE

	1895	1897	1899	1901	1905
	Kilogrammes				
Germany	171.0	254.8	306.0	391.9	514.2
United States	24.1	33.1	36.1	54.0	58.0
Belgium	136.0	133.6	159.0	297.7	441.9
Holland	125.3	201.7	296.8	461.9	762.0
England	—	46.2	58.6	61.5	113.9
Scotland	—	100.9	175.4	254.6	340.8
Sweden	145.0	196.8	197.5	266.6	367.9
Denmark	32.7	40.4	51.7	98.0	135.7

Germany produces on an average about 2,000,000 tons of beet sugar and molasses per annum, which represent a value of more than £20,000,000. The success of Germany's enormous sugar industry is directly due to the German chemist, without whom beet sugar would be unable to compete with cane sugar. Formerly the percentage of sugar which was extracted from the beet was so small that it could be produced only at a loss in free competition with cane sugar; but the German chemists have succeeded in increasing the percentage of sugar extracted from year to year to such an extent that beet sugar can now be obtained in formerly unthought-of proportions and at formerly unthought-of prices. The influence of the chemist on the German sugar industry is clearly traceable from the following figures :—

QUANTITY AND PERCENTAGE OF SUGAR EXTRACTED FROM BEET

1840–50 . .	8,822 tons	5.72 per cent.
1846–50 . . .	35,709 „	7.22 „
1856–60 . . .	128,141 „	8.17 „
1866–70 . . .	210,915 „	8.30 „
1876–80 . . .	418,010 „	8.93 „
1886–90 . . .	1,110,703 „	12.73 „
1900–1 . . .	1,970,000 „	14.93 „
1905–6 . . .	2,400,771 „	15.27 „
1908–9 . . .	2,079,221 „	17.60 „

The few figures given in the foregoing will make it clear that the great and increasing prosperity of German agriculture is not only due to the protective tariff and the protective effect of the freight policy pursued by the German railways, but also to the invaluable assistance which German chemists have given to the agriculturists.

Other industries have similarly benefited by the application of chemical science, and many prominent manufacturers, bankers, and landowners send their

sons to the Universities and technical High Schools to study chemistry, so that they should be able to avail themselves of the assistance of that science in practical life.

The enormous national importance of a prosperous chemical industry lies not only in the invaluable assistance which that industry can give to nearly all other industries, but also in the unthought-of resources which it will create almost out of nothing. A century ago Great Britain's wealthy sugar colonies were the envy of the world, and sugar-planters laughed at the idea of producing sugar from beet. To-day the West Indian sugar-planters are ruined, and Germany produces the "tropical product" on a scale never dreamt of. Since 1890 Germany produces artificial musk at Mulhouse, natural vanilla is being replaced by chemical vanilline, Japanese camphor by synthetic camphor, and chemically-produced sugar is being replaced by saccharine. The extraction of dyes from madder root and from various other plants has ceased, and vegetable dyes have given place to dyes made from tar. At present natural indigo is being crushed out of existence by the synthetic indigo produced by German chemists. How the rise of artificial indigo has affected the former indigo monopoly of India may be clearly seen from the following figures :—

	Acreage under Indigo in India	Value of Exports of Indigo Tens of Rupees
1894–5	1,705,977 acres	4,745,915
1895–6	1,569,869 "	5,354,511
1896–7	1,583,808 "	4,370,757
1897–8	1,366,513 "	3,057,402
1898–9	1,013,627 "	2,970,478
1899–1900	1,046,434 "	£1,795,007
1900–1	977,349 "	£1,423,987
1901–2	792,179 "	£1,234,837
1905–6	400,552 "	£390,918
1909–10	295,706 "	£234,544

INDIGO IMPORTED TO GREAT BRITAIN

1895	£1,392,534
1896	1,533,722
1897	1,470,574
1898	890,803
1899	986,090
1900	542,089
1901	788,820
1902	498,043
1907	151,297
1909	139,335

The facts and figures given make it clear that many a "natural monopoly" which is at present possessed by countries which control the tropics is threatened, and may be taken away from them by the discoveries of the chemists. There is no bound to the possibilities of chemistry, though prejudice always asserts for a time that the natural product is superior to the chemical one. Formerly it was said that cane sugar was superior to chemical sugar. Now it appears that there is practically no difference between the two. Thirty years ago dealers in madder root declared the existence of a method for making chemically alizarine dyes a fable. When the practicability of the method was proved to them they asserted that chemical alizarine was inferior in quality. Yet artificial alizarine has replaced the natural product. At present we are told by producers of natural indigo that the natural dye is superior to the artificial one, whilst chemists maintain that both are equally good. At any rate, the artificial product is by far the cheaper, and the fatal effect of its production on the natural dye is visible from the figures given in the foregoing table. So much is certain that the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik has the utmost confidence in the success of artificial indigo, as may be seen from the fact that this company has spent

no less than £900,000 in cash on a gigantic installation for supplying the world's requirements of indigo. The effect of the discovery of making artificial indigo on Germany may be seen from the following figures :—

	Imports of Indigo into Germany	Exports of Indigo from Germany
1895	£1,075,000	£410,000
1896	1,055,000	320,000
1897	635,000	240,000
1898	415,000	380,000
1899	415,000	390,000
1900	205,000	465,000
1901	215,000	635,000
1902	185,000	925,000
1903	90,000	1,035,000
1904	67,000	1,083,000
1907	54,000	2,129,000
1909	30,000	1,974,000

A few years ago Germany was dependent for the indigo she used on India, and imported on balance indigo of the value of £600,000 and more per annum. Now Germany has completely reversed the balance, and in 1907 she exported £2,075,000 more indigo than she imported. Thus the natural resources of a naturally wealthy country may be taken away from it without bloodshed by the able chemists of another country. The possession of a strong chemical industry is therefore of the utmost economic importance to all progressive countries. This importance was clearly recognised by Prince Bismarck, who remarked in 1894 : "Peace is being maintained less owing to the peaceful disposition of all Governments than owing to the ability of chemists in inventing new kinds of powder. . . . It sounds almost like irony, but it is the truth that the chemist is keeping the swords in their scabbards, and that he decides by his inventions whether there will be peace or war."

We have seen the economic importance of the chemical industry, and we have followed its marvellous

developments on German soil. Now let us inquire as to the reasons why German chemistry has been so successful.

The commanding position of Germany's chemical industry is in no way due to nature's bounty, for Germany is by no means particularly fitted for developing a great chemical industry owing to the possession of the raw products required. On the contrary, she is largely dependent on foreign nations for the supply of chemical raw products, which she works up into chemical manufactures, as is conclusively proved by the following table :—

IMPORTS INTO AND EXPORTS FROM GERMANY OF CHEMICAL RAW PRODUCTS

	Imports	Exports	Excess of Imports over Exports
1889	£8,040,000	£1,620,000	£6,420,000
1890	7,495,000	1,625,000	5,870,000
1891	8,250,000	1,605,000	6,645,000
1892	7,825,000	1,555,000	6,270,000
1893	8,190,000	1,695,000	6,495,000
1894	8,230,000	1,790,000	6,440,000
1895	8,445,000	1,860,000	6,585,000
1896	8,450,000	1,815,000	6,635,000
1897	8,770,000	1,855,000	6,915,000
1898	8,830,000	1,930,000	6,900,000
1899	10,375,000	2,220,000	8,155,000
1900	10,920,000	2,260,000	8,660,000
1901	11,045,000	2,270,000	8,775,000
1902	10,585,000	2,220,000	8,365,000

These figures establish the fact that Germany imports five times more chemical raw products than she exports, and that the dependence of her chemical industry on foreign raw products is rapidly increasing. Therefore it is clear that Germany's success is not due to the fortuitous possession of the first matter.

The great success of Germany's chemical industry

may be traced to the simultaneous action of the following causes :—

1. The natural disposition and aptitude of the individual German for close, patient, persevering, and painstaking work and study.

2. The munificent and enlightened assistance and encouragement given by the German Governments to the study of chemistry in all its branches regardless of expense and regardless of immediate profitable returns.

3. The spirit of combination and the absence of jealousy among chemical scientists and manufacturers, whereby scientific co-operation on the largest scale has been made possible.

How these three factors have combined in making the German chemical industry great is known to all who are acquainted with that industry, for chemical talent of the highest order flourishes rather in France and Great Britain than in Germany. The German chemists owe their successes rather to methodical combination and united plodding than to the inventive genius of individuals, for many of the most important chemical inventions were made outside Germany, though they were most successfully exploited by the German industries.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century Great Britain and France were the leading nations in the chemical industries and in chemical research. The chemical production of aniline dyes was discovered in 1855 by Mr. W. H. Perkin. Notwithstanding the English discovery, nearly the whole of the aniline dyes used are made in Germany, and by the irony of fate they are largely made of English coal tar. A small export duty on coal tar would probably have the effect of transferring a large part of the chemical industry of Germany to these shores.

Evidently a great chemical inventor is of little practical use to a country unless his inventions can be utilised to the fullest extent by a large body of chemical manufacturers and chemists. Otherwise his great discoveries will only benefit that country where an apparatus exists for making use of them. At present Great Britain and France possess perhaps the foremost chemists. Yet the discoveries of these men will chiefly, and perhaps only, benefit the powerful German industries with which neither the French nor the British industries can compete on terms of equality.

The individual German has a great natural aptitude for patient sedentary work. At an age when English boys will romp or pursue various outdoor sports, German boys will be found poring over books and making fretwork. Owing to this disposition towards concentration and close application, Germans may be found in all countries as watchmakers, opticians, &c.

For these reasons a leaning towards chemistry had been prevalent in Germany already in the Dark Ages. Albertus Magnus, of Cologne, was the greatest chemist of the thirteenth century, and Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim (better known under the name of Paracelsus) the greatest chemist of the sixteenth century. In the Middle Ages the capitals and university towns of the various German States were the favourite haunts of the alchemists, who spread the desire for chemical learning far and wide. Many of them were swindlers, but many were guided by the spirit of research, and not a few valuable discoveries were made by these men. Brandt, for instance, discovered phosphorus; Kunkel, ruby glass, &c.

The German apothecaries have never been, and are not now, *more Anglicano*, shopkeepers who sell

pills and patent medicines, and who vend the productions of "manufacturing chemists." Patent medicines hardly exist in Germany, and are on the whole forbidden on account of the great harm that is often done to the community by unscrupulous manufacturing quacks. For these reasons the German apothecaries had to be, and are now, manufacturing and analytical chemists on a small scale, and in their daily work they made many valuable discoveries. Besides, chemistry is with many German apothecaries a hobby which is pursued with love, and many boys become apothecaries merely because of their natural inclination towards patient investigation and research. Thus it has come to pass that many important chemical works have had their beginning in tiny apothecaries' laboratories, and many leading chemists were at one time apothecaries' assistants.

When Justus von Liebig, the greatest German chemist, was at school, the importance of chemistry was not yet understood. At the German Universities there existed neither adequate facilities for the study of chemistry, nor were there any public laboratories in existence. Liebig's greatest service to his country lay not so much in his fruitful investigations and numerous discoveries—which, by the way, chiefly benefited Great Britain and France, for these countries then possessed fully developed chemical industries—as in the organisation of chemical study and research on a broad national basis. Owing to his exertions the first University laboratory, that of Giessen, was created in 1825; and he strove less to advance chemical science by his personal research than to train a large number of pupils, in order to spread his methods far and wide. His example was faithfully copied by his numerous assistants, and many of the most prominent

German chemists living have been initiated into that science by the pupils of Liebig. Thus the spirit of Liebig is still active at the present day, and the seed which Liebig planted has brought forth the magnificent harvest that is now yearly garnered by the German chemical industry.

The German Governments were won over to the cause of chemistry by Liebig's agitation and by his numerous popular writings. Therefore assistance came speedily forward from all quarters of Germany. The laboratory of the University of Marburg was opened in 1840, that of the University of Leipzig in 1843, and from that time onward laboratory followed laboratory, and the various German Governments spent money without stint for the advancement of chemistry. They did not listen to the doctrines of *laissez-faire*, which were much in vogue in Germany in the forties. They neither waited for individual enterprise and private munificence to come forward, nor did they inquire too closely whether an immediate profit could be secured by encouraging chemistry by substantial grants. They simply were convinced that the encouragement of chemistry might be beneficial to the nation, and considered it their duty to spend a little of the money of the nation on a promising experiment, and refused to reject the legitimate demands of the scientists on the grounds that it was not the business to the State to exercise foresight, and that the initiative for all progress should be left to private enterprise.

In consequence of the enlightened policy of the German Governments, there is now a huge army of trained chemists in existence, and that army grows in number and importance from year to year. In 1900 there were more than 7000 German chemists

counted who had been trained at the Universities and Technical and High Schools. They were distributed as follows :—

German analytical chemists in Germany . .	4,300
German analytical chemists abroad	1,000
University professors, lecturers, and assistants	400
Chemists in State employment	100
Private chemists	400
Apothecaries	300
Various	750
Total	7,250

Twenty-five years before there were only 1700 trained chemists employed in the chemical works of Germany. Their increase from 1700 to 4300 is the most eloquent testimony to the progress of the industry and to the progress of chemical investigation in Germany.

Unfortunately, no reliable statistics can be given with regard to the students of chemistry enrolled at the Universities and technical High Schools. However, it may be assumed that the number of chemical students has grown at least *pari passu* with the number of students in which we find the following truly remarkable increase :—

STUDENTS AT THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, THE TECHNICAL, AGRICULTURAL, AND VETERINARY HIGH SCHOOLS, AND THE MINING AND FORESTRY ACADEMIES

	Number of Students.	Proportion of Students to 10,000 male inhabitants
1870	17,761	8.89
1881	26,032	11.73
1892	33,992	13.87
1900	46,520	16.78
1910	83,089	25.03

This progress is most remarkable, and shows the vigour

with which science is pursued and applied to industry in every direction.

In former times a chemical factory was frequently founded on some excellent receipts, the secret of which was most jealously guarded by the fortunate owner. But nowadays it is impossible to maintain a monopoly either by keeping a process secret or by the protection of patents. Chemical science has so greatly advanced that the same ultimate end may be arrived at by a great variety of processes. Consequently neither a secret process nor any number of patents will insure the continued success of a chemical factory which stands still scientifically. A chemical factory can maintain its position only if it remains, by constant research and constant improvement, in the very forefront of scientific excellence. Success can only be won and maintained by the strenuous and constant research of chemists of the highest ability, by constant progress and the introduction of improved methods. This is all the more necessary as the prices for chemicals have been falling for many years, and will apparently continue to fall.

Formerly it was possible to make industrially valuable discoveries in a somewhat haphazard fashion by individual and unconnected experiments, and the results arrived at could be utilised through several generations. But through the teaching of Liebig and his disciples a new era has begun in chemical research. Individual planless effort has made way for systematic, strictly logical, and exhaustive research of many chemists under leaders of standing; and the problem to be solved is patiently pursued in every direction by the combined forces of chemistry until the final aim is arrived at. Every success, every progress, every discovery, should become common property, and

should become the starting point for further and greater successes. In the laboratories of the German Universities and of the great chemical works thousands of highly-trained chemists co-operate as systematically as workmen do in a factory, and the work that is dropped by one chemist who falls out on the way is carried on by another. Thus the army of German chemists have continued their advance, and the astonishing success of the German chemical industry has been brought about.

Combination is the watchword not only in the laboratories, but also in the counting-houses of the chemical factories. In no German industry is there a larger proportion of mammoth enterprises. The Badische Anilin und Sodafabrik, in Ludwigshafen, has about 7000 workmen, and the Farbenfabriken vormals Friedr. Bayer & Co., in Elberfeld, and the Farbwerke vormals Meister, Lucius & Brüning, in Höchst, each employ more than 4000 hands. Besides, each of these works constantly maintains a staff of about 150 trained chemists.

The great individual works are combined in groups for the regulation of prices in Germany and abroad. Germany abounds in trusts (Kartelle), and these combinations are proportionately particularly numerous in the chemical industry. According to an inquiry made in the beginning of 1905 there were then in Germany 385 industrial trusts, 46 of which belonged to the great chemical group. These trusts have proved a blessing to the chemical industry of Germany, but they have, by dumping, done much damage to foreign chemical industries, which they have stifled, and have thus assisted in creating the present world-monopoly of the German chemical industry.

If we review the growth and the achievements of

the German chemical industry, we cannot wonder that the American Consul, in Berlin, reported in 1900 to his Government: "The German exhibit at the Paris Exposition is conceded on all hands to have been—especially in the departments of machinery, chemicals, and all that relates to the application of science to industry—a triumphant vindication of German methods and a display which alone would establish the right of the Fatherland to a place in the front rank of industrial and commercial nations."

Of late much has been said and written in Great Britain as to the advantages of education and on the application of science to industry. However, many, perhaps most, people who uphold education and the application of science to industry have only a dim idea how education and science may help our industries. British education appears to suffer from two very great evils, which are unfortunately recognised by only very few people.

In the first place our higher education is more ornamental than useful, more literary than practical, and does not fit men for the battle of life—*vide* Oxford and Cambridge.

In the second place, education is considered and treated almost solely as a means to pass an examination, not as a preparation for practical life, and tends therefore rather to exercise the retentive power, the memory, in the individual, than to strengthen his intelligence, his judgment, and his critical faculties. In other words, the influence of the crammer upon education is more noticeable than that of the practical man. Education is more for show than for use.

In the application of science to industry the crying necessity of combination seems hardly to be recognised. Every British chemist is an island. The

average work accomplished by the average British chemist is probably greater than that of his German competitor, for the Englishman puts more energy into his work, and works more quickly. Yet, though some of the greatest chemists living are Englishmen, our chemical industries are languishing owing to the lack of organised and co-ordinated effort.

Altogether it seems that the use of education and of science is not yet fully grasped by the nation. The various Governments appear to be interested only in the elementary schools, which will hardly contribute much to the scientific and industrial advancement of the nation, whilst wealthy individuals give and bequeath much money for charitable purposes, and but little for the advancement of true science. Thus science is starved to death. Amateurs and leaders of society, who frequently do not grasp the ends towards which science should be directed, have a commanding influence over the institutions where science should be taught. Truly the scientific and the industrial part of the nation can learn much from the rise of the chemical industry of Germany.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE FISCAL POLICY OF GERMANY AND ITS RESULT

DURING the recent discussion of our fiscal policy, Germany's economic success under a protective régime has so frequently been quoted, and has so often been quoted with insufficient knowledge of the facts of the case, that it would seem worth while to look somewhat closely into the economic history of Germany, into the economic policy which she has pursued and is still pursuing, and into the economic ideas which prevail in that country. By doing so we shall be able to understand clearly the principles on which her fiscal policy is based, we shall see how economic problems similar to our own have presented themselves to another nation, and how they have been solved, and we shall thus be able to consider our own problem in the light of German experience.

The close of the Napoleonic wars left Germany devastated, impoverished, and exhausted; her commerce and her industries were destroyed. While the whole Continent had been ravaged and ruined by incessant wars and hostile invasions, British industries had flourished and prospered in internal peace. The official value of the exports of British and Irish produce had risen from £18,556,891 in 1798 to no less than £42,875,996 in 1815, or by more than 130 per cent., and our shipping had grown from 1,632,112 tons in 1798 to 2,601,276 tons in 1815, or by 60 per cent. After the Napoleonic wars the Continent re-

mained utterly exhausted for a long time; its industries were shattered, its wealth had disappeared, and during the slow progress of its recuperation Great Britain conquered the commerce and industries of the world, and the exports of her produce rapidly rose from £42,875,996 in 1815 to no less than £134,599,116 in 1845, according to official value, while our shipping increased from 2,601,276 tons in 1815 to 6,045,718 tons in 1845. The foregoing figures are taken from the old official records.

Thus, towards the middle of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was the merchant, manufacturer, carrier, banker, and engineer of the world, and ruled supreme in the realm of business. Two-thirds of the world's shipping flew the British flag, two-thirds of the coal produced in the world was British; Great Britain had more miles of railway than the whole Continent, and produced more cotton goods and more iron than all the countries of the world together. Her coal mines were considered inexhaustible, and the coal possessed by other nations was believed to be of such inferior quality as to be almost useless for manufacturing purposes. Great Britain had therefore practically the manufacturing monopoly of the world, and the great German economist Friedrich List wrote with perfect truth in his *Zollvereinsblatt:* "England is a world in itself, a world which is superior to the whole rest of the world in power and wealth."

Our economists and many of our merchants then thought that our economic position was so overwhelmingly strong and so unassailable, that it would be impossible for other nations either to compete with us in neutral markets or to protect their own manufactures against the invasion of our industries

by protective tariffs. They believed that Great Britain's industrial power was stronger than all tariff walls. During the reign of these intoxicating ideas of Great Britain's irresistible economic power, Cobden proclaimed that "Great Britain is, and always will be, the workshop of the world"; Great Britain threw away her fiscal weapons of defence, opened her doors wide to all nations, and introduced Free Trade.

While Great Britain was the undisputed mistress of the world's trade, industry, finance, and shipping, Germany was a poor agricultural country. She had been impoverished by her constant wars; she had neither colonies nor good coal, nor shipping, nor even a rich soil nor a climate favourable to agriculture. She was divided into a number of petty States which were jealous of one another, and which hampered one another's progress. Communications in the interior were bad, and her internal trade was obstructed and undeveloped. Besides she was burdened by militarism, and she possessed but one good harbour. According to the forecast of the British free traders, Germany was predestined always to remain a poor agricultural country, exactly as Great Britain was predestined always to remain a rich industrial nation.

At that time arose in Germany Friedrich List, a writer on political economy and a convinced believer in Protection. He had travelled and seen the world, and had lived a long time in England and the United States. Consequently he spoke with greater practical knowledge on international affairs than do the majority of political economists. His principal work, "The National System of Political Economy," was published in 1840, and created some stir at the time of its appearance. Like Cobden's doctrine of Free Trade, List's system of national Protection was hailed

with enthusiasm by the business men of his country, but viewed by the German Governments with suspicion and dislike. Embittered and disappointed by the lack of official appreciation and by the persecution of the German Governments, List shot himself in 1846. After his death his system rapidly became as authoritative for German economic policy as was the system of Adam Smith for this country, and it became, and is still, the text-book of the German statesman. Consequently it will be interesting to consider some of List's more important views.

At the time when Friedrich List wrote, Great Britain was wealthy and powerful, while Germany was poor and weak. Consequently List endeavoured to show how Great Britain had become so wealthy, and how Germany might also acquire wealth by profiting from Great Britain's example. After investigating the economic history of this country and the causes of its wealth, he summed up the result of his inquiry as follows :—

"The English, by a system of restrictions, privileges, and encouragements, have succeeded in transplanting on to their native soil the wealth, the talents, and the spirit of enterprise of foreigners. This policy was pursued with greater or lesser, with speedier or more tardy, success just in proportion as the measures adopted were more or less judiciously adapted to the object in view, and applied and pursued with more or less energy and perseverance.

"It is true that for the increase in her power and in her productive capacity England is indebted not solely to her commercial restrictions, to her protective laws, and to her commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her conquests in science and in the arts.

"How comes it that in these days one million of English operatives can perform the work of hundreds of millions ? It comes from the great demand for manufactured goods which by her wise and energetic policy England has created in foreign lands, and especially in her Colonies ; from the

wise and powerful protection extended to her home industries; from the great rewards which by means of her patent laws she has offered to every new discovery; and from the extraordinary facility for inland transport afforded by her public roads, canals, and railways.

"England has for a long time monopolised the inventive genius of every nation. It is no more than fair that England, now that she has attained the culminating point of her industrial growth and progress, should restore again to the nations of Continental Europe a portion of those productive forces which she originally derived from them."

From these facts List draws the logical conclusion and applies it to Germany. He says:—

"Modern Germany, lacking a system of vigorous and united commercial policy, exposed in her home markets to competition with a foreign manufacturing power in every way superior to her own, while excluded at the same time from foreign markets by arbitrary and often capricious restrictions, is very far indeed from making that progress in industry to which she is entitled by the degrees of her culture. She cannot even maintain her previously acquired position, and is made a convenience of by that very nation, until at last the German States have resolved to secure their home markets for their own industries by the adoption of a united vigorous system of commercial policy.

"We venture to assert that on the development of the German protective system depend the existence, the independence, and the future of German nationality. Only in the soil of general prosperity does the national spirit strike its roots and produce fine blossoms and rich fruits. Only from the unity of material interests does unity of purpose arise, and from both of these national power."

The position of disunited Germany in 1840 strangely resembled the position of the scattered British Empire of to-day, and if we insert in the last two paragraphs quoted the world "British Empire" for "Germany" List's words might easily be attributed to Mr. Chamberlain.

By a curious coincidence List wrote at the same

time in Germany when Cobden and his disciples preached their gospel in Great Britain, and the British free traders, who with their universal theory and their cosmopolitan views simply ignored the existence of nations, naturally did not like to see a pronouncedly national system of political economy arise that was absolutely opposed to Free Trade cosmopolitanism. Consequently List's book was vigorously attacked by Free Traders throughout Great Britain. The *Edinburgh Review* devoted, in July 1842, an article of no less than forty-two pages to that book, in which we find expressions of contempt such as "a pretended system," "his poor misconception of the doctrines which he tries to brand with the nickname of cosmopolitan economy," "his treatise is unworthy of notice," "unworthy of grave criticism," &c. The writer of that article did, however, not confine himself to abuse, but proved to his own satisfaction that, whereas England was, and ever would remain, the workshop of the world, Germany was, and ever would remain, a poor agricultural country, and that all attempts to build up industries in Germany under the shelter of Protection were misdirected and would prove of no avail. The writer says :—

"The manufactures in which our author exults are an evil to Germany. The labour and capital which that country has expended upon them have been forced from more profitable employments."

The *Edinburgh Review* sapiently concludes :—

"In Continental countries they naturally reason thus: 'England has protected her manufactures—*England is rich*; if we protect our manufactures we *shall be as rich as she* is.' They forget that England *has unrivalled natural* capacities for manufacturing and *commercial industry*, and that no country with capacities distinctly *inferior* can ascend to an equal prosperity by any policy whatever."

The tone of conscious superiority and the confident prediction as to England's everlasting industrial supremacy, and as to the hopeless case of the protectionist countries, which were characteristic for all our Free Traders, seem somewhat out of place in the light of subsequent events.

We have now heard the voice of the English and of the German prophet of seventy years ago. Since that time Germany has had more than half a century of almost uninterrupted Protection, and Great Britain has had more than half a century of almost uninterrupted Free Trade. Germany, which was then a country without experience in industry, finance, commerce, and shipping, without capital, without colonies, without good coal, with only one good harbour, a country weighed down by militarism, convulsed by three great wars and a revolution, and, according to Free Trade doctrines, kept back by Protection, has nevertheless become so wealthy and powerful that she competes with us in all foreign markets and even in our home market, that she has some of the swiftest ships on the ocean, that she is paramount in some of the most important industries, and that she can even afford to emulate Great Britain's fleet after having created for herself the strongest army in the world.

She has been able to introduce an immense scheme of workmen's insurance against sickness, accident and old age, under which her workmen have received £384,000,000 between 1885 and 1909, a scheme which, we are told, Great Britain cannot afford; and she is calmly contemplating and preparing herself for a tariff war against this country and the United States, while our free traders, who still speak of the economic paramountcy of this country, confess that they tremble at the thought that a change in our fiscal

policy might lead to friction with other countries. Our free traders who formerly so loudly spoke of the irresistible commercial and industrial power of Great Britain, have become humble indeed, and they tell us now that a slight tax on corn would create widespread misery and starvation in this country, while the German masses are able to stand a high duty not only on bread stuffs, but on all articles of food without exception. Truly the relative position of Germany and Great Britain has changed during the last half-century!

Germany's progress under Protection has been steady, continuous, and rapid. Between 1850 and 1900 Germany's production of iron has risen sixty-fold, her consumption of cotton twenty-fold, and her savings banks deposits sixty-fold. Her population has about four times the amount of savings in the savings banks which is to be found in the British savings banks. Sixty years ago the average wages of British workmen were, according to List, 18s. a week, or four times as high as the average wages of the German workmen. Now German wages and British wages are equally high in many instances, and German wages have risen fourfold in many trades. Considering that living is much cheaper in Germany than here, the German workman is much better off than the British workman. From a poor debtor country, Germany has become a rich creditor country. Formerly she had to borrow money in foreign countries and on onerous terms; in 1897–8 German capital invested abroad was officially estimated at about £1,000,000,000, giving an average yearly yield of about £60,000,000. Such progress is more than rapid, it is marvellous for a naturally poor country; and when we compare that rapid

progress with Great Britain's vaunted progress under the reign of Free Trade the latter would perhaps be more correctly described as stagnation, if not as retrogression.

In view of Germany's triumphant economic progress, the economic policy and the economic views of Germany should be of the greatest interest to the British statesman and the British public.

Free Trade has never had much influence in Germany, and that is only natural, for Free Trade has never flourished in a struggling country. Free Trade is an excellent policy for industries of irresistible strength. When the producer feels assured that he can always easily sell his produce, he can afford to devote his whole attention to the interests of the consumer. Therefore it comes that those parts which are so greatly favoured by nature that they feel assured of a free market for their produce are always in favour of Free Trade, while struggling industrial parts are always in favour of Protection. In France the Gironde, with its matchless wines, is in favour of Free Trade, and the great Free Trader Bastiat hailed from that district. In the United States the cotton belt and the wheat districts are for Free Trade, while the industrial parts are for Protection. In Germany, where neither nature nor art had given to any industry an overwhelming power, the idea of Free Trade has never taken hold of the country or of any part of it. Jhering, the greatest German jurist of his time, expressed very happily the ideas of the leading circles in Germany on Free Trade when he wittily said: "It is a matter of course that the wolves demand freedom of action for themselves, but if the sheep raise the same demand it only proves that they are sheep." The demand for Free Trade

arose in Great Britain from the cotton industry, and List was not slow in pointing out the real cause of that demand. In his weekly paper, the *Zollvereinsblatt*, he drew attention to the fact that England was then practically the only cotton manufacturer in the world, that the British cotton industry was by far the most powerful exporting industry in the world, and that the demand of the British cotton manufacturers for Free Trade was as natural as it was for the other countries to resist that demand.

A certain number of Free Traders existed in Germany, such as Prince-Smith, Wiss, Ascher, Michaelis, Wirth, Hübner, Soetbeer, Braun, Bamberger, Böhmert, Emminghaus, Lammers, Meyer, Eras, Wolff, and others. These men were mostly professors, journalists, and authors, and were therefore never considered in their country as the spokesmen of the productive industries. It is interesting to note that the chief representative of Free Trade and the man who introduced Free Trade into Germany was Prince-Smith, an Englishman, and by profession an author. In merchant and banking circles, especially in Hamburg, Free Trade found naturally more support, for the purely distributive business of the merchant and the banker is greatly hampered by irksome and often vexatious customs regulations. Besides it is immaterial to merchants and bankers whether they trade in foreign goods and bills or in domestic ones, and unless patriotism is stronger than business instinct these two classes always incline to Free Trade. In consideration of these circumstances their pleadings were ignored, and the German Government made up its mind to look chiefly after the interests of the productive industries, which were considered to be the only basis of a nation's wealth.

Bismarck, when referring in the Reichstag to the German Free Traders, significantly said: "They do not sow, neither do they spin—nevertheless they are clothed and fed"; and he delighted in describing them as people who pore all day long in their study over books and papers, and who are perfectly unacquainted with practical life. His practical mind observed that the men who in later years directed the commercial policy of Great Britain were clergymen, like Adam Smith, Malthus, and the elder Mill, that Ricardo was a stockbroker, that Cobden went bankrupt, that Bright was a cotton manufacturer, and therefore personally interested in the establishment of Free Trade, and that Villiers was a lawyer. In private conversation his derision of these men knew no bounds. Nevertheless his standing instructions were that his unflattering remarks on these men and on "Professor" Gladstone should not get into the papers.

According to Bismarck's opinion Free Trade in England was a most excellent thing—for Germany—and he did not like to see that happy state of affairs altered. Therefore he wished neither to see the Free Traders of Great Britain, whose rule was such a blessing to his country, attacked by the German press nor Great Britain's belief in the panacea of Free Trade shaken. Nevertheless when the German Free Traders became too loud in their praise of British Free Trade, of which they had no practical knowledge, he had a pamphlet written on the Cobden Club by Lothar Bucher, his confidential assistant, in which he declared, "The Manchester Free Trade agitation is the most colossal and the most audacious campaign of political and economic deception which the world has ever seen."

While some of the minor political economists of Germany were Free Traders, Wilhelm Roscher, Germany's greatest political economist, considered Free Trade as an impracticable and unattainable ideal. He said with regard to Free Trade :—

"When the feeling that all mankind constitutes one family has abolished all political boundaries, and when universal righteousness and love have killed all national ambitions and jealousies, differences between nations will become of rare occurrence. However, arguments presupposing such a state of affairs are not admissible before it has been clearly proved that such ideal conditions exist. It is so improbable that such an ideal state will ever be created, and universal 'philanthropy' is something so suspicious, the people are so unable to develop except when they constitute a nation, that I should look at the disappearance of national jealousies with concern. Nothing contributed more to the subjection of Greece by Macedon and Rome than the cosmopolitanism of Greek philosophers."

Professor von Treitschke, the eminent historian, condemned Free Trade from the historian's point of view. He wrote in his "Politik" :—

"We have found it to be an erroneous idea that Protection is only necessary for young industries. Old industries, too, require protection against foreign competition. In this respect ancient Italy teaches us a terrible lesson. If protective tariffs against Asiatic and African bread stuffs had been introduced in time, the old Italian peasantry would have been preserved and the social conditions of Italy would have remained healthy. But Roman traders could import cheap grain from Africa without hindrance, the rural industries decayed, the rural population disappeared, and the Campagna, which surrounds the capital, became a vast desert."

Professor Mommsen expresses the same view in his "Römische Geschichte."

One of the younger political economists, Mr. Victor Leo, a rising man who has represented the

German Government on more than one occasion, says in "The Tendencies of the World's Commerce":—

"Protective tariffs must continue, and a moderate increase of them cannot be considered as a misfortune. In practice it is not possible simply to drop entire industries because similar industries can produce more cheaply somewhere else. From the point of view of the *world* economist it is correct to insist on a division of labour which gives to every nation those industries for which it is most adapted; from the point of view of the *national* economist the disadvantages resulting from such a policy would be greater than the advantage to the consumer of being able to buy the article in question at a cheaper price."

The belief that Free Trade presupposes a universal brotherhood among the nations, and is therefore impracticable, is general in Germany. Therefore it comes that we read in the article "Free Trade" in "Brockhaus's Encyclopedia," which faithfully reflects the mind of the nation:—

"As long as mankind is divided into autonomous States possessing individual institutions, no State must expose itself to the danger, which is not only an economic but also a political and social danger, that home production should lose its independence by over-powerful foreign competition. . . . A weaker State, if it wishes to preserve an independent existence, is absolutely justified in safeguarding its imperfect means of production against foreign competition by Protection."

In spite of the almost universal opposition to Free Trade we find that Protection has not been elevated to a dogma in Germany, as Free Trade has been in this country. Protection is considered merely as a policy in Germany, which is well adapted to the requirements of the present time, but which, like every policy, is subject to revision and reconsideration in altered circumstances. Professor Schmoller, the

distinguished lecturer at the Berlin University, says :—

"Protection and Free Trade are for me not principles, but remedies for the political and economic organism which are prescribed according to the state of the nation. A doctor who would say that he prescribed on principle to every patient *restringentia* or *laxantia* would be considered insane. However, that is the idea both of the extreme Free Trader and of the extreme Protectionist."

Professor Biermer wrote, using a similar metaphor :—

"Protection and Free Trade, rightly considered, are not questions of principle, but only remedies of political and economic therapeutics which, according to the state of the patient, have to be prescribed sometimes in big and sometimes in small doses."

Professor Roscher believed strongly in Protection and in customs unions. He wrote :—

"The greater the extent of a territory protected by tariffs, the sooner will active competition spring up within its frontiers. Foreign markets are always uncertain. Hence all customs unions between related States are to be recommended, not only as financially, but also as economically advantageous."

The uncertainty of foreign markets and the danger to a nation which has become dependent for its very existence on foreign markets and on foreign goodwill have become a matter of the greatest concern to the statesmen and political economists of Germany. Therefore we find in that country a feverish anxiety in political circles to acquire colonial possessions and to found a Central European Customs Union, while the political economists loudly warn the country against a state of affairs in which Germany may become economically dependent on foreign nations and in which the prosperity and the very life of the

country may be made the sport of its enemies. Professor Oldenberg, comparing economic Germany to a huge building, said :—

"When our home industries work for exportation and live on foreign countries by exchanging their produce for foreign food, the huge industrial structure of Germany branches sideways into the air and is made to rest on pillars of trade which are erected on foreign ground. But those pillars, which support our very existence, will remain standing only for so long as it pleases the owner of the ground. Some day, when he wishes to use his own land, he cuts off the pillars of our existence from under us and thus breaks down the building which we have reared on them."

Another economist, Mr. Paul Voigt, shares the misgivings of Professor Oldenberg. He writes :—

"The loss of our export trade would bring starvation to the masses of German workers, and compel them to emigrate and to beg before the doors of foreign nations for work and for food. The collapse of our export trade would be the most terrible catastrophe in German history and would rank with the Thirty Years' War as a calamity. It would wipe out the German nation from the great nations of the world and might end its political existence."

The latter views have been expressed but a few years ago.

The cotton famine in Lancashire, the constantly growing dependence of Great Britain on foreign food and raw material, the numerous "corners" in grain and cotton under which our country has suffered so much owing to the conspiracies of foreign monopolists, and the certainty that the other nations would corner our supplies at the outbreak of a great war in which we might be engaged, and that the British masses would then be starving, have made a deep and lasting impression in Germany. Therefore Germany wishes to act with foresight, and tries to take her precautions in time.

Before 1879 there was a period of moderate Free Trade in Germany, and German industries were acutely suffering for years. At last Bismarck intervened, and inaugurated in that year a strongly protective policy, and since then Germany's prosperity has grown by leaps and bounds. Up to the early eighties Germany was only known as the provider of inferior goods, which were usually clumsy imitations of English goods. The "Made in Germany" stamp was enforced largely, in order to check that abuse. But since that time Germany has conquered the markets of the world with products of the highest excellence, and every English newspaper-reader has become familiarised with German liners, Krupp armour, Siemens steel, Mauser rifles, Zeiss field-glasses, and German electrical and chemical products of the highest class, which have supplanted British products.

There have always been many Free Traders in the German Reichstag, as that assembly is largely composed of professional men and of men belonging to the leisured class who are consumers, not producers, who can easily understand the "consumers' argument," but who are out of touch with the producers of their country. Consequently, Bismarck's proposal for Protection met with considerable opposition from the parliamentarians and from the bankers and merchants. Agriculture and the manufacturing industries enthusiastically supported him. It must be interesting for Englishmen of all classes to follow Bismarck's arguments in favour of Protection. In his speech of the 2nd of May 1879, in which he introduced his protective policy, he said :—

"I do not mean to discuss Protection and Free Trade in the abstract. . . . We have opened wide the doors of our State to the imports of foreign countries, and we have become

the dumping-ground for the over-production of all those countries. Germany being swamped by the surplus production of foreign nations, prices have been depressed, and the development of all our industries and our entire economic position has suffered in consequence. If the danger of Protection were as great as we are told by enthusiastic free traders, France would have been impoverished long ago, for she has had Protection since the time of Colbert, and she should have been ruined long ago, owing to the theories which have guided her economic policy.

"After my opinion, we are slowly bleeding to death owing to insufficient Protection. This process has been arrested for a time by the five milliards which we have received from France after the war; otherwise we should have been compelled already five years ago to take those steps which we are taking to-day.

"We demand a moderate Protection for German labour. Let us close our doors and erect some barriers in order to reserve to German industries at least the home market, in which German good nature is at present being exploited by the foreigner. The problem of a large export trade is always an extremely delicate one. No more new countries will be discovered; the world has been circumnavigated, and we can no longer find abroad new purchasers of importance to whom we can send our goods.

"In questions such as these I view scientific theories with the same doubt with which I regard the theories applied to other organic formations. Medical science, as contrasted with anatomy, has made little progress with regard to those parts which the eye cannot reach, and to-day the riddle of organic changes in the human body is as great as it was formerly. With regard to the organism of the State, it is the same thing. The dicta of abstract science do not influence me in the slightest. I base my opinion on the practical experience of the time in which we are living. I see that those countries which possess Protection are prospering, and that those countries which possess Free Trade are decaying. Mighty England, that powerful athlete, stepped out into the open market after she had strengthened her sinews, and said, Who will fight me? I am prepared to meet everybody. But England herself is slowly returning to Protection, and in some years she will take it up in order to save for herself at least the home market."

On the 14th of June 1882, Bismarck made again an important speech on Protection and Free Trade and said :—

"I believe the whole theory of Free Trade to be wrong. . . . England has abolished Protection after she had benefited by it to the fullest extent. That country used to have the strongest protective tariffs until it had become so powerful under their protection that it could step out of those barriers like a gigantic athlete and challenge the world. Free Trade is the weapon of the strongest nation, and England has become the strongest nation owing to her capital, her iron, her coal, and her harbours, and owing to her favourable geographical position. Nevertheless she protected herself against foreign competition with exorbitant protective tariffs until her industries have become so powerful."

It is very interesting to observe that Prince Bismarck predicted already in 1882 that Great Britain would have to go back to Protection, "in order to secure for herself *at least the home market*," and that the demands for Protection which were advanced by List in 1840, and by Bismarck in 1879, were based on the same arguments as those on which Mr. Chamberlain based his demand for the reconsideration of our fiscal policy. German good nature was shut out of foreign markets by the arbitrary tariffs of foreign nations, which besides exploited, swamped, and spoiled her home market with their surplus production. It was necessary that she at least should reserve the home market for herself and create for herself a weapon which would make it possible for her to conclude advantageous commercial treaties.

The usual objections to Protection were naturally raised by German Free Traders when Bismarck reintroduced Protection, and it was predicted in non-industrial circles that Protection would mean disaster

to German industries and especially to the German export trade. The industrial classes, which clamoured for Protection, were loftily declared to be so short-sighted as to favour a suicidal policy. Protection would benefit only a few capitalists at the cost of the whole people, and it would ruin Germany by customs wars with other nations. These objections were very effectively dealt with by the German political economists who favoured Protection. Professor Schmoller, for instance, said in 1879, in reply to the objection that commerce and exportation would suffer by a protective tariff :—

"Exports will certainly suffer in one or the other branch, but that is a point of minor consideration. At present the conditions of our export business are so bad that they can hardly become worse. Our export trade can only become better if we have commercial treaties and an autonomous tariff."

Arguments like that of Professor Schmoller caused the Society for Social Policy in Berlin to adopt the following resolution in favour of Protection :—

"Considering that our endeavours to conclude commercial treaties, which will open new markets to German industries, must prove unsuccessful in view of the present position of the world, and

"Considering that it will be necessary to increase some important duties in order to place the finances of the Empire on a firm basis,

"The Society for Social Policy declares itself in favour of a moderate fiscal reform in a commercio-political and protectionist direction by a tariff which is especially directed against those countries which are particularly harmful to German production."

This resolution might have come from the mouth of Mr. Chamberlain.

The protective duties which, according to the

German Free Traders, were to prove so ruinous to Germany have, as yet, not crushed the German industries. Though the receipts from customs duties have more than sextupled since 1879, having risen from 114,716,000 marks in 1879 to no less than 715,696,000 marks in 1910, the German industries have not only not been crushed by the tariff, but are most prosperous. This is particularly noticeable in Saxony, the Lancashire of Germany, the income of that country having risen from 959,222,000 marks in 1879 to 1,666,521,000 marks in 1894, and to 2,797,643,500 marks in 1908. Therefore it appears that the income of the German Lancashire has considerably more than trebled since Protection was reintroduced into Germany. It is also significant that Saxony, with 4,500,000 inhabitants, has more than £85,000,000 deposited in its savings bank—as much as have 18,000,000 Englishmen. Evidently Free Trade has not brought ruin to the Lancashire of Germany.

The beneficial effect of the protective tariff on German industries was immediate. On the 16th of March 1881, Mr. von Kardorff stated in the German Diet that 85,901 men were occupied in the German iron and steel industries in January 1879, and 98,224 men in January 1881. They received in wages 5,288,539 marks in 1879, against 6,459,694 marks in January 1881, which is equal to an increase of 50.28 marks per annum for every worker. Mr. Loewe, another member of the Diet, reported on the same date that in the important districts of Bochum and Dortmund wages had risen from five to fifteen per cent., but not only had wages risen but the men who some years ago had been only partly occupied were now fully occupied. Some had formerly been

working only three or four days a week. Other deputies gave similar reports. This rising tendency of wages has almost uninterruptedly continued from 1879, when Bismarck's protective tariff was inaugurated, down to the present time. The average daily wages at Krupp's, for instance, have risen from 3s. in 1879 to 5s. 4½d. in 1907.

Lately the German Government has again increased its protective duties. Again we heard the non-industrial croakers predicting the ruin of the German industries, and again we saw the manufacturers supporting Protection. The German Government has been putting up its duties not because the present Protection has proved disappointing. On the contrary, it has explicitly enumerated the great benefits which Protection has conferred upon Germany. In the preamble to the last Tariff Bill, Government summed up the results of the protective policy hitherto pursued. It said :—

"Strengthened by Protection our industries have been able to increase considerably their production, and have thereby afforded fuller employment and rising wages to the working classes. With the larger turnover the traffic on our railways, rivers, and canals has grown, and our merchant marine has experienced a considerable and constantly increasing expansion, and its freight services for foreign countries have been a source of great profit to Germany. At the same time the participation of German capital in foreign enterprises has increased. Emigration has very substantially diminished. The effect of the growing wealth of the nation may be seen by the visible progress in the conditions and in the life of the broad masses of the people, especially of the working men. The improvement in the standard of life may be seen in the larger proportion of taxpayers who pay taxes on intermediate incomes; from the improved yield of the income tax; from the growth of savings banks deposits; from the expansion of life insurances, and from the rising consumption of the more expensive articles of food. This

improvement is especially striking, as a considerably increased population has had to be provided for, the inhabitants having increased from 45,000,000 in 1880 to 56,000,000 in 1900."

The vast increase in the wealth of Germany has chiefly been derived from the home market, which is no longer swamped and depressed by foreign surplus products, and which has become extremely stable and profitable. The semi-official year-book "Nauticus" says in 1900, in an article on the foundations of the industrial prosperity in Germany :—

"To sum up: during the last two decades the industrial production of Germany has experienced an extraordinary increase. That increase has been caused less by the greater amount of our exports than by the growing importance of the home markets—that is to say, by the growing wealth of the German people."

How rapidly the wealth of Germany has grown and how wealthy Germany has become is so well known that it requires no further proof.

People in this country who are insufficiently acquainted with German affairs may often be heard speaking somewhat vaguely of the great evils of Protection in Germany, and they will repeat, what they have so often read in text-books on political economy, that those iniquitous trusts only flourish under the shelter of Protection. Now it is quite true that a large number of very powerful trusts exist in Germany, which are called "Kartelle" in that country, but nobody intimately acquainted with Germany will be prepared to condemn indiscriminately those 200 large combinations, the majority of which are distinctly beneficial and are kept under proper control, because some of them may have abused their power. The doctrine that trusts flourish only under Protection,

which doctrine has been invented by Free Traders, is considered a fallacy in Germany, and it is pointed out that the most powerful and the most harmful trusts in the world exist and flourish in the paradise of Free Trade and of free competition, in Great Britain. The traffic arrangements between British railways and the "Shipping Conferences," which have abolished nearly all competition, are considered in Germany as gigantic trusts, which are trusts in everything but in name, which exercise not only a tyranny over the people of this country, but which directly favour foreign nations at the expense of Great Britain by carrying their goods more cheaply than British goods, and which have therefore been the cause of ruin for many British industries and especially for British agriculture.

The German Government observes the development of huge trusts in Germany not only with a benevolent interest, but lends them its active assistance and encourages their formation, from which it may be seen that their activity is not considered an evil by the German Government. The German Government adopts this attitude chiefly because the activity of the German trusts outside Germany largely consists in undermining and ruining foreign industries by swamping them with surplus products which are sold below cost price and in thus ridding German industries of dangerous competitors. The way in which the German Sugar Trust has created a huge industry in Germany, and has ruined and killed the formerly so prosperous West Indian sugar industry by flooding England with cheap sugar, is the best known example of that policy. Many similar but less well known instances of the activity of these trusts might be quoted. Their oppression of the

consumer, of which we hear so often, seems chiefly to exist in the imagination of British Free Trade doctrinaires, for in Germany few complaints are heard with regard to these combinations.

We have now followed Germany's economic history for the last sixty years, and we have seen how Germany has prospered and developed, how correct have been the economic views of German political economists, and how eminently successful her statesmen have been in their fiscal policy. Consequently, it would seem interesting to hear what those men think of the economic position of Great Britain. Mr. Victor Leo wrote in "The Tendencies of the World's Commerce" with regard to Great Britain :—

"The constantly growing excess of imports over exports, which has now risen to £150,000,000 per annum, is difficult to provide for even for a creditor country like Great Britain without entrenching on her capital."

Mr. Paul Voigt said in "Germany and the World Market" :—

"British exports have developed far less favourably than German exports. British exportation has become completely stagnant since the seventies, fluctuating between £210,000,000 and £250,000,000, and being therefore now very little larger than German exports. In Great Britain the export industry *par excellence*, the textile industry, is in a particularly unfavourable condition. The adverse balance of British trade has grown continually from less than £50,000,000 in the sixties to more than £150,000,000 at the present time."

These two statements are characteristic for the very serious view which is generally taken in Germany with regard to our economic position, and in the best-informed German circles it is often asserted that Great Britain has for a long time been living on her capital. German statesmen and financiers find a

confirmation of this view in the low price of British Consols and of all British investment stocks; in the fact that Great Britain used to possess huge quantities of Continental Government loans and other Continental investments, and of American railway stocks and bonds, and that she now holds hardly any of them; that American and Continental trade used to be financed, and American and Continental property be mortgaged, in London, and that the trade of the world is no longer financed by this country. From these, and many other symptoms of similar portent, German observers conclude that Great Britain has paid for the huge excess of her imports over her exports by realising a large part of her foreign investments in real estate, stock exchange securities, &c., that the capital of Great Britain is constantly being drained away by foreign countries, and that this process cannot go on indefinitely.

Bismarck said in 1882: "Free Trade is the weapon of the strongest." This argument appears to be irrefutable by logic and in the light of history. Great Britain is economically no longer the strongest among the nations of the world, but is, in proportion to other nations, rapidly getting poorer, and this fact alone should be of sufficient importance to make us consider our position and reconsider our fiscal policy.

CHAPTER XXVII

WHY AND HOW BISMARCK INTRODUCED PROTECTION

THE following mostly confidential State Papers were written or dictated by Prince Bismarck, and illustrate clearly the genesis of the movement for Protection in Germany, which has many points of resemblance with the present movement for a reform of British fiscal policy. They show why and how Germany introduced Protection. Therefore they ought to be of the greatest interest and value to British Tariff Reformers.

Memorandum pro Memoria, the 13th of October 1875.

His Excellency Prince Bismarck is of opinion—which opinion he is inclined to express publicly, and the criticism of which he leaves to experts—that *nothing but reprisals* against their products will avail against those States which increase their duties to the harm of German exports. The objections raised against such steps in the name of political economy seem untenable for reasons of policy.

Extract from Despatch to Prince Hohenlohe, German Ambassador in Paris, March 1876.

We cannot disguise to ourselves that, if the existing system of export bounties in France (by means of *acquits-à-caution*) should continue we would be compelled to levy countervailing duties on French iron

similar in amount to the bounties given by the French Government.

Letter to Minister of State Hoffmann, the 27th of October 1876.

. . . I request your Excellency to make proposals to me how and in which way the Imperial authorities might be empowered to take measures in order to combat the abuse of secret bounties which are given by the French Government to the French industries.

With regard to this matter, we cannot remain dependent upon the good-will of foreign Governments, but require absolute guarantees which we can only find in our own institutions and in our own measures; for even if we should succeed in obtaining by diplomatic negotiations and by the threat of reprisals from the French Government assurances which would appear satisfactory on paper, the French customs authorities would nevertheless in practice always be able to favour the interest of French subjects at the cost of German trade. The administrative arbitrariness of the customs officials in France, which is connived at by the highest authorities in Paris, is too great to allow us to rely upon the French authorities for the protection of German interests.

The honesty and the greater clumsiness of our officials, together with the greater publicity under which our own administration has to work, puts us easily at a disadvantage in dealing with the astute and disciplined officials of foreign Governments. By "disciplined" I mean the greater obedience of foreign officials even to such instructions as are not publicly admitted, and their greater skill in twisting the sense of commercial stipulations in such a way that the

advantages are all on one side, tactics which we find in France not only among the customs authorities but also among the transporting and forwarding intermediaries.

I believe, therefore, that we must not conclude a new commercial treaty which in any way fetters our freedom of action in the sphere of tariffs.

Letter to Minister of State Hoffmann, the 17th of November 1876.

In the draft bill [1] received with your letter of the 15th of this month, Paragraph I., and especially Paragraph II., leave to us the burden of proof as to the actual export bounties which are granted by foreign Governments. It is within our power neither to determine the existence of such bounties nor to adduce legally valid proof as to their amount and extent. The determination of these bounties depends partly on scientific and partly on technical arguments, and on their applicability opinions may be divided.

In view of the lesser scrupulousness with which foreign Governments observe their treaty obligations, and in view of the greater facility with which the customs apparatus of foreign countries is made subservient to the Government for secret purposes *which are not avowed*, it is to be expected that we shall be

[1] The chief provisions of this draft bill were :

Paragraph I. Goods which are imported into Germany, and which receive an export bounty from another country, are, when introduced into Germany, liable to a countervailing duty which may be imposed by Imperial proclamation.

Paragraph II. The countervailing duty must not exceed the amount of the export bounty.

Paragraph III. Countervailing duties can be levied either upon the products of a certain country or upon all goods arriving from that country, without regard to their country of origin.

outwitted in all treaties which presuppose that the *bona fides* of foreign officials is equal to that of our own.

I do, therefore, not think it advisable for us to conclude commercial treaties which limit our freedom of action with regard to tariffs for the whole time for which such treaties are concluded. Only in freedom of action and in our determination to make use of that freedom of action to the fullest extent, shall we find protection against injuries inflicted upon us which we may recognise, but for which we cannot adduce legally valid proof.

Letter to Minister of Finance Camphausen, the 13th of February 1877.

. . . We should bear in mind that the German industries ought to be effectively protected against the injuries that are at present being inflicted upon them by the fiscal policy of foreign States. Therefore it should be our aim to secure for the exports of our home industries into foreign countries conditions at least as favourable as are the conditions which foreign countries enjoy in the German market. We have consequently not only to consider the duties which are levied on foreign frontiers and on our own, but also the export bounties which are granted in various countries, and which, I fear, are insufficient in the case of Germany and lower than those which are given by foreign countries.

Confidential Letter to all the German Governments, the 2nd of July 1878.

In view of the attitude of the German Diet during its last session towards the taxation proposals recently

made by the allied Governments, I think it desirable that the allied Governments should in time arrive at an agreement as to the financial policy of the future, in order to be able to submit proposals for a comprehensive programme of economic reform to the Diet during its next session.

The chief object of that reform should be the expansion of the Imperial revenues, which expansion has on all sides been considered necessary.

Consultation and agreement among the various Governments is required with regard to the following points :

(1) As to the degree to which the revenues must be increased.

(2) As to the objects on which taxation should be increased.

(3) As to the manner in which that higher taxation should be levied.

(4) As to the effect which the settlement of these three points will have upon our fiscal policy.

It appears recommendable that these questions should be discussed by way of confidential conversation between the allied Governments before formal legislation be entered upon. Consequently I take the liberty of submitting to the allied Governments the proposal that, as soon as possible, a conference of the competent ministers should take place.

For such a conference some days in the first half of August would appear to be a suitable time, and a town should be selected for it which is geographically most convenient to all the representatives of the various States. Heidelberg would perhaps be best situated and would be more suitable than Berlin.

In order to give the chief points which will be of interest for the conference I have the honour to

enclose for your confidential information several copies of a memorial [1] in which the questions mentioned are treated.

I take the liberty of asking your Government to let me know as soon as possible whether it would take part in such a conference, and whether my proposals as to time and place are convenient. In case your Government should assent to my proposal I should be glad to be furnished with the names of its representatives as soon as possible.

(The conference in Heidelberg took place between the 5th and 8th of August 1878, and led to an agreement in nearly all points with the proposals made by Prussia.)

Confidential Circular to all the Prussian Ambassadors accredited to the various German Courts, the 28th of October 1878.

I have the honour to send enclosed a copy of a proposal for a revision of our fiscal policy, which proposal has been advanced by the Prussian Ministry of State. I think that it would be desirable to have thereon the views of the allied Governments.

You will therefore communicate in confidence the contents of the enclosure to the Government to which you are accredited, and ask in my name for an expression of its views on that question.

At the same time you will direct the attention of the Government to which you are accredited to the following: The policy of fostering individual industries by protective tariff (for reasons apart from financial considerations) is a policy which is permanently or

[1] The text of the memorial alluded to is not obtainable, but it was probably identical with the next document.

temporarily pursued by all Governments. The opposition which that policy usually finds amongst those producers who are not protected is directed principally against the privileges which individual protected industries are supposed to obtain at the cost of all other industries.

To such opposition a protective system will not be exposed which levies duties on *all* merchandise [1] which passes our frontiers from abroad and which treats all produce alike, subjecting all without exception to *ad valorem* duties.

Prompted by the justified pursuit of German national interest, the whole of the German production would receive a more favourable treatment in the home market than would be granted to foreign production.

According to my opinion, such a system has the following advantages :

(1) The financial results of an *ad valorem* duty would be very considerable.

(2) Such duties would not be oppressive in any direction, as they would affect all classes equally. As every producer in the Empire is at the same time a consumer of the products of other industries, the advantages and disadvantages caused by such a tariff would be balanced and would be more equally distributed than if duties were imposed upon a limited number of particular products.

Only a small minority of the population is non-producing and lives on a settled income, on fixed salaries, professional fees, &c. This fact increases to

[1] Prince Bismarck amended this statement later on by declaring that foreign raw products which are required for manufacturing purposes, and which cannot be produced in Germany, would either not be taxed at all or would be taxed according to requirement.

a considerable degree the difficulties which are in the way of the introduction of such a tariff. These difficulties are especially great, as the majority of our legislators in Parliament, and of our permanent officials, belong to that minority. However, the justified claims of our officials can always be satisfied by increasing their salaries if prices should really advance after an increase in the customs duties has taken place. At all events it does not seem likely that a considerable rise in prices will occur.

(3) The duties raised on foreign imports will either not be borne by the home consumer at all or such duties will be borne by him to a small extent only. These duties will diminish the profit which the foreign producer has hitherto made from us, and will perhaps also affect the profit of the middleman.

By the fact that foreign countries always show the greatest concern if another country desires to increase its duties, it can be seen that such customs duties are to a very large extent borne by the foreign producer and not by the consumer. If the home consumer should really have to bear the weight of increased duties, such an increase would leave the foreign producer indifferent. However, that is not the case, for the gain of the foreign importer is diminished either by the whole amount of the duty or by part of it. Under a system of protective tariffs the Empire will, therefore, derive part of its income from foreign countries.

(4) The cost of the customs apparatus will not be much increased, as the customs arrangements already existing have to be maintained in any case, and they will probably prove sufficient for dealing with the additional goods subject to duties.

So far I have not made proposals in any direction

with regard to the considerations enumerated above. The purpose of this letter is to ascertain how far it is advisable for the Imperial Chancellor to proceed officially, in which way he should proceed, and how far such proposals would be favourably received.

You will, therefore, bring about a confidential expression of views on the part of the Government to which you are accredited and notify to me the result of your conversation.

Enclosure referred to in the previous Letter.

The financial, economic, and political conditions which have determined the direction of our fiscal policy have materially altered in the course of the last years.

The financial position of the Empire and of the single States requires an increase of the revenues. During the confidential conversations which took place last summer in Heidelberg with regard to fiscal reform the conviction was unanimously expressed that the system of indirect taxation should be further developed.

Besides the present state of the German industries and the tendency to increase the protection of home production against foreign competition, which has become apparent in our great neighbour States and in America, have made it necessary to inquire carefully whether it would not be desirable to reserve the German home market also, to a greater extent than heretofore, to the national industries. By taking these steps, the growth of our home production would be encouraged, and at the same time material for future negotiations would be created, provided with which we might try later on in which way and how

far the customs barriers of foreign countries, which at present damage our exporting industries, might be removed for the benefit of our industries by new commercial treaties.

The results of an inquiry into the position of the iron, cotton, and woollen industries which is being conducted will supply us with useful material for answering the question whether an increase of our import duties or their reintroduction will be conducive to the welfare of those industries.

Preliminary investigations have already been made, and papers will be placed before a committee of the council which will be appointed for the object of changing the customs tariff in such a way that in the first place the present disproportion between import duties on manufactured goods and on raw produce will disappear, and that in the second place the protection of our various industries against foreign competition will be increased. However, the introduction of higher duties than those contemplated is in no way excluded. . . .

In order to solve the questions alluded to as quickly as possible and to end the present oppressive uncertainty with regard to the future course of our fiscal policy, which weighs on all our industries, it seems necessary to nominate a special commission for utilising the material which already exists and which has been collected by the inquiries already made in order to prepare the revision of our customs tariff.

The duty of the commission would be to examine the whole of the tariff, and it should be composed partly of officials of the Empire and partly of officials of the most important individual States. The number of its members should not be too small in view of the scope of the task. The working out of questions of

detail should be left to smaller sub-commissions which could be formed from the larger commission. It is also recommendable to empower the commission and the sub-commission to call and examine experts or to call for written opinions and statements through the various authorities.

(On the 12th of November 1878, a copy of this document was sent to the Federal Council, and on the 12th of December a commission was appointed which received Bismarck's views and instructions by his letter of the 15th of December, which is printed below.)

Reply to Objections made by German Governments with regard to the proposed Alterations in the Tariff, end of November 1878.

. . . The proposal to impose duties on our imports may be viewed with suspicion by consumers, and chiefly by those consumers who live on their assured income free from care. But the means of those people also will give out if they do not make up their mind to consider the position of the *producing* part of the population. If the producing part of the population is impoverished the whole State is impoverished. . . . Who after all is to carry the whole burden of the State ? The producer alone ? *Consumers are all.*

Memorandum to Federal Council, the 15th of December 1878.

. . . It is not a matter of chance that other States, especially those which politically and economically have made the greatest progress, rely chiefly on customs duties for their revenue.

Direct taxation which is demanded from the individual, and which, in case of need, is obtained by force, is by its very nature more oppressive than indirect taxation, which is almost unperceived by the consumer. . . . Direct taxation weighs especially heavily upon the middle classes.

It is a matter of course that is not intended that the increase of indirect taxation should mean an increase in the whole burden of taxation, which is not determined by the national income, but by its necessary budgetary expenditure. It is not the intention of the Government to produce larger revenues than are absolutely necessary, but it is its intention to produce them in the least oppressive manner. *The reform of our fiscal policy consists not in increasing taxation but in removing the burden from the more oppressive direct to the less oppressive indirect contributions by a revised tariff.*

To attain that end it would appear recommendable that all merchandise passing our frontiers should be subjected to customs duties. From those duties the raw materials which are necessary to our industries and which are not produced in Germany (such as cotton), or which are produced in insufficient quantity or quality, should be excepted. The duties should be graduated in accordance with the requirements of our home industries. . . .

The increased yield of indirect taxation would not necessitate a corresponding increase in the expenses for collecting the duties, as the existing customs apparatus will probably prove sufficient to cope with the additional work with which it will have to deal.

Though I am laying the greatest stress on the financial aspect of a change in our fiscal policy, I am of opinion that the reintroduction of protection cannot be attacked by political economists on economic grounds.

It is an open question whether a state of complete and reciprocal international Free Trade would be to the interest of Germany. As long as most other nations with which Germany has to keep up business relations are surrounded with tariff walls which are continually rising higher, it seems both justifiable and necessary to introduce protection. . . .

Protective duties in favour of individual industries are like privileges, and meet with hostility on the part of those industries which are unprotected. In order not to give undue privileges to individual industries it would, therefore, be advisable to give a preference *to all home production over foreign production in the home market.*

Such a system would not be oppressive and would be just to all, as the duties would be more equally distributed over all the productive forces of the nation than in the case of protective duties in favour of individual industries.

The small minority of the population which does not produce at all, the consumers pure and simple, would apparently suffer by Protection; but if the prosperity of the country should be increased by Protection the non-productive section of the community and the recipients of fixed salaries, imperial and local officials, &c., would certainly also be benefited. The community would be enabled to give compensation to those classes for a possible rise in the price of commodities; but if such a rise should take place it would be but infinitesimal and nothing like the rise that is usually imagined and feared by the consumers.

Duties which are imposed merely for revenue purposes on products which cannot be raised in the country, and which *must* be imported from abroad,

will always to a large extent be borne by the home consumer. However, on those products which can in sufficient quantity and quality be raised in the country, the foreign producer will have to bear the whole of the duty in order to be able to compete in our market. Lastly, in such cases where a part of the home demand must be supplied by imports from abroad, the foreign competitor will be forced to pay at least a part and sometimes the whole of the duties, and to be satisfied with a smaller profit than heretofore. The customs duties on those products which are in part raised in this country would to a large extent be paid by foreign countries, which may be seen by the interested clamour which is always raised abroad whenever new duties are introduced or when the old ones are increased. If the home consumer would in practice be burdened with the weight of import duties, the introduction of such duties would leave the foreign producer more indifferent.

Whenever a portion of the import duties is borne by the home consumer, it is small in proportion to the fluctuations in price which are caused by the changes in supply and demand. Compared with the great and rapid fluctuations arising from these causes a duty of 5 or 10 per cent. *ad valorem* can only exercise a proportionately small influence upon prices. . . .

The return to the principle of Protection all round has become necessary owing to the altered economic position of the world. *In the revision of our fiscal policy we can be solely guided by the interests of Germany.*

Commercial negotiations with foreign countries may soon be expected, and we can initiate such negotiations in the hope of securing favourable treatment of our claims and favourable conditions to

German trade only if the whole of our industries can, by an autonomous tariff, be brought into a favoured position with regard to foreign countries.

Speech from the Throne to the newly elected Reichstag, the 12th of February 1879.

. . . The new fiscal proposals are firstly intended to increase our resources by broadening the basis of taxation and by abolishing that taxation which is felt to be most oppressive. At the same time I am of opinion that our home industries in their entirety have a claim for as much assistance as can be granted to them by duties and taxes, an assistance which in other countries is given to similar industries perhaps *in excess* of the industrial requirements.

I think it my duty to try to reserve at least the German home market to national production so far as that policy is compatible with our other interests. We shall, therefore, return to those principles which have been proved by experience, which have guided the Zollverein during almost half a century of prosperity, and which we have, to a large extent, deserted since 1865. I fail to see that that departure from Protection has brought to us any real advantages.

Statement placed before the German Diet in support of the Tariff Proposals and explaining their Aim, the 13th of April 1879.

. . . German fiscal policy, in taking up Free Trade, had entered upon a phase during which the well-being of our national industries and the retention of the home market for the benefit of our own industries were almost completely left out of consideration.

That economic policy would have been advantageous and justified only under two conditions.

Firstly, it was necessary that other countries should follow our example and also adopt Free Trade, and the hope that they would do so was widely entertained in economic circles until a few years ago, and was also very prevalent in the Diet. But to-day no doubt exists that the first condition which can justify Free Trade has not come into existence, for no nation has followed our example.

The second condition which could justify the introduction of Free Trade was that no changes in the international economic conditions unfavourable to Germany should take place since the time when Free Trade was inaugurated, and that Germany should preserve her relative economic position amongst nations. This condition also has not been fulfilled.

The marvellous development of transport has, during the last ten or twenty years, completely changed the economic aspect of the world and the distribution of economic power. The most important German industries are at present endangered by huge foreign industries whose production, owing to the greatly increased transport facilities, threatens the German market in a way that, but a short time ago, could not have been anticipated. Furthermore foreign nations have learned—and the United States are an example—to dispense with German goods by surrounding themselves with hostile tariffs and by creating industries of their own in their country.

Our present tariffs, therefore, correspond no longer with the economic conditions of the world and with the requirements of the time.

To the allied Governments the considerations enumerated appeared so weighty as to make a recon-

sideration of our fiscal policy necessary, and from the disadvantages mentioned the direction which the necessary fiscal reforms should have to take became clearly apparent.

In view of the position described above, it evidently became necessary to come to the assistance not of certain individual industries which had suffered, but of all the national industries, by giving them, wherever such treatment appeared desirable, a preference in the home market.

With this end in view a special commission was nominated which has examined every single item of the proposed tariff.

The changes which have occurred in the relative economic position of various nations must make it apparent that it is risky for Germany to keep our market any longer open to foreign nations, especially if we bear in mind that other nations, whose system is more strongly protective than our own, have reserved their home market to their own industries by increased customs duties.

As the unsatisfactory state of the German industries is not of recent growth, material to support the justified claims of our industries is not lacking. Two inquiries into the decay of two industries, which have particularly acutely suffered, were made last summer, and the conclusions arrived at are at the disposal of the various Governments.

The finding of the commission which has examined the requirements of the various industries is apparent from the individual provisions of the new tariff, in which the reasons which have been instrumental for determining each individual provision have also been stated. The general conclusion at which the commission has arrived may be summed up as follows:

Whenever a pressing necessity can be proved to exist, home industries should receive a somewhat higher protection than that hitherto received. As a rule our industries should be granted only a moderate advantage over foreign competition. In drawing up the provisions of the tariff it has been borne in mind that the ability of German industries to export should be fully maintained and that that ability should be strengthened by reserving to them the home market.

Letter to Minister of Finance Bitter, the 13th of May 1880.

With reference to your letter of the 4th of May regarding the decrease in the yield of the income tax on small incomes (*Klassensteuer*), I agree with you that it is necessary to proceed with the utmost economy, and to recommend to the local authorities the greatest possible indulgence in levying taxes in view of the diminished prosperity of the country. In reply to your letter I should like to make the following observations :—

The shrinkage in the income tax on *small incomes* is a proof of the shrinkage in the prosperity of the population. That shrinkage has made itself felt for several years past, and according to my conviction it would have taken place several years earlier had it not been for the war contribution of 5,000,000,000 francs which we received from France between 1871 and 1874. Only that circumstance has, for a time, arrested the deterioration in our economic position which has been caused by the Free Trade legislation that was initiated after the Zollverein period. If these statements should require further proof, the fact that the masses of our population are impoverishing should

be sufficient. That decline in our prosperity began when our fiscal policy was altered in the direction of Free Trade. . . . Only the French War contributions stopped for a time the decay of our prosperity that began when we deserted the traditional policy of the Zollverein, which had been followed ever since 1823. We may, therefore, hope to see this decay disappear if our legislation continues to advance in the direction which it took in the session of 1879, without regard to the wishes of an opposition whose action was due rather to the consideration of the requirements of the political parties in the Diet than to considerations of public welfare.

. . . That the income tax on *large* incomes has risen whilst that on small incomes has fallen off seems to me to be due to nothing else than to the greater pressure which has been exercised by the tax-gathering apparatus whose principle it is to increase the assessment until the public makes formal complaints. However, merchants and other business men who require credit do not easily make such formal complaints, because of their credit requirements. But even those income-tax payers who need not think of their credit will rather bear an undue increase in their assessment for a time, as long as that increase is not *out of all proportion*, than take the trouble of sending in formal complaints. Only incomes which emanate from regularly flowing sources and which are paid in cash can be measured with absolute accuracy. I can, therefore, only view with suspicion the way in which the income-tax gathering authorities have proceeded, if the income tax received between 1874 and 1880 has increased by nearly 12 per cent. when all incomes, as is well known, have decreased. In consideration of the depressing circumstances of the present time and

of the shrinkage in our income, I cannot believe that such an increase could have been effected except by causing perfectly justified dissatisfaction amongst the taxpayers.

If I therefore agree with the wishes of the Minister of Finance for economy, I cannot help seeing in the arguments which your Excellency has advanced in your memorandum a proof how greatly the Free Trade disturbance, which has affected the fiscal traditions of the Zollverein, has damaged the prosperity of the German nation, and how necessary it is to continue to oppose Free Trade. The history of the Zollverein up to the end of the sixties was a history of uninterrupted prosperity for Prussia, notwithstanding the narrow limits of the country and notwithstanding the greater impediments to our home trade owing to our inferior means of transport. During the short space of but half a year since we have deliberately turned away from that mistaken system of Free Trade we have already witnessed a slight improvement in our economic position, and we may count on an increasing improvement if we continue to proceed on the road upon which we have entered.

CHAPTER XXVIII

GERMANY'S WEALTH AND FINANCES [1]

THE principal wealth of a country lies in the productive power of the people. Germany has 66,000,000 inhabitants; Great Britain has only 45,000,000 inhabitants. In man-power, which, rightly considered, is more important than machine-power, Germany is 50 per cent. stronger than Great Britain.

At the time of her great prosperity the population of Great Britain increased more rapidly than that of any other country. Now, every report of the Registrar-General establishes a new low record of the birth-rate, which is rapidly sinking to the level of that of France. Additional men would not increase the national wealth, but only accentuate existing unemployment and poverty in Great Britain. Already we have to maintain more than a million paupers. While the population of Great Britain increases by about 400,000 a year, the population of Germany increases by more than 900,000 a year.

It is obvious that 66,000,000 fully employed Germans produce more than 45,000,000 ill-employed Englishmen, especially as the former are better organised than the latter, and as they employ the most scientific processes and the most perfect machinery. It is true that the three British show-industries—cotton, shipbuilding, and shipping—are much larger than the corresponding German ones, but

[1] Part of this chapter has appeared in the *Daily Mail*.

Germany has proportionately a far greater predominance in other industries. Her chemical and electrical industries, for instance, are foremost in the world, and in the production of steel she has rapidly overtaken Great Britain, as the following figures prove :—

	German Steel Production.	British Steel Production.
1880 . . .	624,000 tons	1,342,000 tons
1908 . . .	11,000,000 tons	5,300,000 tons

Since 1879, the year when she introduced Protection, Germany's supremacy in steel over this country has become overwhelming.

We are only too familiar with the stagnation and the decay which prevail in nearly all our industries. The abounding prosperity of the German industries may be seen at a glance from the following figures :—

	Horse-power of Industrial Steam-engines in Prussia.
1879	984,000 horse-power
1900	4,046,036 „
1909	6,754,468 „

Corresponding official figures for England do not exist.

It is ominous that between 1900 and 1909, in the short space of nine years, German industrial horse-power should have increased by 2,750,000, or by almost 70 per cent.

The abounding wealth of Germany may be seen from the expenditure of the State and of individuals. Germany has spent about £50,000,000 on worthless Colonies; she is spending £35,000,000 on the re-settlement of her Polish provinces; she is spending more than £50,000,000 on her canals; she is spending more than £20,000,000 per annum on her fleet, and £50,000,000 per annum on workmen's insurance.

The assertion that Germany is poor is ridiculous. Money is dear in Germany chiefly because the rapidly expanding industries absorb all the liquid funds. Moneyed Germans invest their cash in the national industries and make 6 per cent. Moneyed Englishmen invest their cash in Stock Exchange securities, and especially foreign stocks, because our shrunken and decaying industries are no longer safe and desirable investments. The cheapness of money in England is not a sign of our wealth, but of industrial stagnation and decay. Our vast foreign trade represents turnover, not profits and wealth. Even Germany's foreign investments seem to be almost as large as those of this country. About 1897 she drew £60,000,000 a year from that source alone, and now her income from foreign investments is officially estimated to amount to from £75,000,000 to £100,000,000 per annum.

A comparison of German and British finances will prove that Germany is financially in a very strong position, that she is in a position which should arouse not our scorn but our envy.

The National Debt of Great Britain amounted in 1908 to £760,000,000, or £17, 6s. per inhabitant. The Debts of the German Empire and of all the States composing it amounted in 1908 in the aggregate to £772,000,000, or to only £12, 5s. per inhabitant. Great Britain possesses practically no realisable assets against her National Debt except the Suez Canal shares and some small items valued together at £40,000,000. Deducting this sum, England's net debt stands at £720,000,000. This amount has been spent on powder and shot, and represents nothing but powder and shot.

The German National Debt has a different origin.

It has been spent not on war, but mainly on the purchase of commercial undertakings, and is a debt in name rather than in fact. Against the German National Debt of £772,000,000 there are vast industrial assets, the value of which is far greater than her indebtedness. While Great Britain possesses no purely commercial State enterprises, the German States possess many commercial undertakings of very great value. Nearly all the railways, nearly all the canals, extensive agricultural domains, vast forests and numerous mines, salt works, factories, and banks are Government property in Germany.

During 1909 the net profits of the State enterprises of Prussia alone were as follows :—

Net profit of State railways	£26,135,000
Net profit of State forests	2,880,000
Net profit of State mines and salt works . .	900,000
Net profit of State agricultural domains . .	800,000
Net profit of various undertakings	800,000
Total	£31,515,000

How carefully the German Empire and the individual States manage their commercial and industrial enterprises may be seen from the fact that, according to a statement made on behalf of the Prussian Ministry of Public Works in the Prussian Diet on March 7, 1907, the price for which the Prussian State railways were acquired was £475,000,000. Of this amount £150,000,000 has been written off, so that the book debt on account of the railways amounts now only to £325,000,000, although the intrinsic value is, according to the State Department, at least £1,000,000,000. This is conservative finance.

Other State enterprises are managed on the same principle. The progressive value of the Prussian State

railways may be seen from the fact that their net earnings have doubled during the last ten years, and these are likely to increase considerably in the near future. The profits of the mines, domains, and forests of the State show a similar increase. Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg, and the other States have railways, forests, mines, and other industrial undertakings of their own. The combined net profits of the commercial undertakings of the Empire and of the States composing it exceed at present £60,000,000 per annum. Capitalised at 4 per cent., the State enterprises of Germany represent, therefore, at present a value of £1,500,000,000.

Against the British National Debt there are practically no realisable assets. Against the German National Debt there are enormous assets. If Germany should sell her public undertakings to limited companies, she could pay off all her debts and receive besides a cash bonus of £800,000,000. She could cancel her entire debt by selling one-half of the State enterprises.

In Great Britain the State is merely an administrative institution. It is propertyless, and, being propertyless, it ought not to borrow and ought not to have a purely unproductive National Debt which is merely a drag on production. In Germany the National Debt is an excellent and highly productive investment which represents a large part of the national working capital. In Germany the State is not only an administrative machine, but is also a business enterprise, and, being exceedingly prosperous, it constantly requires fresh capital, as does every prosperous and expanding private business or limited company.

The bulk of the loans recently issued by Germany

was for the purpose of constructing a vast network of light railways and canals which, like most of her Government undertakings, will greatly assist her manufacturers and traders, and will in due course return about 8 per cent. in net profit, as do her other undertakings. Hence, Germany need not mind borrowing the money required at 4 per cent. Besides, while she borrows certain sums chiefly for building railways and canals, she writes off much larger sums from her industrial undertakings, as may be seen from the example of her railways. Thus the excess of State assets over State liabilities is constantly growing, and Great Britain has little cause to pity Germany for her indebtedness and her borrowings.

Germany is in a far more favourable position than Great Britain, not only as regards indebtedness but also as regards taxation, as the following figures show :—

Income-tax in Prussia. (Allowing for Abatements.)		Income-tax in Great Britain. (Allowing for Abatements.)
On £150 . .	4¼d. in the pound.	9d. to 1s. 8d. in the pound.
„ 300 . .	5⅜d. „	
„ 500 . .	7¼d. „	
„ 1000 . .	7¼d. „	
„ 2000 . .	7⅜d. „	
„ 3000 . .	8¼d. „	

Estate duty to direct descendants :—

None in Germany . . . 1–15 per cent. in Great Britain.

Import Duties in Germany.	Import Duties in Great Britain.
10s. 7d. per head	15s. per head.

All Indirect Taxes in Germany.	All Indirect Taxes in Great Britain.
18s. per head	30s. per head.

For every pound paid by the average German in local taxation the average Englishman pays £2, 10s.

The foregoing figures prove that, compared with Englishmen, Germans are very lightly taxed, that they are able to stand a much heavier taxation, and that they should easily be able to raise by taxation the money which they require.

Those who wish to prove that the financial position of Great Britain is better than that of Germany are reduced to the argument that England's credit is better than Germany's because England borrows at 3 per cent. while Germany borrows at 4 per cent. This argument is fallacious. The wealth of a country cannot be measured by the quantity of unemployed money requiring investment which determines interest. Cheapness of money and consequent low interest is often not a sign of national wealth but of unemployment for money in industry, of industrial stagnation and decay. I have shown in my book on the "Rise and Decline of the Netherlands" that, after the decay of her industries, money was cheaper in Holland than anywhere else. The Government could borrow at 2 per cent. Dutch 2½ per cent. Consols stood high above par. In those countries where industries are most flourishing and expansive, such as the United States and Germany, unemployed money is scarce and dear, and interest is high as a rule.

Besides, as every financier knows, British Consols stand higher than German Consols largely because they have artificially been driven up by forced purchases under the Trustee Acts, and by the fact that all Government funds and the entire savings banks deposits must be invested in British Government securities. Germany has never made a similar attempt to drive up the price of her loans. Her Government offices hold hardly any Government stock, and trust funds and savings banks deposits are invested chiefly in

mortgages. The wealth of the classes in Germany has increased as follows :—

	Income subjected to Income-tax in Prussia. (Allowing for Abatements.)	Income subjected to Income-tax in Great Britain. (Allowing for Abatements.)
1892 . . .	£298,069,881	£537,151,200
1909 . . .	660,981,000	652,886,576

As figures relating to the income subjected to income-tax and applying to the whole of Germany are not in my possession, I can give only those for Prussia. The income of the classes of the whole of Germany should be about 50 per cent. larger than that of Prussia, and should amount for 1909, roughly speaking, to £1,000,000,000, as against £653,000,000 for Great Britain. Income-tax is levied, and income is estimated, on different principles in the two countries. Therefore the two total sums given are not strictly comparable. However, the foregoing statement is of the greatest interest, inasmuch as it shows that the income of the classes in Germany has increased by about 125 per cent. during a period when it has increased by only 25 per cent. in Great Britain. The trifling increase of about 25 per cent. of the income subjected to income-tax in this country is merely equal to the increase of the population during the same period. Therefore, individual wealth has apparently remained almost stationary in Great Britain. However, in view of the fact that the British income-tax collectors have of late years "put the screw on" in an unprecedented manner, it seems likely that the income of Great Britain has in reality remained stationary, or has more probably decreased, during a time when it has almost doubled in Germany.

Germany is no doubt at present by far the wealthiest State in Europe.

CHAPTER XXIX

GERMAN LABOUR CONDITIONS

SUFFICIENCY of employment is the greatest interest of the workers. Let us investigate the state of employment in Germany by comparing it with the state of employment in Great Britain.

Employment is constantly in a state of flux. The ebb and flow of the national labour market may be gauged to some extent from the ebb and flow of the people across its frontiers, and from the ebb and flow of the money in its savings banks. Broadly speaking, it may be said that workers emigrate from countries where employment is bad to countries where it is good. Unemployment and ill-paid employment are no doubt the principal causes of emigration, whilst good employment and well-paid employment are the chief causes of immigration. Therefore the emigration and immigration statistics give a most valuable indication of the state of the national labour market in its entirety, as compared with the purely sectional trade union labour market. Besides, workers who are well employed and well paid are able to save much, whilst workers who are ill-employed and ill-paid can save but little. Consequently in countries where workers are well employed and well paid, savings banks deposits should increase rapidly, whilst in countries where workers are badly employed, and consequently badly paid, savings banks deposits should be stationary or even retrogressive. Hence, the state

of employment among the workers of a nation may further be gauged by observing the business transacted by the savings banks.

The foregoing shows that unemployment may be measured by three different tests: the trade union unemployment test which is generally used; the immigration and emigration test; and the savings banks test. Normally, all three should agree—that is, the indications as to the state of employment furnished by one of these tests should be confirmed by the two remaining tests. Now let us, at the hand of these three tests, compare unemployment in Great Britain and in Germany.

PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG TRADE UNIONISTS.

Years.	In Germany.	In Great Britain.
1903	2.7	5.0
1904	2.1	6.4
1905	1.6	5.3
1906	1.1	3.7
1907	1.5	3.9
1908	3.1	8.7
1909	2.8	7.7

It will be observed that during the period 1903–1909—the official German unemployment statistics were first issued in 1903—unemployment among trade unionists was, as a rule, from three to four times as large in Great Britain as it was in Germany. However, there is an irreducible minimum of unemployment in every country, a minimum which arises from the fact that workers leave one situation on a Wednesday and enter another one on the following Monday, or on Monday week, without being in the meantime unemployed in the usual sense of the term, although they may be reported as being unemployed by their trade unions. Besides, voluntary

holidays, illnesses, &c., cause absence from work, but not unemployment strictly so-called. If we allow, let us say, 1 per cent. for this irreducible minimum of purely technical unemployment, it would appear that between 1903 and 1909 unemployment among trade unionists was about four times as great in Great Britain as it was in Germany; that for every unemployed trade unionist in Germany, there were no less than four unemployed trade unionists in Great Britain.

The state of employment in Germany may be measured not only by the trade union statistics but also by the Sick Fund figures, which are published every month, and which show how many workers are ensured against disease with the State Insurance Societies. By comparing the number of insured workers during 1908 and the previous year, and by allowing for the natural increase of workers, Richard Calwer, a prominent German statistician, has calculated in the *Wirtschaftliche Korrespondenz* that towards the end of 1908, 380,000 workers, out of a total of about 14,000,000 wage-earners, were unemployed in Germany. If this calculation and his carefully drawn-up tables, which have been endorsed by the German press and the German Parliament, are correct, it would follow that 2.7 per cent. of all the German workers were unemployed at a time when 9.4 per cent. of the British trade unionists were unemployed. These figures are particularly remarkable, in view of the fact that it is usually assumed that the percentage of unemployed among British unorganised workers is considerably higher than it is among British trade unionists. Therefore we may safely assume that for every unemployed worker in Germany there are at least four unemployed workers in Great Britain.

Now let us see whether the emigration and immigration figures and the savings banks statistics confirm or contradict the foregoing statement.

	Gross Emigration from Germany.	Net Emigration from Germany.	Gross Emigration from Great Britain.	Net Emigration from Great Britain.
1900 .	22,309	none	168,825	71,188
1901 .	22,073	none	171,715	72,016
1902 .	32,098	none	205,662	101,547
1903 .	36,310	none	259,956	147,036
1904 .	27,984	none	271,435	126,854
1905 .	28,075	none	262,077	139,365
1906 .	31,074	none	325,137	194,671
1907 .	30,431	none	395,680	235,092
1908 .	17,951	none	263,199	91,156
1909 .	19,930	none	474,378	139,774
1910 .	22,773	none	618,859	233,940
1911 .	——	none	623,292	261,858

The foregoing figures show that between 1900 and 1909 gross emigration—that is, emigration which does not allow for immigration—was absolutely from seven to fifteen times as large from Great Britain as it was from Germany. However, it must be borne in mind that the population of Germany is, roughly, 50 per cent. larger than the population of Great Britain. If we allow for that difference in population, it follows that emigration was relatively from ten to twenty-two times as large from Great Britain as from Germany; that for every German emigrant there were from ten to twenty-two British emigrants. Consequently, we may say that the pressure which causes emigration was from ten to fifteen times as great in Great Britain as it was in Germany.

The foregoing figures show a constant, rapid, and very disquieting increase in the outflow of population from Great Britain, an increase which, proportionately, becomes still greater when we look into the figures

of British net emigration. These figures show how many British people have left these shores when the number of all British immigrants is deducted. In comparing gross and net emigration from this country, we find that gross emigration from Great Britain increased between 1900 and 1907 by, roughly, 230 per cent., whilst net emigration from Great Britain increased during the same time by 330 per cent. The inclination of our emigrants to return to their old home is apparently growing smaller from year to year, presumably because they find British conditions of employment more and more unsatisfactory.

Whilst Great Britain loses every year an enormous number of her people by emigration, a loss compared with which the loss of 20,000 lives in the South African War seems but a trifle, Germany gains every year on balance a considerable number of citizens through immigration. Unfortunately, I have no figures relating to the immigrations of Germans into Germany. If these figures could be given, it would probably appear that the German population of Germany is rapidly increasing in numbers through the inflow of German-Americans, of whom many return to their old country. At all events, it is clear that Germany is gaining on balance in population through the immigration of foreigners. At the census of 1900, 757,151 foreigners were counted in Germany. At the census of 1905, 1,007,179 foreigners were counted in that country. Hence, Germany has gained in foreigners alone 250,849 people between 1900 and 1905, whilst she has lost during the same time only 168,849 of her own people through emigration.

A comparison of the British and German emigration and immigration figures seems to indicate that employment is considerably better in Germany than

in Great Britain, and that consequently unemployment is considerably smaller in the former than in the latter country. The objection that it is natural that British emigration is greater than German emigration because Great Britain is more densely populated than Germany, is irrelevant as regards this investigation, which inquires merely into actual conditions, but not into causes. Besides, the fact that the population is denser in Great Britain than in Germany is not by any means a sufficient explanation for the great and constantly increasing outflow of our people. Great Britain is densely populated only in parts. The country contains large, very thinly, and very inadequately populated districts, which might be filled up if our industries were flourishing. Ireland, for instance, which in the year 1845 had about 9,000,000 inhabitants, had at the census of 1900 only 4,458,775 inhabitants. Besides, the population per square mile is 70 per cent. larger in Belgium than it is in the whole of Great Britain, and it is even 6 per cent. larger in that country than it is in densely populated England and Wales. Lastly, people emigrate from this country by the hundred thousand, not because there is not enough room, but because there is not enough work; and I do not think that it can be maintained for a moment that there is not enough work in Great Britain because there is not enough room. Great Britain would have room enough for factories, workshops, and dwelling-houses to maintain more than a hundred million people if there were a sufficiency of markets for the wares which these additional factories and workshops might produce.

Now let us apply the savings banks test to Great Britain and to Germany.

SAVINGS BANKS DEPOSITS

	In Germany.	In Great Britain.
1900 . .	£441,929,000	£181,574,000
1907 . .	696,030,000*	209,654,000†
Difference . .	£254,101,000	£ 28,080,000

* Besides £50,000,000 Reserve Funds. † No Reserve Funds kept.

The foregoing table shows that in 1907 the deposits in the German savings banks were three and a half times as large as the deposits in the British savings banks, without allowing for the important fact that in 1907 the German savings banks had accumulated a reserve fund of £50,000,000, which might properly be added to the deposits, whilst the British savings banks have no reserve fund. A comparison of the growth of the savings banks deposits gives evidently a better indication of the state of employment in the two countries than a comparison of the sums total deposited. The foregoing table shows that between 1900 and 1907 the German savings banks deposits have grown exactly nine times as fast as the British savings banks deposit; and if we allow for the fact that the population of Germany is about 50 per cent. larger than the population of Great Britain, it appears that the deposits in the German savings banks have grown six times as fast as the deposits in the British savings banks, that for every £1 deposited by the British working classes between 1900 and 1907 the German working classes have deposited £6.

As a matter of fact, the British savings banks deposits have not grown, but they have remained stationary between 1900 and 1905, for there the apparent increase during these years is entirely due to the interest added, withdrawals having been equal to

deposits. This state of stagnation has lately changed for one of ominous retrogression. During the three years, 1905–1908, the British savings banks deposits have grown by only £6,000,000, or by £2,000,000 a year. As the interest paid on our savings banks deposits exceeds £5,000,000 per annum, it follows that during those three years withdrawals have exceeded deposits by more than £3,000,000 a year. Rightly considered, our savings banks deposits have not increased, but have decreased by more than £3,000,000 during every one of those three years. During the very same years, the German savings banks deposits have grown more than twenty-five times as fast as the British savings banks deposits—that is, for every £1 deposited during the years 1905–1908 in Great Britain, £25 have been deposited in Germany.

The growth of the German savings banks deposits is all the more remarkable when we remember that the working masses in Germany have the greatest facilities for acquiring freehold cottages, houses, and agricultural land; that millions of German peasants are owners of freehold land and houses; and that by far the largest part of the savings of the German masses is invested in fields, and in bricks and mortar. Apart from the enormous savings banks deposits, which now amount to more than £900,000,000, the German workers have about £100,000,000 in the Imperial assurance societies, to which they contribute at present about £20,000,000 per year, and they are largely interested in prosperous and wealthy co-operative societies, building societies, &c., in which another £200,000,000 of their savings are invested. In cash savings alone the German working masses possess more than £1,000,000,000, whilst the entire capital of the British working masses is usually estimated to

amount to only from £600,000,000 to £1,000,000,000. Hence it cannot be doubted that the German working masses are considerably better off than are the British working masses.

In comparing German and British savings banks deposits, some allowance must be made for the fact that many German savings banks accept considerably larger deposits than £200, which is the maximum deposit allowed by the British savings banks. However, of these larger sums a considerable proportion consists of the collective holdings of workers in various forms, and it may be estimated that about 80 per cent. of the German savings banks deposits, or about £700,000,000, come within the British limit of £200.

The interest paid by the German savings banks, which is usually 3 per cent. to 3½ per cent., is certainly considerably higher than the fixed interest of 2½ per cent. paid by the British savings banks, but relatively both rates of interest are practically equal. German Government stocks yield about 4 per cent., whilst British Government stocks yield only about 3 per cent. to the investor. Hence, the savings banks pay in both countries about ½ per cent. less than the rate which is obtainable on Government stocks. Consequently, it cannot be said that the German savings banks deposits are three and a half times as large and increase from eight to twenty-five times as fast as the British savings banks deposits, because the interest paid is higher in Germany than in Great Britain.

I am also not of opinion that the huge amount and the rapid accumulation of deposits in the German savings banks, as compared with the small amount and the slow growth of deposits in the British savings banks deposits, is chiefly due to the fact that Germans are more thrifty than Englishmen. The greater thrift

of the Germans is largely off-set by other influences which diminish German, but not British, savings. The German workers have on an average a larger number of children, and therefore larger expenses, than have Englishmen of the same class, and education is not gratuitous in Germany, as it is in this country. Besides, the German children are longer at school than British children; they go to work later in life, and they have therefore to be maintained during a longer period by their parents than English children. Lastly, military service is compulsory and universal in Germany, and the pay of the soldier is so low that it is usually supplemented by small sums which the parents send regularly to their sons who are serving. All these circumstances, and various others which I might enumerate, tend to entrench upon German savings.

The comparative tables given in the foregoing pages as to unemployment among German and British trade unionists, as to emigration from Germany and Great Britain, and as to British and German savings banks deposits, corroborate and confirm each other. All these tables point unmistakably to the fact that employment is as a rule very considerably better in Germany than in Great Britain, and that consequently unemployment is less prevalent in the former than in the latter country. They point to the fact that, in consequence of better employment, the great mass of the working population is considerably better off in Germany than in Great Britain. The greater prosperity of the German working masses is eloquently proclaimed by the German savings banks statistics.

Now let us examine German wages.

The fact that the members of certain British trade

unions receive higher nominal wages than the members in corresponding German trade unions, does not contradict the foregoing conclusions. In Great Britain, the trade unions are almost as old as are the manufacturing industries themselves. In Germany, the trade unions are of yesterday. The German trade unions have not yet succeeded in conquering for themselves a privileged position, and "standard union wages" are practically unknown in Germany. Although nominal trade union wages in Great Britain are in many instances higher than are the corresponding trade union wages in Germany, it cannot be concluded that general wages are higher in Great Britain than in Germany. On the contrary, the general level of wages is certainly as high in Germany as in Great Britain, and is very likely higher, largely because Germany suffers habitually from a scarcity of workers.

The election manifesto of the German Social Democratic Party, published in the *Vorwärts* on January 15, 1907, stated :—

"We have in Germany not too large but too small a number of workers. This may be seen from the fact that every year foreign workers are imported into Germany by the hundred thousand."

That statement was literally correct. According to the German Government statistics, and the researches of Dr. Bodenstein, no less than 600,000 foreign workers were imported and temporarily employed in Germany in 1906. Of these about 240,000 were set to work in agriculture, and 360,000 in the manufacturing industries. In 1907 about 700,000 foreign workers were imported. In 1908 800,000 foreign workers were imported. These foreign workers are not imported for the sake of cheapness. In order

to prevent these men settling in Germany, the German Government makes various restrictions and does not allow the employment of Russian and Austrian Polish workers between December 20 and February 1. Hence the employers have to pay for two long and expensive journeys in addition to the ordinary wages, and the consequence is that imported foreign workers are as a rule not cheaper but are actually dearer than German workers. Nearly every German Chamber of Commerce Report—I would particularly mention the reports from Berlin, Barmen, Chemnitz, and Mannheim—contains complaints about a great scarcity of workers, complaints which have been confirmed in the reports from the British Consuls in Germany, and petitions have been sent to the German Government praying for permission to import foreign workers more freely to relieve the dearth of workers.

The fact that, notwithstanding the enormous increase of the German population, workers are as a rule scarce in Germany is also attested by the British Consuls in that country. For instance, Consul-General Schwabach reported from Berlin in May 1907 :—

"Workpeople of all classes were in strong demand, and received employment without regard to nationality. As the dearth of workmen became accentuated in the course of the year, working hours were lengthened, night shifts put on, and overtime became the rule almost everywhere. The abundance of urgent orders received in almost all branches of industry rendered it imperative for manufacturers constantly to increase the number of hands, but although large drafts of men were obtained from the agricultural districts (where there is a permanent dearth of labourers) and foreign countries, the demand was very frequently greatly in excess of the supply."

Consul Brookfield reported from Dantzig in June 1907 :—

"The chief complaint coming from employers of labour was not that they had no work to give, but that they could not obtain the men to execute their orders."

Consul-General Sir William Ward reported from Hamburg in August 1907 :—

"The chief difficulty with which many manufacturers in Germany had to contend in 1906 was the scarcity of workmen which prevailed in many districts, notwithstanding the advance in the rate of wages. Several large coal-mines, for instance, in north-western Germany were, it is stated, unable last year to produce more than one-third of their usual annual output, owing to the impossibility of finding sufficient hands for the work."

Consul-General Oppenheimer reported from Frankfort in July 1907 :—

"With the state of the labour market there was no chance of obtaining even a percentage of the additional hands needed. If there was a decided scarcity of labour in a number of industries, constant complaints proved that the textile industry suffered intensely from this calamity, though the average wages in this industry have improved considerably, and, more especially in the Rhenish Westphalian districts, would have been considered tempting under ordinary circumstances. It is, then, not surprising that a number of industries should have to rely upon foreign workers to fill the vacancies."

Continuing, the Consul-General tells that in 1905 the influx of foreign workers was 151,557 in Rhenish Prussia, 78,252 in Silesia, 57,358 in Westphalia, without giving figures for the agricultural districts.

The great scarcity of workers to which our Consuls testified prevailed not only during 1906 and the first nine months of 1907, but also during several preceding years. Therefore the Chamber of Commerce in Mannheim sent in autumn 1907 a petition to the Government, in which it prayed :—

"A scarcity of male and female workers has prevailed in our districts during some considerable time, as reference to the yearly reports of the Chamber for 1904, 1905, and 1906 shows. During several years this scarcity of workers has been constantly increasing. This scarcity has, in the course of this year, grown to such an extent that various industries have been very seriously hampered in their operations, and have suffered considerable loss and damage. Experience has shown that that scarcity of workers cannot be remedied by offering higher wages. The workers know that labour is scarce. An increase in wages does not increase the output. On the contrary, employers are seriously complaining that their workers produce less and less, knowing that they are the masters of the situation."

The petition from which the foregoing extract is taken is dated the 13th November 1907, a time when employment was bad in Great Britain and when our trade unions reported that 5 per cent. of their members were unemployed. Commenting on this position, the Mannheim Chamber of Commerce stated in its report :—

"The causes of the permanent scarcity of workers in Germany are sufficiently known. The continuous growth of our industries and trade requires a large additional supply of workers, which is not forthcoming through the natural increase of our population."

In view of the fact that the natural increase of the German population exceeds the enormous figure of 900,000 a year, whilst the British population, with a natural increase of only 400,000 a year, is suffering constantly from widespread unemployment and consequent emigration, the foregoing statement is certainly very remarkable.

Work being usually very plentiful and workers scarce, unemployment is as a rule practically unknown in Germany. Wages are high and have been rapidly rising, and they are in many, if not in most,

instances higher than British wages except in certain selected trade unions. The yearly report of 1908 of the Chamber of Commerce of Elberfeld, for instance, states: "Wages in Germany are in numerous instances higher than wages in England and France." The report of the British Consul in Frankfort of 1908 says: "When recently some important chemical works were meditating the establishment of a factory in the United Kingdom, the Directorate of the German company decided, after minute inquiries, so to prepare the plans of the new factory that various branches of their German manufacture could later be transferred to the United Kingdom because 'the workman's wages are, at the present moment, considerably lower in England than in Germany.'" The 1908 report of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce complained that the ready-made clothes trade is leaving Berlin for London because wages in London are lower than they are in Berlin.

It may be objected that the rapid rise in wages in Germany to, and even above, the English level of wages has been offset, or more than offset, by the rise in the cost of living. That objection is refuted by the painstaking and thorough statistical investigations published in the *Arbeitsmarkt Correspondenz*, by Mr. Calwer, a leading German statistician, who, being a Socialist, might be expected to take rather too pessimistic than too roseate a view of the condition of the workers in Germany. The 1908 report of the Chamber of Commerce at Hanover states :—

"The industries of Germany have, during the last decade, prospered more than the industries in any other country, and the working men have participated in the rising prosperity to a substantial extent. During the last twelve years, 1895–1906, the wages of industrial workers have on an average risen

by from 37 to 38 per cent. Although this improvement in wages has to some extent been counterbalanced by the rise in prices, prices have risen during the same time only by 22 per cent. Hence the real yearly income of working men has considerably improved, a fact which is borne out by daily observation."

The foregoing statement was confirmed in the report of the British Consul in Berlin, who supplied similar figures.

The frequently heard assertion that the cost of living is higher in Germany than in Great Britain is absurd. If it were true thrifty German rentiers with moderate incomes would settle in England. Instead of this we find everywhere in Germany English people of reduced means who have settled in that country because living is cheaper over there. It is true that the British Board of Trade has issued a bulky report in 1908 which tried to prove that cost of living was higher in Germany than in Great Britain, but the conclusions of that report were unanimously repudiated by all the German statistical offices with which I communicated, and I have proved, at the hand of the official information supplied to me, the misleading character of the Board of Trade Report in a penny pamphlet, "Economic Problems and Board of Trade Methods—An Exposure," published by Spottiswoode & Co., London.

The great prosperity of the German workers may be seen not only by the small number of unemployed workers and of emigrants, and by the huge amounts deposited in the German savings banks and similar institutions, but also by a comparison of German and British pauperism. The Second Fiscal Blue Book (Cd. 2337) gives statistics of pauperism relating to about one-seventh of the German population. According to these statistics, pauperism in Germany

fluctuated in the period 1884–1901 between 294 and 314 per 10,000, and amounted, therefore, on an average to 304 per 10,000. According to the statistical abstract for the United Kingdom, there are at any time on an average about 1,200,000 paupers in receipt of relief in Great Britain, whilst the total number of individuals relieved per year comes to about 3,000,000, as a recently published White-paper shows. As Great Britain has 44,000,000 inhabitants, it follows that we have about 700 paupers per 10,000 inhabitants in receipt of relief, as compared with 304 per 10,000 in Germany. In other words, for every three German paupers there are, according to Blue Book 2337, no less than seven British paupers. The German pauper figures given in the Blue Book relate chiefly to Bavaria and Berlin, where pauperism is much greater than in other parts of Germany, and therefore they greatly overstate the case. Besides, Great Britain, the most charitable nation in the world, spends yearly about £20,000,000 on private charity, and the armies of poor maintained by private British charity, though being paupers, are not classed as paupers unless they receive parish relief at the same time. If due allowance be made for these two factors, it would probably appear that for every three paupers in Germany there are from nine to ten paupers in Great Britain.

As workmen are probably the best judges of labour conditions, I extract from the report of the Gainsborough Commission of working-men who in mid-winter, 1906, travelled all over Germany, the following passages, which throw a vivid light upon labour conditions in the various parts of that country :—

P. 10. "The general conditions of the working classes in the industrial town of Crefeld impressed us. Wherever we came into contact with them we were struck by their genial

character, general physical health, cheerfulness of demeanour, and freshness about their work. No sign of extreme poverty meets the eye; the problem of the unemployed obviously does not weigh upon the municipal authorities at the present juncture."

P. 29. "The question of the unemployed does not exist here (Dortmund). We found that an immense number of Polish and Italian workmen flock hither."

P. 31. "We could, however, see no trace of want (Dortmund)."

P. 44. ". . . We have been forced to face the fact that it has been during the period following upon the introduction of Protection duties by Prince Bismarck in 1879, that Germany has ceased to be poor and has become well-to-do; that her workpeople have received a large increase in wages; that the general social condition of the latter has improved; that Germany's industry has developed; that she has succeeded in extending her foreign trade and in acquiring ready markets for her continuously developing industry."

P. 50. "In Solingen one of the party went into a horse-meat restaurant, where all kinds of people were dining off horse-meat. It was the restaurant we spoke of in our Elberfeld report. The proprietor does a good business, but his clients are not exclusively working men, who indeed form the minority. There is evidently a taste for this meat in Solingen, where the meat is declared to be very palatable. We heard of a servant-maid here who exclaimed one day to her mistress, 'Can't we have some horse-meat one day for dinner?'"

P. 84. "In the busy districts of Rhineland and Westphalia we came into contact with thousands of our German comrades engaged in the heavy industry, and looked in vain for the signs of poverty which certain persons in Gainsborough and elsewhere told us would confront us on all sides. . . . Nothing indicative in the remotest degree of widespread distress has come within the limit of our vision; on the contrary there is every sign of increasing prosperity. Occupation is to be had everywhere for the asking of it in all factories and at all works in the towns we have passed through. Instead of there being a superabundance of workers and consequently a crowd of 'unemployed,' employers are clamouring on all sides for skilled labour."

P. 108. "One of the leading Socialists (Frankfort-on-Maine) assured us that the consumption of horse-flesh could not be attributed to the high tariffs, seeing that its consumption was confined generally to those who had a particular liking for this sort of meat, and did not affect workmen as such."

P. 116. "The unskilled working man in Germany is undoubtedly as well, and in many cases relatively better paid than unskilled working men in England. During our stay in Germany we have nowhere seen clusters of workmen hanging about idle and unemployed in the streets."

P. 118. "Wherever we have been in Prussia we have seen no lack of employment amongst industrial workpeople; on the contrary there has been everywhere a demand for skilled workmen which could not be supplied. No German municipality is being harassed by an 'unemployed' problem; whilst in Great Britain, which boasts of the advantage of Free Trade and of untaxed wheat, the streets are thronged with strong men who have no work to do, and charity is being generously lavished upon them without much avail. We have everywhere been told by the German working man that he prefers rye bread to wheaten bread, and that he would not at any price give up his rye bread for the best of wheaten bread that we eat in England."

P. 204. "In going through the workmen's quarters in German large towns we were struck by the fact that nowhere have we seen the same abject dirt and misery that one meets with, *e.g.*, in London and Liverpool or Glasgow."

P. 227. "He pays no more in a Protectionist country for his bread, his coffee, his sugar, his clothing, or his boots than we do in England. It would be of no use to offer him white wheaten bread and jam, which we consider in England to be necessaries. He prefers his brown rye bread and other delicacies at which our people would turn up their noses. His meat is just now dearer than it is with us; but in normal times we do not consider that he is worse off relatively in this respect than we are when we make due allowances for national differences of taste."

CHAPTER XXX

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

A CONSIDERABLE number of British working men's deputations have travelled through Germany with a view to discovering whether the working man fares better under Protection or under Free Trade. Their Reports teem with interesting and valuable facts and shrewd observations, but they fail to give a comprehensive picture of German industrial conditions as a whole. Therefore the following pages should prove of interest to those who wish to focus the industrial conditions of modern Germany in their entirety, and to compare them with the conditions prevailing in this country.

Whether the workers of a nation are prosperous or not depends, in the first place, on the productivity of the national industries, for it is obvious that only a people which produces much will be able to consume much. In the second place, the prosperity of the workers depends upon the adequate expansion of the national industries, for every year adds to the existing population fresh numbers who have to be housed, clothed, and fed, whilst the progress of civilisation and of luxury creates constantly new wants among the citizens. As great, but stagnant, industries cannot provide for a rapidly increasing population with rapidly increasing wants, the masses of the people can be prosperous only if the national industries

are so vigorously expanding that they are able to provide the additional employment and commodities which are constantly called for.

Germany introduced Protection in 1879. Let us compare German and British industrial conditions, taking as starting-point 1880, wherever the figures for that year are available.

The great productive industries are four in number: mining, manufacturing, agriculture, trade. Germany, like Great Britain, mines principally coal and iron ore. The production of these has progressed as follows in the two countries, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign Countries (Cd. 5446), published late in autumn 1911:—

PRODUCTION OF COAL AND LIGNITE

	In Germany	*In Great Britain*
	Tons.	Tons.
1880	59,118,000	146,969,000
1890	89,291,000	181,614,000
1900	149,788,000	225,181,000
1909	217,433,000	263,774,000

PRODUCTION OF IRON ORE

	In Germany	*In Great Britain*
	Tons.	Tons.
1880	7,239,000	18,026,000
1890	11,406,000	13,781,000
1900	18,964,000	14,028,000
1909	25,505,000	14,980,000

In 1880 Great Britain produced 150 per cent. *more* coal and 160 per cent. *more* iron ore than Germany. Things have changed since then. In 1909 Great

Britain produced 60 per cent. *less* iron ore than Germany, and her superiority in the production of coal has shrunk to a paltry 20 per cent., and threatens to be a thing of the past in a few years. On balance, Great Britain exports 60,000,000 tons of coal a year, whilst Germany exports only 10,000,000 tons. Hence it appears that Germany has already overtaken Great Britain in the consumption of coal. In value Germany's mining production has, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign Countries, increased in value as follows :—

	£
1880	18,775,000
1890	36,282,000
1900	63,162,000
1909	97,393,000

In value Germany's mining production has grown fivefold during the twenty-nine years under review.

As the manufacturing industries are based on the use of coal, iron and steam, the manufacturing eminence and progress of a country can best be measured by the national consumption of coal and iron, and by the power of its steam engines. As regards the consumption of coal and iron, Germany and Great Britain compare as follows :—

CONSUMPTION OF COAL AND LIGNITE

	In Germany	*In Great Britain*
	Tons.	Tons.
1880	57,008,000	129,078,000
1890	90,798,000	152,876,000
1900	149,804,000	179,083,000
1907	208,195,000	195,466,000
1909	206,321,000	198,080,000

PRODUCTION OF PIG IRON

	In Germany	*In Great Britain*
	Tons.	Tons.
1880	2,713,000	7,749,233
1890	4,651,000	7,904,214
1900	8,507,000	8,959,691
1907	12,875,000	10,114,000
1909	12,645,000	9,532,000

CONSUMPTION OF PIG IRON

	In Germany	*In Great Britain*
	Tons.	Tons.
1880	2,713,000	6,176,673
1890	4,940,000	6,824,925
1900	9,106,000	7,705,201
1907	13,016,000	8,273,000
1909	12,308,000	8,501,000

In 1880 Great Britain consumed 72,000,000 tons of coal *more* than Germany. In 1909 she consumed 8,000,000 tons of coal *less* than Germany. In 1880 Great Britain produced 5,000,000 tons of pig iron *more* than Germany. In 1909 she produced 3,100,000 tons *less* than Germany. In 1880 Great Britain consumed 3,500,000 tons of iron *more* than Germany. In 1909 she consumed 3,800,000 tons *less* than Germany. As the German people use much wood for fuel, and require besides less coal for their closed stoves than Englishmen do for their open fires, the difference in Germany's favour is far greater than appears from the foregoing figures.

Whilst, since the introduction of Protection, Germany's coal consumption has quadrupled, and her iron consumption has quintupled, the power of her

engines has increased even more rapidly, as the figures for Prussia and Bavaria show :—

HORSE POWER OF STATIONARY STEAM ENGINES

In Prussia		*In Bavaria*	
1879	887,780	1879	70,678
1895	2,358,175	1889	124,680
1909	5,768,010	1908	428,253
1910	5,837,782	1910	——

Since the introduction of Protection the engine-power of Germany has grown no less than sevenfold. Unfortunately, economic science, as distinguished from barren economic theory, has been very greatly neglected in this country. Hence no statistics of steam engines similar to those published in Germany are available for Great Britain, and we are spared a comparison which probably would be exceedingly humiliating to this country. The figures given show that the engine-power of Germany has increased enormously since the introduction of Protection, and as her new machines are better, and therefore more productive, than her old ones, and do not stand idle, we are justified in assuming that the industrial production of Germany has grown at least sixfold during thirty years of Protection.

If we now turn to agriculture, we find that the German harvest has increased as follows :—

THE GERMAN HARVEST

	Tons		
	Rye	Wheat	Oats
1880	4,952,525	2,345,278	4,228,128
1890	5,868,078	2,830,921	4,913,544
1900	8,550,659	3,841,165	7,091,930
1908	10,736,874	3,767,767	7,694,833
1910	10,511,160	3,861,479	7,900,376

THE GERMAN HARVEST

	Potatoes	Sugar (*Tons*)	Hay
1880	19,466,242	415,000	19,563,388
1890	23,320,983	1,261,000	18,859,888
1900	40,585,317	1,795,000	23,116,276
1908	46,342,726	2,139,000	27,076,097
1910	43,468,397	2,037,397	28,250,115

During the thirty years under review, when the productivity of her mines and the output of her manufacturing industries have grown about sevenfold, the rural industries of Germany have not decayed as have our own. On the contrary, her soil produces now twice the quantity of bread corn, oats, and potatoes, and five times the quantity of sugar, which it produced before the introduction of Protection. During the same period British agriculture has rapidly decayed, "owing to our industrial prosperity," as the Free Traders tell us, and all our crops, from wheat to hops, have shrunk most lamentably, and have caused millions of British acres to be deserted by the plough and to revert to grass.

The increase of Germany's meat production during the last three decades is no less surprising than the increase of her crops. Her meat production has more than kept pace with the increase of her population, as the following table indicates :—

	Population of Germany	Cattle in Germany	Pigs in Germany
1873	41,564,000	15,776,702	7,124,088
1883	46,016,000	15,786,764	9,206,195
1892	50,266,000	17,555,834	12,174,442
1897	53,569,000	18,490,772	14,274,557
1900	56,046,000	18,939,692	16,807,014
1904	57,475,000	19,331,568	18,920,666
1907	62,083,000	20,630,544	22,146,532

It will be noticed that between 1873 and 1907 the population of Germany has increased by 50 per cent. During the same period the number of her cattle has increased by 33 per cent., and that of her pigs by no less than 200 per cent. Pork is the favourite meat of the German workers, whilst mutton is little esteemed by them. In beef and pork combined Germany now produces, per head of population, twice as much meat as she did thirty years ago. Her meat production has so greatly increased that Germany, notwithstanding the greatly increased meat consumption of her people, has become practically entirely independent of foreign meat supplies during the very time when our meat production has remained stationary, and we have become dangerously dependent on foreign supplies for the greater part of the meat we eat. A comparison of British and German live stock is humiliating. In 1907 Great Britain possessed only 11,630,142 cattle and 3,967,163 pigs.

It is worth noting that, according to the international statistics published in the Year-Book of the United States Department of Agriculture for 1908, Germany produces one-third of the world's potato crop. It is estimated that this enormous crop is used as follows :—

	12,000,000	tons for human food.
	17,600,000	,, for fodder.
	2,500,000	,, for making spirit.
	1,400,000	,, for making starch.
	5,200,000	,, for seed.
	5,000,000	,, for loss and waste.
Total	43,700,000	

The British potato crop amounted in 1907 to 5,223,973 tons. The whole of the United Kingdom produces, therefore, merely as much potatoes as

Germany uses every year for seed alone. According to the American statistics, Germany produces one-sixth of the world's sugar. She raises yearly from 12,000,000 tons to 15,000,000 tons of sugar beet, which furnish 2,000,000 tons of sugar and 10,000,000 tons of fodder, which, like the bulk of the potato harvest, is converted into pig meat. Germany's 22,000,000 pigs are merely a by-product of her intensive agriculture.

As all trade is exchange, the greatness of a nation's trade cannot fairly be measured by its foreign trade alone, as our Free Traders do, especially as the home trade is far more important than is the foreign trade, both in Great Britain and in Germany. The German home trade is carried largely by water, and its increase during the last three decades may be gauged from the following figures, which are taken from the Royal Commission Report on Waterways (Cd. 4841) and the German Statistical Year-Book :—

	Ton-miles on German railways	Ton-miles on German waterways
1875	6,758,000,000	1,798,000,000
1885	10,292,000,000	2,976,000,000
1895	16,430,000,000	4,650,000,000
1905	27,652,000,000	9,300,000,000

	Carrying capacity of German inland shipping
1877	1,379,222 tons
1887	2,100,705 ,,
1897	3,370,447 ,,
1907	5,914,020 ,,

During the last thirty years Germany's railway freight traffic has increased by more than 300 per cent., Germany's inland waterways traffic has increased by more than 400 per cent., and the tonnage of her inland

shipping has increased by more than 300 per cent. Unfortunately, a comparison of Germany's home trade, as given in these figures, with that of Great Britain, is impossible, owing to the deplorable defectiveness of our statistics. Still, the rudimentary British figures existing suffice to show that, during the last thirty years, the railway freight traffic of Great Britain has grown little compared with that of Germany, whilst our canal traffic has remained stationary. How enormous is the German home trade may be seen from the fact that, in 1907, the German merchant marine measured 2,629,093 tons net. Hence Germany's inland fleet vastly exceeds in carrying capacity her great ocean fleet. Our inland shipping, with its toy barges, is quite insignificant, and here, again, the absence of exact statistical information must be deplored.

Free Traders never tire of assuring us that Protection makes production dear, that it thus hampers the sale of domestic manufactures in foreign markets, and "destroys" the export trade. Since 1879 the exportation of German manufactures has increased as follows—

	£
1880	83,500,000
1890	107,440,000
1900	149,100,000
1910	239,800,000

The foregoing figures prove that Germany's foreign trade also is exceedingly prosperous and rapidly expanding. During the period 1880–1910, when Germany's manufactured exports have increased by no less than 200 per cent., the manufactured exports of Great Britain have increased by only 70 per cent.

The statistics given prove that in all the productive

industries, in mining, manufacture, agriculture, and commerce, Germany's progress is stupendous, that Germany has overtaken Great Britain in industrial production, although we are still supreme in cotton and shipping; and it stands to reason that the German people must have fully participated in this enormous expansion of national wealth production and consequent prosperity.

Whether the masses of the people, of whom the majority are wage-earners, are prosperous or not depends on three factors: employment, wages, cost of living. Each of these three factors will be separately considered.

Unemployment appears to be many times larger in Great Britain than in Germany. According to the statistics of unemployment among Trade Unionists, published by the British Board of Trade, there are, as a rule, from three to four unemployed workers in Great Britain to every single unemployed worker in Germany. It is a well-known fact that working men leave their country chiefly through lack of employment. A comparison of the emigration statistics of the two countries shows that there are, as a rule, from ten to twelve British emigrants to every single German emigrant. The harrowing tale of the British emigration statistics, and of the British statistics of unemployment among Trade Unionists, is amply confirmed by a comparison of the British decennial censuses with the German industrial censuses of 1892, 1895, and 1907. Unfortunately, the British censuses and the German industrial censuses are not strictly comparable. They have been taken in different years, and different classifications have been adopted in the two countries. Still, the existing figures suffice to show how employment has changed in certain im-

portant and comparable industries of the two countries during a considerable space of time.

EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN TRADES IN GERMANY

	Metal and Machinery Trades	Textile Trades	Building Trades	Agriculture
1882 . .	815,802	910,089	533,511	8,236,496
1895 . .	1,247,258	945,191	1,353,637	8,292,692
1907 . .	2,093,147	1,057,243	1,905,987	9,883,257

EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN TRADES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

	Metals and Machinery	Textile	Building Construction	Agriculture
1881 . .	978,102	1,430,985	926,135	2,574,031
1891 . .	1,145,386	1,519,861	955,573	2,420,926
1901 . .	1,475,410	1,462,001	1,335,820	2,262,454

A comparison of the two tables is most interesting. It shows that during the period covered by the last three censuses, the German metal and machinery trades have provided employment for 1,280,000 additional workers, whilst the British metal and machinery trades have provided work for only 497,000 additional workers; that the workers in the building trade have increased by 1,370,000 in Germany, and by only 410,000 in the United Kingdom; that the workers in the textile trades have increased by 150,000 in Germany, by only 31,000 in the United Kingdom; that agriculture provides work for 1,600,000 additional workers in Germany, and for 312,000 fewer workers in the United Kingdom. Further figures, which I refrain from giving through lack of space, confirm the tale of vastly increased employment in Germany, and of slowly and inadequately increasing, stagnant, or shrinking employment in Great Britain.

The British population increases by only 400,000 a year, whilst the German population increases by no less than 900,000 a year. Notwithstanding our re-

latively small increase in population, between 200,000 and 300,000 people emigrate on balance every year from this country, whilst Germany, with her immense increase in population, has an emigration of from 20,000 to 30,000 only. On balance she has no emigration, but receives instead from 50,000 to 100,000 people a year from abroad, immigration exceeding emigration by these numbers. The census figures given in these pages supply an explanation of this strange phenomenon which must be alarming to every British patriot. People flee from this country by the hundred thousand, as from a stricken land, through lack of work, whilst they migrate into Germany by the hundred thousand, being attracted thereto by regular employment and good wages. In some districts of Germany the amount spent in wages has trebled and quadrupled within twenty years. According to the report of the Dortmund Mining Society for 1906, the wages paid to the Dortmund coal-miners have increased from £3,859,423 in 1886 to £18,942,579 in 1906. In 1910 they amounted to £23,114,778 according to the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*. Those paid to the coal-miners of Upper Silesia have increased from £981,995 in 1886 to £4,110,626 in 1906, and to £5,603,633 in 1910. Those paid to the coal-miners in the Saar district have increased from £999,840 in 1886 to £2,745,099 in 1906, and to £2,939,405 in 1910. We cannot wonder that a very large percentage of the coal-miners in Germany are foreigners—Russians, Poles, Austrians, Italians, &c.

The price of labour, like the price of all commodities, is regulated by the law of demand and supply. Hence it is only natural that the great demand for labour of every kind which prevails in Germany has raised general wages very greatly in that country, whilst

the insufficient demand for labour in Great Britain not only drives hundreds of thousands of Englishmen every year out of the country, but has depressed general British wages considerably below the German level. In 1908 the British Board of Trade issued a report on German industrial conditions (Cd. 4032), in which we were informed that wages are considerably higher and the food prices considerably lower in Great Britain than in Germany. That report has been widely quoted by the Free Trade Press. It contained summary comparisons of German and British wages in general, but the calculations supplied by the Board of Trade were utterly fallacious and misleading, because the wage-figures given are restricted to the skilled workers in a few selected industries. The summary comparisons supplied are not by any means representative of the prevailing general wages. For every skilled worker in Germany and in Great Britain there are six or seven unskilled workers. Consequently it was unscientific, unfair, and inadmissible to compare merely the wages of a small, but in Great Britain highly favoured minority, and treat these wages as wages representative of generally prevailing wages.

Whilst it is true that in a few trades, such as those selected by the Board of Trade for comparison in the report mentioned, the nominal wages of the skilled workers, that is, wages which leave out of account loss through unemployment and short time, may be higher in Great Britain than in Germany, the general level of wages, and especially of real wages, is certainly lower, because the wages of the numerically far more important unskilled workers are considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain. In Great Britain skilled workers receive approximately twice

the wages of the unskilled workers owing to the strength of the firmly established Trade Unions, which artificially restrict the supply of labour. In Germany the Trade Unions are of very recent date, and as they have not yet succeeded in securing abnormally high wages for their members, as the British Trade Unions have done, the difference in the wages of skilled and unskilled workers is very slight. How small this difference is may be seen from a report, *Household Budgets in Families of Small Means*, which was published by the German Statistical Office in 1909. From that publication we learn that the following average wages—not nominal wages, but real wages actually earned in the course of a whole year, which allow for short time and unemployment—were received in the cases investigated :—

	£	s.	d.		s.	d.	
Skilled workers . .	78	9	5	per year or	30	2	per week.
Unskilled workers . .	65	3	0	,, or	25	1	,,
Dockers	79	12	11	,, or	30	7	,,
Road workers . . .	60	14	11	,, or	23	4	,,
General labourers . .	67	5	8	,, or	25	11	,,

Whilst on an average British skilled workers in full employ earn from 30s. to 35s. per week, British unskilled workers earn only from 18s. to 22s. per week. Possibly the average level of wages among skilled Unionist workers is slightly higher in Great Britain than in Germany, owing to the strength of the British Trade Unions. On the other hand, the average level of wages among unskilled workers is certainly considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain, owing to the greater demand for, and the consequent scarcity of, labour.

That the wages of many German workers, especially of non-Unionists, who form the vast majority, are

higher than the corresponding British wages, has been stated by many competent authorities. The report of the Chamber of Commerce of Elberfeld of 1908 stated: "Wages in Germany are, in numerous instances, higher than wages in England." The report of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce of 1908 complained that the ready-made clothes trade was leaving Berlin for London "because wages are lower in London than in Berlin." The report of the British Consul in Frankfurt of 1908 said: "When recently some important chemical works were meditating the establishment of a factory in the United Kingdom, the directorate of the German company decided, after minute inquiries, so to prepare the plans of the new factory that various branches of their German manufacture could later be transferred to the United Kingdom, because the workman's wages are, at the present moment, considerably lower in England than in Germany." The report of 1909 of the British Consul in Frankfurt, who, by the by, is a Free Trader, stated: "A report from a prominent firm in the colour-printing trade runs as follows: 'While years back the wages paid to printers in Germany were considerably less than those paid in the United Kingdom, we should say that to-day little, if any, difference exists between the earnings of the average printer in the two countries; while, with regard to the specially skilled colour printer, we should say that, if anything, the German to-day is in receipt of a higher wage than the same calibre man in the United Kingdom. The net result is, that whereas years ago fairly good colour printed work might be procured from Germany at a saving when compared with British work of the same quality, this difference has entirely vanished to-day, with the very natural result

that a considerable amount of the work which used to go to Germany is now placed with British firms.' A report from a prominent brewing concern in the North, one of the partners of which has given special attention to the question of comparative wages, assures me that he has no doubt whatsoever that, on the whole, the German workmen in the brewing business are decidedly better paid than the British. In the paper industry a similar impression prevails." It cannot be doubted that, if we take into account the many millions of unskilled workers who receive a higher wage in Germany than in Great Britain, the general level of wages—the national real wages as distinguished from the nominal Trade Union wages—are considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain.

How greatly German wages in certain trades have risen since 1879 may be seen from the following interesting figures, furnished by an official German statistician, Mr. Kuczynski, in 1909 :—

DAILY AVERAGE WAGES IN MARKS

	Dortmund Miners	Rostock Bricklayers	Berlin Bricklayers	Berlin Carpenters
1879	2.55	3.20	—	2.50
1884	3.08	3.20	3.75	—
1889	3.42	4.00	5.50	3.87
1894	3.73	4.20	5.25	4.83
1899	4.84	4.40	5.40	4.83
1904	4.78	4.70	6.30	6.28
1907	5.98	5.30	6.75	—

	Hamburg Bricklayers	Elberfeld Bricklayers	Workers at Krupp's
1879	—	3.00	3.02
1884	5.00	3.00	3.55
1889	6.00	3.50	3.83
1894	6.00	3.80	4.06
1899	6.00	4.51	4.72
1904	6.30	4.60	4.88
1907	7.20	5.41	5.35

Those who believe that the German workers are poor may argue: "It may be true that employment is very good and that wages have risen very substantially in Germany, but, owing to Protection, the cost of food has risen more than have wages, so that the German workers are worse off than they were, notwithstanding the great rise in money wages." Some support for this argument is furnished by the Board of Trade report on German labour conditions (Cd. 4032), which gives the following surprisingly high percentages of income spent on food among the German workers :—

Income of German workers per week	Percentage of income spent on food
s. *s.*	
25 to 30	62 per cent.
30 ,, 35	59 ,,
35 ,, 40	58 ,,

The Board of Trade report is unreliable and misleading, not only as regards German wages but also as regards cost of food. Therefore the report of the German Statistical Office, *Household Budgets in Families of Small Means*, published in 1909, makes the damning statement, "The summary of the Yellow Book on German labour conditions, published by the British Board of Trade, cannot be considered as a correct representation of the conditions prevailing in 'average' or 'typical' German working-men's households," and, after a searching investigation of German working-class expenditure covering a whole year, it summarised the percentages of working-men's expenditure, as found by twelve months' actual book-keeping, as follows :—

	Skilled Industrial Workers	Unskilled Industrial Workers
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
Percentage of Income spent on food . . .	51.5	52.8
,, ,, ,, clothing . .	11.2	10.6
,, ,, ,, rent . . .	16.8	18.4
,, ,, ,, fire and light	4.2	4.1
,, ,, ,, health, education, newspapers, fares, taxes, amusements	16.3	14.1
	100.0	100.0

The British Board of Trade has not only greatly understated German wages, but has evidently equally grossly overstated the German working-man's expenditure on food.

Whilst the British Board of Trade estimated that the British workers spend from 61 per cent. to 66 per cent. of their income on food, the German Statistical Office calculated, from hundreds of budgets kept during a whole year, that the German workers spend only from 51.5 per cent. to 52.8 per cent. on food. It is a well-known fact that the percentage of income spent on food is greatest among the poorest workers. The official figures given by the German and British Government Departments indicate clearly, firstly, that the German working-men are better off than the British working-men, and, secondly, that food is, on the whole, considerably cheaper in Germany than in Great Britain.

If the cost of food had risen more than wages, the consumption of food, and especially of the more expensive kinds of food, should have declined in Germany. That this is not the case appears from the White Books published by the German Ministry of Finance in 1908, from which I extract the following :—

AVERAGE CONSUMPTION PER HEAD OF POPULATION

In Kilogrammes

	Rye	Wheat	Barley	Potatoes
1879 . . .	125.1	50.6	40.6	281.2
1889 . . .	106.4	56.2	50.6	423.1
1899 . . .	144.6	89.8	69.5	581.1
1906 . . .	143.5	94.4	82.5	592.6

It will be observed that between 1879 and 1906 the consumption per head of population of all the staple vegetable foods has greatly increased. The increase is smallest in rye, which furnishes the so-called black bread, and greatest in wheat, which is principally consumed in the forms of rolls, fancy bread, and cake. The consumption of beer per head has increased from 85 litres per head in 1879–83 to 118 litres per head in 1904–7. As regards meat, there are available only statistics regarding the consumption of beef and pork in Saxony, which show the following :—

CONSUMPTION OF MEAT, EXCLUSIVE OF VEAL, MUTTON, POULTRY, AND GAME, IN SAXONY

In Kilogrammes

	Beef	Pork	Total
1880 . . .	11.1	18.1	29.2
1890 . . .	14.0	20.6	34.6
1900 . . .	15.2	27.9	43.1
1907 . . .	14.4	27.9	42.3

During the period of Protection the consumption of beef and pork has grown by 50 per cent., not only in Saxony but throughout Germany, and the German Ministry of Finance published in its White Books of 1908 an estimate showing that the German population consumes 55 kilogrammes of meat of all kinds per head per year, as compared with only 52.2 kilogrammes per head per year for the British population.

It is true that the cost of living has lately considerably increased both in Germany and in Great Britain. However, whilst during this period of rising prices wages have remained stationary, or have declined, in this country, they have in Germany advanced much more rapidly than has the cost of living. On this point the Hanover Chamber of Commerce reported in 1908 that between 1895 and 1906 German wages had risen by from 37–38 per cent., whilst the cost of living had risen by only 22 per cent. The British Consul at Berlin reported in the same year: "The average annual wage of a workman in Germany has risen between 37 and 38 per cent., whilst the ratio of the price of commodities has risen, at the utmost, 25 per cent." The British Consul in Berlin wrote in his report of 1909: "The ample rise in wages has more than kept pace with the rise in price." Unfortunately, in this country we have a higher cost of living, but not higher wages. Whilst the German workers have grown richer, the British workers have grown poorer.

The foregoing pages show that employment is considerably better in Germany than in Great Britain; that general wages are considerably higher in the former country than in the latter; that the cost of living is considerably lower to the workers in Germany than to the workers in this country. From these three facts we must conclude that the German working-man is considerably better off than the British working-man, and much corroborative evidence can be adduced in support of this conclusion.

An eminent Free Trader, Lord Brassey, wrote in his book, *The New Fiscal Policy*, "For the masses of our population no test of progress can be more conclusive than the deposits in the Post Office and Trustee

Savings Banks." Let us apply Lord Brassey's test to Great Britain and Germany, and compare their progress since the introduction of Protection :—

	Savings Banks Deposits in Germany	Savings Banks Deposits in Great Britain
	£	£
1880	130,690,000	77,721,084
1890	256,865,000	111,285,359
1900	441,929,000	187,005,562
1911	900,000,000	227,902,840

The foregoing table shows that during the period of Protection, 1880–1911, the German people have placed £770,000,000, and the British people have placed only £139,000,000, into the Savings Banks, whilst between 1900 and 1911 the German people have placed £459,000,000, and the British people only £41,000,000, into the Savings Banks. During these eleven years the German Savings Banks Deposits have grown more than eleven times as quickly as the British Savings Banks Deposits. It is worth noting that more than £700,000,000 of the German Savings Banks Deposits consists of small sums which have been put into these banks by people belonging to the working class.

British workers put their savings, not only into the Savings Banks, but into Building, Friendly, Co-operative Societies, and Trade Unions as well. According to the second Fiscal Blue Book (Cd. 2337) these savings are as follows :—

	£
Building Societies	62,000,000
Friendly Societies	43,000,000
Co-operative Societies	40,000,000
Trade Unions	5,000,000
Total	150,000,000

According to the White Books published by the

German Ministry of Finance, the savings in the German Co-operative Societies alone were, in 1906–7, as follows :—

	£
Deposits in Allgemeiner Verband	45,800,000
,, Verband Darmstadt	68,650,000
,, ,, Neuwied	18,170,000
,, ,, Bavaria	9,730,000
,, ,, Baden	2,765,000
,, ,, Wurtemberg	4,150,000
,, ,, Trier	1,715,000
,, ,, Hanover	4,895,000
,, ,, Posen	6,150,000
,, ,, Berlin	3,490,000
Total	165,515,000

It will be noticed that the savings in the German Co-operative Societies alone exceed those of all the British popular societies combined. According to Heiligenstadt (*Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung* 1901), the savings placed into the Prussian Co-operative Societies should be £7,500,000, and into all the German Co-operative Societies, £11,250,000 per year. In the State Insurance Societies there are more than £100,000,000 to the credit of the workers, and many hundreds of millions of pounds are invested by the workers in freehold land and houses.

Workers who are poor cannot afford to join a trade union. The German Social-Democratic Trade Unions alone show the following record :—

	Number of members	Yearly Income	Accumulated Funds	Average contribution per member per year
		£	£	s. d.
1891 .	277,659	55,829	21,292	4 2
1893 .	223,530	111,218	30,352	9 11
1898 .	493,742	275,434	218,665	11 2
1903 .	887,698	820,999	648,686	18 8
1908 .	1,831,731	2,427,220	2,041,989	26 6
1910 .	2,128,021	3,216,110	2,628,700	24 10

The Social-Democratic and the Non-Socialist Trade Unions combined have more than 4,000,000 members.

In nineteen years the number of German trade unionists has grown eightfold, and their contributions nearly sixtyfold. The average contribution per member has risen from 4s. 2d. per year to 24s. 10d. per year, or to 6d. a week. Could ill-employed and badly-paid workers who, as we are told, suffer severely from the dearness of food, spare 6d. a week for unions which in Germany serve mainly, not for purposes of insurance—that is done by the State Insurance Societies—but for purposes of agitation? In some of the German unions the contributions are considerably higher than 24s. 10d. a year or 6d. a week. In 1908 55,482 compositors contributed to their unions 80s. per head per year; 16,648 lithographers contributed 60s. per head per year; 146,337 wood-workers contributed 35s. per head per year; 360,099 metal-workers contributed 33s. per head per year.

How greatly the prosperity of the German workers has grown during recent years can be seen at a glance from the Prussian Income Tax statistics. From these we learn that the number of people who earn from £45 to £150 per year, and their income, have increased as follows :—

PEOPLE WITH INCOMES OF £45 TO £150 PER YEAR IN PRUSSIA

	Number of People	Income per Year
		£
1892 . . .	2,118,969	145,599,000
1909 . . .	5,477,856	382,081,000
1910 . . .	5,537,741	383,780,000
Increase .	3,358,887	236,482,000

During the years 1892–1909 both the number of the Prussian people in receipt of a substantial working-

class income and their aggregate income have increased by 160 per cent., whilst at the same time the number of people earning less than £45 per annum has very greatly shrunk. In other words, millions of working men who used to earn less than £45 a year earn now an income of from £45 to £150 a year.

Mr. Lloyd George has proclaimed that the German working masses subsist on offal and carrion. Mr. Lloyd George was wise to advance that argument, for those who desire to prove that the German masses are poor have no argument left except the horse meat and dog meat argument. A number of Germans and Frenchmen eat horse meat not from poverty but because they like it, or believe it more strengthening than other meat. The Board of Trade Report on labour conditions in Germany reported on page 125, with regard to Breslau: "Few workpeople appear to have any personal knowledge of the use of horse-flesh," and on page 438 with regard to Solingen, "Horse-flesh has long been in favour with the working classes, owing more, it is asserted, to a local preference for this meat than to inability to buy other meat." With regard to dog meat, the Board of Trade Report stated on page 379, with regard to Munich: "The public abattoir has a special department for the killing of dogs, but it is maintained that only a small portion of the flesh is used as human food, and even then only because of the belief that a dog's flesh is an antidote against tuberculosis, a belief in many parts of Germany." My inquiries in Germany have confirmed the foregoing statements. The superstition that the meat of a fat dog is good in wasting diseases is chiefly found among German Roman Catholics. In Prussia, which has as many inhabitants as Great Britain, 1596 dogs were killed at the slaughter-houses in 1908, or four

dogs per day. Possibly more than four dogs per day are eaten in Great Britain, though they need not be killed in public slaughter-houses. But then it is not compulsory in Great Britain, as it is in Germany, to kill in public slaughter-houses all animals offered for sale. As regards horse meat, we must remember that different nations have different tastes. The Turk abhors pork, the Englishman horse, and the German rabbit, porridge, periwinkles, half-baked, but white, bread, and tea which has been allowed to stew.

The members of all the working-men deputations who have visited Germany, both Protectionists and Free Traders, have expressed their surprise at not seeing any ragged people in the streets. This absence of visible poverty is all the more surprising as, according to the German census of 1907, only 27,399 people were maintained in institutions for the poor, comparable with our workhouses. In the British workhouses between 300,000 and 400,000 paupers are permanently maintained out of sight of the community. If this whole army of paupers, except 27,399, were turned into the streets, how then would British and German visible poverty compare ?

The British workmen delegates have searched for poverty in Germany but have not found it. The tale of the poverty of the German working masses is a fable. By unexampled mendacity the Free Trade party is trying to maintain the fiction that the British workers are the best employed, best paid, best fed, and happiest workers in the world, the envy of the workers of the universe, thanks to Free Trade, and that the workers of Germany are ill-employed, overworked, under-paid, under-fed, and miserable owing to Protection.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND BRITISH TARIFF REFORM

WHAT is the German navy for ?

The advocates of an overwhelmingly strong British fleet habitually assert that Germany is building a huge Navy because she intends to attack Great Britain. The champions of naval economy, on the other hand, assure us with equal confidence and emphasis that Germany is a peaceful country, that William the Second, as he has lately so often declared, is a friend of peace and of Great Britain, that there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, that he has no warlike designs, and that therefore we need not fear a German attack.

Both explanations betray great crudity of thought. Both spring from insufficient acquaintance with the realities of statesmanship. Both arise from a mistaken attempt of applying to matters of national policy and to international relations the motives of private intercourse and the standards of private morality.

The policy of States is not directed by the personal sentiments and publicly expressed intentions of their rulers, but by considerations of national interests, by political and economic necessity. In considering Germany's naval policy, we had therefore better leave out of our calculations the problematical intentions, warlike or peaceful, of Germany and her ruler, and study the factors which shape Germany's naval policy by investigating those interests which her naval policy is evidently meant to promote.

The naval policy of all great nations is directed rather by economic necessity than by ambition. Great Britain became a great sea Power and a colonial and maritime empire by sheer force of circumstances. The British world-empire was built up during the time when England had practically the world's monopoly in trade and manufactures, in shipping and in banking. Great Britain, like all the great colonial and maritime empires of the past, from Phœnicia to Holland, was forced into a career of conquest and expansion over sea by economic pressure. Our powerful industries, which made Great Britain the workshop of the world, and the necessities of our trade imperatively demanded markets outside these islands, and led to the conquest of India and of various other colonies. The rapid increase of our population beyond the national means of subsistence equally urgently demanded settlements in a temperate zone and led to the colonisation of America and Australia.

At the time when Great Britain was conquering and colonising the world, Germany was divided into numerous badly governed independent States, which quarrelled among themselves. The country was wretchedly poor. It subsisted on agriculture. German wheat, timber, hides, &c., were exchanged for British manufactures. In 1844 Lord Palmerston visited Berlin, and from his correspondence we learn that he was struck by the poverty and backwardness of the country, and that he thought that Germany was in the mechanical arts a century behind Great Britain. The overwhelming industrial superiority which England then possessed over Germany may be seen from the fact that in 1846 Great Britain produced 64.2 per cent. of the world's coal, whilst the Prussian and Austrian States combined, with double the number of

inhabitants, produced but 8.4 per cent. of the world's coal, and that Great Britain produced eleven times more iron than all the German States. At that time, steam engines were hardly known in Germany. The industrial machines used in Prussia possessed but 21,716 horse-power in 1846. Since then they have increased three hundred-fold, and amount now to more than six millions.

The political and economic unification of the independent German States, which took place in 1871, their transformation into a homogeneous empire, and the wise organisation and direction and the vigorous and deliberate development of all the national resources immediately after the Franco-German war, gave to the industries of the young empire an excellent start, and the introduction of Protection in 1879 converted a backward agricultural country into a wealthy industrial, commercial, and maritime State. Bismarck introduced his protective tariff in 1879, with the deliberate and avowed object of transferring part of the industries and the wealth of Great Britain to Germany, and his policy has succeeded only too well. In the present age of steel, the production of steel is perhaps the best index to a nation's manufacturing eminence. In 1880, the year following the introduction of Protection into Germany, Germany produced but 624,418 tons of steel, whilst Great Britain produced 1,341,690 tons of steel. In 1908 Germany produced 11,000,000 tons of steel, whilst Great Britain produced only 5,300,000 tons of steel. In other words, Germany and Great Britain have changed places. Only a short time ago, Great Britain produced twice as much steel as did Germany. Now Germany produces twice as much steel as does Great Britain. Other German industries have followed the lead of the steel industry,

but space precludes the showing of their progress in detail. The fact that the industrial steam engines of Prussia have increased from 984,000 horse-power in 1879, the year in which Protection was introduced, to 6,754,468 in 1909 shows better than a lengthy account the marvellous progress of the German manufacturing industries as a whole.

Largely owing to Germany's surprising development as an industrial nation, Great Britain is ceasing to be the workshop of the world, and Germany is rapidly attaining her place. It is true that if we look uncritically, as most Free Traders do, at the combined export and import figures which are swelled by our huge imports of food and our constantly growing exports of coal and of other raw materials, Great Britain is still the first trading nation in the world. But a closer examination will show that the character of our trade has curiously altered during the last three decades, that Great Britain is becoming, to an increasing extent, a purveyor of raw materials to other nations, whilst Germany is becoming the workshop of the world; that Germany is industrially rising, whilst Great Britain is industrially declining. I would therefore draw attention to the following most instructive and significant figures, which sum up the most recent industrial development of Germany in two lines.

	Imports of Raw Material into Germany.	Exports of Manufactured Goods from Germany.
1894 . . .	£83,295,000	£93,970,000
1910 . . .	254,165,000	239,775,000

During the short period of 1894–1910, whilst Great Britain has but haltingly increased her exports of manufactured goods, Germany has exactly trebled

her imports of raw materials and nearly trebled her exports of manufactures.

The change in the industrial character of Germany and in the character of her foreign trade is particularly striking if we study the change which has taken place in the nature of the Anglo-German trade. Formerly, Germany sold to Great Britain raw materials and food, and bought from us our manufactured goods. Germany was Great Britain's farm, and Great Britain was Germany's factory. Now Germany exports to Great Britain chiefly manufactures of every kind, and receives in return principally raw materials and food. Yarn apart, which is a raw material to the German industries and is therefore subject to only a slight duty, Great Britain exports to Germany chiefly coal, gold, silver, leather, furs, fish, caoutchouc, wool, copper, &c. According to the very reliable German Customs statistics, almost exactly nine-tenths of the British exports to Germany consist of raw materials and food, whilst only one-tenth of the British exports to Germany are fully manufactured articles, such as machinery, woollen and cotton cloths, &c. Great Britain has become a hewer of wood and a drawer of water to Germany.

The industrial development of Germany is still progressing with an incredible speed. The fact that the horse-power of industrial steam engines in Prussia has increased from 4,046,036 in 1900 to 6,754,468 in 1909 shows that Germany's manufacturing industries continue even at the present moment to increase their productive power by leaps and bounds, and that they must in the immediate future rely to an increasing extent upon expansive foreign markets for the sale of their productions. Unless the expansion of the German industries be accompanied by a corresponding

increase of opportunities for sale abroad, the German industries, and with the German industries the German Empire, will decline and decay. Germany experiences now the same imperative necessity for expansion over sea which Great Britain has experienced in times gone by, and she knows that upon her ability to secure that needed expansion depends her future as a great nation. Her leading statesmen, economists, and merchants have told her so, and when the German Emperor said, "Germany's future lies upon the water," he simply gave a convenient formula, easy to remember, to the general thought that the economical requirements of Germany and of her industries make maritime expansion absolutely necessary.

To a great industrial and trading nation, a great merchant marine is a necessity, and a great merchant marine requires adequate harbours.

Germany has become an industrial State whose population relies principally on the manufacturing industries for its support. Her manufacturing industries are forced to rely to an ever-increasing extent upon foreign markets, and especially upon markets over sea, for the sale of their wares. About three-quarters of Germany's foreign trade is over-sea trade, and the proportion of Germany's over-sea trade to her land trade is constantly growing, in consequence of the protective tariffs with which her neighbours in Europe try to shut out Germany's manufactures. Therefore Germany's most important market for the sale of her manufactures is not that of Austria-Hungary, or of Russia, or of France, her immediate neighbours. Her best customer is the British Empire, which absorbs about 25 per cent. of Germany's exports, more than is taken by Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France combined.

The chief characteristic of Germany's foreign trade is its precariousness. The precariousness of the hold of Germany on her most important market, the British market, is well known to the German statesmen and to most German business-men, who dread the possibility of Great Britain introducing Protection and arranging with her Colonies for the preferential treatment of her manufactures. How rapidly Germany's exports to Great Britain, and especially to her principal Colonies, have grown is apparent from the following figures, which are taken from the German official statistics :—

German Exports to	1896.	1902.	1909.
	£	£	£
Great Britain .	35,755,000	48,275,000	50,750,000
India and Ceylon .	2,460,000	3,310,000	4,475,000
Australia . .	1,465,000	2,275,000	3,320,000
Canada . . .	756,500	1,935,000	1,240,000

It will be observed that the figures relating to Canada show between 1902 and 1909 a very heavy decline in the German exports. A comparison of this decline with the other figures, which indicate a constant and vigorous growth of the German exports to Great Britain and her Colonies, shows how much damage a preferential tariff may inflict upon Germany's industrial exports. Germany stands in danger of seeing by far her most valuable markets, the markets of the British Empire, closed to many of her wares. However, this is by no means the only danger which threatens Germany. If Great Britain should introduce Protection, she will, following Germany's example, conclude preferential treaties of commerce with her best

foreign customers (the Colonies would, of course, be placed upon the most favoured footing), and thus Germany will lose many of the advantages which she now enjoys in neutral markets owing to the advantageous commercial treaties which she has concluded, but which she will hardly be able to renew in competition with the British Empire. A study of the Japanese Customs returns, for instance, reveals the fact that Germany is ousting Great Britain in the Japanese market. An Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, giving Great Britain and her Colonies preference over Germany in Japan, which undoubtedly can be concluded in view of Japan's great interest in the India trade, would practically exclude certain German manufactures from that country.

The German tariff policy which Bismarck inaugurated in 1879 led to the transference of much English trade to Germany. The tables may be turned upon Germany. The introduction of Protection into Great Britain and of preferential arrangements throughout the Empire would lead to the transference of much valuable German trade to Great Britain.

Germany is threatened not only with the narrowing of the outlets for her manufactured products, but also with the danger of seeing her supply of raw products for industrial purposes diminish.

Owing to her Colonies and dependencies, the value of which has not yet been sufficiently realised by most Englishmen, Great Britain controls the supply of many industrial raw products. Inter-imperial preference for sale would, no doubt, be followed by inter-imperial preference for purchase, especially in the case of articles of relative scarcity. Great Britain would, for instance, probably receive the preference for the

purchase of Empire-grown cotton and wool. Hence some of the most important German industries would find themselves hampered by the British Empire, both in buying their raw products and in disposing of their manufactured articles, and the result would, no doubt, be the wholesale transference of many industries and of much industrial capital from Germany to Great Britain and to the British Dominions over sea, a transference which at the same time would greatly benefit the British nations and greatly weaken Germany.

Germany, whose natural resources, such as coal, coast-line, harbours, easy access to the sea, &c., compare most unfavourably with those possessed by Great Britain, owes her marvellous success chiefly to the fact that she was the first nation to exchange the policy of *laisser-faire*, the policy of Governmental indifference and neglect, for a far-seeing and business-like policy of national industrial organisation and development. Owing to the inferiority of her natural resources, and especially to her lack of harbours and to the vast distances (from 200 miles to 400 miles) which separate her industrial centres from the sea, Germany's industrial position is exceedingly unsafe. Germany's industrial prosperity has been built up on the basis of British *laisser-faire*, her wealth has been drawn out of British purses, and as soon as that basis is withdrawn there will be a collapse in the German industries. Every German economist knows that, given equal conditions, Germany could not industrially compete with Great Britain.

Recognising the dangers which threaten her by the conclusion of a Pan-Britannic Customs Union, Germany has naturally done her utmost to prevent the unification of the British Empire upon an economic

basis—an event which, for her, would be a calamity of the very greatest magnitude. Therefore no Englishman was more dreaded and hated by Germany than was Mr. Chamberlain. Therefore Germany penalised Canada when she took the first practical step towards the unification of the empire and the conclusion of a Pan-Britannic Zollverein by giving Great Britain a preference in her market.

The foregoing should suffice to show that Germany's abounding prosperity is largely due to certain temporary conditions which the short-sightedness of English administrations and the far-sightedness of Bismarck and his successors have created. It should also show that the conclusion of a Pan-Britannic Customs Union would lead to a rapid decline of German prosperity, and to a rapid exodus of a large part of her capital and of her industrial population, an exodus similar to that to which, unfortunately, we have become accustomed in this country. Germany, if she cannot defeat the conclusion of a Pan-Britannic Customs Union by diplomacy or force, can counteract its harmful effect upon her industries and prosperity only by expansion over sea. She can improve her unfavourable position as to commercial harbours only by securing the control of Antwerp and Rotterdam, which are the natural ports to her chief manufacturing districts in Rhenish Prussia and Westphalia. She can obtain secure markets only by acquiring extensive Colonies, both in temperate and tropical zones, which make her independent of other countries as regards the supply of raw materials, which give her an adequate outlet for her surplus population, and which at the same time afford expansive markets for her manufactures similar to those furnished by her Colonies to Great Britain.

Maritime expansion is not merely a hobby of the Emperor's, as so often is believed, but it is a question of life or death for Germany. Germany, from her point of view, is perfectly justified in endeavouring to strengthen her industrial position by the acquisition of Rotterdam and Antwerp, which at one time formed part of the German Empire. Great Britain, on her part, is equally justified in preventing Germany from acquiring harbours from which a descent upon the English coasts would be comparatively easy. Germany is perfectly justified in trying to acquire Colonies for her abounding population; but Great Britain is equally justified in defending her Colonies, and in preventing their receiving so dangerous a neighbour as Germany might prove. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the question of the expansion of Germany depends in the first place on Germany's power to overcome the opposition which Great Britain, for the sake of self-preservation, is compelled to offer. There was much sense in the German Emperor's winged word, "Germany stands in bitter need of a strong navy."

Great Britain's opposition need not necessarily be overcome by war. A demonstration of sufficient naval force might suffice, as German writers have frequently pointed out, to overcome Great Britain's opposition to Germany's maritime expansion.

Those who doubt that the German Navy is primarily destined either to defeat the British fleet or to overawe Great Britain without war, in order to obtain a free field for Germany's maritime expansion, and those who find the leading principle of Germany's naval policy which was laid down in the Navy Bill of 1900 not sufficiently explicit, should ask themselves: "Against which State, apart from Great Britain, can the German naval armaments possibly be directed?" Germany

requires no fleet in case of a war with France, as a Franco-German war will be decided on land, as Moltke has pointed out. Russia has practically no fleet. Outside Europe, there are only two great naval Powers —the United States and Japan. Both countries are too far removed from Germany to make a war with Germany likely. Besides, the German fleet, proceeding to attack the United States or Japan, would find no coaling-stations open to her, and would have to pass within reach of the guns of the French and English coasts. In view of the intimate relations existing between Great Britain and the United States, and between Great Britain and Japan, Germany cannot think of a war against either country. Germany can strike westward only if Great Britain is on her side. It is almost inconceivable that Germany would run the risk of having her fleet cut off from her harbours by Great Britain or France or by both Powers combined. Not only economically, but geographically as well, Great Britain bars Germany's way; if Germany wishes to take New York or Tokio she must first take London. The way to New York or to Tokio goes *viâ* London.

Lately the British Government has shown a desire to withdraw from the race for naval supremacy by making puerile proposals of naval disarmament to Germany, which serve only to strengthen Germany's determination to outbuild this country. The British disarmament proposals were declared impractical and absurd by the leading organs of the Conservative, Liberal, and Clerical parties of Germany, and even the German Socialists, who favour disarmament in the abstract, exposed the childish proposals of the Liberal Government to well-deserved ridicule. The *Vorwärts*, for instance, wrote :—

"With the greatest number of the Liberal advocates of disarmament, their point of view originates simply in the consideration that strong naval and military armaments demand more and more from England's purse and her human material, whilst England possesses all that she can wish for, and has therefore nothing to gain from fresh conquests. All over the world she has the most valuable colonies. She is in that satisfied frame of mind which makes the fortunate winner at cards say, 'Let us leave off, I am tired of playing any longer,' and the thing is, therefore, to secure what she has got, and to diminish her heavy financial burdens. This desire is comprehensible, but the other Powers will hardly respect it. Social-Democracy is very much in sympathy with the disarmament idea, but no amount of sympathy can get over the fact that in the world as at present constituted there is little chance of a general disarmament. The conception that war is only a product of human unreason is on the same level as the idea that revolutions are only mental aberrations of the masses. War is rooted in the opposing interests of the nations, as are revolutions in the opposing interests of the classes."

There is no hope for England to secure her possessions and her peace cheaply by a piece of paper. She can secure them only by her armed strength.

It is not sufficient that Great Britain possesses merely a supremacy over Germany in first-class battleships. She must possess an overwhelming supremacy. Accident, floating mines, a surprise attack by torpedo boats, a mistake of a captain or an error of judgment on the part of an admiral—for we cannot count upon always having a Nelson upon our side—may destroy or temporarily cripple a few of our best ships, and might convert our theoretical superiority into a very real inferiority. Besides, some of our own *Dreadnoughts* and *Invincibles* may in case of an Anglo-German war have to be detached in order to protect British interests in other directions. For these reasons it is necessary that the doctrine should be laid down

that for every German battleship Great Britain will build two.

In view of the growing disproportion in the increase of British and of German wealth, and the evident economic decay of Great Britain, it is clear that the question whether Germany will outbuild Great Britain, or whether Great Britain will outbuild Germany, is a purely financial one. Great Britain has no monopoly of naval ability. The longest purse can build the strongest fleet. Mr. Lloyd George's amendment of the Patent Laws, which no longer allow foreign manufacturers who hold British patents to manufacture abroad, has caused some important patent-protected German industries to migrate to this country, and these German industries are giving occupation to thousands of British working men. The capital so transferred from Germany to Great Britain is said to amount already to £25,000,000. An amendment of the Fiscal Policy of Great Britain, sufficiently high protective duties for our industries, will compel German industries which now import their productions into Great Britain to migrate wholesale to this country. With them a large part of Germany's wealth will be transferred to this country, the flight of British capital towards Protectionist countries will cease, English industries will flourish again, and Germany will no longer financially be able to dispute Great Britain's naval supremacy. A strong tariff will pay for a strong fleet, and enable us to preserve our independence, wealth, and empire. The latent resources of Great Britain and her Colonies are ample. All that Great Britain desires is to preserve and develop her country and possessions. All that she may desire from Germany she can obtain by means of a tariff. Therefore, a strong tariff will make an Anglo-German War sense-

less on the part of Great Britain and impossible on the part of Germany, whose resources will be crippled when Great Britain introduces Protection. Hence a strong Protective tariff may prove a stronger safeguard of Great Britain's peace and independence than her Navy, the most satisfactory alliances and treaties of arbitration, and the most cordial assurances of friendship and goodwill towards Great Britain on the part of the German Emperor.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE ULTIMATE RUIN OF GERMANY [1]

DURING the first half of 1914 peace in Europe seemed firmly and permanently established. Although the situation in Ireland was causing much anxiety, the people thought of their holidays, and as foreign affairs were quite uneventful and uninteresting the newspapers and periodicals filled the space usually devoted to foreign politics with the discussion of various schemes for abolishing war and restricting national armaments. To-day five of the six European Great Powers, with more than 400,000,000 people, are at war, and more than 20,000,000 soldiers have been mobilised and are dealing out death and destruction. Compared with these gigantic armies, the mythical hosts of the Persians and Scythians shrink into insignificance. The greatest war the world has seen, and perhaps the greatest the world will ever see, has begun. We live in a great and terrible time. People are asking: Why did the German Emperor make war? What was its real cause? What will be its issue and its consequences? In the following pages an attempt will be made to answer these questions.

Many people in this country are surprised and amazed that the German Emperor, who was considered to be the strongest defender of the world's peace, should recklessly have plunged all Europe into war; that he should rashly have jeopardised the existence of his country and of his dynasty on account

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, Sept. 1914.

of Austria's quarrel with Serbia; that the Triple Alliance, which only recently had been renewed, and which was proclaimed to be an absolutely reliable partnership, should have broken down before the first shot was fired; that Germany, which is supposed to be the best governed and administered country in the world, and which under Bismarck had always known how to isolate her enemies and secure for herself the support of the leading Powers, should, in company with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, be at war with six powerful nations—France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium, Serbia, and Japan—whose ranks may be increased to eight if, as appears probable, Italy and Roumania should range themselves on the side of Germany's opponents; that the German navy should have remained absolutely inactive during the first critical weeks of the war, when its value and influence would have been greatest, and that the celebrated German army should have begun the campaign by a series of palpable mistakes. However, the readers of the earlier editions of this book and of the *Nineteenth Century and After* will scarcely be surprised at the terrible events of the last few weeks, for I have frequently and emphatically foretold these during more than a decade. Year after year I have warned the British and the German peoples with all my strength of the coming catastrophe. Year by year I have watched with increasing concern the mistakes of Germany's foreign and domestic policy, which were bound to lead to disaster. In the preface to the fourth edition of this book, published in the autumn of 1912, I wrote :—

"During the last few years Germany's failures, to which I had drawn attention in previous editions, have become more salient and more frequent. During twenty years the German

Foreign Office has serenely marched from failure to failure. The Morocco fiasco is merely the last of a large number of mistaken and unsuccessful enterprises.

"By her policy towards Great Britain, Germany has brought into being the Triple Entente and that isolation about which she has so frequently complained, and she is accelerating the unification of the British Empire, which she wishes to prevent and has tried to prevent. The failure of her domestic policy is proclaimed by the constant increase of the Social Democratic Party, which polled more than 4,250,000 votes at the Election of 1912. Germany's prosperity is admittedly phenomenal. Still, a careful observer cannot help noticing that her economic progress is slackening. Germany's future seems no longer as bright as it used to appear."

Although intimate friends of the Emperor often assured me that he was a prince of peace, I never ceased to describe him as immoderately ambitious, reckless and dangerous to the peace of the world, and I indicated almost the exact moment when he would strike. In an article "England, Germany and the Baltic," which was given first place in the *Nineteenth Century* in July 1907, and reprinted in Chapter VIII of this book, I pointed out the enormous strategical importance of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, which was being greatly enlarged so as to make it available to the largest German Dreadnoughts and which would practically double the striking power of the German fleet. In one of the concluding paragraphs I said with all the emphasis which I could bring to bear :—

"It is expected that eight years will be required to finish the Baltic and North Sea Canal. Therefore during the next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North Sea Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her magnificent new ships will for about eight years be restricted to one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, during the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a conflict with a first-class naval Power. During the next eight years Germany

has every reason to keep the peace. Only when the enlargement of the Baltic and North Sea Canal has been accomplished will she be ready for a great naval war."

The article, and especially its conclusion, attracted a great deal of attention, both in England and abroad. By accelerating the work, the Kiel Canal was finished not in eight years, but in seven. Its completion was celebrated on the 24th of June 1914, five weeks before the outbreak of the present war, and by the irony of fate English warships took a prominent part in the festivities.

To those who have given the matter some consideration it was clear that if Germany should embark upon a world war the Netherlands might become its principal theatre. In an article, "The Absorption of Holland by Germany," I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century*—see Chapter IV of this book—in July 1906 :—

"During four centuries the Netherlands have been the centre of gravity to the European Great Powers. The sceptre of Europe lies buried not on the banks of the Bosphorus but at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt. Therefore the Netherlands have during four centuries been the battlefield on which the struggle for the mastery of Europe and of the world has been decided. In the Netherlands the mighty armies with which Philip the Second, Louis the Fourteenth, Louis the Fifteenth, and Napoleon the First strove to subdue Europe and to conquer the world were broken to pieces, and in the Netherlands Germany may find either her Gemblours, her Breda, or her Waterloo."

When William the Second came to the throne Germany dominated Europe. Her position was impregnable and unassailable. The Triple Alliance was absolutely reliable and Germany's possible antagonists were isolated, for Bismarck had with marvellous skill created a strong antagonism between France and Italy, by giving Tunis, which was claimed by Italy, to

France. Besides, he had estranged France and England by inciting France to encroach upon England's Colonial domain and to pursue an anti-British policy, and he had increased the differences between England and Russia by encouraging Russia to press upon England in Asia. As both France and Russia were antagonistic to England, Germany could always count upon Great Britain's support, or at least upon her benevolent neutrality, in case of that war on two fronts which Bismarck dreaded so much.

The great value which the Iron Chancellor attached to good and cordial relations with England is apparent from many of his public utterances. On the 10th of July 1885, for instance, on the occasion of some colonial dispute between England and Germany, he stated in the Reichstag :—

"I would ask the last speaker not to make any attempt to disturb the good relations between England and Germany, or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I absolutely deny that possibility. It does not exist, and all the questions which are at present being discussed between England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really do not know what dispute could arise between England and Germany."

Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, Bismarck stated in the Reichstag with reference to Anglo-German differences regarding Zanzibar :—

"The preservation of Anglo-German goodwill is, after all, the most important thing for us. I see in England an old and traditional ally. No differences exist between England and Germany. If I speak of England as our ally, I am not using a diplomatic term. We have no alliance with England. However, I wish to remain in close contact with England also

in colonial questions. The two nations have marched side by side during at least a hundred and fifty years, and if I should discover that we might lose touch with England, I should act with caution and endeavour to avoid losing England's goodwill."

Bismarck desired that Germany's relations with Great Britain should be most cordial, because he counted upon British support in case of a war with France and Russia combined. He dreaded England's hostility not only because Germany was vulnerable at sea, but also because he knew that Germany and Austria-Hungary could reckon upon the loyal support of allied Italy only as long as Great Britain was either friendly or observed a benevolent neutrality. As Italy has very extensive coasts, as most of her large towns can be shelled from the sea, as her most important strategic and commercial railways run close to the seashore, and can easily be destroyed by the warships of a superior naval Power, and as she is economically as dependent upon her sea trade as is Great Britain, it was clear that England's hostility to Germany and Austria-Hungary would automatically lead to Italy deserting her allies in case of war. Italy's desertion was foretold by those acquainted with the true position, as, for instance, in Chapter XII of this book, written many years ago.

Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's unity and firmly established the State, Bismarck desired to establish its permanence and security by pursuing a peaceful, prudent, moderate and conciliatory foreign policy, rightly fearing that a policy of dash and adventure, of interference, provocation and bluster, would raise dangerous enemies to the new State. In one of the concluding chapters of

his *Memoirs*, his political testament, that great statesman laid down on large lines the policy which Germany ought to pursue in the future, in the following phrases :

"In the future not only sufficient military equipment, but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the German ship of State through the currents of coalition to which, in consequence of our geographical position and our previous history, we are exposed.

"We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling among the nations, which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

"In order to produce this confidence, it is above everything necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events."

In 1888 William the Second came to the throne. Believing that he possessed the genius and the universality of Frederick the Great, and being confirmed in that opinion by the flatterers surrounding him, the young Emperor declared in his overweening self-confidence that he was divinely inspired, that he had received his crown from God, and that he was responsible only to God. He said, for instance : "Only one is master in this country. That is I. Who opposes me I shall crush to pieces." "Sic volo, sic jubeo." "We Hohenzollerns take our crown from God alone, and to God alone we are responsible in the fulfilment of our duty." "Suprema lex regis voluntas." "All of you have only one will, and that is my will ; there is only one law, and that is my law," &c.

"Intoxicated by the exuberance of his own verbosity" and by the adulation of his entourage, and animated by a boundless confidence in himself, William

the Second, like another Frederick the Great, took the control of all the great departments of State out of the hands of his responsible Ministers, and assumed their direction. Soon after his accession he dismissed Prince Bismarck, who refused to carry out the hasty, crude and ill-considered views of the new Emperor. After Bismarck's dismissal the young Emperor declared, with the admiring applause of his flattering courtiers, that he would steer the ship of State over a new course, his own course, that he would lead the nation to a great and glorious future, that henceforth he would be his own Chancellor. Pursuing a purely personal policy, and allowing himself to be swayed by the impulses of the moment, he threw caution to the wind, and irritated and exasperated, by his restless and interfering policy, not only the continental Powers, both large and small, but also Great Britain, Germany's "old and traditional ally," and the United States.

From his retirement Bismarck looked upon the Emperor's activity with anxiety and dismay. He feared that William the Second would endanger Germany's future. Obviously referring to William the Second and to the flattering courtiers surrounding him, and comparing him with his grandfather, the Emperor William the First, the founder of the German Empire, Bismarck wrote in his *Memoirs* :—

"The Emperor William I. was completely free from vanity of this kind; on the other hand he had in a high degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries and of posterity.

"No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity he would have thought 'If anyone has the right of praising me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would not admit either.

"What I fear is, that by following the road in which we are

walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers; if obedience alone is the qualification, then demands will be made on the general ability of the monarch, which even a Frederick the Great could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day."

William the Second disregarded Bismarck's wise advice that Germany should follow a frank and conciliatory policy, and that she should endeavour to avoid friction with other nations; and, in addition, he made the fatal mistake of challenging Great Britain's naval supremacy. Thus he converted Germany's "old and traditional ally" into a dangerous opponent.

Clearly recognising that Germany's naval policy would, in case of a great European conflict, compel this country to support Germany's opponents, the writer of this book repeatedly urged the danger of Germany's naval and anti-British policy upon Prince Bülow, Admiral von Tirpitz, and other leading Germans, but he preached to deaf ears.

In the summer of 1911 the second Morocco crisis broke out in consequence of the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir. It nearly led to war between France and Germany. Both in England and in Germany hostilities were expected between the two countries, and Mr. Lloyd George plainly announced in his Mansion House speech that if Germany should attack France, Great Britain would aid France in her defence. The tension between Great Britain and Germany reached the breaking point. In December 1911, when the Morocco question had been settled, I happened to see one of the leading German diplomats at the German Foreign Office. In the course of a long conversation I pointed out once more that Germany's

trans-maritime policy not only endangered her security but was bound to lead to the break-up of the Triple Alliance; that she rashly risked her very existence; that Germany's safety on the Continent depended on good relations with Great Britain; that she would act wisely in ceasing to antagonise France; that she should not increase her fleet beyond the provisions of her gigantic naval programme; that she should stop the anti-British agitation of the German navy party; that if Germany continued on the course on which she had embarked a collision between Great Britain and Germany was inevitable. I added that an Anglo-German war might lead not merely to Germany's defeat, but to her downfall; and that my action was undertaken rather in the interest of Germany than in that of Great Britain, for if the two countries should unhappily go to war Germany would risk very much, while Great Britain would risk but little. The eminent personage before whom I put these considerations treated me with studied discourtesy. The leaders of Germany's foreign policy seemed struck with blindness.

A few weeks after this conversation the German navy programme received another enormous expansion. The whole German fleet was to be put on a permanent war footing in time of peace. More ships were to be laid down, and once more a virulent and malicious anti-British agitation was engineered in the German Press by the Press Bureau of the German Admiralty. Shortly after my return I wrote an article on "Anglo-German Differences and Sir Edward Grey," which appeared in the *Fortnightly Review*, and which was addressed to the German Foreign Office. In that article I gave the following warning:—

"Great Britain has little cause to plead for Germany's goodwill, for she suffers little through the existing Anglo-German

tension, while isolated Germany suffers much and risks more. While Great Britain's position throughout the world is secure, that of Germany is very precarious because of her exposed frontiers. As matters stand at present Germany has far more need of Great Britain's support than Great Britain has of Germany's. It is true that Germany possesses still the strongest army in Europe, but it is not strong enough to face a great European combination. She is no longer a danger to the peace of the world, owing to her isolation and to the estrangement of Great Britain. The minds of her statesmen must rather be preoccupied with the problem of defending Germany than with ambitious wars of aggression. Under these circumstances it is madness for Germany's rulers to continue proclaiming that Germany requires more Dreadnoughts, and still more Dreadnoughts, and ever more Dreadnoughts against Great Britain.

"Germany's prospects are dark and threatening. She is not rich enough and not strong enough to maintain at the same time the strongest army and a navy able to challenge the strongest navy. Every nation which has tried to become supreme on land and sea has failed."

When it became clear that Germany was determined to continue her dangerous anti-British policy, I stated in an article published in the *Nineteenth Century* in June 1912, and entitled "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany":—

"A nation can safely embark upon a bold and costly transmaritime policy only if it is secure on land, if it either occupies an island, like Great Britain and Japan, or if it occupies an isolated position and cannot be invaded by its neighbours, like the United States. Germany has three great land Powers for neighbours. Two of them, France and Russia, are not friendly to Germany, and she cannot rely with absolute certainty upon the support of her third neighbour, Austria-Hungary, a fact of which Bismarck warned her in his *Memoirs*. Under these circumstances it is obvious that Germany's greatest need is not expansion oversea, but defence on land; that her greatest interests lie not on the sea, but on *terra firma*."

It was obvious to many that, owing to the unwise

policy of William the Second, the Triple Alliance had become a sham, that Germany could no longer rely on Italy's support in the hour of need. I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century* in June 1912 :—

"In matters of foreign policy praise or blame must be meted out according to results. At the time of Bismarck's dismissal the Triple Alliance was a solid and reliable partnership, and as France on one side of Germany, Russia on another, and Great Britain on a third were isolated, Germany's position in the world was absolutely secure. She dominated the Continent.

"By pursuing an anti-British policy, Germany has not only driven Great Britain from Germany's side and has driven her into the arms of France and Russia, but she has at the same time greatly weakened the formerly reliable Triple Alliance. Few Germans believe that Germany can count on Italy's support in the hour of need. Thus Germany has simultaneously created the Triple Entente and weakened, if not destroyed, the Triple Alliance. It is true the Triple Alliance exists still—on paper. However, Italy would not think of supporting Germany in a war against France, and still less in a war against Great Britain or against Great Britain and France combined.

"Few intelligent Germans reckon upon Italy's support. Most think that in a great European war Italy will either remain neutral or will be found on the side of Germany's enemies."

In Bismarck's time, and at the beginning of the reign of William the Second, Germany's position was, I repeat, absolutely secure. Not only were Germany's enemies isolated, but the Triple Alliance was in reality a Quintuple Alliance in disguise. The loyalty of Italy was then undoubted, and Germany could firmly reckon upon the support of Turkey and of Roumania in case of need. Turkey and Roumania could have afforded invaluable assistance to the Triple Alliance in case of a war with Russia. By allowing Turkey to be attacked and despoiled in quick succession, first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, Germany seriously changed

the balance of power in Europe to her disadvantage; and Roumania, recognising that the central European group of Powers was no longer the stronger one of the two, not unnaturally turned towards the Powers of the Triple Entente for support, especially as she desired to acquire those vast territories of Austria-Hungary which border upon Roumania, and which are inhabited by three million Roumanians. Through the wretched policy of her Emperor, Turkey has been crippled and Roumania has been estranged. Commenting on Germany's impolicy in allowing Turkey to be struck down, and in estranging Roumania, I wrote in an article "The Changing of the Balance of Power," published in the *Nineteenth Century Review* in June 1913:—

"In view of the fact that Germany had driven Great Britain into the arms of France and Russia, and had exposed herself to the possibility of being simultaneously involved in a great war by land and sea, it was of course of the utmost importance to her that her position on land should be absolutely impregnable. In these circumstances it was clearly the first and most urgent duty of German statesmanship to take care that Austria-Hungary and Italy should be as strong as possible, and that Roumania and Turkey—and especially Turkey, the support of which should be invaluable in case of complications with Great Britain—should be firmly attached to Germany or to the Triple Alliance. But with the same incredible short-sightedness and levity with which Germany had embarked upon an anti-British course, she allowed Turkey to be attacked first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, and to be utterly defeated. If Germany had possessed a policy, if her diplomacy had been guided by a statesman, or merely by a man possessed of common sense, she would have known that the support of Turkey would be more valuable to her in the hour of need than that of Italy. She would, therefore, either have attached Turkey to the Triple Alliance by treaty, as General von Bernhardi had suggested, or she would have replied to Italy's ultimatum to Turkey by an ultimatum of her own addressed to Italy, which very likely would have prevented the war."

Year by year it became clearer that the German Emperor's unceasing, unnecessary and exasperating activity in all quarters of the globe had made Germany's policy universally disliked and suspected, that Germany had come to take that place among the nations which France occupied in the time of Napoleon the Third, that Germany had become the disturber of the world's peace, and was in danger of being treated as such by the generality of nations. In an article entitled "German Designs in Africa," published in the *Nineteenth Century and After* in August 1911, I had written :—

"War has been brought within the limits of vision. It is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course which in a very short time may bring her into a collision not only with France, but with several Great Powers ; and as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive alliance relating only to Europe, Germany may find herself deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us hope that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as the mistake of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will solve and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will soon be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course which Germany is steering at the present moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason."

Germany had become a danger to the peace of the world. Time after time she had dragged the nations to the very brink of a world-war. By his ceaseless, neurotic activity, William the Second was likely to raise a great coalition against Germany. He was likely to be confronted in the hour of trial by a Europe in arms, as was Napoleon the First a century ago. In

my article "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," published in the *Nineteenth Century and After* in June 1912, I wrote :—

"Bismarck was constantly haunted by the thought of the formation of a great European coalition against Germany. This will be seen from his *Memoirs*, and from many of his letters and conversations. Bismarck's worst fear may be realised before long. Germany's post-Bismarckian diplomacy is doing its best to destroy the work of the great Chancellor. It has already destroyed Germany's security on the Continent. Yet there is no sign that the 'new course' will be abandoned."

The forecasts made have come true in every particular. Germany, which was the undisputed leader of the strongest group of Powers in Europe, which dominated a Quintuple Alliance, and which kept the other Powers in a state of isolation and mutual distrust, has at present scarcely a single friend, and she is at war with nearly all Europe. Before long Germany may have the fate of Imperial France and William the Second that of Napoleon the First.

It has been asserted that Germany has gone to war in order to acquire the hegemony of Europe. That assertion is not correct. Germany possessed the hegemony of Europe in the time of Bismarck. She lost it through the mistaken policy of William the Second, and she is now trying to regain by force what she has lost through her own folly.

Hitherto the German army has been considered to be by far the best army in the world. However, those who have studied military matters closely and without prejudice were aware that the influence of William the Second had been as fatal to the German army as it has been to Germany's diplomacy. In the first place, since the time when the German Emperor embarked upon naval competition with Great Britain,

the army was relatively neglected. It was starved of money and men for the sake of the navy. In the second place, William the Second insisted upon being not only his own Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but also his own Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, and his own Chief of the Staff of both services. At the time when the Emperor made the nephew of the Great Moltke Chief of the Staff, appointing him to the same position which his uncle had filled with such wonderful success, the rumour was current in well-informed circles in Berlin that von Moltke asked not to be given that most responsible position, because he thought that he did not possess the necessary high qualifications, but that the Emperor had replied, "Never mind, Moltke. You can safely take the post. What you don't know I do, and I can do the work for you." Two years ago, when nobody dared to question the pre-eminence and excellence of the German army, I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century Review*, in an article entitled "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," published in June 1912 :—

"Guided by the maxim 'Germany's future lies upon the water,' the leaders of the 'new course' have been so anxious to strengthen the navy that the German Army has been neglected both quantitatively and qualitatively. Germany's expenditure on the navy has been comparatively extravagant, and that on her army scarcely sufficient. Not only quantitatively but qualitatively as well has the German Army suffered during the 'new course.' German generals complain that promotions are made less by merit and more by favour than in former times. Similar complaints are heard in most Government offices. They complain that the officers are no longer as good as they used to be. Owing to the rise in wages the German Army can no longer obtain a sufficient number of good non-commissioned officers. The German war material also is scarcely up to date. The military outfit of France is superior to that of Germany. According to Lieutenant-

Colonel Beyel, of the French artillery, and many other experts, the German artillery is inferior to the French. The tactics of the German Army have become antiquated. According to various German writers Germany has failed to learn the lessons of the Boer war and of the Russo-Japanese war. Major Hoppenstedt published in 1910 a book, *Sind wir Kriegsfertig?* in which he showed that the German Army is too much occupied with barracks-square drill and too little with warlike training. Many officers attribute the neglect of the army to the influence of the Emperor, who is severely criticised. William the First was a soldier by nature. The army was his principal interest. He did not understand the navy. He tolerated no flatterers, and knew no favouritism. He worked incessantly on the improvement of the army. William the Second has made the navy his hobby and attends to the army perfunctorily, and many say that it is little better managed than his Foreign Office."

After the Morocco crisis of 1911 Germany hastily tried to improve her neglected army by greatly increasing the establishment, improving arms and appliances, strengthening fortresses, &c. Her military expenditure rose from £47,200,000 in 1912 to £50,400,000 in 1913, and to no less than £83,500,000 in 1914, and a special "war levy" of £50,000,000 was voted by the Reichstag for bringing her army up to date. However, armies and navies are largely spiritual things of slow organic growth. They cannot be improvised, nor can they be rapidly improved if they have been neglected for a long time, even if money is poured out like water. Besides, monetary expenditure, however lavish, cannot alter the spirit of an army and its supreme direction. Money neither gives foresight nor does it destroy conceit in the leaders. It neither replaces officers appointed by favour by men of merit, nor does it improve a defective organisation and faulty tactics.

Modesty, concentration, thoroughness and hard work command success in diplomacy and war. While

modesty and thoroughness were the great characteristics of William the First and of his time, the reign of William the Second has become notorious for luxury, ostentation, arrogance, favouritism, amateurishness, self-praise and conceit. During the reign of William the Second the old Prussian virtues of frugality, modesty and thoroughness disappeared. German idealism died, and Berlin became a centre of coarse materialism, of luxury, and of immorality. Encouraged by the most exalted circles, all Germany gave itself over to self-admiration and self-praise. In the Emperor's speeches and in innumerable articles, lectures, pamphlets and books, the Germans were told that they were, to quote the Emperor, "the salt of the earth," the wisest, ablest, strongest and most valiant nation in the world, and that they were, therefore, entitled to rule the universe. Foreign nations, especially the English, were looked upon with undisguised contempt. Being convinced of their irresistible might and their great destiny, many Germans thought that Germany should become supreme in the world by the free and unscrupulous use of her irresistible strength. Although Bismarck had eloquently warned the nation against *Machtpolitik*, against pursuing a policy based on force, against the policy which had caused the downfall of Napoleonic France, the idea of *Machtpolitik* became the guiding principle of the German nation, and the word *Machtpolitik* was in everyone's mouth. Unfortunately Bismarck had not practised in the earlier years of his career what he preached in the later. In three great wars he had given to little Prussia the hegemony of Europe. Young Germany hoped, by another series of successful wars, to conquer the hegemony of the world. By sheer force and audacity the world was to be made German.

The Government, following the fatal precedents set by Bismarck, continued to rely on force in its foreign and domestic policy. By force Germany was to conquer for herself "a place in the sun." By force were the Poles, Danes and Frenchmen in the conquered provinces to be denationalised. By force were Socialism and popular dissatisfaction to be crushed. By force was the German people to be governed against its will, and by force were the rudimentary parliamentary institutions of Germany to be abolished if parliament should cease to obey the will of the ruling class. Patriotic Germans in their thousands had been converted to the gospel of force, and they endeavoured to aid the policy of the Government by creating enormous organisations which advocated solving all German problems by that means. The Navy League, with more than a million members, demanded that Germany should have the strongest fleet, the Army League that she should have the strongest army, the Air League that she should rule the air. The Ostmarkenverein and Nordmarkenverein agitated in favour of denationalising the Poles and Danes dwelling in the conquered provinces by force. A Government-aided league made war on Socialism, and the Pan-Germanic League, founded three years after the Emperor's accession, advocated Germany's conquest of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, the Baltic provinces of Russia, &c. It advocated the Germanisation of Europe and of the world. An enormous literature arose in which "the war of the future" was vividly and patriotically described. In hundreds of romances the German people, and especially the younger generation, were told how Germany would conquer France and Russia, defeat the English fleet, raise India in rebellion, invade England, deprive her of her colonies,

punish the United States for their arrogance, and tear up the Monroe doctrine. Scarcely in any of these romances, or in any serious books, was the possibility of a German defeat contemplated. Countless admirals, generals, university professors, lecturers, authors and journalists unceasingly preached the need of power, but none the need of wisdom, of caution and of fairness. To discuss even the possibility of disaster or to advocate moderation was considered unpatriotic.

The Germans are a most docile nation. They are what their rulers make them. They may be arrogant to foreigners, but they are always most obedient and respectful to their rulers. That lies in their training. They take from their rulers their policy and their opinions. Since the advent of William the Second an evil spirit has taken possession of Germany. A quarter of a century of stirring Imperial oratory, of jingoist self-admiration, self-praise, and brag, has totally corrupted both the sterling character and the mind of the German nation.

During the early part of the Emperor's reign the advocates of Germany's expansion believed in him. They trusted that he, like his ancestors, would be a "Mehrer des Reiches." William the Second had no doubt the ambition to increase the territory and the glory of his country, but he had not the ability. When, time after time, the Emperor failed in his attempts to acquire new territories, when one diplomatic failure followed the other in quick succession, when at last it became generally recognised that he habitually threatened but did not act, Germany's leading men sarcastically referred to him as the Friedenskaiser, and began openly to call him a coward. After his second failure to overawe France by raising the Morocco question, the ultra-patriotic *Post* of Berlin

referred to him as a "poltron misérable" in leaded print. His friends and his own family, especially the Crown Prince, openly showed their disgust that the Emperor's bold words were never followed by suitable action. Many leading Germans began to despair of the Emperor and of the future of their country. William the Second felt the ground on which he stood crumbling under his feet, that deeds, not words, were expected of him.

The Emperor's unceasing activity had alarmed the nations around, and they had made arrangements for their mutual protection. Germany felt constantly hampered and circumscribed by the Triple Entente. The balance of power was felt to be a most powerful check to Germany's desire for expansion. Many of the most eminent military men demanded that Germany should endeavour to break up the Triple Entente and destroy the balance of power. General von Bernhardi, for instance, wrote in his book *Unsere Zukunft*: "We can render secure our position on the Continent of Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente and forcing France, which is never likely to co-operate with Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is her due." Numerous statements of similar import made by leading Germans might easily be given. Germany repeatedly tried to destroy the Triple Entente, but as her policy was no longer directed by a master-hand, every attempt at weakening the bonds connecting France, Russia and Great Britain resulted in the strengthening of their determination to support each other. So Germany bided her time and waited for a favourable opportunity.

Many patriotic Germans, and especially the leaders of the Pan-Germanic League, advocated the creation of a Greater Germany, the territories of which should

reach not only from Hamburg to Trieste, but from Hamburg to Constantinople, and to the lands beyond the Straits. Asia Minor was to become a German colony, the Bagdad railway a German railway, and thus Egypt and India would fall into Germany's hands. Austria-Hungary desired to make herself supreme in the Balkan Peninsula, and to acquire the harbour of Salonica. She allowed the Balkan war to break out, hoping that it would result in the defeat of the Slavonic Balkan States, or in the weakening of both sides, for either result would have facilitated Austria's progress in the direction of Salonica. However, Servia blocked the way. The valley of the Vardar is the great natural highroad from Vienna and Budapest on the one hand to Salonica and Constantinople on the other. The Vardar runs through the centre of Servia. To Austria's dismay the Balkan States were victorious. A stronger Servia, holding the gateway to Constantinople, was likely to block Austria's and Germany's path to the Ægean Sea and the Bosphorus. Desiring to ruin Servia, Austria brought about the second Balkan war. In the course of the Balkan war and during the peace negotiations she repeatedly threatened little Servia with war by inventing outrages done to Austrians—the most notorious case was the infamous invention spread and maintained by the Austrian Government press for weeks that the Servians had perpetrated an unnameable mutilation upon the Austrian Consul Prochaska—and by forbidding Servia to acquire an outlet on the Adriatic. However, while Austria was threatening and blustering in public, she was very kindly but very firmly informed by Mr. Sazonoff in private that an Austrian attack upon Servia would be equivalent to an Austrian attack upon Russia, that Russia was as strongly interested in

Servia's independence as was Great Britain in the independence of Belgium. Austria clearly knew what the consequences of an attack on Servia would be.

When William the Second had dismissed Bismarck he proclaimed that he would henceforth be his own Chancellor. He no longer required an able Chancellor but only an obedient one. In Bismarck's words quoted above, obedience alone was made the qualification of the monarch's principal adviser. Bismarck had four successors: General von Caprivi, who was accustomed to discipline and did what he was told; Prince Hohenlohe, an outworn diplomat, who was made Chancellor at the age of seventy-five, and who, according to his *Memoirs*, was very badly treated by the Emperor; Prince Bülow, a sprightly diplomat and an entertaining companion full of good jokes and stories; and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, a dull but industrious bureaucrat, who had no experience whatever of diplomacy and of practical statesmanship. When, in the spring of 1892, Bismarck learnt that General von Caprivi intended resigning, he said, according to Harden :—

"I am not pleased with the news. At least he was a general. Who will come next? That is the question. If you get for Chancellor a Prussian bureaucrat who has learned his trade solely at his desk, then you will see strange happenings which at present seem unbelievable."

This prediction of Bismarck's, as so many others, has come true. The unbelievable has happened.

From evidence which it would lead too far to give in detail in these pages it appears that the German Emperor and the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand agreed on common action against Servia. Austria-Hungary was to pick a plausible quarrel with that country, and Germany was to support the action

of her ally with her entire strength. Russia would either intervene or abstain from action. If she only threatened but did not act, Russia would lose all credit among the Balkan Slavs, and Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, would, through Servia and the Vardar valley, dominate the Balkan Peninsula with Salonica and Constantinople. An enormous step in advance would have been taken. If, on the other hand, Russia should attack Austria-Hungary, war between the two great groups of Powers would ensue. As Great Britain had no direct interests in Servia it was expected that she would keep neutral, especially if she should at the time have her hands full with problems of her own. If Great Britain should not take part in such a war, Italy would no doubt support Germany and Austria-Hungary in the hope of receiving valuable territorial compensation for her assistance. By raising the Servian question there seemed to be a possibility of ranging the three Powers of the Triple Alliance against France and Russia. A war of three Great Powers against two seemed very promising. A few weeks before the Archduke's murder he was visited by the German Emperor at his castle of Konopischt. It has been asserted that a secret treaty was then concluded between Germany and Austria, and very likely it dealt with the Servian question in the manner described above.

After the Archduke's murder Austria-Hungary kept quiet for weeks. Apparently the outrage was to be treated as an ordinary crime, and there was much reason to treat it as such, for the murderers, though Serbs by race, were Austrian citizens. On the 20th of July Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had "deprecated the

suggestion that the situation [between Austria-Hungary and Servia] was grave." Three days later, on the 23rd of July, Austria-Hungary despatched to Servia, without any previous warning, a totally unacceptable ultimatum, accusing Servia of being responsible for the Archduke's death. She gave no proof of her assertion, yet she demanded from Servia that she should, within forty-eight hours, divest herself of her sovereign rights and place herself under Austria's protection and dependence. What had happened in the meantime ?

The Irish crisis had been watched by all the Continental Powers with the greatest interest. Civil war in Great Britain seemed unavoidable. At the eleventh hour the King called a conference of the leaders of all parties at Buckingham Palace. A settlement by consent seemed possible. That hope quickly disappeared. On the 22nd of July it became generally known in London that the Conference would be a failure, and on the 24th the leaders held their last and purely formal meeting, when the impossibility of reaching an agreement was announced. Great Britain not only had no direct interest in the Austro-Servian quarrel, but seemed likely to be lamed by the imminence of civil war. Besides, Russia was expected to suffer from famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and both the French President and the French Prime Minister were abroad. Last, but not least, the Russian and French armies were not ready for war. Russia was about to reorganise and greatly increase her army and to construct most important strategical railways, while, according to Senator Humbert's report, confirmed by the Minister of War, France lacked heavy artillery, ammunition, and boots, and the French fortresses required strengthening against the heavy

artillery introduced in Germany. The whole situation seemed most favourable to the Germanic Powers. The longed-for moment had arrived at last. Now or never was the time to strike. The moment seemed all the more propitious as Germany and Austria-Hungary had recently greatly strengthened their armies; as Russia had not yet followed suit and was believed to be unprepared; as, according to Senator Humbert's report, grave deficiencies existed in the French army; and as, last but not least, the strategically most important Baltic and North Sea Canal had just been completed.

It has been asserted in Berlin that the initiative for Austria's Servian policy came from Vienna. That assertion is quite inadmissible. Germany has unmistakably shown to Austria-Hungary in the past that she, as the stronger Power, is not willing to allow herself to be dragged into adventures at the heels of her weaker partner. Besides, Austria-Hungary has, ever since 1848, when Francis Joseph came to the throne, followed a policy of drift and surrender. Hence it seems most improbable that her aged monarch would, at the end of his days, and upon his own initiative, act with such unexampled and ferocious energy. It is true that at the outbreak of the crisis the German Foreign Office declared that they had no knowledge of Austria's ultimatum to Servia. However, according to a despatch sent by the British Ambassador in Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, "the German Ambassador [in Vienna] knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." According to the British Ambassador's report the Emperor "endorsed every line of it." Apparently the German Emperor either inspired the fatal ultimatum himself

or at least agreed upon it with Austria-Hungary, leaving the German Foreign Office in complete ignorance of his action. Similar things have happened before. William the Second is his own Chancellor and his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he has no use for any but obedient Chancellors and Ministers.

From the hundred and fifty-nine documents contained in the "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis (Cd. 7467)," published with praiseworthy promptitude by the British Foreign Office, it appears that all the Great Powers except Germany urged Austria-Hungary to settle her quarrel with Servia by agreement in some form or other. Only Germany raised difficulties by ominously declaring that the matter did not concern any Power except Austria-Hungary and Servia, that arbitration, conference, or international discussion was out of the question, although she knew that every Balkan question had so far been treated as one of European concern by the Concert of Powers. Assured of Germany's unconditional support, Austria-Hungary absolutely declined all proposals towards an amicable settlement made by Sir Edward Grey, and on the 28th of July Count Berchtold informed Russia with haughty abruptness that he could not even discuss Austria's Note to Servia.

But suddenly the aspect of affairs altered very seriously to the disadvantage of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On the 30th of July the British parties agreed to bury all their differences in view of the critical foreign situation. The second reading of the Home Rule Amending Bill was indefinitely postponed. Great Britain was united and stood ready for action. Immediately Austria's tone changed. She now declared in courteous tones her readiness to discuss the

unacceptable ultimatum, and plainly displayed her anxiety to come to an understanding with Russia. Peace seemed secure. Unfortunately Austria-Hungary had reckoned without Germany. Although Austria was ready to negotiate, and although Russia declared on the 30th of July that she would "stop all military preparations," the German Emperor sent in hot haste an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should unconditionally demobilise within twelve hours. War would be the consequence of refusal. Thus war was brought about, not owing to the differences between Austria and Servia or to Russia's intervention, for Russia and Austria were both willing to adjust matters peacefully. War was precipitated by the Emperor's action, taken apparently against the advice of his Chancellor and his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Why did William the Second plunge his country and all Europe into war at a moment when peace was in his grasp? Possibly he was urged into war by the war party. Possibly because he dreaded the supreme disgrace of another diplomatic failure, of another surrender. The governing class and his own family were exasperated at the Emperor's surrenders on the occasions of the first and second Morocco crises. They would never have forgiven him a third surrender, which would have been deadly to the prestige of Germany and to that of the crown. In rushing into this war the Emperor probably knew that he was endangering the very existence of the Empire, that Germany was not unlikely to be defeated, for his speech from the balcony of his Berlin castle to the citizens below on the 31st of July was that of a beaten man. Addressing the people he said :—

"A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious people everywhere are compelling us to our just defence. The sword has been forced into our hands. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us, and in maintaining peace, we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honour. War would demand of us enormous sacrifices in property and life, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to church and kneel before God and pray for His help and for our gallant army."

While the Emperor asserted in his speech that Germany was wantonly attacked, the White Book regarding the outbreak of war, published by his own Government, states that Germany unconditionally backed up Austria-Hungary in her Servian policy, with a view to foiling the policy of Russia, who aimed at disintegrating and destroying the Dual Monarchy; in other words, that she deliberately challenged that country. And, while protesting in an introductory memorandum that Germany urged Austria to preserve the peace, the German Government has hitherto failed to publish a single one of its despatches sent to Vienna at that critical period. No official document has been published to show that Germany recommended moderation in Vienna. That omission is noteworthy. Germany was well aware that she would appear to be the aggressor, and herein lies perhaps the reason why the German Ambassador, shortly before leaving Paris, drove repeatedly up and down the Quai d'Orsay through the seething mass of the people. Perhaps he had orders if possible to produce an incident which would put France into the wrong. Strangely enough the Paris populace kept its temper and offered no insult to the Ambassador.

Germany has protested to the world that she was

attacked. Those who wish to find out whether Germany or her opponents were in the wrong need not study the numerous official publications of the governments concerned. The fact that Great Britain, France, and Russia promptly published all their despatches shows that they have little to conceal. The fact that Germany has published only a few picked communications and none of the vitally important ones nominally addressed to Austria in the interest of peace gravely prejudices Germany in the eyes of the world. Moreover, it is improbable that the militarily unready Powers took the initiative in attacking fully prepared Germany and Austria-Hungary. As a rule the prepared, not the unprepared, army is the aggressor.

At the moment when Germany sent her ultimatum to Russia it was evident that her position would be an extremely dangerous one in case of war. Although Germany and Austria-Hungary could conceivably hope to defeat France, Russia, and Servia on land, they could hardly hope to defeat Great Britain on the sea. Hence, even if the war on land should end in Germany's favour and if France, Russia, and Servia should have to withdraw from the stricken field, Great Britain was not likely to cease fighting, and exhausted and impoverished Germany could not hope to vanquish her. Besides Italy, dreading Great Britain's hostility, was now likely to desert Germany and Austria-Hungary in the hour of need. She would therefore have to fear the vengeance of her former partners, should they prove victorious. Consequently Italy was vitally interested in the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it was clear that in case of need she would draw the sword and help in the downfall of her former allies so as to establish her own security. If things should go badly for Germany and Austria

Italy would in all probability attack Austria-Hungary in order to recover the Italian Tyrol, the Trentino, and Trieste. These considerations must have been in the Emperor's mind and in that of his diplomatic advisers on the fatal 31st of July. Unfortunately military and naval men were closeted with the Emperor and his diplomats, and probably none of the Emperor's advisers possessed Bismarck's authority and determination and was ready to risk his position for the sake of his country. Bismarck would never have consented to such a suicidal war. He would rather have raised the country against his Emperor. However, it was observed that when, after the fatal and final decision, the Emperor and his Chancellor drove into Berlin, the Chancellor's face was so distorted that the people in the streets did not recognise him. He probably considered that the Emperor had signed the death warrant of Germany and of his own dynasty.

When the Emperor resolved upon war with France and Russia it was perhaps still somewhat doubtful whether Great Britain would come to the aid of France, but soon the Emperor made Great Britain's hostility certain by invading Luxemburg and Belgium. That attack was not unexpected. The strategical intentions of a military nation in case of war can clearly be gauged by its strategical railways and especially by their military platforms. To detrain rapidly the gigantic armies used in modern war, hundreds of thousands of horses and tens of thousands of guns and vehicles, enormous military platforms and sidings are required. By comparing the detraining capacity of the military platforms on the Belgo-German frontier with that on the Franco-German frontier, it was clear that Germany intended to strike at France by way of

Belgium. As France had powerfully fortified her eastern frontier, it had been an open secret for more than thirty years that Germany would try to enter France by breaking through Belgium. In a confidential and authoritative monograph *Sketch of the Defences of France against Invasion from Germany*, marked "Secret," and published by Harrison and Sons in 1887, we read :—

"It is from the recognition of the extraordinary strength of the north-eastern barrier that it is argued that Germany will in a future war be forced to direct her attack by way of Belgium. The best, shortest, and safest line of invasion from North or Central Germany, having Paris for its objective, lies unquestionably by the Meuse, Sambre, and Oise, and follows the latter river up to the gates of the capital. The roads and railways connecting Cologne and Düsseldorf with Aix-la-Chapelle lead thence on Liège, the northern key to the valley of the Meuse and distant only about nineteen miles (a two days' march) from the German frontier. From Liège, the valley of the Meuse, prolonged by the valley of the Sambre, opens up a broad road into France, which carries an invader without sensible interruption from the plains of the Meuse basin into those of the Seine basin."

The general staffs of all nations were prepared for Germany's breach of Belgium's neutrality. However, with regrettable insincerity the German Government pretended that France and Belgium were to be blamed for the universally expected invasion. On the 31st of July the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs complained to the British Ambassador that Belgium had "already committed hostile acts by placing an embargo on a consignment of corn to Germany." General von Emmich, the Commander of the invading army, put forth the still more ridiculous claim that invasion was justified because "some French officers had crossed the Belgian frontier in disguise in motor-

cars." His Proclamation to the Belgian people was as follows :—

"To my great regret German troops are compelled to cross the frontier by inevitable necessity, the neutrality of Belgium having been already violated by French officers who crossed the frontier in disguise in motor-cars. Our greatest desire is to avoid a conflict between our peoples, who have hitherto been friendly and were formerly allies. Remember Waterloo, where the German armies contributed to found the independence of your country! But we must have a clear road. The destruction of bridges, tunnels, and railways will have to be considered hostile actions. I hope that the German Army on the Meuse will not be called upon to fight you. We want a clear road to attack those who wish to attack us. I guarantee that the Belgian population will not have to suffer the horrors of war. We will pay for provisions, and our soldiers will show themselves to be the best friends of a people for whom we have the highest esteem and the greatest sympathy. It depends upon your prudence and patriotism to avoid the horrors of war for your country."

Lastly the Imperial Chancellor, with greater candour than the German Foreign Secretary and the invading General, pleaded simply necessity in the following speech delivered in the Reichstag :—

"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. That, gentlemen, is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponents respect it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the justified protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened,

as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through."

These mutually contradictory and insincere explanations are highly suggestive, as also were the equally clumsy attempts of the German Government to induce Belgium not to resist the German armies by promising to restore her independence " after a German victory " ; and the incredibly foolish attempt of the Chancellor to induce Great Britain to forsake France, by promising on the 29th of July that in case of victory Germany would take no French territory, but only the French colonies—two days later, on the 1st of August, he improved this offer by stating that Germany might guarantee " the integrity of France and her colonies " —and to tolerate the invasion of Belgium against a promise that Germany would evacuate the country at the end of the war. They show that the German Foreign Office, which, under Bismarck's control, was the best organised and best informed Foreign Office in the world, has, under the personal government of William the Second and under the nominal control of a bureaucrat unacquainted with diplomacy, become a byword for incapacity, confusion, and ignorance among the world's diplomats. The three contradictory explanations of Germany's reasons for invading Belgium are due either to the fact that the Foreign Office gave one explanation, while the Emperor gave totally different instructions without informing the Foreign Office, or to the fact that the Emperor himself, within a few hours, three times changed his mind as to the explanation which should be given. The German Ambassadors are appointed by the Emperor. They owe their position rather to favour than to merit, and they have learned that they will fare best if they

report not what is true, but what exalted circles desire to hear. Of course there are exceptions to the rule, It is believed that Prince Lichnowsky did his best to enlighten Berlin as to Great Britain's attitude; but in the misinformation supplied by her diplomatic representatives lies probably the reason of Germany's endeavour to induce Great Britain and Belgium to abandon their most vital interests without a stroke, by ridiculous and palpably insincere promises.

Although Germany no longer actually feeds herself, although, after the United Kingdom, she is the largest importer of food, she can resist almost indefinitely as far as food is concerned. She produces about nine tenths of her bread corn, and the remaining tenth can be replaced by potatoes and sugar, of which she has a huge surplus. By reducing the production of potato-spirit and of beer, she can accumulate a huge reserve store of potatoes and barley. As she imports scarcely any meat, her meat supply is ample, but she may experience a shortage of fodder. On the other hand, there should be a serious deficiency in butter, eggs, cheese, fish, coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco, of which she imports large quantities.

While, even if the war lasts a year and longer, Germany will scarcely suffer from a shortage of the most necessary foods, her industries will suffer very severely through the cessation of her foreign trade and through shortage of coal and lack of imported raw materials, such as wool, cotton, silk, ore. Her people may also suffer from lack of coal, as the vast majority of the miners have been called into the army. So far the entire able-bodied population up to forty-five has been mobilised. If Germany should be invaded in force, she may call out all the able-bodied from sixteen to sixty. Only about one tenth of Germany's

foreign trade is carried on with Austria-Hungary and her neutral neighbours, while approximately nine tenths are carried on with her antagonists and with the countries oversea. The war may well result in the destruction of Germany's manufacturing industries, shipping and foreign trade, and in the general impoverishment of the people.

If Germany should be defeated, her political and economic position will become a very serious one. She will probably be deprived of large territories in the East, West, and North. She will certainly lose to France Alsace-Lorraine, the iron-ore beds of which are indispensable to her magnificent iron and steel trade, which is by far the largest German industry. Possibly the French and Belgians will claim all German territory up to the Rhine. Germany may lose Schleswig-Holstein with Kiel and the Kiel Canal to Denmark, who owned these provinces until 1864, while Heligoland and Borkum and her colonies may fall to Great Britain. Lastly, the Czar has announced his intention to reconstitute the ancient kingdom of Poland, placing it under Russian protection. That measure would deprive Germany of a vast district in the East. It would deprive her of the southern part of Silesia which contains a very important industrial district and the largest coalfield on the continent of Europe, and of the important harbours of Dantzig and Königsberg, the most Prussian of all Prussian towns, in which the princes of the house of Hohenzollern have been crowned. That loss of territory would reduce the distance separating Berlin from the nearest point on the Russian frontier from 180 miles to about 90 miles. Berlin would be within a few days' march of the Russian army.

Germany's manufacturing industries, Germany's

shipping and Germany's foreign trade may never recover from the war. When the war is over, and especially if it is very protracted, much of the German business will have fallen into foreign hands. In addition impoverished Germany may have to pay to the victors an indemnity compared with which that paid by France would appear a trifle. Before the war the German Press threatened that if France should support Russia she would, at the end of the war, have to pay, as an indemnity, not £200,000,000 as in 1871, but £2,000,000,000. Such a sum may be exacted from Germany by her opponents should they be victorious. Poverty combined with high taxation does not afford a congenial soil to the manufacturing industries. In the countries of her antagonists, France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Russia, German business men have acquired huge interests, and these also will in part be lost. The war may totally destroy the great industrial position which Germany has acquired during the past three or four decades. It may convert Germany from a wealthy into a poverty-stricken land, and the Germans may be compelled to emigrate by the million to the United States and the British Colonies in the same way in which the Irish emigrated after the Potato Famine of 1846. The outlook for Germany would be terrible.

The war may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only the entire life work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name for generations. With the same ruthlessness with which her diplomats, following the principles of *Machtpolitik*, have disregarded the sacredness of treaties, making Germany's advantage their only law, her soldiers have disregarded the written

laws of war, and, what is worse, the unwritten law of humanity. According to numerous accounts, the German soldiers have bombarded open and undefended towns, wantonly burned down villages, killed wounded soldiers and peaceful inhabitants of both sexes, and executed all Belgian civilians caught with arms in their hands, although, according to Article 2 of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War, signed at The Hague on the 18th of October 1907 by Germany herself :—

"The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation who, on the approach of an enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war."

Though many of the accounts published may be untrue, there is bound to be a considerable substratum of truth. By these actions and by the infliction of crushing fines upon the conquered towns and territories, the German Government is not weakening resistance, but increasing the bitterness and determination of its opponents, and it is doing irremediable harm to the reputation of the race throughout the world. Besides, the German people may reap a hundredfold the harvest of hatred which its government is sowing. Its action in Belgium, France, and Poland may lead to fearful reprisals in Germany, and the war may in the end assume the character of a Balkan butchery.

The question now arises whether the docile Germans will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will rebel against those who have brought about their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a twofold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after a serious defeat of the German army, detach

themselves from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German Emperor. The Empire may be dissolved. The secession of the Southern States would no doubt be encouraged by a victorious French army. On the other hand, it is possible that there would be a general rising of the people against their rulers. The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied with their form of government. A well-educated people does not like to be governed like children. An absolutism thinly disguised by parliamentary forms is tolerable only as long as it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. The vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and Socialists. This majority has at present no influence whatever upon the government and policy of the country. Failure of the Government in the present war would make absolute government impossible in Germany. If Germany should experience a serious defeat, she may either become a strictly limited monarchy on the English model, or a republic. As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are equally responsible for the present war, it may well happen that the German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German republic is certainly within the limits of possibility.

Germany may be greatly reduced in size, and may become much impoverished, but the German race will not die. Greatness will return to it, and adversity may prove its salvation. The character of the German nation has been warped and distorted by the military-bureaucratic *régime*, which has educated the people to the worship of militarism and of brute force. A free, self-governing German people would probably again take a leading place among the nations of the world. Feudal and militarist Germany may be replaced by a German democracy, which will take its

place side by side with Great Britain and the United States. The dream of an alliance of the three great Germanic States may still come true.

The present war will be enormously costly in lives and property. Directly and indirectly it costs per month about £600,000,000, an amount almost as large as our gigantic national debt. But this enormous expenditure of blood and money will not, it is to be hoped, be all lost. This war, should Great Britain and her allies be successful, would have the most far-reaching results. It has solved the Irish question, and it should bring about the unification of the British Empire. It should give an enormous impetus to British industry and trade, and stimulate the growth of the Dominions. Other nations also would greatly benefit. France would once more become *la grande nation*, and Russia, by freeing Poland, seems to be starting on a path which may gradually lead her through constitutionalism to federalism. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that the war is not merely a war between two groups of nations, but between two political systems and two political philosophies. It is a war between democracy and feudalism, between human freedom and military absolutism, between liberty and force, between right and might. It will decide whether the world will become Prussian or Anglo-Saxon, militarist or free, whether it will be ruled by the gospel of force or by the gospel of right. If the forces of militarism and of feudalism should be defeated, it will mean the dawn of a new era. A victory of the Entente Powers would free the world of the incubus of militarism, it would secure the pre-eminence of the Anglo-Saxon nations for centuries, it might lead to a general disarmament among nations, and it would certainly lead to a reduction of the armies

and navies. Probably not for many decades should we see another great war. A victory of the Entente Powers would set free many European nations which were arbitrarily cut up and despotically ruled. After the war the world would be freer and happier than it has ever been before.

CHAPTER XXXIII

HOW THE MILITARY RULES GERMANY[1]

THE outbreak of the present war has been brought about by the German war party. It has apparently been brought about by the military against the wish and will of the civil power. Since the earliest times Prussia has been a military State, and modern Germany is a military State, Reichstag and democratic franchise notwithstanding. The true character of the German government, the fact that the military is absolutely supreme over the civil power, was startlingly revealed to the world six months before the outbreak of the great war. The escapades of a very young lieutenant in the little German garrison of Zabern late in 1913, and the consequent differences between the military and the civil population of the town, filled the papers of the world during a couple of months and very nearly led to a most serious constitutional crisis in Germany in the beginning of 1914. The Zabern affair is most characteristic of modern Germany, and the little lieutenant may some day occupy a considerable space in the constitutional histories of Germany.

The whole world was greatly interested in the conflict—the Italian papers in the South of Sicily, where I was staying at the time, published every day two columns of news regarding it—because it was generally recognised that the Zabern conflict was not an event but a symptom. It was not only a conflict

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, February 1914.

between the officers and citizens of an unimportant town but a trial of strength between the military and the civil authorities of Germany, between reaction and progress, between might and right, between absolutism and democracy, and herein lies its importance. There are two powerful currents in Germany, an autocratic and a democratic one, and no one can understand Germany's foreign and domestic policy who is not acquainted with the elements which have clashed at Zabern. Therefore it is worth while to consider the foreign and domestic policy of Germany in the light of the Zabern events.

Zabern is a little town of about nine thousand inhabitants in German Alsace. The vast majority of the people are Germans. They are thoroughly loyal to Germany, and there had been no conflicts between the civil population and the military until Lieutenant von Forstner, a youth of twenty, joined the garrison. He was tactless enough to make before his men, some of whom were French Alsatians, highly offensive remarks about France; to call the native Alsatian recruits "Wackes," which means rowdies, larrikins; to tell his soldiers that they should use their weapons with energy should they come into collision with the local civilians; and to offer a prize of ten marks to those who should succeed in "running a man through" with their side-arms. His remarks became the talk of the town, they found their way into one of the local papers, and as the rumour got about that an infantile and somewhat ludicrous physical mishap had occurred to Lieutenant von Forstner while in a state of intoxication, he was laughed at and teased by the people, and especially by children and youths. His fellow-officers took his part, soldiers with fixed bayonets began to accompany the officers on their

walks through the town, Lieutenant von Forstner was seen buying chocolates escorted by soldiers with fixed bayonets, and dining at a public restaurant with a revolver lying on the table. The merriment of the town increased through this ludicrous exhibition, and small crowds began to follow the officers and to collect before the barracks awaiting developments. Then Colonel von Reuter, the commander of the regiment, instead of sending Lieutenant von Forstner away, after complaining about insufficient police protection to the civil authorities, resolved to take the law into his own hands. He called his soldiers out, apparently had ball cartridge served out and machine guns got in readiness, and threatened to fire upon the crowd in front of the barracks which, according to his own statement before the military court, numbered only from forty to one hundred people. The people ran away. Orders were then given to the soldiers to arrest every civilian who lingered near the barracks or who insulted the soldiers or laughed at them, and thirty people were arrested, among them some of the local judges who came from the law courts. Soldiers, eager to arrest people who were supposed to have laughed or jeered, pursued the fugitives into their houses, and a front door was broken in during the man-hunt. The prisoners secured were locked up in a coal-cellar all night; they were brought next morning before the civil magistrates, who immediately set them at liberty. However, Lieutenant von Forstner remained a butt to the populace. One day, when marching along with his soldiers, he was jeered at by some youths. They were pursued by the soldiers but escaped. A lame shoemaker was left behind. He was attacked by Lieutenant von Forstner with his sword and received a cut over the head.

The high-handed action of the military was loudly condemned by all the Liberal, Radical, Clerical, and Socialistic people of Germany and their press, but was praised by the small but powerful Conservative party and its papers. When the matter was brought up before the Reichstag, the Imperial Chancellor, instead of promising immediate redress for the injustice done, expressed abstract views on the conflict of right and wrong in an impersonal, detached, and non-committal way, while the Minister of War, who followed him, instead of expressing regret for the occurrences, used the opportunity of making a glowing speech in praise of the virtues of the Prussian officers and of the army who were the defenders of the Throne and of the Fatherland. In consequence of the attitude of the Imperial Chancellor and the Minister of War, who seemed to flout the German Parliament and people, a vote of censure on the Chancellor was moved and was passed by the enormous majority of two hundred and ninety-three to fifty-four. The Conservatives alone supported the Government. To allay the anger of people and Parliament, a judicial inquiry was announced, and Lieutenant von Forstner was promptly sentenced to forty-five days' imprisonment by a military court for wounding the shoemaker. Proceedings against Colonel von Reuter were delayed. Lieutenant von Forstner appealed against the sentence, and his appeal and the case of Colonel von Reuter came simultaneously before the higher military court at Strassburg.

Before the appeal of the young lieutenant and the case of Colonel von Reuter came on for hearing, one of the most powerful officials in Germany, Herr von Jagow, the Police President of Berlin, who is considered a possible successor to Herr von Bethmann-

Hollweg, published over his name in the Conservative *Kreuzzeitung* a manifesto in form of a letter in which he stated :—

"Military exercises are acts of the State. Those who try to impede acts of the State are liable to be prosecuted and punished. Consequently Lieutenant von Forstner could not be placed on trial, and could still less be punished. The military court which condemned him has apparently failed to be guided by these considerations. If the law stood differently, its prompt amendment would be needed. For if German officers, who are garrisoned in what is nearly the enemy's country, are in danger of being prosecuted for illegal detention because they endeavour to make room for the exercise of the power of the State, the highest profession in the land is disgraced."

The legal arguments of the President of the Berlin Police were scarcely taken seriously, but his attempt to influence the decision of the military court in favour of the accused officers at a time when the matter was still *sub judice*, the fact that Herr von Jagow tried to use his great position and influence in order to secure for the officers a judicial verdict in their favour, outraged once more the Liberals, Radicals, Clericals, and Socialists of Germany, but was applauded by the entire Conservative Press.

The military court at Strassburg declared both Colonel von Reuter and Lieutenant von Forstner not guilty—the colonel because, in detaining people, he had acted in ignorance of the law, and the lieutenant because he had wounded the shoemaker in putative self-defence.

In the struggle between the military and civil power, between the military and the people, the military had proved victorious. Military absolutism and contempt of law had been declared legal by a high military court. The German nation is a well-drilled nation. From the

tenderest age the children are taught in the schools that obedience to authority is the foremost duty of the citizen, that military officers belong to an exalted and highly privileged class, that the military uniform is sacred, that even the youngest lieutenant is the representative of the Emperor-King. In how high estimation officers are held in Germany may be seen from this, that many of the leading business men and estate owners whose names are generally known in Germany have printed on their visiting cards the fact that they are Lieutenants of the Reserve.

The German people apparently acquiesced in the Strassburg verdict and were seemingly ready to pocket their defeat by the military. The enormous excitement caused at the time by the high-handed behaviour of the Zabern officers died down. Militarism in Germany became as all-powerful as ever. The well-known politician and publicist, Herr Eduard Bernstein, wrote in the *English Nation* of January 17:

> "It is no use concealing the truth. The hold of militarism on the German nation is certainly stronger than ever. Were it otherwise, Mr. Lloyd George's timely remarks upon the necessity of stopping the growth of armaments would not have been passed over with a few embarrassed remarks by the great Liberal Press of the Empire."

The significance of the Zabern verdict was recognised throughout Germany. Democratic Germany was profoundly depressed and humiliated, while Colonel von Reuter received more than fifteen thousand letters and telegrams of congratulation from the supporters of absolutist government. Herr von Jahn, who had presided at the trial at Strassburg, immediately after having read the verdict in court, sent telegrams of congratulation to Herr von Jagow, the Berlin President of Police, and to the famous Herr von

Oldenburg-Januschau, who, as a deputy, had declared a few years ago in the Reichstag, "The King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany must be able to tell a lieutenant at any moment: 'Take ten men with you and close the Reichstag.'"

The Zabern affair offers some most valuable and important lessons to all who are interested in Germany. Even the most casual observer must be struck with several curious phenomena which require explanation. He will ask: How is it that the phlegmatic, patient and law-abiding German population, which is very slow to anger, has during the last few years twice been roused into such a passion by the action of its rulers—once over the Emperor's *Daily Telegraph* interview and now over the Zabern affair—that the vast majority of the newspapers and people have demanded an alteration of the Constitution by which the people should be given greater power over the national executive and administration? How is it that in both cases the German Reichstag has failed to take action whereby to secure some control over the national executive and administration? And how is it that the angry passions died down as quickly as they arose? How is it that the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, instead of promising to make similar military excesses impossible in the future, adopted a weak and apologetic attitude? How is it that he remained Imperial Chancellor, although the recent vote of censure is the third which the Reichstag has passed upon him?—The inefficient and somewhat childish petulance of the German people, when provoked by its rulers, the fact that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not promise that he would make recurrence of events like those at Zabern impossible, and the fact that the German Parliament has not even tried to provide a permanent

remedy for the grievances of the people by bringing pressure to bear upon the German Government and Administration, spring all from the same source. They spring from this: that Germany, which has the most democratic franchise in the world, possesses a Parliament but no Parliamentary Government; that Germany is an almost autocratically governed military State which possesses merely the semblance of representative Government; that the German Parliament, unlike the British Parliament, has not been created by the people but has been bestowed upon the German people as a free gift by its rulers; that, in view of the fact that the Reichstag exists not by the will of the people but by the permission of the Monarch, the Monarch may take away his gift as soon as the representatives of the people are no longer absolutely loyal to him and to the officials he has appointed, but try to enter upon a serious conflict with the Imperial Government with a view to limiting its practically absolute powers.

Germany, as William the First said, is merely an enlarged Prussia. The Imperial Chancellor, like all German officials, is nominated and dismissed by the Emperor, for, according to Art. 18 of the Constitution, "The Emperor appoints the Imperial officials, has their oaths taken, and effects their dismissal if required." The Reichstag and the Party Leaders can neither bring about the appointment of a Government official, nor can they bring about his dismissal or his resignation by a vote of censure. Moreover, a vote of censure upon the Imperial Chancellor is an interference with the Imperial prerogative. It is an attempt to influence the Imperial will. Therefore it only causes the censured Chancellor to be retained, for dismissal after a vote of censure would make it appear that the

Emperor had obeyed Parliament or given way to popular pressure. No German Emperor is likely to do that. As the Reichstag knows that its votes of censure have no practical effect whatever, it does not take its own votes of censure very seriously, nor does anyone in Germany. Hence the relations between the Reichstag and the censured Chancellor have remained practically unchanged.

The arrogant attitude of the Zabern officers and the great reserve maintained by the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag when dealing with the Zabern events are due to the fact that Germany is an almost autocratically governed military State. Neither the Reichstag nor the Imperial Chancellor has any influence over the army. Bismarck himself was quite powerless where the army was concerned. Article 63 of the German Constitution states: "The whole of the military forces of the Empire will form a homogeneous army which is commanded by the Emperor in war and in peace." As the Emperor keeps the command of the army in war and in peace absolutely in his own hands and allows no interference from any quarter, least of all from any civilian, and as the Chancellor's authority extends only to civil affairs, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was of course powerless to promise the Reichstag that Lieutenant von Forstner should be punished or Colonel von Reuter reprimanded. Where the army is concerned the Imperial Chancellor has no greater power than has any ordinary citizen.

Article 64 of the German Constitution states: "All German troops are obliged unconditionally to obey the Emperor. That obligation is to form part of the military oath of fidelity." According to the Constitution, the Emperor's power over the army is unlimited. A conflict between the Imperial Army and the army

of one of the smaller German States is unthinkable. The commanders of the troops and of the fortresses in the non-Prussian States have, according to their oath, to obey the Emperor. The independent armies of the individual States exist rather in theory than in fact. Moreover, while in all civil matters the orders of the Emperor require for their validity the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who thereby assumes responsibility for them, the Emperor's orders regarding the army need not be countersigned even if they indirectly touch the budget. In military matters the authority of the Emperor is absolute. Interference with the army by the civil government or by Parliament is out of the question.

The German Army is a national army in the fullest sense of the word, and being, so to say, the Emperor's bodyguard, has been given a highly privileged position. Officers are treated as the highest class of Society, not only at Court, but throughout Germany. According to the instructions they receive, officers must not draw their weapons when insulted, but "immediate use of their arms is required should they be assaulted." According to Dilthey's widely read textbook "every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier is entitled to use his arms if assaulted. He may use the arms which the Emperor has given him for the protection of his person and of his honour. Therefore arms *must* be used on suitable occasions, and they must be used with an energy commensurate to the dangerousness of the opponent." A civilian who lifts his hand against a German officer, even if the officer be the aggressor, risks being sabred or shot. Their highly privileged position and the right to use their weapons are apt to make the German officers overbearing, create men of the von Forstner type, and

arouse much dissatisfaction among the body of the citizens.

At the time of the excitement caused by the publication of the German Emperor's interview in the *Daily Telegraph* the Socialist members of the Reichstag proposed that the Imperial Chancellor should be made responsible to the Reichstag by an amendment of the Constitution. The Reichstag did not accept that proposal. After the Zabern scandal the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and other influential Liberal and Radical journals proposed that supplies should be withheld when the next budget came up for discussion, unless the outraged citizens received full satisfaction. However, once more it was unlikely that the Reichstag would quarrel with the Imperial Government, which means with the Emperor himself, for the Emperor is the Government.

The greatest power of Parliament consists in the power of the purse. The Reichstag could hope to limit the powers of absolutism only by withholding supplies and bringing the Government to a standstill. Democratic Parliaments can use that power with great effect, but the German Reichstag cannot do so. In parliamentarily governed countries the refusal of supplies by the people brings government to a standstill, and automatically brings about the fall of the governing statesmen. In Germany such a refusal would have no similar effect. In Great Britain and other democratic monarchies the people rule through their elected representatives, who appoint the officials, and the King carries out the will of the people. In Germany the Emperor rules through his officials with the assistance of the Reichstag, and if the Reichstag, as the less important part of the Government, refuses to assist in governing the country, the Government is simply

carried on without its assistance. According to Laband and other leading writers on German Constitutional Law the co-operation of the Reichstag for providing supplies is only theoretically necessary. If supplies are not voted, the last year's taxes and imposts are automatically renewed, and are collected by the officials, for the Reichstag has no authority to abrogate existing taxation. The *Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Wähler* states quite correctly: "Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of withholding supplies. However, so much is certain, that taxes and other sources of the national income, which have once been voted, cannot be discontinued in consequence of the Reichstag's veto." The question whether Prusso-Germany can be governed if the deputies refuse to vote supplies is in the last resort rather a question of practical politics than of constitutional theory. In 1863 the Prussian Parliament refused to allow the doubling of the army and also refused supplies. Nevertheless the army was doubled. Bismarck did not shrink from a conflict with Parliament, and the necessary taxes were collected against Parliament's will. The German citizens are very law-abiding and they possess a strong sense of caution. It would be dangerous for them to quarrel with a ruler who disposes of 1,350,000 officials and of an army of 800,000 men in time of peace.

Both at the time of the *Daily Telegraph* interview and of the Zabern incident the Reichstag refused to act with vigour against the Government because it recognised its powerlessness. Had it entered upon a conflict with the Government, which means with the Emperor, it would probably have been defeated by the Emperor, who not only absolutely controls the bureaucracy and the army, but who has power over

the national purse as well. In every conflict between the people and the Government the passionate outbursts of the Reichstag have been only of momentary duration, because its members were aware that a serious conflict with the Emperor's Government would not lead to the resignation of the Chancellor or to the diminution of the Emperor's prerogative, but that it would lead either to the dissolution of the Reichstag—according to Article 12 of the Constitution the Emperor has the right to dissolve it—or to a *coup d'état* and an alteration of the Constitution, which would make the Reichstag powerless for the future.

Prussia is a strong Conservative, one might almost say an anti-democratic, State. Yet Bismarck created in the German Reichstag a Parliament based on the most democratic franchise in the world. He did so, not actuated by a sense of justice and fitness, but compelled by necessity. When, in 1866, Prussia risked her existence in a struggle with Austria, Bismarck offered to the people, who had been vainly clamouring for parliamentary institutions for decades, a democratic Parliament so as to obtain the necessary support of the very influential German Liberals and Democrats for that most dangerous war. However, Bismarck was not in love with the democratic franchise. He did not endeavour to democratise the Prussian Parliament (the Landtag), which is elected under the most anti-democratic franchise in the world, and he quarrelled incessantly with the Reichstag and contemplated its destruction by a *coup d'état*.

The historian Professor Hans Delbrück, a well-informed man, who at one time was the present Emperor's tutor, has told us in volumes 147 and 153 of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, and in his *Regierung und Volkswille*, that Bismarck intended to destroy the

power of the Reichstag by a *coup d'état*. In 1884 the Federal Council, which represents the rulers and the Governments of the individual German States, had, at Bismarck's desire, solemnly declared that the German Empire was a free and voluntary federation of the German sovereigns, and that this federation, in case of need, could again be dissolved. When William the Second came to the throne Bismarck thought that the time was ripe for action. Having found himself confronted by a hostile majority in the Reichstag he mapped out the following plan. He wished to dissolve the Reichstag by the Emperor's authority—expecting that the sudden dissolution would lead to Socialist demonstrations in the streets. These would be repressed with the greatest energy. Blood would flow in the principal towns. Riots and revolts would take place. A state approaching civil war would be created. Then the German Emperor was to declare that he could no longer govern Germany under the existing conditions. He would renounce the Imperial Crown. All the German sovereigns would be called to a conference. The suggestion would be made that the German Empire should be reconstituted under the Presidency of the King of Prussia, but the King of Prussia would declare that he would be willing to reassume the Imperial Crown only if the Imperial Constitution was altered, if all those Germans who pursued a policy hostile to the State, and especially all Socialists, were disfranchised, and if the secrecy of the ballot was abolished. The sanguinary riots and the dramatic renunciation of the Crown by the German Emperor would have created an enormous sensation throughout Germany. In their patriotic excitement the German people would probably have enthusiastically supported the projected reform of the franchise,

the crisis would have been over in a few days, and the electors would have discovered when it was too late that they had assisted in destroying the only democratic institution of Germany.

Herr Delbrück's information as to Bismarck's intentions is amply corroborated by conversations between Prince Bismarck and the Prime Minister of Würtemberg, von Mittnacht, and between the German Emperor and Prince Hohenlohe reported in their memoirs, by a conversation between Bismarck and Herr Kaemmel, published by the *Grenzboten* in 1907, and by Bismarck's letter to Herr von Helldorf, the leader of the Conservative party, written in 1887, in which Bismarck stated: "I will devote the last years of my life to correcting my greatest mistake, the universal vote and the secrecy of the poll." Numerous allusions to the necessity of abolishing the secrecy of the vote and of disfranchising the Socialists and other enemies of the Empire may be found in Bismarck's public speeches and in his reported conversations. In his *Memoirs* we read: "I have hinted in public speeches that the King of Prussia might find himself compelled to lean for support on the foundations afforded to him by the Prussian Constitution, if the Reichstag should carry its hindrance to the monarchical establishment beyond the limits of the endurable." In other places also Bismarck expressed the hope that the German people would have the courage and strength to rid themselves of the Reichstag if it should prove itself a hindrance to Germany's development. According to the *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, William the Second told the Prince that he was unwilling to act upon Bismarck's suggestion and to begin his reign by shooting his subjects and effecting a *coup d'état*. The Emperor's refusal to act his part was apparently

the principal reason for his rupture with Prince Bismarck and for Bismarck's subsequent dismissal.

Since Bismarck's dismissal the idea of weakening the Reichstag and of abolishing Germany's democratic franchise by a *coup d'état* has frequently been contemplated by German statesmen and politicians. Especially the small but mighty party of the feudal Conservatives, who hate democracy, have been anxious that the Government should destroy the Reichstag's power by violence. Count Mirbach stated at the meeting of the Conservative party on the 1st of January 1895 that universal suffrage was a derision of all authority, and recommended the abolition of the secret ballot. The same gentleman stated in the Prussian Upper House on the 28th of March 1895: "The country would greet with jubilation a decision of the German Princes to create a new Reichstag on the basis of a new Election Law." In the same place Count Frankenberg stated two days later: "We hope to obtain a new Election Law for the German Empire, for with the present Election Law it is impossible to exist." Freiherr von Zedlitz, Freiherr von Stumm, and von Kardorff uttered similar sentiments. At the meeting of the Conservative party on the 8th of March 1897 Freiherr von Stumm said "The right to vote should be taken away from the Social Democrats, and no Social Democrat should be permitted to sit in the Diet," and Count Limburg-Stirum likewise advocated their exclusion. Hundreds of similar views expressed by Conservative and Conservative-Liberal politicians and papers might be given. In 1906–1907, when there was a great agitation for the increase of the German Navy, and when the Reichstag seemed disinclined to vote the funds required, many leading German politicians and newspapers recommended that

the Government should provide the necessary funds by a *coup d'état* should the Reichstag prove obdurate; that the Government should levy the necessary taxes with or without the Reichstag, and should, in case of need, govern against the will of Parliament or without Parliament. At the time of the General Election of 1907 the possibility of a *coup d'état* was again universally discussed. Many Conservative politicians and many prominent Conservative journals, such as the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, the *Post*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, demanded an Imperial *coup d'état* disguised in the phrase "Reform of the Franchise"; and Prince Bülow seemed to contemplate the possibility of abolishing, or at least modifying, parliamentary government in Germany by force of arms if an anti-expansionist Reichstag should be elected, for in his election manifesto he threatened the anti-expansionist part of the German community in no uncertain tone with "the sword of Buonaparte." On the 19th of February 1910 Prince Hatzfeldt said in the Reichstag:—

"The universal and secret vote has a history. The present franchise is indissolubly connected with the German Empire. It has welded together North and South Germany. However, an alteration of the franchise may come in question if the Reichstag should have a majority which threatens the conditions essential to the life of the Empire."

The German Emperor has strong autocratic inclinations—that is evident from many of his pronouncements. A conflict between German absolutism and German democracy seems unavoidable. Formerly Germany was an agricultural country. The towns were small and poor. The aristocracy was the wealthiest and the most intelligent class in the community. They ruled the country and their supremacy was taken as a matter of course. Since her unification,

and especially since the introduction of Protection in 1879, Germany has become very wealthy. Germany's wealth is no longer represented by her agriculture and her landed proprietors, but by industry, commerce, and finance, by business men and their workers, and these desire to be no longer merely tax-paying subjects but to take a part in the government of the country.

Hitherto the Conservatives have maintained a predominant position in the Reichstag, partly because the Conservative deputies belong to the ruling caste and because the Conservative party was considered to be the Government party, partly because they knew how to increase their weight in that assembly by a skilful policy and by a judicious co-operation with other parties, partly because they were much over-represented. More than forty years ago Germany was divided into parliamentary districts. Since that time the population in the rural districts, which are dominated by the Conservatives, has remained stationary and has declined in many instances while the population in the industrial towns has enormously increased. The Government and the Conservative party have hitherto strenuously opposed the redistribution of seats, and the result is that the democratic towns are greatly under-represented while the Conservative rural districts are greatly over-represented in the Reichstag. In 1907 the electoral district of Teltow near Berlin had 248,000 electors, while that of Lauenburg had only 13,000; the district of Bochum-Gelsenkirchen had 144,000 voters, while Schaumburg-Lippe had only 10,000 voters, &c. The parliamentary strength of the Conservative party is largely due to the prevalence of rotten boroughs and to the intimidation of the rural voters by the Conservative landowners.

The under-representation of the democratic parties

in the Lower House of Prussia is still more startling, owing to the three-classes system by which the Prussian masses are disfranchised. By far the largest party in Germany is the Social-Democratic party. Yet, until 1908, not a single Social-Democrat had been able to obtain a seat in the "Representative" Assembly of Prussia, while the Conservative contingent always exceeded two hundred. At present there are in the Prussian Landtag only six Social-Democrats, as compared with 212 Conservatives, although there are three times as many Social-Democratic voters in Prussia as there are Conservative voters.

Dissatisfaction with Governmental absolutism in all its manifestations—the Zabern incident is only one out of thousands—has greatly strengthened the Democratic parties of Germany, and the overbearing attitude of the German bureaucracy and the sense of injustice done to the people has particularly increased the number of the Democratic extremists, the Socialists. Since the foundation of the Empire the number of Socialist votes polled at the Reichstag elections has increased as follows:—

1871	101,927 votes
1881	311,969 ,,
1890	1,427,098 ,,
1903	3,010,771 ,,
1912	4,250,400 ,,

In 1912 considerably more than one third of the men who voted for the Reichstag voted for Socialist candidates. That fact alone shows that there is something radically wrong in German domestic politics, that there is widespread dissatisfaction among the German people. While in 1912 the Socialists polled 4,250,400, the two Conservative parties polled together only 1,493,500 votes. Yet the influence of the fifty-eight Conserva-

tive members in the Reichstag is far greater than that of the 110 Socialists. Bismarck skilfully split up the German Liberal party, setting one fraction against the other. If the Democratic parties should unite, if the German Liberals and Socialists should co-operate in the Reichstag against the Conservative parties, they would have the majority. Although the Democratic majority could not control the German administration, over which the Reichstag has no influence, it could at least control German legislation, and absolutist legislation would become impossible.

The Government is so strongly entrenched in its position by the Emperor's control over the services and over the national purse, and by Germany's feudal constitution, that a Democratic Parliament cannot hope to obtain the control over the Government by gradual pressure, by orderly parliamentary means. A Democratic Reichstag can obtain such control only by a revolution, and a revolution is impossible in Germany as long as the army remains loyal to the Emperor. Only a great defeat might democratise the country.

From year to year the German people is becoming more democratically inclined. From year to year the dissatisfaction of the population with the present form of Government is increasing. With nearly every election the strength of the Democratic elements in the Reichstag is growing, while that of the Conservative elements is dwindling. Every year the Conservative elements are more hardly pressed by the advance of Democracy. Every year absolutist legislation becomes more impossible. German absolutism feels that its influence is waning. Hence its most daring supporters call from year to year more loudly for violent measures with which to stem the Democratic tide.

Germany is rich, but Germany is very dissatisfied. Those who are powerful are discontented because they are not wealthy, and those who are wealthy because they are not powerful. The Conservatives are dissatisfied because Liberalism and Socialism are rapidly increasing, and the Liberals and Socialists because they have no power and no influence, although they are the large majority of the citizens, possess the bulk of the country's wealth, and pay by far the largest part of the taxes.

The aims of the German Democrats are obvious. They work for representative government, they wish to limit the powers of absolutism, they strive to secure greater liberty to the individual, and desire that in domestic and foreign affairs Germany should be allowed to develop gradually and naturally. To them force is no remedy. The Conservatives, on the other hand, believe in force as a policy. They would like to Prussianise Germany by force, and to establish by force the supremacy of absolutism in Germany, and the supremacy of Germany in Europe and in the world. As the Democratic majority has scarcely any influence in political, and especially in foreign-political, affairs, the views of the champions of absolutism should be interesting to all who desire to understand Germany's foreign and domestic policy.

The views of many German Conservatives as to Germany's domestic policy are unreservedly given in Frymann's *Wenn Ich der Kaiser Wär'* (Leipzig, 1911). The book costs 3s., and has had a large circulation. The copy in my possession is marked 12th to 15th thousand. "Frymann" is a pseudonym. As the author intimates that he was grown up at the time of the Franco-German War, he must be about sixty years old. The views of German Conservatives as to

Germany's foreign policy are well stated in the book *Unsere Zukunft* by General von Bernhardi (Berlin, 1912). An English translation of this book has been published under the title *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, by Messrs. Wm. Dawson & Sons, Ltd., London. That book, the latest political book of Bernhardi's, has the advantage over its predecessor of being far more outspoken and therefore far more interesting than his first book, *Germany and the Next War*. Both books are representative of a large literature.

"Frymann," like most German Conservatives, is very dissatisfied with the German franchise. He urges a reform of the election law and advocates the formation of five classes of electors. Votes should not merely be counted but be weighed. Agricultural estate-owners and other large employers of labour should be given a number of votes corresponding to the number of hands employed. On principle the weight of votes should be proportionate to the amount of taxation paid, but men of high culture and of great administrative ability should receive a considerable number of votes. Those who pay no taxes should have no vote. The result of the policy advocated would be that the property-owning and educated classes would at all times command a majority in Parliament. Continuing, the author proposes that the Government should alter the present franchise by a *coup d'état*. He writes :—

"We must alter the electoral law at any price, and even at the price of a conflict between the Government and people, at the price of a *coup d'état*. That sounds frivolous and brutal. However, it is the same thing as if a father resolves that a serious operation must be performed upon his child in order to save its life. Politically the German nation is ill unto death. It can be saved only by an alteration of the Constitution, and if the Constitution cannot be altered owing

to the opposition of Parliament, then it must be altered notwithstanding the will of Parliament, exactly as a father orders the surgeon to operate on a child against the child's will.

"We must consider in this connexion the possible occurrence of foreign difficulties. 'England's envy, France's thirst for revenge, and Germany's need of expansion create antagonisms which cannot be abolished unless Germany is willing to abandon her position as a Great Power. Therefore all who love the German people, and wish to accelerate the advent of a crisis, will long for the outbreak of a war which will wake all the wholesome and strong forces of the nation.

"If Germany should be victorious there will occur a great moral revival similar to that resulting from the Franco-German war, and it will have similar political results. A Reichstag with a large patriotic majority will be elected. As that sentiment may be only transient, it should immediately be utilised. Immediately the Constitution should be altered by the abolition of the present franchise.

"If we should be defeated—that, after all, is possible—the present internal disunion would increase. It would become a curse. It could be converted into order only by the absolute will of a Dictator. A Dictatorship, supported by the Army and all patriots, could then effect the necessary revision of the Constitution.'"

"Frymann" is anxious to combat Socialism by a drastic anti-Socialist Law drafted after the Bismarckian model. He writes:—

"In accordance with its provisions every action should be prohibited which might serve to undermine, or threaten to undermine, the existing order of State and Society. Meetings, societies, journals and periodicals of subversive tendency should not be tolerated. The masses should be freed from the present leaders of the Party of Subversion. All Socialist members of the Imperial Diet and the various State Parliaments, all leaders and officers of the Socialist party, all editors, publishers, and journalists connected with Socialist papers and publications, and all Socialist officers of Trades Unions, in short, all who stand in the service of the Socialist propaganda, should be expelled from the German Empire. All Anarchists should receive the same treatment."

The author is, of course, an uncompromising anti-Semite :—

"It is absolutely necessary that the frontiers should be completely closed against the immigration of Jews. It is equally indispensable that foreign Jews who have not yet acquired citizen rights should be expelled without delay and without consideration.

"However hard it may seem to the German sense of justice, we must restrict the rights of resident Jews. The good may suffer together with the bad, but necessity must steel our hearts to pity. We must demand that all Jews in Germany be placed under alien law.

"The question at once arises : Who is a Jew ? We must differentiate between race and faith. Jews are a race, and those who have changed their faith are Jews still. We must further re-establish the old Germanic principle that in case of marriages between Jews and Christians the descendants belong to the inferior race. Therefore it should be laid down that all those are Jews who belonged to the Jewish faith on the 18th of January 1871 or who are descendants of those who were Jews at that date, even if only one of the parents was a Jew."

The following measures should be taken :—

"Jews should be excluded from all public employments in the gift of the Empire, the single States and the local authorities, whether such employment be in consideration of a remuneration or purely honorary and gratuitous. Jews should not be admitted to the service of the Army and Navy. Jews should neither vote nor be elected. They should be excluded from the profession of the law, and they should not teach in schools. They should not manage theatres. Newspapers which have Jews for contributors should clearly state that fact. The other newspapers, which one may call German newspapers, should neither be owned by Jews nor have Jewish managers, editors, or journalists. Banks should not be conducted by Jews unless they are private banks. Landed property should neither be owned by Jews nor be hypothecated to them. In consideration for the protection which Jews enjoy as aliens they should have to pay double taxes."

The millions of Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes resident in Germany should, according to "Frymann," be Germanised by force :—

"We must demand that the members elected by the Polish nation into the German Parliament should have only the right to speak, but not to vote, and that they could demand to be heard only on questions which touch the Poles or the district inhabited by them. If it should be found that this provision is evaded by their co-operating with one of the Parliamentary parties, the right to vote and the right to be elected should be definitely taken away from the Poles. Polish newspapers and periodicals should under all circumstances give a German translation of the Polish text, and the only language permissible at public meetings of Poles should be German. . . .

". . . We have acquired Alsace-Lorraine because the territory is militarily necessary to us. The inhabitants were thrown in. We have given them the option either to become German subjects or to emigrate into France after the acquisition of their country. Now we must give them a second option, but a more thorough one. Every inhabitant of Alsace-Lorraine who is of age should publicly declare that he is an unconditional supporter of the German Empire and he should enter into the obligation not to use the French language in public or within his own house, nor should he obtain newspapers, periodicals, or books from France. Those who refuse to enter into this obligation should have to leave the country without delay. Those who contravene the foregoing should be expelled. All private schools should be closed, and French should be taught only as a foreign language, and no more time should be devoted to it than is devoted to French in the other parts of Germany. Newspapers printed in French should be compelled to issue at the same time a German translation of the French text. The Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine should be abolished and its administration be placed under a Minister with dictatorial powers. The Danes in Schleswig-Holstein should receive the same treatment."

While "Frymann" recommends establishing the supremacy of absolutism in Germany by force, General von Bernhardi proposes in his book, *Unsere Zukunft*, to establish by force the supremacy of Germany in

Europe and throughout the world. He recognises that Germany's expansion is restrained by the balance of power in Europe, that Germany cannot expand because the forces of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente are about equally strong :—

"We can render secure our position on the Continent of Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente and forcing France, which is never likely to co-operate with Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is her due."

General von Bernhardi hates Great Britain with a passionate hatred, partly because her adhesion to the Franco-Russian Alliance has established the balance of power in Europe, partly because he envies Great Britain her enormous possessions, partly because he despises her for not possessing a national army. According to him "armed strength in its moral, intellectual, and physical aspects is the truest measure of civilisation." He believes that Great Britain wishes to destroy Germany :—

"Only England has an interest in bringing about a general European war which would necessarily involve Germany. In the first place England finds it from day to day more difficult to man her rapidly increasing fleet. She seems to be approaching the limits of her naval capacity. In the second place the Baltic and North Sea Canal will soon be finished, and its completion will yield considerable military advantages to Germany. Lastly, the German Navy grows from year to year, so that the conclusion lies near that the comparative strength of the two countries will gradually be altered to England's disadvantage. In the Mediterranean the Austrian and the Italian navies are about to be strengthened. All these circumstances make it clearly desirable for England to bring about a war as soon as possible and to obtain the assistance of France and Russia for such an undertaking. . . .

"German competition, German enterprise, and German industry hamper Englishmen throughout the world, and often

prove superior. It is England's interest to destroy Germany's competition, especially as the German nation has the greatest ability among the nations of Europe and the greatest hope of expansion, for it is a maritime State of the first rank. It threatens to obtain a predominant position on the Continent, to disturb the balance of power in Europe which is so profitable to England, and to develop a navy which may become dangerous to Great Britain. Great Britain has allied herself with Russia and France in order to keep Germany down, to prevent her political development and to destroy her fleet. We cannot be deceived on that point. The German Fleet must be destroyed. That is the Alpha and the Omega of British policy. It is the necessary and logical consequence of the Triple Entente."

General von Bernhardi has not a very high opinion of the British Fleet:—

"The British Fleet is an extremely powerful opponent. However, it suffers from a national weakness. It is already difficult to secure a sufficient supply of men, and especially of the higher ratings. Therefore, unless universal compulsory service be introduced, a distinct limit is put to the increase of the British Fleet. Besides, the German artillery is at least as good as the English; perhaps it is better. The same applies to the torpedo boats. Lastly, the newest English ships correspond in no way to expectations."

The General thinks that a war with Great Britain is inevitable because Great Britain will never allow Germany to acquire great colonial possessions. He writes:—

"We must enlarge Germany's colonial possessions and acquire adequate territories suitable for the settlement of white men. However, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that England will undoubtedly oppose Germany's acquisition of valuable Colonies, of coaling stations and naval bases. Colonies situated in the Temperate Zone can scarcely be acquired without a war with other States.

"Exactly as Bismarck clearly recognised in his time, that a healthy development of Prussia and Germany would be

possible only when the differences between Austria and Prussia had finally been settled, so every German who looks at the matter without prejudice is convinced that Germany's further development as a world-Power is possible only when the existing Anglo-German competition has come to an end. Exactly as a cordial alliance was possible between Germany and Austria only after the Austro-German war of 1866, so we shall obtain an understanding with England, which from many points of view is desirable, only after an Anglo-German war."

General von Bernhardi recommends that Germany should secure the co-operation of the United States against Great Britain and that Germany should weaken Great Britain's power of resistance by fomenting risings of the natives throughout the British Empire:—

"There is a distinct conflict of interests between the United States and England, firstly, because the United States are England's most dangerous competitor in the trade of the world and especially with Eastern Asia; secondly, because the United States are determined not in any case to submit to England's naval predominance. The Dominion of Canada forms another point of friction between the two States, whilst there are no material differences between the United States and Germany. It is true that peaceful division of the world between England and the United States is conceivable. However, no indications can at present be found of such an understanding. As matters are at present, the enormous increase in England's power which would flow from the defeat of Germany would be opposed to the interests of the United States. It follows that the co-operation of the United States and of Germany would be in the interests of both countries.

"It is to be borne in mind that in the English Colonies, in India, South Africa, and Egypt, there is explosive material in large quantities, so that it seems by no means unthinkable that revolts and national risings would occur in the event that England should be engaged in an unfortunate or dangerous war. These are circumstances with which we have to count, and it is our duty to make the best use of them. . . . England would probably feel inclined to conclude peace if, in the course

of a European war in which she was engaged, risings and revolts took place in her Colonies which threatened her pre-eminent position. It may be considered as a matter which does not admit of dispute that in India, in Egypt, and in South Africa there is sufficient inflammable material."

General von Bernhardi thinks that Great Britain and Germany can come to an understanding only if Great Britain is willing to abandon her allies on the Continent and allow Germany to deal with them as she pleases. He thinks that Great Britain and Germany can conclude an alliance only if Great Britain agrees not to oppose in any way Germany's oversea expansion, and if she agrees to redistribute her fleet so as to allow Germany to rule the North Sea. The General writes :—

"There are two possibilities of arriving at an understanding with England. An agreement with her can be either lasting or transient. If a lasting agreement is desired, the important interests of Germany must be safeguarded. Nothing must remain that could impede their necessary development. This demand makes it necessary for England to abandon its claim to a predominant position in the world. It involves England's recognition that England and Germany have equal rights. England would have to give an absolutely free hand to Germany in Europe, and would have to agree beforehand to any increase of power of Germany on the Continent which might arise out of a Central-European federation of States or out of a Franco-German war. England would have to abandon its diplomatic opposition to Germany's colonial policy as long as Germany does not strive to acquire Colonies at England's cost. England would have to agree not to oppose Austria's expansion in the Balkan Peninsula, nor to oppose Germany's economic policy in Asia Minor, nor the development of the German Navy and the acquisition of coaling stations.

"Whether such an understanding would take the form of an alliance is an open question. In reality it would for most purposes be equal to an Anglo-German alliance, and on the basis of such an understanding England and Germany could

peacefully settle their economic interests. Such an agreement of the two great Germanic States would create an irresistible political force which would promote the development of both nations in every way. It would create a factor for civilisation which would more than any other promote human progress. Thus a practical way would be found to banish war and the danger of war for ever, or at least to restrict its danger. Peace in Europe would be secured by England's approaching the Triple Alliance. At the same time a powerful counterpoise would be created to the growing influence of the United States. The pressure of East European Slavism would be diminished and a powerful wall would be raised against the millions of yellow men in the Far East.

"It would be seen that such an understanding between England and Germany would have the most far-reaching advantages not only to the two countries but to all mankind. However, it is clear that England would have to alter her entire policy. The basis of all negotiations should be the demand that England would abandon the Triple Entente and redistribute her fleet. After all, it is clear to every thinking man that England and Germany can never enter into friendly and cordial relations as long as Great Britain is allied with Germany's enemies. Besides, Germany could never have any confidence as to the honesty of England's peaceful intentions as long as the entire British Navy is concentrated in the North Sea and kept ready for an attack upon Germany."

General von Bernhardi evidently strives to secure for Germany not only supremacy in Europe but supremacy throughout the world. He wishes to conclude an Anglo-German alliance, but Germany is to be the predominant partner. Great Britain is to help Germany to become a world-Power, but in order to be on good terms with Germany she must disarm. She must redistribute her fleet and apparently leave the protection of her shores to Germany. According to General von Bernhardi a durable understanding between the two Powers can be concluded only if Great Britain consents to become Germany's vassal.

The Germans are frequently described as a peace-

ful nation. They would more correctly be described as a well-drilled and well-disciplined nation. They are firmly ruled by a small class through an all-powerful bureaucracy, army, and police. Absolute obedience to official orders is the first duty of the citizen and the first law of the State. The well-drilled Germans are a law-abiding people and their obedience is absolute. Orderly grumbling, if done in moderation, is permitted. Hence, if the people are dissatisfied with their rulers or disapprove of their policy, they may protest but they will obey. That was seen in 1866. Then the Prussians passionately protested against the "Bruderkrieg," the fratricidal war, against Austria. Yet they obeyed and fought. The Government has crushed the spirit of the people. This lack of spirit constitutes Germany's strength but also her weakness. German enthusiasts have always greatly admired democratic government, but, unlike Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch, they have never seriously fought for it. They were at best half-hearted supporters of revolution. The nation rose only, as in 1813 against Napoleon, when ordered by the Government. In Germany the Government does not carry out the will of the people but the people execute the will of the Government, and those who try to prove that Germany is peaceful because the German merchants, clergymen, and working-men do not wish for war, only show that they are unacquainted with Germany's political character and organisation and with the elementary facts of German history. The majority of Germans are undoubtedly peaceful, but that peaceful majority will go to war with alacrity as soon as the ruling minority gives the signal. There is a great difference between democratic and autocratic Germany, a difference which is

not sufficiently appreciated in other countries. Democratic Germany talks much but does not act; autocratic Germany acts but does not talk. Democratic Germany has filled the newspapers with loud complaints about the Zabern incident; autocratic Germany has not talked at Zabern but has acted, and the incident has closed with the victory of autocratic Germany. Herein lies the lesson of Zabern.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE GERMAN CUSTOMS OF WAR

Extracts from *Kriegsbrauch*—The Customs of War, the official handbook for the information of officers (published by the German General Staff, Berlin, 1902).

INTRODUCTION.—To conduct war with energy it must be made not only on the combatant forces of a hostile State and its fortresses. Equally strong endeavour must be made to destroy its entire intellectual and material resources. The claims of humanity, the sparing of human lives and of property, may be considered only in so far as the nature of war permits. Although the purpose of war allows a State which is at war to employ all means suitable for attaining its purpose, experience has taught us that it is in our own interest to limit the use of certain warlike measures and entirely to omit others. The spirit of chivalry and of Christian morality, the advance of Culture, and last but not least the recognition of one's own advantage, have led to a voluntary limitation in the means employed in time of war. . . .

In the course of the nineteenth century various attempts have been made to formulate and modify the existing customs of war, to lay down laws of war binding upon all nations and armies, in other words, to create an International Law of War—a *codex belli*. However, hitherto, a few points excepted, all these attempts have failed. If, nevertheless, the words "Rights of War" are used in the following pages, it must be remembered that we are not referring to a

lex scripta which is based upon international treaties, but only to a mutual, though not expressly covenanted, agreement of nations regulating warfare which is intended to set limits to arbitrary action, limits which have been established by custom, tradition, humanity, and calculating egoism, limits which are respected not because of the existence of some superior force controlling the action of States, but because of the "fear of reprisals." . . .

The modern customs of war are not merely founded upon the tradition of former ages and upon ancient military customs and views. They are the precipitate of the currents of modern thought. . . .

The study of the history of war will prevent officers forming views of exaggerated humanity. It will teach them that wars cannot be conducted without certain severities; that rightly considered true humanity lies often in their unsparing use. . . . To understand the Right of War we must study it not only from the point of view of the military historian, but we must acquaint ourselves with the fundamental views of modern International Law. This is the object of the present work.

IRREGULAR TROOPS—LEVÉE EN MASSE.—The prejudice against the use of irregular troops is founded on this, that the lack of a thorough military training and the absence of a severe discipline, easily induces them to perpetrate crimes and to disregard the customs of war. . . . According to International Law, no State is compelled to limit its military forces in case of war to its standing army. On the contrary, a State is perfectly justified to arm all the inhabitants able to bear arms, and to authorise them to take part in the war. Therefore, up to the most recent times, authorisation by the State has been the absolutely necessary

condition of recognising irregular troops as combatants.

The organisation of irregular troops in military formations, and their control by responsible officers, does not suffice to entitle them to be treated as combatants. More important than the foregoing condition is that by their outward appearance they can easily be recognised as soldiers, and that they carry their arms openly.

Guided by the view that one can never deny to the people their natural right of defending their country, and that smaller States, possessed of inferior power, can only protect themselves by arming the people—by a *levée en masse*—the majority of authorities on International Law have demanded, in making proposals for codifying the Laws of War, that they should, on principle, be recognised as combatants.

THE MEANS OF WARFARE.—*All means of warfare may be used without which the purpose of war cannot be achieved. On the other hand, every act of violence and destruction which is not demanded by the purpose of war must be condemned.*

Among the means of warfare which are not permissible are : The use of poison against individuals and against masses of the enemy, the poisoning of wells or of food and the spreading of infectious diseases; murder in every form; the use of arms or missiles which cause unnecessary suffering; the killing of incapacitated wounded men and of prisoners; the killing of soldiers who have laid down their arms and have surrendered themselves.

Closely connected with means of warfare which are not permissible is the employment of uncivilised and barbarian peoples in European war. Considered from the point of view of right, it is evident that no State

can be prohibited to employ troops taken from its non-European colonies. However, with the modern tendency to humanise warfare and to diminish the sufferings caused by war, the employment of soldiers who lack the knowledge of civilised warfare, and who consequently perpetrate cruelties and inhumanities prohibited by the customs of war, cannot be reconciled. The employment of such troops is as inadmissible as is the use of poison, murder, &c. The employment of African and Mohammedan Turcos by France in 1870 was undoubtedly a lapse from civilised into barbarous warfare, because these troops could have no understanding for European and Christian civilisation, for the necessity of protecting property, and of safeguarding the honour of men and women.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR.—No measures should be taken against prisoners of war beyond keeping them under guard. They should especially not be incarcerated as if they were to be punished. They should not be fettered, and their liberty should not be unnecessarily restricted unless special reasons justify such measures or compel their adoption. The housing of prisoners of war should take place in edifices which are as healthy, clean, and decent as possible. Prisoners of war should not be placed into prisons and other houses of punishment. . . . It is opposed to the Right of War that prisoners should be kept under conditions where they lack sufficient air and food, or be brutally treated, as has happened in the American Civil War in a prison of the South with regard to soldiers belonging to the North American States.

The food of prisoners of war must be sufficient and in accordance with their condition in life. . . . Prisoners of war retain their private property, arms, horses, and documents of military importance excepted.

Prisoners of war must be treated in accordance with the laws of the land in which they are kept, and in accordance with the prevailing regulations governing the treatment of the troops of the country. They must be treated like the soldiers of the State which retains them, neither worse nor better.

As regards the right of killing prisoners of war, the following opinions prevail. They may be killed—

(1) In case they commit crimes which, according to civil or military law, are punishable with death;

(2) In case of resistance or flight;

(3) As reprisals, either against the killing of prisoners by a hostile Power, or against other transgressions of a hostile army;

(4) In case of pressing necessity.

Many teachers of International Law maintain that the killing of prisoners, as a form of reprisal, is inadmissible for reasons of humanity. To assert that such action is not permissible under all circumstances would, according to Professor Lueder in his book *War Rights on Land*, be an erroneous conception of the importance, the seriousness and the right of war, flowing from an understandable but exaggerated and unjustified feeling of humanity. It must not be overlooked that also, as regards the killing of prisoners, the necessity of the war and the security of the State must be considered in the first place, but not the idea that prisoners have to be spared at any price.

In transporting prisoners, commanders and soldiers guarding them must do everything in their power to ease their lot as much as possible, especially if they are ill or wounded. In particular, they must be protected against insults and ill-treatment on the part of an excited populace.

SIEGES AND BOMBARDMENTS.—War is conducted not only against hostile combatants, but also against the inanimate means of war possessed by the enemy. Among the latter, hostile fortresses take the first place, but war may also be made upon every town and village which hampers military action. All inhabited places may be besieged, shelled, stormed and destroyed if they are defended by the enemy and under certain circumstances also when they are only occupied by him.

The prohibition to shell open towns and villages which are neither occupied nor defended by the enemy, has been formulated by the Hague Conference. However, that prohibition appears superfluous, as the modern history of war scarcely knows a case in which such shelling has taken place.

RUSES OF WAR.—The employment of ruses of war has been considered lawful since the most remote times. . . . However, certain ruses are not reconcilable with honest warfare, namely those which degenerate into perfidy, fraud, and the breach of the given word. . . . Among these are to be mentioned pretended surrender with the object of killing an unsuspecting opponent on his approach, the abuse of the white flag or of the Red Cross. . . . These crimes violate the most ancient principles of war. The natural sense of right possessed by all men, and the spirit of chivalry which lives in the armies of all civilised States, have branded such proceedings as crimes against humanity and against Right, and, guided by these sentiments, one refuses to recognise any longer as equals opponents which thus openly violate the laws of honour and justice. The views of military authorities with regard to these means of warfare differ in many points from those expressed by

reputed teachers of International Law. Thus, the use of the enemy's uniform, the use of the enemy's flags or of neutral flags in order to deceive, is declared admissible by the majority of those who expound the theory of legitimate warfare. On the other hand, the military writers (see Boguslawski, *Der Kleine Krieg*) have expressed themselves unanimously against their use, and the Hague Conference has supported their opinion by prohibiting the use of the enemy's uniform and flags, and placing their use into the same category as the abuse of the white flag and of the Red Cross.

Professor Lueder, in his *Handbuch der Völkerrechts*, writes: "The ugliness and immorality of such ruses cannot alter the fact that their recognition is admissible. The purpose and necessity of war entitle those who conduct it, and under certain circumstances make it even their duty, not to allow decisive advantages to escape them which can be obtained by the use of these ruses."

CUSTOMS OF WAR RELATING TO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF INHABITANTS.—While in past ages the laying waste of the enemy's country, the destruction of his property and even the enslaving of the inhabitants was considered a natural consequence flowing from a state of war, more recent times have introduced more lenient views. While formerly the opinion prevailed that the destruction of private property was "the principal means of warfare," and that the right to plunder private property was unlimited, to-day the opinion prevails universally that the inhabitants of a hostile country are no longer to be considered as enemies. . . . It follows that the citizens of an occupied country possess the *right*, that neither their life may be taken nor that their honour and liberty be diminished, that every case of unlawful

killing of the civil population, that every malicious or careless wounding, that every insult, every disturbance of the domestic peace, every attack upon the family, upon honour, and upon morality, in short, every unlawful or criminal attack and insult, is exactly as punishable as if it had been perpetrated against the inhabitants of one's own country. . . . On the other hand, the inhabitants of an enemy-country have naturally the duty to behave peacefully, not to take part in the war in any way, and not to harm in any manner the troops occupying their country.

The majority of writers are unanimous in condemning the forcing of the people to give information about their own army, the conduct of war, and about military secrets concerning their own country. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to do without such information. Force to obtain it will no doubt be used with regret, but the purpose of war will frequently make that step necessary.

PRIVATE PROPERTY IN TIME OF WAR.—As, in accordance with the views of International Law as to the right of war prevailing to-day, war is made not between private people but between States, it follows that all arbitrary devastation of the country, and every wilful destruction of private property, unless it is called for by the necessity of war, is opposed to International Law. . . . It follows :—

(1) All unnecessary devastation, destruction, arson, &c., in the enemy's country is prohibited, and soldiers guilty of such action will be punished as criminals according to law.

(2) All destruction and damage brought about for military reasons is permissible.

The following double rule prevails: *No damage, not even the smallest, must be done unless it is done for*

military reasons. On the other hand, the greatest damage may be inflicted if it is demanded by the conduct of war.

PLUNDERING AND LOOT.—According to modern views, the victor may appropriate, without any formalities, all movable property belonging to a hostile State. He may confiscate the monies deposited in national offices, but discrimination must be used, for the monies in communal offices are considered to be private property.

Some consider the taking of private property from a defeated combatant to be permissible. The conflict of opinions has, however, led to the rule that the taking of valuables, money, &c., from a defeated combatant is inadmissible, and that only the taking of his military outfit is permitted.

Plunder is the worst form of taking other people's property. It consists in robbing the citizens of the country by making use of the terror of war, in abusing the superior force possessed by the military. The worst feature of the crime of plunder lies in this, that the plunderer appropriates objects of value in the presence of the frightened owner, who cannot offer any resistance, and that he takes objects which are not required by his necessity, such as food and clothing. If objects are taken from uninhabited houses, or from houses from which the owner is absent, the crime is theft, but not plunder.

FORCED REQUISITIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS.—Contributions of war are sums of money which are levied by force from the people of an occupied country. They differ in character from requisitions in kind because they do not serve an immediate requirement of the army. Hence, requisitions in cash are only in the rarest cases justified by the necessities of war. Monetary requisitions have generated from the old

custom of ransom. In former times, the burning of towns was not undertaken against an agreed-upon payment in cash. Thus, ransom arose from the right to destroy and plunder private property. As modern International Law no longer recognises the right to destroy and plunder, and as the maxim that wars are made upon States and not upon private individuals is no longer in doubt, it follows logically that forced contributions in money are not permissible according to present-day views, because such contributions represent only an arbitrary enrichment of the victor. The victor is, in particular, not entitled to recover the cost of war by a tax upon private people, even in the event that he was forced into war by the action of the enemy. Therefore, the demand of contributions in cash is permissible only in lieu of taxation, in lieu of contributions in kind, or as a form of punishment.

THE CUSTOM OF WAR RELATING TO NEUTRAL STATES.—The fundamental demand which neutral States should satisfy is the equal treatment of the belligerents. It follows that a neutral State may assist both belligerents provided it gives equal assistance to either. However, as this is absolutely impossible, and as probably both parties would complain about greater favour shown to the other, experience has led to the establishment of the following principle: the basic condition of neutrality is that a neutral State gives no aid to either combatant.

The principal duties of neutral States are the following:—

1. The territory of a neutral State must not be used for the conduct of war by any of the belligerents. In the Franco-German War of 1870–71, the Prussian Government complained about Luxemburg's attitude, because that country did not prevent the flight of large

masses of French soldiers across Luxemburg territory after the fall of the fortress of Metz. The government of a neutral State must therefore, after a declaration of war, prohibit the troops of both belligerents to march through the country, and it must prevent the establishment of factories and workshops in its territory for providing either belligerent with warlike requirements. According to International Law, the organising of troops and the collecting of volunteers within the territory of neutral States is also prohibited.

2. If a neutral State borders upon territory upon which the war is fought, its government must place sufficiently strong military forces on the frontiers in order to prevent the crossing of the frontier on the part of the armies at war which may desire to march through, to rest after a battle, or to avoid capture. Every individual belonging to the fighting armies who crosses the border of a neutral State must be disarmed and restrained from rejoining the armies during the war. Organised bodies of soldiers which cross the frontier must be treated in the same manner. They are not prisoners of war, but must be prevented from re-entering the theatre of war. . . .

Neutral States have the following rights :—

1. A neutral State is entitled to remain at peace while its neighbours are at war.

2. The belligerent States must respect the integrity of the neutral territory. They must not interfere with the exercise of its governing power even if the necessity of war should demand violation of these rights. Consequently, neutral States possess the right of asylum for members of the armies at war as long as no favour is shown to either side. Even the reception of a large or small body of troops pursued by the hostile army, does not entitle the pursuer to con-

tinue the pursuit across the frontier of a neutral State. It is the duty of a neutral State to prevent troops which have crossed its border to reorganise themselves and to embark upon an attack across the neutral frontier.

3. If the territory of a neutral State is entered upon by one of the nations at war for the purpose of military action, the neutral State is entitled to oppose the violation of its territory by all means in its power, and to disarm the troops which have entered it. If entry upon neutral territory has been effected by order of the army commander, the State violating the neutrality is obliged to give full satisfaction and to pay for all the damage done. If such violation has been done without authorisation, the guilty parties are liable to prosecution at law. If the violation has taken place in consequence of ignorance as to the position of the frontier, and not intentionally, the neutral State can demand the immediate cessation of the wrong, and the taking of measures which will ensure that no repetition will occur.

CHAPTER XXXV

RULES OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION

EXTRACTS from the Regulations adopted at the Hague Conference of 1907, and subscribed to by Germany :—

Article 2.—"The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves . . . shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war."

Article 3.—"The armed forces of the belligerents may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have the right to be treated as prisoners of war."

Article 4.—"Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them. They must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property."

Article 22.—"Belligerents have not got an unlimited right as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy."

Article 23.—"It is particularly forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons; to kill or wound by treachery individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or no longer having means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; to declare that no

quarter will be given; to employ arms, projectiles, or materials calculated to cause unnecessary sufferings; to make an improper use of the flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as of the distinctive sign of the Geneva Convention; to destroy or seize enemy property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. . . . A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the subjects of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the service of the belligerent before the commencement of war."

Article 25.—"The attack or bombardment, by any means whatever, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden."

Article 27.—"In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate such buildings or places by distinctive or visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand."

Article 28.—"The giving over to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is forbidden."

Article 46.—"Family honour and rights, individual life, and private property, as well as religious convictions and worship, must be respected. Private property may not be confiscated."

Article 47.—"Pillage is expressly forbidden."

Article 50.—"No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on

account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible."

Extracts from the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers :—

Article 1.—"The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable."

Article 2.—"Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power."

Article 10.—"The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act."

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